AFRICA YEARBOOK 2025

Editors
Prof. Dr. İsmail Ermağan
Dr. Fatma Yıldız



YTB



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YTB
REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE MINISTRY
OF CULTURE AND TOURISM
PRESIDENCY FOR TURKS ABROAD
AND RELATED COMMUNITIES

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Table of Contents

Foreword, **6-7**

Introduction, **8-11**

Editors' Preface, **13-25**

Chapter One
Politics, Economy, Society and Environment
27-164

Chapter Two
Türkiye-Africa Relations
165-302

Chapter Three
Global and Regional Actors' Relations with Africa
303-404

Chapter Four
Culture, Art, Education and Sports
405-500

Publications Regarding Africa: 2025
501-520



FOREWORD

Türkiye's relations with Africa continue to deepen, building not only on strong human ties rooted in a shared history, but also on new areas of cooperation that respond to changing circumstances. With emerging opportunities and responsibilities in the wake of transformation across the continent, the scope of our engagement with African countries expands, while mutual interaction in the form of political consultations, economic relations, education, culture, development, and youth initiatives lays the groundwork for lasting and forward-looking relations. With a view that takes into account the development priorities of African countries, Türkiye continues to make constructive contributions to our shared efforts for the future of the continent.

In taking our relations with Africa forward, particular importance must be attached to harnessing the continent's demographic potential and developing a skilled human capital. While sharing its experience and know-how in education and culture with African countries, Türkiye supports young people's access to knowledge, education, and opportunities for professional development. In this regard, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) carries out various activities aimed at strengthening human ties between Türkiye and the peoples of Africa, alongside education and capacity-building initiatives for Africa's younger generations.

Africa Yearbook 2025, the fifth edition of the Africa Yearbook series first launched in 2021, emerges as a distinguished collection of work that contributes to a better understanding of the transformation Africa is undergoing and to reflections on the continent's future. Covering not only Africa's political, economic, and social agenda, but also issues such as security, energy, climate, education, culture, and technology that shape the continent's future, the volume, with its broad scope, also contributes to expanding the body of written knowledge on Africa.

I sincerely congratulate our academics, researchers, and valued colleagues from our national institutions who contributed to the preparation of this valuable book. I hope that *Africa Yearbook 2025* will help us gain a clearer understanding of Africa today and broaden our horizons as we look to its future. I hope this work will serve as a valuable reference for all those interested in and working on Africa, and I extend my gratitude to everyone who contributed to its preparation.

With the hope that it will contribute to many more endeavors in the service of Africa…

Mehmet Nuri ERSOY
Minister of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Türkiye



INTRODUCTION

Today, Africa occupies a major position in the global agenda, with its young population, economic potential, regional integration efforts, and growing weight in international affairs. Properly understanding the transformation taking place on the Continent requires understanding Africa not only through current developments, but also in conjunction with its own historical heritage, social dynamics, priorities, and aspirations for the future.

Türkiye's relationship with Africa is also informed by this understanding. The approach expressed by Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in his statement, "A fairer world is possible," sets forth a vision of a world in which African countries are more strongly represented in international affairs, the Continent's own priorities are taken into account, and relations develop on the basis of equal partnership. The multidimensional nature that Türkiye-Africa relations have reached today is likewise built on this understanding, with a focus on mutual respect, acting together, and a shared future.

One of the most enduring dimensions of this partnership is the bond created among people. Beyond political and economic relations, ties developed through education, academia, culture, and exchange of experience cement trust between Africa and Türkiye, while also laying the groundwork for a shared future.

African young people who have received education in Türkiye through various means, particularly the opportunities offered by our Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities under the Türkiye Scholarships program, today hold important positions in the public administration, diplomacy, academia, business community, and civil society of their countries. The more than 20,000 Türkiye Alumni from Africa constitute a strong human capital that not only strengthens existing ties but also shapes the future of relations. New areas of cooperation, ranging from education to technology and from

culture to entrepreneurship, are also expanding through the opportunities provided by this network.

Africa's growing weight in the international system and the increasingly diverse nature of Türkiye-Africa relations make the production of high-quality, in-depth knowledge about the Continent more important as well. Understanding Africa within its own dynamics, assessing developments from different perspectives, and contributing to knowledge building for African studies in Türkiye constitute an important part of this relationship.

The Africa Yearbook, published by our Presidency since 2021, is published to cater to that need. Prepared with contributions from eminent academics and researchers, the Yearbook addresses developments in Africa through different disciplines, while exploring through a wide lens the Continent's relations with the world and Türkiye. Published regularly for five years, the book reaches an international readership through its English edition, in addition to its contribution to the Turkish-language literature. Its publication in French for the first time this year will further expand the work's reach in Francophone Africa.

Africa's weight and international visibility in global affairs became even more pronounced in 2025. South Africa's assumption of the G20 Presidency and the Continent's hosting of the G20 Leaders' Summit for the first time were among the notable developments of the year.

The coming period also presents important opportunities to deepen the Türkiye-Africa partnership in new areas. The 4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit, scheduled to take place in Tripoli, the capital of Libya, at the end of 2026, will provide an important opportunity to assess the progress made to date and jointly consider new steps for the future of the partnership.

The Africa Yearbook 2025 addresses developments that took place in Africa throughout the year under the headings of politics, economy, society, environment, culture, education, and international relations. Consisting of 49 articles penned by academics, 15 articles by various Turkish institutions, and 7 book reviews, the Yearbook presents readers with a broad framework

covering the contemporary course of Africa-Türkiye relations, the policies of global and regional actors toward the Continent, the work of public institutions in Turkiye, and the year's major developments.

I would like to thank our editors, authors, institutions, and researchers who contributed to the preparation of this valuable work. I hope that the Africa Yearbook 2025 will enrich the academic body of knowledge on understanding Africa, contribute to new studies on Türkiye-Africa relations, and serve as a lasting reference for all readers interested in the subject, particularly researchers.

Abdulhadi TURUS
YTB President



EDITORS' PREFACE

Africa is gaining an increasingly prominent position on the global agenda due to its strong potential and multifaceted transformation dynamics. With its young population, strategic resources, growing markets, and diversifying diplomatic relations, it is becoming one of the geographies that will shape not only the present but also the future. In the current international environment, where global power balances are being reshaped and debates surrounding multipolarity are intensifying, the Continent's strategic importance is becoming increasingly visible.

An important dimension of this transformation is the efforts of African countries to strengthen their positions within the international system and expand their room for maneuver in line with their own priorities. While maintaining their historical ties, countries across the Continent are developing new areas of cooperation with different partners and centers of power and diversifying their foreign policy options. The strengthening role of regional organizations, particularly the African Union, is also supporting this process; thus, Africa is emerging as a more active actor in global politics, pursuing its own priorities and objectives.

The year 2025 was a period in which the different dimensions of this transformation became evident. Developments in areas such as economic transformation, energy, climate change, social change, education, regional integration, technology, and development, alongside political and security developments, demonstrated that Africa's agenda is becoming increasingly diverse. The *Africa Yearbook*, produced by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) and published for the fifth time this year, aims to closely follow this multidimensional agenda and assess developments in Africa and the Continent's relations with global and regional actors, particularly Türkiye, from a holistic perspective. The Yearbook hence aims to serve as a reference resource for academics, researchers, experts, and policymakers working on Africa, providing an opportunity to assess current developments collectively.

In this regard, the Yearbook covers a broad range of topics, extending from politics, security, and the economy to energy, climate, society, and regional integration, and from culture, education, and health to technology, digital transformation, development, and governance. The first chapter of the *Africa Yearbook 2025*, which consists of five sections, addresses political, economic, social, and environmental developments in Africa; the second section examines Türkiye-Africa relations; the third chapter explores the relations of global and regional actors with Africa; the fourth chapter covers developments in the fields of culture, arts, education, and digital transformation; and the fifth section examines works published on Africa in 2025.

Accordingly, the first chapter of the book assesses Africa's political, economic, security, and social landscape as of 2025 and comprises 19 articles prepared by experts in their respective fields. The topics addressed by the authors are as follows:

In their study titled "Elections in Africa in 2025," Burcu Taşkın and Brahim Mahamat Abakar examine the presidential and parliamentary elections held in Africa in 2025 from a comparative perspective. While the elections are evaluated in terms of preserving democratic norms, political participation, representation, legitimacy, and stability, regional differences are also analyzed. In particular, the challenges faced by African democracies in 2025 are discussed based on outcomes in countries with low voter turnout and varying levels of democracy.

In his study titled "Green Transformation and Climate Justice in East Africa in 2025: The NaBREP Programme in Nairobi and the Addis Ababa Corridor Project," Adnan Söylemez comparatively examines green urban transformation projects implemented in the capitals of East African countries, particularly Addis Ababa and Nairobi, in 2025. He analyzes how these policies, while increasing cities' resilience to climate change, may deepen processes of eco-gentrification that exclude vulnerable population groups. The study discusses the tension between the discourse of urban resilience and housing security, spatial inequality, and climate justice.

In his article titled "2025 Development Data in Africa: Key Indicators and a Statistical Overview," Ali Onur Tepeciklioğlu evaluates Africa's development performance as of 2025 through economic, demographic, and structural indicators. Moving beyond optimistic narratives of growth and emphases on structural vulnerabilities concerning the Continent, he compares long-term trends and Africa's position in the world.

In his article titled "Emerging Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025," Emre Saygın analyzes the economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025, examining both the opportunities arising from the region's natural resources, demographic structure, and strategic position and the vulnerabilities created by geopolitical risks, fluctuations in commodity prices, and global power competition. He also comparatively evaluates the differentiated economic landscapes of prominent countries based on data from international and regional organizations.

In his study titled "Africa's Pursuit of Justice in the International System on the 20th Anniversary of the Ezulwini Consensus," Mustafa Ateş examines the representational injustice faced by Africa in decision-making mechanisms within the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, despite the Continent's high level of representation within the United Nations. The study analyzes the contradiction between the Continent's significant contributions to peace operations and the international security agenda and its lack of permanent membership. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Ezulwini Consensus, it also highlights the reform demands of African countries and Türkiye's support within the framework of its "The World Is Bigger Than Five" discourse.

In his study titled "Energy Outlook in Africa in 2025," Gökhan Kahraman examines Africa's energy and mining landscape as of 2025 within the framework of rising energy demand, limited access to electricity, infrastructure deficiencies, and competition over natural resources. The study examines energy summits held across the Continent, prominent national policies, and initiatives undertaken by actors from outside the Continent in the energy sector. The article hence draws attention to Africa's growing importance in the global system in terms of energy security, development goals, and strategic minerals.

In Mehmet Cem Oğultürk's study titled "Security and Geopolitics in the Sahel in 2025," security and geopolitical developments in the Sahel region in 2025 are examined in terms of terrorism threats, political instability, and great power competition. The effects of the Alliance of Sahel States, formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, on the regional security architecture and institutional fragmentation in West Africa are analyzed. Military governments, the deepening humanitarian crisis, external actors, and Türkiye's position in the region are also evaluated.

In Belma Engin Güder's study titled "Civil War in Sudan in 2025: Military Dynamics, Humanitarian Crisis, and External Actors," the course of the civil war that began in Sudan in 2023 throughout 2025 is examined from military, humanitarian, and diplomatic perspectives. While the power struggles underlying the conflict, military balances, and social vulnerabilities are analyzed, the dimensions of the deepening humanitarian crisis are also examined. At the same time, attention is drawn to the impact of regional and international peace initiatives aimed at ending the war.

In her article titled "The G20 South Africa Summit: Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability," Fatma Yıldız examines the G20 Leaders' Summit held in South Africa in 2025 against the backdrop of the Continent's increasing role in global governance. At the summit, which was shaped around the theme of "Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability," South Africa's priorities, development goals, and the expectations of African countries are analyzed. The significance of the summit in terms of multilateralism, the United Nations system, and global governance, as well as the limitations it faced, are also evaluated.

In his study titled "Africa's Air Transport Liberalization Process: Developments," Abdullah Özbay examines the stage reached as of 2025 by the Yamoussoukro Decision and the Single African Air Transport Market, which aim to liberalize air transport in Africa. While regulatory progress aimed at strengthening intra-Continent connectivity, competition, and economic integration is examined, ongoing traffic rights issues, high ticket prices, and limited flight options in practice are also examined. Thus, the study evaluates the discrepancy between legal and institutional developments in air transport across the Continent and their implementation on the ground.

In Mehmet Öten's article titled "Meteorological Events Underlying the 2025 African Food Crisis," the effects of extreme climate events, such as heat waves and irregular precipitation, on agricultural production and food security in Africa during the 2024-2025 period are examined. The consequences of these climate extremes and the decline in production for food prices, acute hunger, social stability, and migration movements are analyzed. Thus, the study demonstrates that the climate crisis in Africa has become not only an environmental issue but also an economic and security-related problem.

In Levent Kırval's article titled "Defense Industry in Africa in 2025: Development, Dynamics, and Sustainability," the transformation of Africa's defense industry as of 2025 is examined within the framework of regional cooperation, technology adaptation, and local production. The study examines the Continent's efforts to move away from dependence on external defense procurement and analyzes the structural problems facing the sector and its relationships with global actors. It also puts forward possible policy recommendations for the future of Africa's defense industry.

In her article titled "Africa in Global Climate Governance: 2025 Energy Policies and Restorative Justice," Dilşad Taşkın Kuveloğlu focuses on how Africa's position in global climate governance changed in 2025 from a discourse of victimhood toward more active and assertive agency. The African Union's vision of restorative justice is analyzed within the framework of climate finance, technology transfer, and green industrialization goals. Attention is also drawn to the effects of the Africa Climate Summit, South Africa's G20 Presidency, and the COP30 process on the Continent's negotiating capacity and energy policies.

In her article titled "The Start-Up Ecosystem in Africa in 2025," Ceren Türkmen examines the transformation taking place in Africa's start-up ecosystem within the framework of local talent, global capital flows, financing, and digital infrastructure. Accordingly, emphasizing that African entrepreneurship ecosystems cannot be explained through a single model, the article evaluates the effects of local conditions, state capacity, and dependence on external funding on ecosystems in different African countries, including Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Namibia.

Erdinç Özdemir and Adem Özer's study titled "Israel's Recognition of Somaliland: Changing Security Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Implications for Türkiye" examines the effects of Israel's decision to recognize Somaliland on December 26, 2025, on the security architecture, regional stability, and great power competition in the Horn of Africa.

Examining the historical and political background of the Somaliland issue, the study analyzes the implications of this development for Somalia's territorial integrity and the African Union's principle of the inviolability of borders. It also draws attention to the new risks and policy options arising within the framework of Türkiye's diplomatic, military, and humanitarian presence in the region.

In their article titled "A New Route for International Trade: The Trans-African Highway Project (Latest Developments in 2025)," Nida Günsan and Haluk Yergin examine the strategic importance of the Trans-African Highway in terms of international trade, economic development, and regional integration. By examining the scope of the project and developments recorded in 2025, the article analyzes how infrastructure investments can strengthen trade flows and connectivity among African countries. It also evaluates the highway's potential to support the Continent's position in the global economy.

In his study titled "Türkiye-Africa Summit Diplomacy: Toward the 4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit," Baran Yağarcık examines the process through which Türkiye-Africa relations have become institutionalized and evolved into a strategic partnership through summit diplomacy. The effects of the Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summits held in 2008, 2014, and 2021 on political dialogue, trade, development, and security cooperation are examined. In addition, opportunities, risks, and key dynamics that could shape the future of relations ahead of the 4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit are outlined.

In his article titled "Defense Industry Exports from Türkiye to Africa in 2025," Güngör Şahin examines developments in Türkiye-Africa defense industry relations in 2025 from political, military, economic, and social perspectives. The article analyzes how the rise in Türkiye's defense exports intersects with security needs in Africa, expectations for technology transfer, and efforts to establish strategic partnerships. It also evaluates Türkiye's defense industry presence on the Continent within the framework of geopolitical power projection, geostrategic positioning, geoeconomic gains, and geo-cultural influence.

In his article titled "A New Era in the Türkiye-Somalia Energy Partnership: The Strategic Agenda for 2025," Tunç Demirtaş examines the transition of Türkiye-Somalia energy cooperation in 2025 from political agreements to field activities and long-term exploration plans. The study examines the maritime surveys conducted by the *Oruç Reis Seismic Research Vessel*, the expansion of cooperation to onshore fields, and preparations for identifying drilling targets. It also highlights the significance of this process in terms of Türkiye's international energy operations capacity and Somalia's objectives of identifying its natural resources, strengthening its sovereign capacity, and laying the groundwork for future investments.

The second chapter of the *Africa Yearbook 2025* focuses on institutionalized relations between Türkiye and African countries. This section, which contains a total of 15 articles, examines Türkiye's multidimensional cooperation across the Continent and evaluates the initiatives, engagements, and activities carried out throughout 2025.

The section authored by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) provides a comprehensive overview of its educational, academic, and cultural activities targeting Africa in 2025. It notes that African students were supported through educational programmes, particularly the Türkiye Scholarships programme, that ties established with Türkiye alumni were sustained through various activities, and that academic and cultural initiatives focusing on Africa were carried out. These efforts are considered to have

contributed to strengthening Africa's human capacity while also laying the groundwork for developing lasting bonds between Türkiye and African societies.

In the section authored by the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, Türkiye's relations with African countries in 2025 are addressed within the framework of equal partnership and a win-win approach. Türkiye's contributions in the areas of peace, security, stability, development, and capacity building are examined, while its activities shaped according to local needs in different regions of the Continent are evaluated. The key elements of Türkiye's multifaceted and active engagement pursued in line with its Africa Partnership Policy are also analyzed.

In the section authored by the *Ministry of National Defense*, the defense and security cooperation developed by the Ministry with African countries in 2025 is highlighted within the framework of equal partnership, mutual benefit, and the principle of "African solutions to Africa's problems." Türkiye's activities aimed at developing the military capacities of its security partners on the Continent, enhancing their counterterrorism capabilities, and supporting the professionalization of defense institutions are outlined. The contributions to Africa's peace, security, and stability through military training, doctrine sharing, and institutional capacity building are also evaluated.

In the section authored by the *Ministry of Trade*, policies aimed at developing Türkiye's trade and economic relations with African countries are addressed within the framework of activities carried out in 2025. Cooperation established through bilateral and multilateral engagements, Joint Economic Commission meetings, and the Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum is evaluated. The importance of updating the Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with Africa in terms of deepening partnerships based on mutual benefit is also highlighted.

In the section authored by the *Ministry of Industry and Technology*, the developing cooperation between Türkiye and African countries in the fields of industry and technology is described within the framework of sustainable development, mutual benefit, and long-term partnership. The section covers activities concerning organized industrial zones, technology development centers, scientific research, entrepreneurship, and quality infrastructure carried out under programs coordinated by the Ministry of Industry and Technology. The contributions of these partnerships to the production capacities, human resources, technology transfer, and innovation ecosystems of African countries are also analyzed in the text.

The article authored by the *Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources* examines the multidimensional cooperation developed by Türkiye with African countries in the fields of energy and natural resources. Activities carried out in the areas of hydrocarbon exploration and production, mining, electricity, renewable energy, infrastructure investments, and technical capacity building are examined on a country-by-country basis. The contributions of these partnerships to Türkiye's energy supply security and to African countries' goals of access to energy, development, and sustainable growth are also highlighted.

The article authored by the *General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration* (MTA) focuses on the developing cooperation between Türkiye and Niger in the field of mining and addresses this cooperation within the framework of energy security, access to critical minerals, and supply chain resilience. The diplomatic, economic, and institutional initiatives carried out alongside the technical activities of MTAIC and Niger Mining are examined, and the place of this structure within Türkiye's Africa policy is evaluated. The contributions of this cooperation to the development

of Niger's resource potential and to strengthening Türkiye's multidimensional presence in the Sahel region are also highlighted.

The article authored by the *Ministry of Health* examines the cooperation developed by Türkiye in the field of health within the framework of its Africa Partnership Policy. Activities carried out within the framework of access to health care, universal health coverage, and health diplomacy are examined, and the contribution of these initiatives to strengthening strategic partnerships with countries across the Continent is highlighted. Health projects and institutional partnerships implemented by Türkiye in different African countries are also analyzed.

The article authored by the *Directorate of Communications of the Presidency* examines Türkiye's strategic communications and public diplomacy activities for African countries as part of a multidimensional foreign policy approach. The work carried out by the Presidency's Directorate of Communications in 2025 to effectively communicate Türkiye-Africa relations to domestic and international public, establish sustainable communication networks with media actors in countries across the Continent, and strengthen mutual understanding is evaluated. The role of strategic communications, strengthening the Türkiye brand, and efforts to combat disinformation within Africa policy is also examined.

The section authored by *Anadolu Agency (AA)* discusses Anadolu Agency's activities in Africa in 2025 and notes that it produced news and documentary content covering a broad range of subjects, from political, economic, and social developments across the Continent to culture, nature, gastronomy, and human stories. In addition to AA's broadcasts addressing developments in Africa from different perspectives, this section also discusses its efforts to contribute to strengthening local media capacity through training activities for African journalists.

The section authored by the *Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA)* conveys how Türkiye's development cooperation vision was reflected on the ground in Africa in 2025 across numerous areas, including education, health, agriculture, the empowerment of women and youth, digital transformation, and clean energy. Through 23 program coordination offices across the Continent and approximately 7,000 projects implemented to date, sustainable solutions focused on production and employment and tailored to local needs have been developed; knowledge sharing, capacity building, and long-term development goals have been supported.

The section authored by the *Yunus Emre Institute (YEI)* focuses on cultural, artistic, and educational activities organized in different African countries in 2025. YEI hosted Sema performances, Hacivat-Karagöz shows, marbling and calligraphy workshops, and gastronomy events, reaching African children and young people. While the establishment of lasting cultural ties was supported through Turkish language instruction, online student gatherings, and social responsibility projects, mutual understanding and cooperation were fostered through art and education.

The section authored by the *Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)* discusses the multilingual broadcasts conducted by the institution in English, French, Hausa, and Swahili in 2025 under its "Afrika, as it is" vision. This section addresses TRT's efforts to convey Africa's political, cultural, and social developments to global audiences through news reports, documentaries, special interviews, and analyses, and draws attention to TRT Afrika's contribution to Africa's international visibility, with 13.8 million followers across its digital platforms.

The section authored by the *Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)* focuses on Türkiye's humanitarian diplomacy efforts in African countries affected by natural disasters, conflicts, and forced migration in 2025. In this

context, food, shelter, health, and emergency supplies were provided in Botswana, Burundi, South Sudan, Somaliland, and Sudan; these efforts were carried out in coordination with local authorities and international organizations. The shipment of 30,000 tents and emergency relief operations in Sudan constituted one of Türkiye's most comprehensive humanitarian assistance operations in Africa.

The third chapter of the *Africa Yearbook 2025* examines the diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural relations between Africa and global and regional actors in 2025. This section, which addresses the foreign relations of African countries, contains 16 articles written by country and regional experts who have lived in the respective countries for many years, possess extensive knowledge of their languages, cultures, histories, and social structures, and have field experience.

In his article titled "Relations between the Turkic World and Africa in 2025," Fevzi Kırbaşoğlu examines the collective and institutional presence of the member states of the Organization of Turkic States in Africa as of 2025. The relations developed between the Turkic World and the Continent are analyzed within in terms of defense diplomacy, logistics corridors, energy security, investment instruments, and soft power elements. The significance of this multilayered cooperation model for Africa's security architecture and regional partnerships is also evaluated.

In his article titled "China-Africa Relations in 2025," Yavuz Çelik examines the transformation of China-Africa relations in 2025 in terms of trade, investment, financing, and institutional cooperation. Focusing particularly on the way the decisions adopted at the 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit were implemented, the article analyzes trends of continuity and rebalancing in the relationship. It also notes that African countries have become active and strategic actors in shaping their relations with China in line with their priorities in infrastructure, industrialization, and development.

In his article titled "India-Africa Relations in 2025," Emre Yürük examines the transition of India-Africa relations in 2025 from a foundation of historical solidarity toward a more multidimensional, institutionalized, and strategic partnership model. Assessing India's Africa policy in alignment with Continental initiatives such as AfCFTA and Agenda 2063, the study examines cooperation in the areas of trade, maritime security, energy, agriculture, health, infrastructure, and digitalization. It also draws attention to India's growing political visibility and prestige on the Continent through high-level diplomatic visits.

In their study titled "Japan-Africa Relations in 2025," Gökberk Durmaz and Acar Boray Bıldırcın examine Japan's Africa policy within the framework of economic cooperation, development assistance, security, and geopolitical objectives. While examining the historical development and key parameters of Japan's Africa diplomacy, the study analyzes the significance of the 9th TICAD Summit held in 2025 for bilateral relations. It also evaluates Africa's place in Japan's vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Tokyo's position amid great power competition on the Continent.

In her study titled "South Korea-Africa Relations in 2025," Ezgi Kılıçarslan Gül examines the transformation of Africa-South Korea relations in 2025 into a technology-focused partnership model based on mutual interdependence and aligned with the Continent's development priorities. The alignment between South Korea's Global Pivotal State strategy and the African Union's Agenda 2063 vision is analyzed through diplomatic, economic, and technological cooperation. The significance of this partnership for Africa's industrial transformation, digital sovereignty, and position in global value chains is also highlighted.

In his article titled "Russia-Africa Relations in 2025," Burak Kolot evaluates the transformation of Russia-Africa relations in 2025 along the lines of institutional consolidation, strategic selectivity, and deepening rather than expansion. Analyzing Russia's Africa policy within the framework of the discourse on multipolarity, systemic tensions with the West, and its orientation toward the Global South, the study examines relations developed in the areas of security, diplomacy, and strategic sectors. It also emphasizes that Moscow's presence on the Continent has been shaped less by hegemonic expansion than by a model based on low-cost and selective engagement.

In his study titled "Indonesia-Africa Relations in 2025," Kamil Tarhan examines the transition of Indonesia-Africa relations from the historical Bandung Spirit toward a foundation of strategic and economic partnership. Indonesia's BRICS membership, its position in the Global South, and the cooperation it has developed with African countries in the areas of trade, critical minerals, defense industry, health, education, and diplomacy are analyzed. The place of Jakarta's Africa policy within the Golden Indonesia 2045 vision and the development potential of its domestic industrialization model for African countries are also evaluated.

In his study titled "BRICS-Africa Relations in 2025," Yücel Bulut examines the expansion process of BRICS in 2025 and the increasing role of African countries within this framework. Through the membership of Egypt and Ethiopia and the partner-country status of Nigeria and Uganda, the study addresses Africa's pursuit of South-South cooperation, fair representation in global governance, and economic development. It also points to the significance of sustainability, humanitarian crises, and debates over a multipolar world order on the 2025 BRICS agenda for African countries.

Segah Tekin's study, titled "Brazil-Africa Relations in 2025," examines Brazil's Africa policy in 2025 within the framework of historical and demographic ties, South-South cooperation, and Atlantic geopolitics. The revitalized Opening to Africa following Lula da Silva's return to office is analyzed through the relationships developed with North African countries, Portuguese-speaking African states, and Brazil's other regional partners. The study also evaluates Brazil's efforts to restore its diplomatic and economic influence on the Continent.

In his article titled "France-Africa Relations in 2025," Halil Kaya examines the transformation of France's historical influence in Africa as of 2025 within the framework of the colonial legacy, the *Françafrique* system, and rising demands for sovereignty. Particular attention is paid to France's loss of its privileged position in the region, especially the decline of its military presence in West Africa and the Sahel, as well as the growing influence of new actors such as Russia in the region. The study also evaluates the possibility that Paris may move away from being a decisive power in Africa toward a more limited and competitive partnership model.

In his article titled "Germany-Africa Relations in 2025," Ahmet Bülbül examines Germany-Africa relations against the backdrop of continuing effects of the colonial past and changing geoeconomic and strategic priorities. He analyzes Germany's discourse of equal partnership, sustainable development, and normative responsibility in the context of historical legacy, multilateralism, and an approach based on limited engagement. The study also emphasizes how, as of 2025, the energy transition, migration management, global competition, and supply chain security have reshaped Berlin's Africa policy.

In their article titled "United Kingdom-Africa Relations in 2025," Mehmet Ali Mert and Gökhan Sırmalı examine the restructuring that emerged in the United Kingdom's Africa policy as of 2025 within the context of the historical

legacy, post-Brexit foreign policy pursuits, and the Continent's growing global visibility. While relations in the areas of security, economy, health, migration, and public diplomacy are examined, the fundamental elements of the new approach based on consultation and co-production are emphasized. The opportunities created by the African Union's growing role in global governance for United Kingdom-Africa relations are also highlighted.

In his article titled "Italy-Africa Relations in 2025," Raşit Yenigün examines the qualitative transformation in Italy-Africa relations in 2025 in areas of energy security, migration, trade, and supply chains. The article draws attention to Italy's efforts to move away from its traditional approach of assessing Africa solely through the lens of security problems and to position the Continent as a strategic and economic partner. It also evaluates the new cooperation model developed by the Mattei Plan, which entered the implementation phase, on the basis of mutual benefit and equal partnership.

Meysune Yaşar's study, titled "United States of America-Africa Relations in 2025," examines U.S. Africa policy in 2025 along the axes of geopolitical competition, economic cooperation, and security policies. It also analyzes the elements of continuity and change in U.S. policy toward Africa, regional crises, and the intensifying global power competition, particularly due to China's growing influence on the Continent.

In his study titled "Relations between the Gulf Countries and Africa in 2025," Hamdullah Baycar examines the ways in which the relationship between Gulf countries and Africa evolved in 2025 across economic, diplomatic, political, and security dimensions. In addition to investments in energy, logistics, and infrastructure, the article examines the Gulf countries' involvement in conflicts, mediation efforts, and pursuit of regional influence, drawing on Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as case studies. The study also draws attention to how the presence of the Gulf countries in Africa has deepened along the axes of competition and diplomacy.

In her article titled "Israel-Africa Relations in 2025," Sevinç Ebru Temel examines Israel's Africa policy as of 2025 across diplomatic, economic, military, and technological dimensions. The growing diplomatic importance of African countries on multilateral platforms following the Gaza War is evaluated together with cooperation in the areas of security, defense industry, agricultural technologies, water management, and cybersecurity. The study also analyzes the possibilities and limitations of Israel's efforts to seek influence in the face of the growing presence of China, Türkiye, the Gulf countries, and Russia on the Continent.

The fourth chapter of *Africa Yearbook 2025* contains 14 articles addressing developments in the fields of culture, education, arts, language, sports, and digital transformation in Africa in 2025 that are likely to attract public interest. The studies included in this section reveal the dynamics of social transformation in Africa across various areas, such as the preservation of cultural heritage, digital education, creative industries, cultural diplomacy, and soft power practices.

In her article titled "A Tangible Demonstration of Culture-Based Communication in Türkiye-Africa Relations: African Culture House," Zeliha Sağlam examines the reflections of cultural communication in Türkiye-Africa relations on the ground through the example of the Africa Cultural House. The study argues that the African Culture House brings together elements of cultural, public, and humanitarian diplomacy, thereby giving Türkiye's vision for Africa a concrete form at the societal level. It is argued that the African Culture House builds long-term trust, mutual understanding, and cultural affinity through discourse, spatial practices, and forms of interaction and, in this respect, offers a sustainable and distinctive model of cultural diplomacy.

In their article titled "Cultural Festivals and Events in Africa in 2025," Rukiye Nur Akyazıcı and Habeeb Emiola emphasize the renewed proliferation of events focused on Africa's cultural and historical heritage, social identity, and cultural diversity. The authors state that various festivals and events serving this perspective emerge as strategic tools that strengthen social solidarity, cultural transmission, and Africa's visibility on a global scale. According to the study, 2025 marked an important turning point in Africa's process of cultural revitalization and expressing its own identity at the global level.

Duygu İlkhan Söylemez's article, titled "Museology in North Africa in 2025: The Grand Egyptian Museum and the National Museum of Libya," states that the opening of the titular museums in 2025 brought significant innovation to museology in North Africa, both in terms of scale and quality. The Grand Egyptian Museum and the National Museum of Libya represented a significant transformation in North African museology in terms of architecture, conservation, and cultural heritage management. Both projects demonstrated that archaeological artifacts can be preserved and exhibited in accordance with international standards, while also serving as models for future museological practices in Africa.

In her study titled "The Repatriation of Historical Artifacts to African Museums in 2025," Esin Güzel argues that 2025 marked an important diplomatic, legal, and institutional turning point in the repatriation of cultural assets belonging to Africa. In this context, repatriation processes have gone beyond the return of physical artifacts to reshape debates over ownership, representation, and cultural sovereignty. At the same time, despite UNESCO's growing role, legal limitations and the approach adopted by some European museums of lending rather than permanently returning artifacts remain major obstacles to the process.

In his study titled "Cultural Heritage Rivalry in North Africa: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, and the 2025 Crisis," Burak Yetimoğlu examines the competition between Morocco and Algeria over cultural heritage. In particular, disputes surrounding cultural elements such as the kaftan and *zellige* have led to the use of international mechanisms such as UNESCO and trademark registration as instruments of sovereignty and nation branding. The study demonstrates that this cultural competition in North Africa is connected to historical tensions, the Western Sahara issue, and struggles for regional leadership. At the same time, it states that shared cultural heritage should be regarded not as a source of competition but as an element that strengthens regional cooperation and Maghrebi identity.

Mehmet Babacan's article, titled "Continental-Scale Digital Transformation in Education and Information Technologies in Africa in 2025," states that Africa made significant advances in 2025 in areas such as artificial intelligence, digital technologies, the Internet of Things, smart cities, and cybersecurity, which were identified as important priorities. According to the study, Africa's digital ecosystem was strengthened by promoting technology fairs and international cooperation at both the national and continental levels, while platforms were established to draw global investors towards technology initiatives.

Sena Birinci's article, titled "The Global Rise of African Pop Music in 2025: Afrobeats," argues that Afrobeats attained an influential position in the global music industry, particularly in 2025, bolstered by digital platforms, international collaborations, and institutional developments. The article argues that the genre has assumed a significant role in increasing the visibility of African-origin identities, strengthening cultural representation, and redefining Africa's place within the global cultural system.

In her study titled "The Multilayered Position of Swahili in Africa in 2025," Sevgi Çalışır Zenci states that Swahili has gained ground both in Africa and across the world. UNESCO's recognition of Swahili as one of its official working languages, as well as the growing use of Swahili in artificial intelligence, natural language processing, and digital education platforms, has made significant contributions to the development of the language. The study argues that Swahili has become not only a language of communication but also a strategic element supporting political, cultural, and economic integration in Africa.

In her article titled "Military Turkish Language Education in Africa in Light of Developments in 2025," Elif Ermağan focuses on a new area emerging from Türkiye's increasingly diverse relations in Africa. According to the study, while the Turkish language facilitates communication in military training processes, it also enhances cultural interaction and lays the social groundwork of sustainable partnerships. Despite persisting structural challenges such as the diversity of instructors, materials, and programs, increasing institutionalization and innovative educational methods indicate that development in this field will continue. In this respect, military Turkish language education stands out as one of the enduring elements of Türkiye's long-term international cooperation strategy toward Africa.

Ahmet Göksel Uluer's article, titled "AFCON 2025 and Morocco's Regional and Global Strategy of Positioning Through Sports," examines the tournament as a soft power instrument that not only enhances the country's international prestige but also develops its tourism, economic cooperation, and diplomatic influence. In addition to increasing Morocco's continental and international visibility, AFCON 2025 represented a strategic intermediate step supporting the country's objectives of deepening its relations with the European Union and strengthening its claim to leadership in Africa.

In her chapter titled "The Sociological Dynamics of Digital Transformation in Education in Kenya: 2025 Developments," Ani Tarugishvili focuses on digital transformation in education as one of the highly critical developments in Africa. The study identifies various advances in digital education infrastructure and governance in Kenya, along with different obstacles such as the urban-rural divide, income disparities, and gender inequalities. Digital education is characterized not merely as a technological development but as a process in which social inequalities become visible and efforts to seek solutions gain importance.

In his study titled "2025 Continental Education Reforms in Africa: From Colonial Legacy to National Curricula," Yusuf Dinçel argues that comprehensive reforms aimed at transforming the educational approach inherited from the colonial period and developing local and national curricula gained momentum in Africa. In this context, the Second African Union Continental Education Strategy (2025-2034) and the Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa, published in 2025, aimed to restructure education systems in accordance with the needs of the Continent. It is anticipated that these significant initiatives will have a major impact on Africa's future.

Buse Erhalim Gümüş and Suad Jama Aidiid's article titled "Somalia in 2025: The Rising Star of the Art Ecosystem in Africa" analyzes the case of Somalia across themes of identity, collective memory, environmental crises, and digital transformation that stood out at biennials, exhibitions, and art fairs held across Africa in 2025. The study observes the emergence of an interconnected cultural ecosystem in the fields of literature, visual arts, music, film, and performance in different parts of the country, particularly Mogadishu. The article hence demonstrates that Somalia's reputation is now moving beyond security challenges alone, as the country gains recognition in a process of cultural reconstruction and creative production.

In his section titled "Success Stories of Türkiye Alumni from Africa in 2025," Tuğrul Oğuzhan Yılmaz points out that Türkiye Alumni from Africa have made substantive contributions to promoting relations between Türkiye and African countries while also playing an active role in the development processes of their own countries. Examples such as Zanzibar President Hussein Ali Mwinyi and Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, who has held various ministerial positions in Somalia, demonstrate the political and social impact of education received in Türkiye in Africa. Examples in the article demonstrate that African students educated in Türkiye have assumed major positions in diplomacy, healthcare, engineering, and public administration after returning to their home countries.

The fifth chapter of *Africa Yearbook 2025* features reviews of books published in Türkiye that contribute to the literature on Africa. The section includes seven reviews covering various topics such as politics, diplomacy, non-state actors, civil society, economic relations, regional outreach, and Türkiye-Africa relations. Overall, these works reflect contemporary political interactions, new diplomatic dynamics, and the impact of the colonial legacy in Africa.

İpek Merve Hazal Aydın reviews the book titled "Civil Society in Africa: Possibilities and Constraints," edited by Filiz Cicioğlu and Hatice Rumeysa Dursun. This work presents a comprehensive examination of the historical development, contemporary structure, and social role of civil society in Africa against the backdrop of postcolonial evolution and political, economic, and institutional dynamics. With an interdisciplinary methodology and broad historical perspective, the study demonstrates the importance of civil society in democratization, development, and governance processes in Africa.

Muhammet Albayrak reviews Kaan Devecioğlu's book titled "U.S.-China Competition in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait." The work examines the global power struggle between the United States and China along the axes of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Yemen Crisis, and the Horn of Africa, addressing its geopolitical, economic, and security dimensions. Analyses based on Power Transition Theory comprehensively explain the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb in global power balances and the impact of regional crises on international competition.

Hasan Sekman reviews Mürsel Bayram's edited volume titled "Politics and Diplomacy in West Africa." This study presents a comparative analysis of the historical, political, diplomatic, and social structures of 15 countries in West Africa. The study examines the impact of the colonial legacy, security challenges, foreign policy orientations, and global power competition in the region within a historical context, while also exploring the development of Türkiye's multifaceted relations with West Africa.

Aras Fırat Tekeş reviews Mürsel Bayram's edited volume titled "Politics and Diplomacy in Central Africa: An Analysis of Causality, Method, and Source Problems in Area Studies." The work addresses the political and diplomatic evolution in Central Africa from the precolonial period to the present through a multidisciplinary and field-oriented approach, within the framework of internal dynamics and global power competition. Filling an important academic gap in Türkiye concerning Central Africa, the book is considered likely to contribute to the empirical and theoretical development of African studies.

Musa Demirdağ reviews the work titled "Yearbook of Non-State Actors in Africa 2025: Analysis of Security and Political Dynamics," edited by Kemal İnat and Talha İsmail Duman. Rather than confining non-state actors in Africa to terrorist organizations, the book explains political, social, ethnic, and paramilitary structures within the framework of historical and structural dynamics. Combining a theoretical framework with field-based analyses, the

study emphasizes the role of weakening state authority, the colonial legacy, and governance crises in the emergence of these actors and addresses security challenges together with their political and economic dimensions.

Erkan Şahin reviews Deniz İstikbal's work titled "China's Africa Strategy: Investment, Dependency, and Competition." This book analyzes China's economic investments, diplomatic influence, and grand strategy in Africa from an international relations perspective. Examining China's Africa policy through the examples of Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya; the book also explains China-Africa relations in the context of the global U.S.-China competition.

Abdullatif Hüseyin Mazı reviews the edited volume by Tunç Demirtaş titled "Türkiye-Africa Relations: From Policy to Practice." This study examines, through country cases, how Türkiye's Africa policy has evolved into a multidimensional partnership model institutionalized in areas such as diplomacy, security, energy, trade, and cultural diplomacy. The study, which comprehensively demonstrates Türkiye's growing influence on the Continent, has been strengthened by contributions from African academics.

In conclusion, *Africa Yearbook 2025*, published by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities in its fifth edition this year, emerges as a comprehensive work addressing the 2025 developments across the Continent from different perspectives. The original studies and book reviews included in the Yearbook offer a broad perspective extending from Africa's politics to its economy, from security to social life, from Türkiye-Africa relations to the presence of global actors on the Continent, and from culture to education and digital transformation. In this respect, the Yearbook aims to serve as an up-to-date and high-quality reference book not only for academics and researchers studying Africa but also for policymakers, experts, students, and anyone interested in the Continent.

We hope that the Yearbook, which aims with each issue to improve the scope and quality of knowledge production on Africa, will contribute to a better understanding of the Continent's changing dynamics and to enriching academic and intellectual work on Türkiye-Africa relations. It is our greatest wish that it will contribute to the emergence of further research, diverse perspectives, and joint studies on Africa's future, shaped by its own priorities and efforts to find solutions.

We extend our gratitude to all our authors who contributed to the preparation of this work and to all institutions and organizations that provided their support. We would like to thank all our colleagues who contributed to bringing this work to fruition, particularly YTB, as well as those who have provided their valuable support to African studies.

We dedicate *Africa Yearbook 2025* to all our friends who believe in Africa's richness, dynamism, and future and who contribute to further strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation between the Continent and Türkiye.

Sincerely,

Prof. Dr. İsmail Ermağan
Dr. Fatma Yıldız



Chapter One

Politics, Economy, Society and Environment

1 Elections in Africa in 2025 **29-38**
Burcu Taşkın | Brahim Mahamat Abakar

2 Green Transformation and Climate Justice in East Africa in 2025: The NaBREP Programme in Nairobi and the Addis Ababa Corridor Project **39-44**
Adnan Söylemez

3 2025 Development Data In Africa: Key Indicators And A Statistical Overview **45-54**
Ali Onur Tepeciklioğlu

4 Emerging Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025 **55-60**
Emre Saygın

5 Africa's Pursuit of Justice in the International System on the 20th Anniversary of the Ezulwini Consensus **61-68**
Mustafa Ateş

6 Energy Outlook in Africa in 2025 **69-74**
Gökhan Kahraman

7 Security and Geopolitics in the Sahel in 2025 **75-80**
M. Cem Oğultürk

8 Civil War in Sudan in 2025: Military Dynamics, Humanitarian Crisis, and External Actors **81-88**
Belma Engin Güder

9 G20 South Africa Summit: Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability **89-96**
Fatma Yıldız

10 Africa's Air Transport Liberalization Process: Developments in 2025 **97-102**
Abdullah Özbay

11 Meteorological Events in Africa in 2025 and Their Impact in the Food Crisis **103-108**
Mehmet Öten

12 Defense Industry in Africa in 2025: Developments, Dynamics and Sustainability **109-116**
Levent Kırval

13 Africa in Global Climate Governance: 2025 Energy Policies and Restorative Justice **117-124**
Dilşad Taşkın Kuveloğlu

14 The Start-Up Ecosystem in Africa in 2025 **125-130**
N. Ceren Türkmen


15 Israel's Recognition of Somaliland: Changing Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Implications for Türkiye **131-136**
Erdinç Özdemir | Adem Özer

16 2025 Developments in the Trans-African Highway Project **137-142**
Nida Günsan | Haluk Yergin

17 Türkiye-Africa Summit Diplomacy: Towards the 4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit **143-150**
Baran Yağarcık

18 Defense Industry Exports from Türkiye to Africa in 2025 **151-156**
Güngör Şahin

19 A New Era in the Türkiye-Somalia Energy Partnership: The Strategic Agenda for 2025 **157-164**
Tunç Demirtaş



1 Elections in Africa in 2025

Burcu Taşkın* | Brahim Mahamat Abakar**

1. Introduction

Following the "year of elections" in 2024, during which heads of state were elected in 19 African countries, the 2025 electoral calendar appeared comparatively calmer. At a time when the four fundamental pillars of democracy, i.e. representation, civil rights, the rule of law, and political participation were under pressure globally, African countries accounted for the largest share of the worldwide democratic decline, at 33 percent.[1] Consequently, after a year marked by coups and protests in 2024, these elections became, in effect, a test of the continent's ability to sustain democratic norms. Throughout 2025, numerous presidential, parliamentary, senate, and local elections were held across the continent. A selection of these has been chosen for the present comparative electoral analysis. In all presidential-system countries except Gabon, presidential and parliamentary elections were held on the same day (See Table 1).[2] The fact that, with the exception of Egypt and Malawi, these elections took place predominantly in West Africa, where the continent's democratic performance is relatively strong, and in Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region, which rank among the most fragile regions in terms of democratic governance, provides noteworthy case studies that allow the phenomenon to be examined across different political contexts. The low voter turnout observed in parliamentary elections across the continent further indicates that 2025 was a challenging year for democracy, political legitimacy, and stability in Africa.

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1 The Global State of Democracy 2025: Democracy on the Move.

https://www.kisa.link/MybIe , Access Date: 17.02.2026.

2 Because some parliamentary elections extended over a prolonged period, some involved electoral irregularities and repeat voting, and several employed complex electoral systems (including two-round majority systems), the table presents only the number of seats won by each political party for these elections.

Country	Election Type	Date	Election Results	Voter Turnout
Gabon	**1. Presidential** **2. Parliamentary** (145 seats)	April 12 September 27- October 11	Brice Oligui Nguema (UDB): **94.9 %** Alain Claude Bilie-By-Nze (EPG): 3% UDB: 101 PDG: 17 Independents:8 Other: 16	70.7% 28.7%
Togo*	**Presidential**	May 3	Jean-Lucien Savi de Tové	Directly elected by the parliament
Burundi	**Parliamentary** (111 seats)	June 5	President Nyangoma's **National Council for the Defense of Democracy** (CNDD-FDD): **18 (100 +8)** **Twas** (Quota, 3 seats)	98.88%
Malawi	**1 .Presidential** **2. Parliamentary** (229 seats)	September 16	Peter Mutharika (DPP) **%6.8%** Lazarus Chakwera (MCP) %33% DPP: 77 MCP: 53 UTM and other parties: 31 Independents: 71	76.4%
Seychelles	**1.Presidential** **2. Parliamentary** (34 seats)	September27	**1st round** **2nd round** Patrick Herminie: 48.8% **52.7%** Wavel Ramkalawan: 46.4% 47.3% (governing party, LSD) BİZ (United Seychelles): 19 (15+4) LDS (ruling coalition): 15 (11+4)	77%
Cameroon	**Presidential**	October12	Paul Biya: %53.7 Issa Tchiroma Bakary: %35.2	57.7%
Côte d'Ivoire	**1. Presidential** **2. Parliamentary** (255 seats)	October 25 December 27	Alassane Ouattara (RHDP): **91.2%** Jean-Louis Billon: 3.2% RHDP: 197 PDCI-RDA: 32 Independents: 23 Other: 3	50% 35%
Tanzania	**1.Presidential** **2. Parliamentary** (377 seats , of which 272 directly elected, 115 female MP quota)	October 29	Samia Suluhu Hassan (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM): **97.7%** Mwalim Salum Juma (Chaumma): 1% CCM: 270 + 113 ACT-Wazalendo: 2+0 CHAUMMA: 0+2	82% 37.7%
Egypt	**Parliamentary** (568 seats + 28)	November 1- January 4, 2026	Nation's Future (Mostaqbal Watan): 227 Pro-government block: **403** Opposition: 158; Independents: 103	32.4%
Guinea-Bissau	**Presidential**	November 23	*** Both the incumbent President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and his challenger, Fernando Dias, claimed victory in the election. Before the official election results were announced, a military coup took place, and a transitional government was established.	65%
Central African Republic	**1.Presidential** **2. Parliamentary** (140 seats)	December28	Faustin-Archange Touadéra (MCU): **76.2%** Anicet-Georges Dologuélé: (URCA): 14.7% **** No official nationwide vote percentages were published for the parliamentary elections, however: MCU (Touadéra): majority MLPC and others: limited	52.4%
Guinea	**Presidential**	December 28	Mamady Doumbouya: **86.7%** Abdoulaye Yero Baldé: 6.6%	82.9%

Table 1. Elections and Election Results in Africa in 2025

Source: Table created by the authors.

For voter turnout see: https://www.idea.int/ ; For election results see: IPU PARLINE, https://data.ipu.org/ ; For level of democracy see: https://freedomhouse.org/

N.B.: Egypt and Côte d'Ivoire operate under semi-presidential systems, whereas the other countries employ presidential systems. With the exception of Egypt and Malawi, all have dominant-party systems.

* Since Togo transitioned to a parliamentary system following the 2024 constitutional referendum, its president is no longer elected by popular vote.



President-elect Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, swore into office on May 3, 2025.
(Source: Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema's X account)

2. Elections in Gabon

The 2023 military coup, which marked a watershed moment in Gabon's political history, not only brought about a change in government but also brought an end to the Bongo dynasty, which had ruled the country for decades.[3] Led by Brice Oligui Nguema, the intervention can be interpreted both as a consequence of internal power struggles and as a reflection of growing

3 Aljazeera, "Gabon's first election after collapse of Bongo dynasty: What's at stake?"
https://www.kisa.link/xYPKd Access Date: 04.02.2026.



Cameroon's President Paul Biya addressed the parliament after being elected president for the eighth time. (Source: Paul Biya's X account)

public dissatisfaction with the regime. Following a two-year transitional period, the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2025 represented a significant step in the country's transition to civilian rule. Nevertheless, the overwhelming electoral victory secured by Nguema and his party, together with the consolidation of personalized rule through constitutional amendments and practices that constrained the opposition's capacity to compete politically, raises serious doubts about the democratic character of the elections and the country's progress towards democratization.

3. Elections in Cameroon

According to the results of the presidential election held on October 12 in Cameroon, Paul Biya, who has remained in power since 1982, was re-elected for an eighth term after securing approximately 53.7 per cent of the vote. The constitutional amendment adopted in 2008, which abolished presidential term limits, institutionally consolidated Biya's political dominance and enabled him to maintain his long-standing rule. During the electoral process, one of the leading opposition candidates, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, who was also supported by Biya's daughter, declared victory on election night and challenged the official results. This development intensified concerns regarding the credibility and transparency of the electoral process, while protests organized by Tchiroma's supporters escalated into violent incidents and clashes with security forces in several parts of the country. Within this framework, it can be argued that these elections, which left intact the political order that has prevailed in Cameroon for more than four decades, exhibited significant shortcomings in terms of transparency, political competition, and fundamental freedoms. Indeed, restrictions on media freedom and the rights to freedom

of assembly and demonstration, the opposition's appeals to both domestic and international audiences challenging the fairness of the election results, and the political tensions that intensified in the aftermath of the elections are all likely to further deepen debates over the democratic legitimacy of Biya's government in the period ahead.

4. Elections in the Central African Republic

In the Central African Republic, the main opposition coalition boycotted the 2025 elections following a constitutional referendum that removed presidential term limits and enabled the incumbent president, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, to seek a third term. Although Touadéra and his party won the elections by a substantial margin under these circumstances, the legitimacy of the outcome, which granted him a new seven-year mandate, continues to be contested by opposition groups, civil society organizations, and international actors.

Touadéra's further consolidation of power, after occupying a central position in the country's political landscape for many years, has also generated considerable debate regarding the prospects for democratization. In particular, the security and political support mechanisms associated with the Russia-backed Wagner Group since 2023 have raised significant concerns about the competitiveness of the elections and the state of political pluralism. Allegations that the Wagner Group conducted disinformation campaigns in support of Touadéra and exerted pressure on opposition actors are regarded as among the principal risks undermining the country's democratic transition.[4]

5. Elections in Tanzania

The general and presidential elections held in Tanzania on October 29, 2025, resulted in a decisive victory for the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and its leader, incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan.[5] Hassan was re-elected to a second term after securing approximately 97.7% of the vote, underscoring the CCM's continued political dominance. At the same time, restrictions on the participation of major opposition parties and certain candidates, along with various constraints imposed on campaign activities, sparked debate over the elections' democratic competitiveness and political pluralism. In addition to criticism from the opposition and international observers that the electoral process lacked meaningful competition, post-election protests, particularly in major urban centers, and the security forces' response contrib-

4 Christopher, Spearin, "Russia's Wagner Group and the sustainment of authoritarianism in Africa: Implications for China at home and abroad". *Contemporary Security Policy*. Vol. 46, No. 3, 2025, pp. 497–521.

5 In March 2021, then Vice President Samia Suluhu Hassan succeeded the late President John Magufuli. In doing so, Hassan became the first woman to assume the presidency of Tanzania.

uted to escalating political tensions. Allegations that numerous individuals lost their lives during these events drew widespread attention, while international actors, including the United Nations and the African Union, expressed concern over the developments. In this context, whether Tanzania will be able to preserve political stability while maintaining its current model of governance or instead face renewed challenges concerning its democratic institutions, political competition, and fundamental rights remains a critical question for the country's political future.

6. Elections in Egypt

Egypt's parliamentary elections, which lasted approximately 100 days (Table 1) and became one of the longest electoral processes in the country's history, concluded in January 2026**.** President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who came to power following the military intervention in 2013, became eligible to seek another term after the 2019 constitutional amendment extended the presidential term from four to six years. He was subsequently re-elected in the December 2023 presidential election with 66.7% of the vote.

In the 2025 parliamentary elections, the coalition of political forces supporting the Sisi administration secured a clear majority in parliament. According to the official results, the pro-regime Mostaqbal Watan (Nation's Future) Party won 227 seats in the 568-member parliament, emerging as the largest political bloc. Together, the Mostaqbal Watan Party, the Homeland Defenders Party, the National Front Party, and the Republican People's Party-the principal components of the pro-Sisi coalition-captured a total of 403 seats, surpassing the two-thirds threshold required to amend the constitution.

Although approximately 15 political parties, along with pro-government independent candidates, gained representation in parliament, restrictions on the opposition's participation in the electoral process and campaign activities, combined with voter turnout of less than 35 percent, prompted debate over the elections' level of competitiveness and political pluralism. In this context, the election results point, on the one hand, to the consolidation of Egypt's existing power structure and the strengthening of the regime-aligned party system, while, on the other hand, they have renewed debate over the quality of political competition and the regime's societal legitimacy.

7. Elections in Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire

Burundi's parliamentary elections, held on June 5, 2025, took place at a time when the country was grappling with domestic challenges, including economic fragility, high inflation, and food shortages, while also facing regional security risks stemming from the ongoing conflict in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. The elections resulted in a decisive victory for the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The CNDD-FDD secured approximately 96.5 percent of the vote and won all but three of the 111 seats in the National Assembly, with the remaining three seats reserved for representatives of the Twa ethnic group.[6]

Since the 2010s, Burundi has experienced a notable increase in voter turnout compared with many other African countries, with participation rates occasionally reaching as high as 99 percent. Nevertheless, considerable debate persists over the extent to which these exceptionally high turnout rates reflect genuinely free and competitive electoral processes. During an electoral process in which the main opposition party, the National Congress for Liberty (CNL), was prevented from participating, opposition actors alleged political repression, coercive practices targeting voters, and irregularities in the vote-counting process. Against this backdrop, the elections, in which the opposition was largely excluded from meaningful political competition, can be viewed as reinforcing the dominance of the ruling party and consolidating a political system characterized by neopatrimonial governance.

A similarly constrained electoral process unfolded in Côte d'Ivoire, where the opposition also faced significant limitations. President Alassane Ouattara, who has remained in power since 2011, sought a fourth term in the 2025 presidential election despite ongoing controversy surrounding constitutional term limits. He was re-elected with approximately 90 percent of the vote in an election marked by low voter turnout. In the parliamentary elections held during the same period, Ouattara's party secured a commanding majority in parliament, thereby ensuring the institutional continuity of the existing power structure.

6 Of these, 100 seats were filled through direct elections, while the remaining seats were allocated in accordance with constitutional provisions. A 60-40 balance between the Hutu and Tutsi groups was maintained, and a 30 percent quota was applied for women.

8. Elections in Malawi and Seychelles

Within approaches that regard democracy as one of the most effective means through which societies can express their political demands, 2025 also

witnessed several positive democratic developments across the African continent. In this regard, the presidential and local elections held in Malawi constitute a noteworthy example in the country's democratization process. In what was widely regarded as one of the most competitive presidential elections in Malawi's history, featuring 17 candidates, including one woman, former President Peter Mutharika was elected president once again after receiving 56.8 percent of the vote, defeating incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera.[7] Mutharika thus returned to power after a period in opposition. These elections are significant because they were only the second presidential election held under the electoral reforms adopted in 2020, which introduced an absolute majority requirement for presidential elections. The principal objective of the reform was to strengthen mechanisms of political representation and promote political stability within a political system in which no single ethnic group or political party is capable of securing a decisive majority on its own.[8] In this context, Mutharika's achievement of more than 50 percent of the vote represents one of the rare instances since the 1990s in which a political actor has secured such a broad level of nationwide public support.

A similarly high level of voter turnout was observed in the small island state of Seychelles, where a transfer of power followed the two-round presidential election and the hybrid legislative elections. This development suggests that political competition in the country may be evolving toward a more balanced configuration and that relations between the executive and legislative branches may enter a new phase of negotiation and compromise.

9. Elections in Guinea

Alpha Condé'nin Alpha Condé's decision to seek a third presidential term through a constitutional amendment in 2020, together with the harsh suppression of protests against the move, precipitated a profound political crisis in Guinea. Against this backdrop, the 2025 presidential election was held on December 28 following a prolonged period of uncertainty and repeated electoral delays after the 2021 military coup led by General Mamady Doumbouya, which resulted in the removal of President Condé from office. As a result of the election, Doumbouya was elected president for a seven-year term, emerging as the central figure in Guinea's transition from military to civilian rule. Nevertheless, although the election was organized within the framework of the military government's commitment to transfer power, its democratic character remained the subject of considerable debate. The exclusion of several opposition candidates from the race and the high financial requirements imposed on prospective candidates gave rise to criticism regarding the competitiveness of the electoral process.[9]

7 https://www.kisa.link/AFWoH (Access Date: 26.02.2026).

8 Burcu Taşkın, "Afrika'da Siyasi Partiler ve Parti Sistemleri", Dünya Siyasetinde Afrika-6, İsmail Ermağan (ed.), December 2020, Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık.

9 Agathus Chibuike Mgbeahuruike ve Dengiyefa Angalapu, January 1, 2026,

https://www.kisa.link/wRjWl (Access Date: 18.02.2026)

At the same time, the African Union's decision to lift the sanctions imposed on Guinea following the coup after Doumbouya assumed office in early 2026 was widely regarded as an important step in the country's efforts to regain international legitimacy. However, the current process continues to raise the question of whether the elections genuinely represent a democratic transition to civilian rule or instead serve to legitimize a military-backed political order through electoral means.

10. Conclusion


Although elections have been held regularly across Africa since the 1990s, they have brought about relatively little political change, with authoritarian parties and presidents largely succeeding in retaining power throughout the multiparty era.[10]

Given this context, the elections held across African countries in 2025 can be characterized as a period in which only limited progress was made toward strengthening democratic legitimacy and fostering institutionalized opposition forces capable of mounting an effective challenge to those in power. The 2025 elections can be classified into three broad categories based on the characteristics of the political systems in which they took place: hegemonic party systems (Cameroon, Burundi, Tanzania, Egypt, the Central African Republic, and Côte d'Ivoire); competitive but fragmented political systems (Malawi and Seychelles); and cases in which elections were not held or transitional authorities remained dominant (Gabon, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau).

Overall trends indicate the persistence of incumbent rule in many countries, the continued institutional and political weakness of opposition actors, and the persistence in some cases of problems such as electoral postponements and incomplete political transitions. Although voter turnout varied considerably across countries, only a limited number of elections evolved into genuinely competitive contests capable of producing alternation in power. In this regard, Malawi and, to a lesser extent, Seychelles stand out as exceptional cases on the continent in terms of peaceful transfers of power and political competition.

In conclusion, the 2025 elections in Africa demonstrate that, although elections continue to exist as institutionalized political processes, democratic competition and mechanisms for the peaceful transfer of power remain insufficiently developed in many countries.

10 Matthijs, Bogaards, "Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa." European Journal of Political Research, V. 43, No. 2, 2004, pp.173-197.



Green Transformation and Climate Justice in East Africa in 2025: The NaBREP Programme in Nairobi and the Addis Ababa Corridor Project

2

Adnan Söylemez*


1. Introduction

2025 The year 2025 marked a turning point in East African metropolitan areas, as green urban transformation policies moved beyond theoretical planning documents and began to directly reshape the physical and demographic fabric of cities. Two major initiatives stand out in this transformation: *the Nairobi River Basin Rehabilitation Programme* (NaBREP), officially launched in March 2025 by Kenyan President William Ruto with a budget of 50 billion Kenyan shillings, and the ongoing Corridor Development Project (CDP), together with the expansion of the Beautifying Sheger initiative, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital, throughout 2025. The African Development Bank's 2025 Economic Outlook Report indicates that East Africa remained the fastest-growing region on the continent and that investments in urban climate adaptation had become one of the principal drivers shaping this growth.[1]

Focusing exclusively on urban policy developments that took place during the 2025 calendar year, this study offers a comparative analysis of these two initiatives. Its central argument is that, although the green transformation policies that gained momentum in both cities during 2025 enhance urban resilience to climate shocks at the macro level, they simultaneously deepen a process of "eco-gentrification" that systematically excludes the most vulnerable population groups at the micro level. In this context, the discourse of "urban resilience" becomes a source of legitimacy for the reproduction of spatial inequalities.

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1 African Development Bank, African Economic Outlook 2025, Abidjan: AfDB, 2025.



A view of the work being carried out as part of the Ethiopia Corridor Development Project. (Source: corridorandriverside.gov.et)

The *United Nations Human Settlements Programme*'s (UN-Habitat) World Cities Report 2024 defines urban resilience as the capacity of cities to maintain their functionality in the face of internal and external shocks. At the same time, it emphasizes that building such resilience at the expense of secure housing for low-income urban residents directly contradicts the principles of climate justice.[2]

2. Eco-Gentrification in Light of the 2025 Activities

The relationship between green urban transformation and gentrification has become one of the most dynamic areas of debate in urban studies over the past decade. Anguelovski and Connolly define green gentrification as a process in which residents of historically disadvantaged urban neighborhoods are displaced from increasingly green communities and relegated to gray, climate-insecure areas.[3] Within this framework, green infrastructure projects cease to function merely as instruments of environmental improvement serving the public interest and instead become urban commodities that fuel land speculation. This theoretical framework closely corresponds to the developments observed in Nairobi and Addis Ababa during 2025.

In urban contexts across the Global South, this theoretical risk materializes much more rapidly. In both Nairobi and Addis Ababa, informal settlements are concentrated along riverbanks and other high-value central urban corridors that are particularly vulnerable to climate risks, making it almost inevitable that green transformation policies disproportionately affect low-income populations. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Sixth Assessment Report projected that increasingly intense rainfall patterns across East Africa

2 UN-Habitat, World Cities Report 2024: Financing Sustainable Urbanization, Nairobi: UN-Habitat, 2024, p. 12.

3 Isabelle Anguelovski and James J. T. Connolly, "Segregating by Greening: What do We Mean by Green Gentrification?", Journal of Planning Literature, March 2024,

https://www.kisa.link/qNmjW, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

would heighten the risk of urban flooding, and this projection constituted the underlying condition that shaped the urgency of policy interventions in both cities throughout 2025.[4]

3. Nairobi: 2025 Initiatives of NaBREP and Spatial Exclusion

Officially launched by President Ruto during his visit to Kamukunji on March 10, 2025, the *Nairobi River Basin Rehabilitation Programme* (NaBREP), with a budget of 50 billion Kenyan shillings, represents the most comprehensive urban river restoration initiative in Kenya's history. The program aims to restore a 27.2-kilometer corridor along the Nairobi, Mathare, and Ngong Rivers, reduce pollution hotspots by 90 percent, construct a 60-kilometer trunk sewer line, and deliver approximately 30,000 social housing units.[5]

On March 6, 2025, the Nairobi City County Government announced that the Nairobi River Corridor would be designated a "Special Planning Area." Pursuant to Sections 52 and 53 of the Physical and Land Use Planning Act, this designation initiates a two-year integrated development process and establishes, in addition to the existing 30-meter riparian protection buffer on both sides of the river, an additional 30-meter development control zone.[6] Because this legal framework directly encompasses major informal settlements such as Mathare, Korogocho, Mukuru, and Kibera, it became the focus of intense legal and public debate throughout 2025.

The most significant contradiction in NaBREP during 2025 emerged in the form of unequal implementation. On paper, the project's design adopted an inclusive approach, promising "fair and lawful resettlement protocols" rather than forced evictions.[7] However, the Environmental Impact Assessment published by the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) in September 2025 reported that the project posed the greatest risk of displacement in low-income neighborhoods such as Kariobangi, Dandora, and Mathare, while implementation remained considerably more limited in higher-income areas such as Kileleshwa and Riverside.[8] Researchers have identified this as one of the most striking urban ironies of 2025: a system in which the law is applied stringently to the poor but flexibly to privileged groups, thereby reproducing colonial-era spatial hierarchies under the banner of "green resilience."[9]

4. Addis Ababa: The Corridor Project, Beautifying Sheger and Eco-Gentrification in 2025

The most consequential urban document to emerge from Addis Ababa in 2025 was Amnesty International's investigative report published in April 2025.

4 IPCC, Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report, Geneva: IPCC, 2023, pp. 52-55.

5 "Positive progress made along Nairobi River basin, says commission", The Star, June 18, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/NbDNg, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

6 "Nairobi River Corridor to be Declared a Special Planning Area", Muma & Kanjama Advocates, August 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/epscO, Access Date: 07.04.2026.

7 "Nairobi banks on river revival to transform the city by 2027", The Star, September 5, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/CWrfN, Access Date: 05.04.2026.

8 "NEMA Warns of Traffic Disruption, Air Pollution and Evictions for Nairobi River Project", Kenyans.co.ke, September 8, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/Nbszt, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

9 Manji and Ghai, "Why are Nairobi's rivers and banks such a disappointment?", The Star, December 7, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/CpgFC , Access Date: 01.04.2026.

The report comprehensively documented the forced evictions carried out in the Bole and Lemi Kura sub-cities during January and February 2025. Analysis of satellite imagery confirmed that at least 29 hectares of densely built-up areas were demolished during this period. Individuals who were displaced told Amnesty International researchers that most had been removed from homes they had occupied for decades without prior notice or after receiving only extremely short notice.[10]

In February 2025, residents of the historic Kasanchis (Gazanchis) neighborhood learned that their community had been slated for demolition in the name of "modernization" and "beautification." This development represented a continuation of earlier redevelopment initiatives undertaken in Arat Kilo and Piassa under the Beautifying Sheger program. Field observations conducted by Addis Insight indicate that the project's primary objective extends beyond public beautification to the removal of low-income residents from centrally located land expected to appreciate in value.[11]

By mid-2025, speculative activity in the housing market had reached a troubling level. According to data compiled by the research firm Bamboo Routes in mid-2025, more than 70 percent of large-scale private investment in Addis Ababa was directed toward the real estate sector. Housing prices in central neighborhoods such as Bole, Old Airport, and Kasanchis had risen to between US$1,500 and US$2,000 per square meter.[12] OkayAfrica's July 2025 investigation reports that long-term residents who had lived in the city for decades experienced a form of urban exile during the year as a result of rising rents and large-scale redevelopment projects that transformed their surrounding neighborhoods.[13] The 2026 study by Fei et al. further substantiates this dynamic at the theoretical level by documenting the fragility of the aesthetic legitimacy created by Beautifying Sheger and the deep divide between its elite-driven urban vision and public expectations.[14]

5. 2025 Policies and Climate Justice

The experiences of both cities in 2025 reveal three fundamental structural contradictions. First, they expose a reliance on external financing coupled with a deficit in local democratic participation. In Nairobi, NaBREP is financed through World Bank climate funding and the United Kingdom's ClimateWorkX program[15], while Addis Ababa's Corridor Development Project and Beautifying Sheger are supported through the African Development Bank's multi-donor financing mechanism. These international funding streams have resulted in projects being shaped by top-down decisions made by central authorities rather than through local participatory mechanisms.

10 Amnesty International, "Ethiopia: Forced Evictions in Addis Ababa Linked to Corridor Development Project", April 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/VhztA, Access Date: 11.04.2026.

11 Addis Insight, "Gazanchis: The Gentrification of Addis Ababa Disguised as Urban Renewal", February 7, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/WPfEe, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

12 "A New Addis Ababa Is Rising. But Who Is This Urbanization Really For?", OkayAfrica, July 25, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/JVRrW, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

13 Dong Fei, Jie Yang and Yue Zhang, "Aesthetic Politics and Elite-Driven Urban Development in African Cities: The Case of Beautifying Sheger in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia", International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, February 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/nkbzt , Access Date: 03.04.2026.

14 Bamboo Routes Research, Ethiopia Real Estate Market Report 2025, Addis Ababa: Bamboo Routes, 2025; cited in: "Ethiopia's Real Estate Gold Rush: Mirage or Miracle?", The Abyssinian Times, November 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/jLuGj, Access Date: 02.04.2026.

15 World Bank, Kenya Urbanization Review: Reimagining the Urban Future, Washington DC: World Bank, 2025.

Second, as documented in both cities during 2025, eviction practices have been selectively implemented. While they impose systematic pressure on residents of informal settlements, structures belonging to more privileged groups that encroach upon riparian buffers or protected areas have largely remained untouched.


Third, both cities continue to lack inclusive social housing policies. In neither case has the creation of green spaces been coordinated with housing policies capable of reintegrating displaced residents into accessible areas of the city.

The policy practices observed in 2025 are also highly significant in light of recent findings in the urban resilience literature. The theoretical framework developed by Anguelovski and Connolly demonstrates that high-profile projects centered on large-scale parks and green corridors almost invariably trigger gentrification. The experiences of Nairobi and Addis Ababa in 2025 provide particularly compelling confirmation of this proposition. Because green urban transformation is not merely a matter of physical infrastructure but also a question of urban politics that reshapes power relations and the distribution of land value, preventing eco-gentrification ultimately requires placing spatial justice at the center of project design from the outset.

6. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a pivotal moment in which Nairobi and Addis Ababa simultaneously emerged as East Africa's leading examples of climate adaptation and some of the continent's most striking cases of eco-gentrification. In Nairobi, the launch of the 50 billion Kenyan shilling NaBREP program and the designation of the Nairobi River Corridor as a Special Planning Area signaled a fundamental shift in environmental policy. However, the project's implementation has continued to systematically exclude residents of informal settlements. In Addis Ababa, Amnesty International's April 2025 report stripped away the bureaucratic justification surrounding the forced evictions carried out under the Corridor Development Project, documenting them as clear human rights violations. In both metropolitan areas, investments in green infrastructure gained considerable momentum, but the costs of this transformation were once again borne by the most vulnerable urban residents.

The experiences of 2025 offer a clear warning for 2026 and beyond: unless climate adaptation policies are accompanied by the principles of a "Just Transition", inclusive land policies, and the meaningful participation of communities in decision-making processes, they are destined to become instruments that deepen urban inequality. For East African cities, the fundamental challenge is not only to make urban environments physically resilient to flooding but also socially resilient to exclusion.



2025 Development Data In Africa: Key Indicators And A Statistical Overview

3

Ali Onur Tepeciklioğlu*

1. Introduction

As Africa enters the second quarter of the twenty-first century, its demographic dynamism, abundant natural resources, and evolving economic structure have made the continent one of the focal points of both global politics and the political economy. At the same time, assessments of Africa are often reduced either to narratives of rapid economic growth or to an emphasis on persistent structural vulnerabilities. Against this backdrop, evaluating the continent's development performance as of 2025 through objective, comparable, and long-term indicators provides a more comprehensive understanding of Africa's position in the global landscape. Rather than presenting a static snapshot, the indicators used in this chapter are intended to reveal broader trends while facilitating comparisons with the rest of the world.[1]

2. General Macroeconomic Outlook

1 Table 1 compares Africa's five geographic subregions using key macroeconomic indicators for the 2024-2025 period. West Africa recorded the strongest growth performance, with an annual growth rate of 5.8 percent.

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1 In international statistical reporting, finalized data for a given year are typically published toward the end of the following calendar year. Accordingly, this chapter is based on the most recent data available at the time of writing. Although most of the data for 2025 remain projections, these estimates are derived from extensive datasets and are generally considered to provide a close approximation of the final observed values.

East Africa stands out as the continent's most dynamic subregion, with growth projected to accelerate from a modest 2.7 percent in 2024 to 5.9 percent in 2025. North Africa, meanwhile, is expected to recover from negative growth (-0.5 percent) in 2024 to a projected growth rate of 5.3 percent in 2025.

Region	GDP Growth (%)		Inflation (%)		Current Account Balance/GDP (%)		Government Debt/ GDP (%)	
	2024	2025P	2024	2025P	2024	2025P	2024	2025P
West Africa	5.8	5.4	9.1	6.0	-5.0	-3.8	66.7	62.4
East Africa	2.7	5.9	56.9	19.0	-6.1	-6.6	62.6	58.3
South Africa	1.2	1.9	4.1	3.7	-3.3	-5.7	53.9	55.9
North Africa	-0.5	5.3	33.7	17.5	-3.7	-3.4	99.1	91.9
Central Africa	3.0	2.6	8.8	6.7	-1.2	-2.8	54.5	51.7

Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators for African Subregions, 2024-2025 (P: Projection)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2025[2].

At the country level, however, the picture differs markedly. South Sudan ranks first in terms of economic growth, with a projected rate of 24.3 percent. Nevertheless, this surge largely reflects increased oil production and higher global oil prices rather than a sustainable trajectory of economic development.[3] Libya ranks second with a growth rate of 15.6 percent, while Ethiopia, Guinea, and Rwanda, each with growth exceeding 7 percent, are expected to perform well above the regional average. The inflation outlook is considerably more concerning. South Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Sudan, with inflation rates of 97.5 percent, 89 percent, and 87.2 percent, respectively, represent the continent's most severe cases of price instability. In 2025, the principal drivers of high inflation include chronic structural challenges affecting African economies, such as sharp depreciation of domestic currencies, rising import costs, and ongoing internal conflicts. Moreover, these structural weaknesses continue to fuel inflationary pressures even as global inflation has begun to moderate.[4]

3. GDP Growth Trend

In 2025, the GDP growth trend for Sub-Saharan Africa continues the broadly stable pattern observed in recent years. A similar trend is evident in North Africa. This trajectory is consistent with broader global growth patterns. According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections, the re-

2 IMF, "World Economic Outlook – October 2025",
https://www.kisa.link/njKVr, October 2025, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

3 World Bank, "World Bank's South Sudan Economic Monitor Urges Swift and Sustained Reforms to Accelerate Economic Recovery and Inclusive Growth", 13.03.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/RKKvo, Access Date: 24.03.2026. DW, "South Sudan: Can oil production save the economy?", 30.01.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/HSLJn, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

4 Ekanem, Solomon, "10 African nations with the highest inflation in 2025", Bussines Insider Africa, 13.01.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/PBtvf, Access Date: 14.03.2026.

gion is expected to continue growing at approximately 4 percent in 2025, and some of the world's fastest-growing economies are located in Africa. However, growth figures alone can be misleading when interpreted as indicators of economic prosperity or sustainable development. The distribution of prosperity across society, rapid population growth, and vulnerability to external shocks remain significant challenges for Africa in 2025. In particular, persistently high inflation has eroded purchasing power, meaning that economic growth has often translated into nominal expansion rather than tangible improvements in living standards.





Chart 1: Regional GDP Growth Trend 2015-2025

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2025

4. Government Debt and the Current Account Balance

Government debt and the current account balance provide important insights into countries' and regions' development trajectories by reflecting fiscal discipline, sovereign default risk, and dependence on external financing. The 2025 data for Africa show that Sudan (221.5 percent), Senegal (122.9 percent), and Cabo Verde (106.0 percent) rank among the countries with the highest government debt-to-GDP ratios on the continent. These three countries exhibit significant structural vulnerabilities, with government debt ex-

ceeding the size of their economies. By contrast, Ghana's government debt declined from 70.3 percent to 59.1 percent as a result of debt restructuring under its IMF-supported program, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo (19.1 percent), Comoros (30.2 percent), and Djibouti (30.5 percent) stand out as the countries with the most favorable debt positions.



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2024. Projection of 2025 Values. *2025 Projection for Zambia unavailable.

Current account data reveal similarly pronounced disparities. Djibouti (8.1 percent) and Nigeria (5.7 percent) are among the continent's leading current account surplus countries, whereas Mozambique (-39.9 percent), Malawi (-18.3 percent), and Namibia (-14.7 percent) continue to record persistent current account deficits, reflecting their ongoing dependence on external financing. These patterns underscore the importance of evaluating debt sustainability and external balance dynamics alongside economic growth when assessing the robustness of a country's development trajectory.

Chart 2: Government Debt/GDP 2024-2025[5]

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2025.

5 2025 data for Zambia is unavailable.

Indicator	Rank	Highest / Fastest		Lowest / Slowest	
		Country	Value	Country	Value
GDP Growth 2025P (%)	1	South Sudan	**24.3**	Equatorial Guinea	**-1.6**
	2	Libya	**15.6**	Botswana	**-0.9**
	3	Ethiopia	**7.2**	South Africa	**1.1**
	4	Guinea	**7.2**	Lesotho	**1.4**
	5	Rwanda	**7.1**	Gabon	**1.9**
Inflation 2025P (%)	1	South Sudan	**97.5**	Seychelles	**0.4**
	2	Zimbabwe	**89.0**	Côte d'Ivoire	**1.0**
	3	Sudan	**87.2**	Morocco	**1.2**
	4	Burundi	**37.3**	Burkina Faso	**1.3**
	5	Malawi	**28.2**	Gabon	**1.4**
Government Debt/GDP 2025P (%)	1	Sudan	**221.5**	Democratic Republic of the Congo	**19.1**
	2	Senegal	**122.9**	Union of the Comoros	**30.2**
	3	Cape Verde	**106.0**	Djibouti	**30.5**
	4	Mozambique	**97.2**	Chad	**31.5**
	5	Republic of the Congo	**93.1**	Nigeria	**36.4**
Current Account Balance/GDP 2025P (%)	1	Djibouti	**+8.1**	Mozambique	**-39.9**
	2	Nigeria	**+5.7**	Malawi	**-18.3**
	3	Zimbabwe	**+3.1**	Namibia	**-14.7**
	4	Ghana	**+1.8**	Rwanda	**-13.8**
	5	Gabon	**+1.8**	Liberia	**-13.1**

Table 2: Top- and Bottom-Performing Countries in Key Macroeconomic Indicators 2025P

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2025


5. Foreign Direct Investments

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key source of external financing for sustainable development because it not only provides capital inflows but also promotes structural transformation through technology transfer, em-

ployment creation, and access to global markets. The standard reference source for FDI statistics is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).[6] Africa's FDI performance during the 2021–2024 period shows that the continent attracted between US$55 billion and US$97 billion in annual investment. According to the most recent data, FDI inflows reached a record high of US$97 billion in 2024. However, comparative data reveal that the most striking feature of the global investment landscape is the disparity in scale. During the same period, Asia attracted more than US$600 billion in annual FDI, far surpassing Africa's performance. Africa's share of global FDI has remained at approximately 3 to 4 percent, indicating that the continent continues to attract investment well below its potential.

Chart 3: Africa and Other Regions, FDI Inflows, 2021-2024

Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2025



Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2025. Values expressed in US Dollars.
*Negative values in Europe in 2022 due to investment outflows amid Russia-Ukraine War.

6. Human Development and Demographic Transformation

The Human Development Index (HDI) evaluates development not only in terms of economic growth but also by incorporating the dimensions of health, education, and income. Table 3 demonstrates that regional averages reveal substantial disparities in the geography of human development across Africa. North Africa and Southern Africa lead the continent with an average HDI of 0.68, whereas West Africa records the lowest regional average at 0.52. At the country level, Seychelles (0.848) and Mauritius (0.806)

6 UNCTAD, "World Investment Report 2025", June 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/nYISj, Access Date: 20.03.2026.

The Foreign Direct Investment report is published in the second quarter of the year following the reporting year. At the time of writing, the most recent report was the 2025 edition, which is based on data for 2024.

rank among the continent's highest-performing countries. In contrast, South Sudan (0.388), Somalia (0.404), and the Central African Republic (0.414) record the lowest HDI values, reflecting persistent structural deprivation across the dimensions of health, education, and income.


Region	HDI Value	Life Expectancy (year)	Expected Years of Schooling	GNI per Capita ($)
West Africa	0.52	63.2	10.1	3,764
East Africa	0.56	65.9	10.4	5,589
South Africa	0.68	64.8	12.7	10,909
North Africa	0.68	72.0	12.6	11,558
Central Africa	0.58	63.4	11.1	6,529

Table 3: Human Development Indicators in African Subregions[7]

Source: UNDP Human Development Index.

Tunisia (76.5 years), Algeria (76.3 years), and Cabo Verde (76.1 years) rank among the countries with the highest life expectancy, whereas Nigeria (54.5 years) and Chad (55.1 years) are among those with the lowest. In terms of per capita income, the nearly 42-fold difference between Seychelles (US$29,195) and South Sudan (US$688) illustrates the magnitude of income inequality across the continent. From a demographic perspective, Figure 4 shows that Sub-Saharan Africa continues to experience the highest population growth rate in the world, at nearly 2.5 percent annually. At the same time, the region's urbanization rate, at 65 percent, remains below that of all the other regions included in the comparison, although it continues to increase steadily.

7 UN, "Human Development Index", 2026, https://www.kisa.link/yxKJq, Access Date: 09.03.2026. The most recent available data for the Human Development Index (HDI) are for 2023.



Source: World Bank WDI (population growth) and UN DESA World Urbanization Prospects 2025 (urbanization). Urbanization data cover cities and towns. 2025 values are projections.

Chart 4: Population Growth and Urbanization Rates


Source: World Bank WDI and UN DESA 2025.[8]

8 BM, "UN Population Division Data Portal", https://www.kisa.link/gyHEL Access Date: 10.03.2026. World Bank, "World Development Indicators Database", https://www.kisa.link/RynfT, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

7. Conclusion

2025 As of 2025, Africa's development profile is characterized by both significant progress and deep structural vulnerabilities. Economic growth rates are broadly in line with the global average, and several subregions continue to exhibit strong momentum. Nevertheless, extreme values, such as Sudan's government debt of 221.5 percent of GDP, South Sudan's inflation rate of nearly 100 percent, and life expectancy of only about 55 years in Nigeria and Chad, underscore the severe deprivations that remain concealed behind regional averages.

In conclusion, Africa is undergoing a multidimensional and highly differentiated development process. Moving beyond broad generalizations, comparative analyses that take into account the distinct national and regional contexts remain the only effective means of capturing the continent's true development profile.



Emerging Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025

4

Emre Saygın*

1. Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa stands out for its strategic location, robust demographic dynamism, abundant natural resources, and rich cultural diversity. Until recently, many countries in the region struggled to translate this potential into broad-based social prosperity. However, rising commodity prices driven by geopolitical risks, together with the opportunities created by intensifying competition among major powers in an increasingly multipolar international system, have opened new avenues for development while simultaneously exposing the region to a new set of risks.

This study aims to analyze the economic performance of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025, identify the principal factors shaping that performance, and highlight the distinctive characteristics of the region's leading economies. The chapter is based primarily on reports and statistical data published by international organizations, regional institutions, and think tanks specializing in African studies, and employs a descriptive analytical approach.

2. The Economic Performance of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded economic growth of approximately 4 percent in 2025. These figures indicate that, following the slowdown observed

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over the previous two years, the region's economic performance recovered and regained upward momentum (see Table 1). Although global uncertainty and geopolitical risks continued to generate economic vulnerabilities, rising prices for gold, precious metals, and other commodities increased fiscal revenues across the region, thereby supporting economic growth in 2025.[1]

	2022	2023	2024	2025
West Africa	3.9	3.6	4.5	4.3
East Africa	4.3	1.3	4.3	5.9
Central Africa	5.2	4.4	4.0	3.2
South Africa	2.9	1.8	1.9	2.2
Sub-Saharan Africa Average	4.2	3.0	3.3	3.9

Table 1. Economic Growth Performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, 2022-2025 (%)

Source: Africa Development Bank, "African Economic Outlook 2025 - Making Africa's Capital Work Better for Africa's Development", 2025, https://www.kisa.link/MVqbl, Access Date: 09.02.2026, p.3

The sources of economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa during 2025 were relatively balanced, with private consumption (4.6 percent), government expenditure (4.3 percent), and investment (4.7 percent) each making significant contributions. At the same time, growth performance varied considerably across individual countries. While growth accelerated in nearly half of the region's economies, it slowed in the remainder.[2] Indeed, several of the world's fastest-growing economies including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas economic performance remained notably weak in a number of countries that continue to rely heavily on natural resource revenues or have been adversely affected by regional conflicts.[3]

3. Sectoral Dimensions of Economic Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa

Because Sub-Saharan Africa consists predominantly of low- and lower-middle-income countries, the primary objectives of economic growth are to diversify economic structures, reduce unemployment, maintain price stability, manage public debt, and ultimately alleviate poverty.

According to World Bank data, over the past twenty-five years agriculture has accounted for approximately 16-20 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's economic output, industry for 24-28 percent (with manufacturing representing 9-11 percent), and services for 48-53 percent.[4] The relatively

1 World Bank, "*Global Economic Prospects*", January 2026, https://www.kisa.link/sycwZ, Access Date: 08.02.2026, p. 91.

2 World Bank, "*Global Economic Prospects*", January 2026, https://www.kisa.link/sycwZ, Access Date: 08.02.2026, p. 97.

3 International Monetary Fund, "*Regional Economic Outlook Sub-Saharan Africa*", October 2025, https://www.kisa.link/lAJPA, Access Date: 10.02.2026, p. 2.

4 World Bank, "*World Development Indicators (Online Database)*", https://www.kisa.link/gGLlH, Access Date: 09.02.2026.

large share of agricultural output, which remains highly vulnerable to climatic variability, reflects both the concentration of production in a relatively low-productivity sector and the persistence of inflationary pressures. At the same time, the limited size of the industrial sector, particularly manufacturing, has confined many Sub-Saharan African economies to exports based on low technology and natural resources, placing the region among the least economically diversified in the world.[5]

Despite these structural weaknesses in agriculture and industry, service sectors such as tourism, food processing and agro-processing, horticulture, export-oriented agriculture, information technology, consulting and professional services, and modern transportation and logistics have made substantial contributions to employment. Often referred to as "smokeless industries," these sectors not only generate above-average productivity but are also reshaping the region's economic landscape through technological progress and their capacity for scalability.[6]

Additionally, although rising non-performing loans resulting from instability in global markets and domestic challenges across Sub-Saharan African countries have adversely affected the overall risk profile of the banking sector, the financial sector remained profitable and resilient in 2025, supported by high net interest margins, thereby contributing to overall economic performance.[7] Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the region declined modestly from the previous year, totaling US$42 billion. Nevertheless, improvements in global financial markets and increased liquidity originating from advanced economies are expected to create stable and durable external financing conditions that will support this cautious recovery.[8]

4. Leading Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025

South Africa, the largest emerging economy in Sub-Saharan Africa, recorded average economic growth of less than 1 percent over the past decade. In 2025, however, its growth rate increased modestly to 1.1 percent. Although this performance does not yet warrant strong optimism for the future, the continued momentum of reforms in the energy and logistics sectors, together with expanding private sector-led fixed capital investment, has begun to generate positive effects.[9]

Nigeria, another major emerging economy in the region, recorded economic growth of 3.1 percent in 2025. Despite sluggish growth and rising

5 Harvard Growth Lab, "*Economic Complexity Index – Geo Map (Online Database)*", 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/YUUoh, Access Date: 11.02.2026.

6 Bhorat, H., Page, J., Newfarmer, R., & Coulibaly, B., "*New Pathways to Job Creation and Development in Africa: The Promise of Industries without Smokestacks*", 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/yLrYG, Access Date: 10.02.2026.

7 The Asian Banker, "*Sub-Saharan Africa struggles with modest economic growth in 2025*", 30.01.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/LdvKr, Access Date: 10.02.2026.

8 UNCTAD, "*Global Investment Trends Monitor-No: 50*", January 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/qTDpD, Access Date: 11.02.2026.

9 Reuters, "*South Africa's economy grows 1.1% in 2025, below government estimates*", 10.03.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/mzLTo, Access Date: 11.02.2026.

poverty risks, Nigeria has pursued a more inclusive reform agenda over the past two years. As the country moves more decisively away from dependence on natural resources and accelerates the diversification of its economy through agriculture, manufacturing, and technology, it is expected to emerge as a major global economic hub within Africa.[10]

Guinea was the fastest-growing economy in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2025. Its rapid economic expansion has been driven by robust mining production and large-scale infrastructure projects. Assuming these favorable trends continue, real GDP growth is projected to approach an average of 10 percent annually between 2026 and 2029. Although Guinea remains highly vulnerable to external trade shocks because nearly 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings derive from mineral exports, rising foreign direct investment in the country's vast iron ore reserves has helped mitigate this vulnerability. Furthermore, increasing government revenues from non-mining sectors have contributed positively to the quality and sustainability of economic growth.[11]

Benin also maintained its strong growth trajectory in 2025, supported by robust performance in trade, tourism, and agriculture, as well as increased cotton production. The resolution of the oil supply dispute with Niger, the continued expansion of organized industrial zones and the construction sector, and the dynamic contributions of the mining and transportation sectors all supported Benin's economic growth.[12]

10 Schimmelpfennig, A. & Ebeke C., "*How Nigeria Can Unleash its Economic Potential*", 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/ogceZ, Access Date: 11.02.2026.

11 S&P Global, "*Guinea Outlook Now Positive On Expected Declining External Imbalances, Increasing Government Revenue; Affirmed At B+/B*", 13.03.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/ffVrD , Access Date: 12.02.2026.

12 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "*EBRD Transition Report 2025-26: Country Assessments Benin*", 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/zGeGV, Access Date: 11.02.2026.

	2025*	2026**	2027**
Benin	7.3	7.0	7.0
Côte d'Ivoire	6.3	6.4	6.5
Ethiopia	7.2	7.1	7.7
Guinea	7.5	9.3	11.6
Niger	6.5	6.7	6.6
Ruanda	7.0	7.2	7.6
Senegal	6.4	4.1	4.3
Sudan	6.1	5.1	3.7
Tanzania	6.0	6.2	6.5
Uganda	6.3	6.4	9.8
Zimbabwe	6.6	5.0	5.0

*Estimate , **Forecast

Table 2. Highest Growing Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2025-2027 (%

Source: World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects", January 2026, https://www.kisa.link/sycwZ, Access Date: 08.02.2026, p.98

Meanwhile, Ethiopia achieved economic growth exceeding 7 percent, driven by the strong performance of the agricultural sector, increased gold and electricity production, and the continuation of its long-term comprehensive reform strategy. Zimbabwe's economic performance improved markedly compared with previous years, reaching 6.6 percent, owing to the recovery of agricultural production and increased investment in the mining sector, which stimulated industrial output. Uganda recorded economic growth of 6.3 percent, fueled by rising government expenditure, strong consumer demand, increasing private investment, and coffee exports, reaching its highest growth rate since before the global pandemic. Similarly, Côte d'Ivoire achieved economic growth of 6.3 percent, supported by increases in private consumption and investment.[13]

5. Conclusion

Despite persistent uncertainty in the global economy and continuing instability within the region, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced an economic recovery in 2025, characterized by cautious but positive growth supported by infrastructure investment and the diversification of the services sector. At the same time, structural and macroeconomic challenges including drought, dependence on natural resources, inadequate infrastructure, inflation, unemployment, poverty, and rising debt burdens continued to exert significant pressure on the region's development.[14]

Against this backdrop, it is essential to foster a framework for coordination that can help overcome political disputes among countries and accelerate functional forms of regional integration. Such a framework would facilitate a more balanced distribution of official development assistance across the region and promote more integrated regional development. Equally important are maintaining the public sector at an optimal size while encouraging private sector investment based on the efficient allocation of resources, promoting good governance to increase the region's share of global foreign direct investment flows, and ensuring that a securitization perspective is not lost in responding to the challenges posed by contemporary forms of neo-colonialism.[15]

13 World Bank, "*Global Economic Prospects*", pp. 91-92.


14 United Nations Development Programme, "*Sub-Saharan Africa's Economic Outlook 2025 - Navigating Uncertainty and Aligning Policy for Sustainable Recovery*", 2026,

https://www.kisa.link/kHxrD , Access Date: 10.02.2026, p. 2.

15 African Union Commission & OECD, "*Africa's Development Dynamics 2025 - Infrastructure, Growth and Transformation*", 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/ARNhP, Access Date: 10.02.2026, s.17-19; Africa Development Bank, "*Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook*", November 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/ubKmJ, Access Date: 09.02.2026, p. 19.



Africa's Pursuit of Justice in the International System on the 20th Anniversary of the Ezulwini Consensus

5

Mustafa Ateş*

1. Introduction

Africa accounts for 54 of the 193 member states of the United Nations (UN), approximately 28 percent of the total membership, and nearly 19 percent of the world's population. Despite this, it remains significantly underrepresented in the international system's decision-making mechanisms. Although nearly one in every three UN member states is African, the UN Security Council (UNSC), the organization's highest decision-making body, has no permanent African member. The African Group is one of the UN's five regional groups and the largest bloc without permanent representation. Although South America likewise lacks permanent representation, Africa constitutes the most significant representation deficit under the current system, given its number of member states, its prominence on the UN agenda, and its operational contributions. Nearly half of all UN peacekeeping operations are conducted in Africa, while approximately 40 percent of UN peacekeepers are African.[1] The extent of this asymmetry becomes even more apparent in the 2025 data. Africa accounted for 36 percent of the UNSC's country- or region-specific meetings, 51 percent of its resolutions, 75 percent of the resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (concerning threats to international peace and security), and approximately 63 percent of its press statements.[2] Despite occupying a central place on the

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1 "UN chief calls for permanent Africa Security Council seat", *BBC News*, December 1, 2024, https://www.kisa.link/LNdct, Access Date: 19.03.2026.

2 "Highlights of Security Council Practice 2025", UN, https://www.kisa.link/CFlyF, Access Date: 19.03.2026.

Security Council's agenda, Africa remains without a permanent seat on the Council. Africa's pursuit of justice in the international system stems largely from this fundamental contradiction.

The current structure of the United Nations reflects the post-World War II global balance of power. It preserves an outdated status quo that no longer corresponds to contemporary realities and is inconsistent with the principle of equitable representation. African states have therefore engaged in a sustained diplomatic effort to make representation within the UN more inclusive and equitable. The institutional foundation of this effort is the *Ezulwini Consensus*, adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2005, which articulates Africa's common position on reform of the UN Security Council. The year 2025 carries both symbolic and strategic significance as the twentieth anniversary of the Consensus. This study aims to examine African states' challenges to the existing global order in 2025, their initiatives in pursuit of greater justice within the international system, and Türkiye's support for these efforts through its *The World Is Bigger Than Five* discourse.

2. Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration

The Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration constitute the institutional and normative foundations of Africa's pursuit of justice in the international system. Adopted during the 7th Extraordinary Session of the AU Executive Council in March 2005, the Ezulwini Consensus established the *Common African Position* on UN reform. Although the Consensus outlines the AU's broader vision for reforming all principal organs of the United Nations, its most significant proposal concerns reform of the UNSC. The AU called for Africa's full representation on the Council, specifically demanding "no fewer than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership, including the right of veto, and five non-permanent seats."[3]

The Sirte Declaration, adopted in July 2005 by African heads of state and government at the AU Assembly, formally endorsed the Ezulwini Consensus. Through this declaration, African leaders expressed their political commitment to submitting the reform proposal reflecting the Common African Position to the UN General Assembly. Although the Consensus primarily addresses political reform centered on the Security Council, the Declaration's call for the "democratization of the Bretton

3 African Union, "The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus'," Addis Ababa, March 7-8, 2005,
https://www.kisa.link/rsxPE, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

Woods institutions" demonstrates that Africa's pursuit of justice extends beyond political representation to encompass a broader vision of global economic governance.[4]

3. Developments in Africa's Pursuit of Justice in the International System in 2025

The year 2025 holds particular significance for African countries as it marks the twentieth anniversary of both the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. Throughout the year, the African Union and its institutions including, most notably, the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government (C-10), which advocates the Common African Position in international forums undertook a range of initiatives. The pursuit of justice within the international system served as the principal driving force behind many of these activities and, in some cases, was adopted explicitly as their guiding motto.

3.1. The African Union's Theme for 2025

Africa's pursuit of justice gained renewed prominence in 2025 not only from a systemic perspective but also from a historical one. Accordingly, the African Union designated its 2025 theme as "*Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations*." This initiative addresses historical injustices, including the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism, apartheid, and genocide, while advocating for restorative justice.[5] Through this theme, the AU broadened Africa's demand for justice on the twentieth anniversary of the Ezulwini Consensus, situating it within a more comprehensive framework centered on redressing historical wrongs.

3.2. The 38th Ordinary Session of the AU

At the 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, held on February 15–16, 2025, concrete measures were adopted to reinforce Africa's commitment to speaking with one voice in the process of UNSC reform. However, Africa's demand for justice within the international system was not confined solely to UNSC reform; historical injustices were likewise emphasized. The Assembly reaffirmed its commitment to the Common African Position and identified the following concrete priorities in pursuit of greater justice:

4 African Union, "Decisions, Declarations and Resolution of the Assembly of the African Union, Fifth Ordinary Session", Sirte, Libya, July 4-5, 2005, Assembly/AU/Decl.1-3 (V), https://www.kisa.link/KEhaX, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

5 African Union, "AU Theme of the Year 2025: 'Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations', ", February 15, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/uKvJS, Access Date: 05.04.2026.



The African Union's theme for 2025: "Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations" (Source: AU THEME OF THE YEAR 2025 | African Union

- The Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government (C-10) should engage at the highest political levels, including with all five permanent members of the UNSC, and convene high-level meetings
- All AU member states should reaffirm the Common African Position in their national statements during the 80th session of the UN General Assembly.
- AU member states should prioritize UN Security Council reform in their diplomatic engagements outside the African continent.[6]

The summit was also significant because of UN Secretary-General António Guterres's explicit support for Africa's pursuit of justice. Addressing the Assembly, Guterres stated: ""There is no justification for Africa still lacking permanent representation in the twenty-first century. Together with the African Union and all member states, I will continue working to ensure that Africa receives the representation it needs and the justice it deserves."[7]

6 African Union, "Decisions, Declarations and Resolutions of the Assembly of the African Union, Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session", Addis Ababa, February 15-16, 2025, Assembly/AU/Dec.903-941(XXXVIII),

https://www.kisa.link/QXHob, Access Date: 07.04.2026.

7 António Guterres, "Secretary-General's Remarks to the African Union Summit," United Nations Secretary-General, February 15, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/oALZI, Access Date: 09.04.2026.

3.3. The 7th Summit of the African Union Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government (C-10)

At the seventh C-10 Heads of State Summit, held on September 21, 2025, participants criticized the lack of tangible progress toward achieving justice over the preceding twenty years. Julius Maada Bio, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and Coordinator of the C-10, described Africa's reform demand as "legitimate, non-negotiable, and just," arguing that it should be regarded "not as a favor, but as the correction of a historical injustice." João Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola and Chairperson of the African Union, likewise emphasized that virtually no meaningful progress had been made regarding reform and that Africa continued to be excluded from the Security Council. He characterized the reform proposal as "neither excessive nor symbolic, but rather the expression of a legitimate right grounded in contemporary geopolitical realities," adding that such reform was also essential to preserving the credibility of the UN Security Council.

3.4. The 9th African Union–United Nations Annual Conference

The communiqué issued following the 9th AU–UN Annual Conference, held on November 13, 2025, confirmed that Africa's pursuit of justice within the international system had evolved into a multidimensional agenda.[8] Africa's demands were no longer limited to increasing its representation on the Security Council but had expanded to include the democratization of the global financial system and the strengthening of the continent's economic sovereignty. Within this broader framework, the establishment of the African Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA), whose preparatory phase was completed in 2025 and which is scheduled to become operational in 2026, may be interpreted as a manifestation of Africa's challenge to the existing global financial architecture.

3.5. G20 South Africa Summit

In 2025, the G20 Summit was hosted on African soil for the first time, under South Africa's presidency. The Leaders' Declaration called for reform of the UN Security Council to better reflect the realities and demands of the twenty-first century and urged an expansion of its membership to include underrepresented regions such as Africa.[9] The Declaration demonstrated that the African Union's permanent membership in the G20, together with South Africa's presidency, had strengthened Africa's capacity "to advocate for its strategic role in shaping a more just and inclusive international or-

8 African Union, "Joint Communiqué of the Ninth African Union-United Nations Annual Conference", November 13, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/pNgvA, Access Date: 09.04.2026.

9 DIRCO, "G20 South Africa Summit: Leaders' Declaration" Johannesburg, November 22, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/uEVIZ, Access Date: 14.04.2026.



President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addresses participants during the general debate of the 80th United Nations (UN) General Assembly in the UN General Assembly Hall. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

der."[10] The 2025 G20 Summit thus illustrated that reform of the international system had evolved beyond being merely "an African demand" to being recognized by the world's largest economies as "a systemic necessity."

4. Türkiye's Support for Africa's Pursuit of Justice

Türkiye has framed its critique of the UN Security Council's shortcomings in terms of inclusiveness and representation through the slogan "The World Is Bigger Than Five." Central to this discourse is the criticism that no African state holds a permanent seat on the Security Council.[11] In this respect,

Türkiye's position closely aligns with Africa's demand for permanent representation. In his address to the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated this position, declaring: "We will continue to say, *'The world is bigger than five,'* until an international order is established in which the righteous are strong, rather than one in which the strong determine what is right."[12]

5. Conclusion

The year 2025 marks an important milestone in Africa's pursuit of justice and equitable representation in the international system, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the Ezulwini Consensus. Throughout the year, African states consistently emphasized the need for justice within the international system across a wide range of international forums. Their demonstrated commitment to speaking with one voice provides clear evidence that the Common African Position has evolved beyond rhetorical declarations into a coordinated diplomatic strategy. Likewise, the African Union's emphasis on historical justice and its pursuit of greater fairness in global economic governance reflect a broader and more comprehensive rights-based agenda.


The adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 79/263 at the beginning of 2025, establishing the Africa Dialogue Series and the High-Level Policy Dialogue, institutionalized Africa's pursuit of justice within the United Nations framework. Furthermore, the G20 Leaders' Declaration, UN reports, the UN Secretary-General's endorsement of Security Council reform, and Türkiye's "The World Is Bigger Than Five" vision constituted the most significant external factors strengthening the international legitimacy of Africa's reform agenda in 2025.

Despite the diplomatic legitimacy and rhetorical support that Africa's demands have received, it remains difficult to conclude that justice has been effectively realized within the international system or that efforts to address these longstanding grievances have advanced beyond symbolic gestures. As of 2025, no decisive structural reforms capable of transforming the existing international order have yet been implemented. Nevertheless, the developments of 2025 suggest that Africa's struggle for justice is likely to continue in the years ahead along an increasingly resilient and institutionalized trajectory.

10 African Union, "G20 Leadership Summit 2025", December 14, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/qJkUA, Access Date: 14.04.2026.

11 The Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, The Presidency's Directorate of Communications, *Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın BM 79. Genel Kurulu Hitabı*, Ankara, 2024, p. 17.

12 The Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, The Presidency's Directorate of Communications, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan Birleşmiş Milletler 80. Genel Kuruluna Hitap Etti," September 23, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/lwtgC, Access Date: 17.04.2026.



6

Energy Outlook in Africa in 2025

Gökhan Kahraman*

1. Introduction

Africa is one of the world's most resource-rich regions, particularly in terms of human capital as well as its abundant underground and surface natural resources. The continent's population continues to grow steadily. This trend, combined with economic expansion and technological advancement, has led to a continuous increase in energy demand. Nevertheless, more than 600 million people in Africa currently lack access to electricity. At the same time, approximately 1 billion people do not have access to clean cooking facilities.[1] In South Africa, the country with the continent's most advanced industrial sector, 231 days of scheduled power outages occurred during 2025 despite the country's high rate of electricity access.[2] In addition, the intensifying competition among developed countries over critical raw materials, particularly rare earth elements, has heightened the interest of external actors in Africa's natural resources. This has made Africa a strategically important continent in the fields of energy and mineral resources.

This study examines Africa's energy outlook within the framework of the major developments that shaped the continent's energy agenda in 2025. It first presents an overview of Africa's energy and mineral resources before examining the major energy summits that brought together public- and private-sector representatives alongside heads of state and government from across the continent. It then analyzes the energy initiatives of external actors in Africa. In this context, the study evaluates the key energy policies that stood out across Africa in 2025.

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1 Fatih Birol, "Africa Energy Outlook 2022," World Energy Outlook Special Report, International Energy Agency, p. 16, July 23, 2025,

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2 Alister Bull, "Eskom Keeps Lights on for 231 Straight Days in South Africa", Bloomberg, 02.01.2026,

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2. Africa's Energy Outlook

Africa is exceptionally rich in both energy resources and mineral resources, which constitute one of the principal components of the energy sector. On a global scale, the continent accounts for 8 percent of proven oil reserves and 7 percent of natural gas reserves.[3] In terms of mineral resources, Africa possesses approximately 30 percent of the world's reserves. Its abundance of critical minerals, in particular, has significantly enhanced the continent's strategic importance. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which supplies more than 70 percent of global cobalt demand, is the world leader in this field. South Africa holds more than 90 percent of global platinum group metal reserves. Guinea possesses the world's largest bauxite reserves. Mozambique stands out as the world's leading graphite producer, while Mali for lithium, Gabon for manganese, Namibia for uranium, and Zambia for copper are among the continent's leading countries in terms of mineral reserves.[4] At the same time, thanks to its geographical characteristics and high levels of solar irradiation, Africa has enormous renewable energy potential. According to data from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the African Development Bank, the continent has an estimated annual solar power generation potential of approximately 10 TW. In addition, it is estimated to possess 350 GW of hydropower, 110 GW of wind power, and 15 GW of geothermal energy potential.[5] Africa's green hydrogen potential is estimated at approximately 50 Mt.[6]

3. Key Developments in Energy and Mining Sectors in 2025

The African Union (AU) published the African Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS) to advance the continent's sustainable energy security and inclusive development objectives. Owing to its abundant reserves of critical green minerals such as nickel, cobalt, lithium, platinum group metals, and rare earth elements, Africa occupies a strategic position in the global energy transition under this strategy.[7]

In 2025, African countries focused on a strategy of processing and adding value to their mineral resources domestically rather than exporting them as raw materials. During the same period, however, competition among actors such as the United States, the European Union (EU), and China intensified in the areas of raw material access, processing, and logistics. In this context, the Lobito Corridor, stretching from Angola through Zambia to the DRC, featured prominently at the Seventh AU-EU Summit held at the end of 2025. At the summit, participants pledged $2 billion in investment to provide strategic support for transporting African minerals to Western markets. In addition, the United States has also provided financial support for the Lobito Corridor.[8] These initiatives have facilitated access for African minerals, particularly critical minerals, to European and U.S. markets.

3 African Development Bank Group, "Catalyzing Growth and Development Through Effective Natural Resources Management," African Natural Resources Center, Abidjan, 2016, pp. 3-4.

4 Ben Chandler, "Africa's Critical Minerals," Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2022, p. 2.

5 African Development Bank Group, "Why Africa is the next renewables powerhouse," AFDB, 2018, retrieved July 23, 2025,

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7 African Union, "Africa's Green Minerals Strategy", AMDC, March 18, 2025,

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8 Daniel Tjarks, "Angola's Lobito Corridor is being revived – but who stands to gain?", The Conversation, February 2, 2026,

https://www.kisa.link/RSAtE, Access Date: 15.02.2026.

North African countries launched significant initiatives in renewable energy generation. Egypt continues construction of the country's first nuclear power plant, which will also be Africa's second, near Cairo.[9] Morocco has accelerated the Xlinks Project, a new undersea electricity interconnection beneath the Mediterranean intended to contribute to Europe's energy supply.[10] Namibia, meanwhile, continues investing in green hydrogen projects with the goal of becoming one of the world's lowest-cost producers of clean energy.[11] Following the suspension of projects by international investors due to security incidents in the Cabo Delgado region, Mozambique's liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects resumed operations in 2025.[12] Meanwhile, Senegal became one of the world's newest LNG exporters in 2025 as its LNG projects reached full production capacity.[13]

The Just Energy Transition Partnership pursued by developed countries with South Africa and Senegal has continued despite the withdrawal of the United States.[14] The funding gap created by the U.S. withdrawal has been offset by the European Union through a $5.1 billion support package.[15] South Africa also signed Clean Trade and Investment Partnership agreements with the EU prioritizing critical mineral processing and green hydrogen investments.[16] As the holder of the G20 presidency in 2025, South Africa placed the issue of a just energy transition for the Global South on the summit agenda.

4. Africa Energy Forums

The *17th Africa Energy Indaba* was held in South Africa in 2025 under the theme "Driving Innovation and Collaboration in Africa's Energy and Utilities Sector".[17] Africa Energy Week was organized under the theme "Invest in African Energy," bringing together senior officials and heads of state from across the continent. The summit defended Africa's energy realities against Western pressure to phase out fossil fuels. While discussions focused on ending energy poverty by 2030, participants criticized Europe's recognition of natural gas as a transition fuel while failing to finance African gas projects, describing this contradiction as "financial apartheid."[18] The *19th Investing in African Mining Indaba* was held in Cape Town, South Africa, in 2025. Organized under the theme "Future-Proofing African Mining, Today!," the event addressed issues including local value addition, critical minerals and the energy transition, artificial intelligence and automation, and investment security.[19] In addition to the various summits held in South Africa throughout the year, energy- and mining-focused events were also organized in Nigeria, Ghana, and Libya.

9 World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Egypt, November 28, 2025,
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10 Cosmo Sanderson, "Green colonialism attack on $30bn Morocco-Uk power link plan", February 20, 2025,
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11 African Development Bank Group, "African Development Bank Approves $10 Million to catalyse Namibia's Larger Green Hydrogen Project", December 9, 2025,
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12 Wendell Roelf, America Hernandez and Custodio Cossa, "Mozambique, TotalEnergies relaunch $20 billion Lng Project", Reuters, January 29, 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/eIIsr, Access Date: 20.02.2026.

13 Francis Perrin, "Senegal in the Offshore Oil and Gas Era", Policy Center for the New South, Policy Brief, May 2025,
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14 Gökhan Kahraman, "Enerji Dönüşüm Çağında Güney Afrika Cumhuriyeti Enerji Politikaları: "Adil Enerji Dönüşümü" Ortaklığı Modelinin İncelenmesi" Abant Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 25(3), x-x.

15 Wendell Roelf, "EU pledges 4.7 billion euros to South Africa as Trump brings them closer", Reuters, March 14, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/VgtAZ, Access Date: 20.02.2026.

16 Sarah Jackson and Sara Michelangeli, "The EU-South Africa CTIP", New Climate Institute, December 11, 2025,
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17 Africa Energy Indaba, "Driving Innovation and Collaboration in Africa's Energy and Utilities Sector",
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18 Yunus Kemp, "Africa: Call to tackle "financial Apartheid" in eergy sector", ESI, September 30, 2025
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19 Africa Mining Indaba, "Future-proofing mining: A multi-disciplinary approach", February 4, 2025,
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Africa Energy Indaba, one of the major events focusing on Africa's energy sector, was held in Cape Town, South Africa, on March 4-6, 2025. (Source: Africa Energy Indaba 2025 Photo Gallery - Africa Energy Indaba)

5. Major External Actors' Energy and Mining Initiatives

Global powers continue to compete in Africa, particularly in strategic energy and mining sectors centered on the supply of critical minerals. The United States has sought to expand its influence across the continent by supporting the construction of logistical corridors for the supply and transportation of critical minerals. With the Trump administration, U.S. policy shifted away from a climate-centered approach toward a strategy focused on securing supplies of critical minerals.

Russia has developed energy cooperation with African countries primarily by supporting nuclear energy and hydrocarbon infrastructure projects. Notable initiatives include the construction of a nuclear power plant in Egypt, the preparation of an action plan for nuclear power plant construction with Ethiopia, and efforts to establish two 2 GW reactors in Niger.[20] At the Cairo Ministerial Conference, held as part of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum in Egypt in December 2025, energy and technology transfer ranked among the priority agenda items.[21] In this context, Russia appears to be using cooperation in the nuclear and hydrocarbon sectors as a strategic instrument to help address Africa's energy crisis.

China's approach seeks to expand its influence in African countries not only by financing infrastructure projects through Chinese firms in exchange for access to natural resources, but also through strategies focused on renewable energy and the supply of critical minerals. Under the Green Silk Road Initiative, China is supporting low-carbon development by constructing large-scale solar power plants across the continent.[22] Chinese experts have described 2025 as both China's "greenest" and its "brownest" year in Africa.[23] South Africa's growing alignment with China following tensions with the United States resul-

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21 Mohamed Lamine Kaba, "The second ministrerial conference o the Russia-Africa partnership forum: when Cairo buries Western hegemony", December 24, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/qcZjG, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

22 FECO, "Working Together to Build a Green Belt and Road", August 29, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/mQAyc, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

23 Tom Baxter, "The Belt and Road boomed in 2025", February 4, 2026, Eco-Business,
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ted in a strategic partnership that includes, among other initiatives, a zero-tariff agreement and expanded energy cooperation.[24] This development has strengthened China's influence in South Africa's mining sector.

The Gulf counties, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have leveraged their financial resources to invest in renewable energy projects, especially solar and wind power, as well as natural gas and oil infrastructure. For the Gulf counties, Africa is regarded as an important testing ground for the green transition.[25]

6. Energy and Mining Initiatives by Türkiye

Consistent with its development model, Türkiye has adopted a win-win strategy for energy cooperation with African countries. Türkiye's energy partnerships in Africa, particularly with Libya and Algeria, have in recent years reached their highest level with Somalia. The year 2025 marked a period in which Türkiye took concrete steps in Africa's energy sector. In this context, the *Oruç Reis* Seismic Research Vessel conducted operations off the coast of Somalia.[26] In addition, MTA International Mining (MTAIC) commenced its first gold production project in Niger.[27] Türkiye also signed a memorandum of understanding with Gabon covering cooperation in the hydrocarbon and mining sectors.[28] Finally, the vision of an "integrated energy network" was presented to the public at the Fifth Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum, held in Istanbul.[29]

7. Conclusion

Africa's energy landscape in 2025 was characterized by energy transition, strategic competition, and expanding partnerships. Faced with rising population growth and increasing energy demand, the continent accelerated investments in renewable energy while assuming a central role in the global competition for critical minerals. Africa's LNG projects have emerged as an alternative source of supply to Russian gas for European countries, while North African states have diversified their energy portfolios through nuclear energy and green fuel initiatives. The African Union's Green Minerals Strategy has further reinforced the continent's strategic position in the global energy transition. As the United States, the European Union, China, Russia, and the Gulf states intensified their competition for influence through energy and mining investments, Türkiye took concrete steps through projects in Somalia, Niger, and Gabon. Energy summits and strategic partnerships highlighted issues such as a just energy transition, access to financing, and regional cooperation. Consequently, as of 2025, Africa has evolved beyond being merely a supplier of natural resources to become a strategic actor in both the global energy supply chain and the broader energy transition.

24 Global Times, "China grants South Africa 100% zero-tariff acces to its market under new partnership deal, February 2026,
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
25 Maddalena Procopio, Corroda Cok, "Deversification Nations: The Gulf Way to Engage With Africa", Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OEeGI, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

26 The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Türkiye, "Oruç Reis Somali'de", September 2024,
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27 Merve Safa Akıntürk, "Nijer'de altın üretiminin ilk fazı tamamlandı", Yeni Şafak, February 17, 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/HvqRO, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

28 The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Türkiye, "Gabon ile 3 Alanda İş Birliği", July 31, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/vwXPK, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

29 Enerji Terminali, "Bakan Bayraktar, Türkiye-Afrika İş ve Ekonomi Forumunda konuştu", October 2025,
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Security and Geopolitics in the Sahel in 2025

7

M. Cem Oğultürk*

1. Introduction

As of 2025, the Sahel has evolved into a multidimensional crisis zone where the growing terrorist threat, political instability, and great-power competition increasingly intersect. In particular, the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel, AES), composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has emerged both as the centerpiece of the region's security architecture and as the primary source of institutional fragmentation in West Africa.[1]

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) documents and regional analyses emphasize that throughout 2025, the security environment in the Sahel has been shaped by a triad of increasingly sophisticated terrorist attacks, a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis, and fragmented regional cooperation.[2] This section examines the principal dynamics shaping security and geopolitics in the Sahel in 2025, focusing on the terrorist threat, military coups and regional institutions, the roles of external actors, and Türkiye.

2. The Security-Development Nexus

The countries regarded as the "core belt" of the Sahel, i.e. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger had, by 2025, become among the regions experiencing the highest levels of terrorism-related fatalities worldwide. According to United Nations (UN) data, both the frequency and scale of attacks increased significantly across these three countries, while numerous rural settlements became arenas where armed groups, inter-communal violence, and military operations converged.[3]

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1 European Think Tank Group, *The Nexus between Security and Development in the Sahel*, ETTG Brief No. 3, Brussels, 2025, pp. 1-6.

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2 Security Council Report, *West Africa and the Sahel, December 2025 Monthly Forecast*, New York, November 29, 2025, pp. 1-3.

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ECOWAS convened with the attempted coup in Benin and issues in the region on its agenda. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

UNSC assessments indicate that organizations such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) significantly enhanced their operational capabilities in 2025 through the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, improvised explosive devices, and multi-front attacks. This has placed additional strain on the already limited state capacities of the AES countries, forcing their armed forces to balance frontline combat operations with the responsibility of protecting civilians. Consequently, numerous villages in Burkina Faso, northern Mali, and western Niger have reportedly been completely abandoned, with millions of people displaced.[4]

The coups that took place in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2020 and 2023 emerged in 2025 as the principal political ruptures shaping the region's security architecture. The military governments that assumed power in the aftermath of these coups have generated new fault lines in both domestic politics and foreign relations.[5] Established by the three countries in 2023, the AES attracted considerable attention in 2025 through its claims of collective defense and its "anti-interventionist" discourse. At the AES summit held in Bamako in December 2025, the leaders agreed to establish a joint battalion of approximately 5,000 troops, primarily intended for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. At the same time, by emphasizing economic integration and a common foreign policy, AES leaders sought to develop an alternative axis to Western-backed security arrangements.[6]

3 ibid.

4 United Nations Security Council, *Security Council Told Political Upheaval, Violent Extremism Threaten West Africa, Sahel, as Speakers Call for Targeted Action, Regional Cooperation*, Press Release No: SC/16257, December 17, 2025.

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5 Al Jazeera, *Sahel summit: What is the biggest challenge facing the region?*, 24.12.2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/24/sahel-summit-what-is-the-biggest-challenge-facing-the-region, Access Date: 16.03.2026.

6 European Think Tank Group, *The Nexus between Security and Development in the Sahel,* ETTG Brief No. 3, Brussels, 2025, pp. 1-6.

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Meanwhile, relations between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AES countries remained strained throughout 2025. Although ECOWAS lifted the stringent sanctions imposed following the coup in Niger in 2024, citing humanitarian costs and concerns over regional fragmentation, this decision failed to reverse the AES countries' de facto disengagement from the organization. As a result, analysts have argued that a new institutional fault line has emerged in West Africa between pro-democracy and pro-sovereignty blocs.[7]

Another factor exacerbating the security crisis in the Sahel is the growing nexus among terrorism, organized criminal economies, and inter-communal violence. Drug and human trafficking, illegal mining, and smuggling networks have become major sources of financing for both terrorist organizations and local militias. Weak state oversight and the region's vast geographical expanse have created an environment of impunity that enables these networks to operate freely.

This deteriorating security environment has also generated a severe humanitarian crisis as of 2025. UN reports indicate that millions of people have been displaced across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, numerous settlements have been entirely abandoned, and food insecurity has reached critical levels. Terrorist attacks, road blockades, and armed conflict have restricted humanitarian access, thereby accelerating public health crises, the collapse of educational infrastructure, and the further erosion of already fragile social structures. Under such conditions, the propensity of young people to become radicalized and join armed groups has also increased.

The relationship between security and development in the Sahel remained one of the central issues debated by international actors throughout 2025. Although security assistance may strengthen military capabilities in the short term, it can also reinforce cycles of violence over the longer term. The region's vast geography, persistent security risks, and weak state institutions often limit the effectiveness of comprehensive development initiatives, leaving them fragmented and uneven. This demonstrates that security-centered policies alone cannot produce lasting solutions and that comprehensive strategies incorporating political participation and socioeconomic transformation are essential.

3. The Sahel Policies of the Major Powers

One of the most significant developments affecting the geopolitical balance in the Sahel has been the redefinition of military engagement by traditional Western powers. France has largely withdrawn its forces, substantially reducing

7 Security Council Report, *West Africa and the Sahel, December 2025 Monthly Forecast*, New York, November 29, 2025, pp. 1-3.

https://www.kisa.link/bnqXH Access Date: 16.03.2026.

its direct military presence in the region. As of 2025, Paris has shifted its Sahel policy toward a more indirect model of engagement based on diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and development assistance rather than maintaining frontline military deployment.[8]

For the United States, the critical turning point was the agreement to withdraw its military presence from Niger by the fall of 2024. This withdrawal has been interpreted as a recalibration of the U.S. strategy in the Sahel and a transition toward a "low-visibility" security partnership model. However, the relative withdrawal of both France and the United States has created a widespread perception of a significant security vacuum on the ground. Determining which actors will fill this vacuum, and under what normative framework, has become one of the defining questions of Sahelian geopolitics in 2025.[9]

Much of the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Western powers has, as of 2025, been filled by Russia. Moscow has increasingly institutionalized the activities previously carried out through the Wagner Group by transferring them to a new structure known as the Africa Corps, operating under the authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Various analyses indicate that Wagner officially declared its mission in Mali complete in mid-2025 and withdrew, with Africa Corps units assuming its responsibilities.[10]

A The role of the Africa Corps in the AES countries is defined as ensuring regime security, combating terrorist organizations, and providing military training and advisory services. Nevertheless, allegations of human rights violations and the opaque nature of security agreements have raised serious concerns regarding Russia's expanding influence in the Sahel. While Russia's military support may strengthen regime security in the short term, it also risks undermining democratization and accountability processes over the long term.[11]

4. Türkiye-Sahel Relations in 2025

In 2025, relations between Türkiye and the Sahel countries deepened within a framework that intertwined security and defense cooperation with a multidimensional political and economic engagement. As traditional actors such as France and the United States reduced their military presence, Ankara emerged as an "alternative security and development partner," particularly for the member states of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), i.e. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

At the core of Türkiye's Sahel policy in 2025 were the export of defense industry products, military training and capacity building, and the strengthening of its diplomatic presence. In addition to the sale of armed unmanned aerial vehicles

8 Lisa Bryant , *France starts 2025 with fresh controversy, questions over Africa*, Voice of America, January 11, 2025,

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9 Natasha Bertrand, *US reaches agreement with Niger to withdraw military forces by September 15*, CNN, 19.05.2024,

https://www.kisa.link/uJHlG, Access Date: 16.03.2026

10 Robert Lansing Institute, *Russia's Africa Corps: Wagner's Successor in Africa (2022–2025)*, September 30, 2025.

https://www.kisa.link/gckHe, Access Date: 16.03.2026

11 Al Jazeera, *Sahel summit: What is the biggest challenge facing the region?*, 24.12.2025.

https://www.kisa.link/OAVRB, Access Date: 16.03.2026.

(UCAVs), armored vehicles, and other defense systems to AES countries, particularly Mali and Niger, Türkiye provided military training programs for their armed forces, thereby establishing itself as a visible actor within the Sahel's evolving security architecture. The agreement signed between Türkiye and Chad in February 2025 regarding the use of the military bases in Abéché and Faya-Largeau represented a symbolic step demonstrating Türkiye's determination to establish a lasting security presence in the Sahel. Furthermore, the prominent participation of Turkish defense companies in Mali's first defense exhibition, held in 2025, was widely regarded as a symbolic indication of this growing engagement.


Across the capitals of the Sahel, Türkiye continues to be perceived not only as a security provider but also as a "multidimensional partner" offering support in the fields of development and education. Politically, Ankara has adopted a pragmatic approach toward its relations with the AES countries governed by military regimes, maintaining open diplomatic channels while continuing security- and economy-based cooperation with these governments.

5. Conclusion

In 2025, security and geopolitics in the Sahel were shaped by interconnected processes, including the escalation of terrorist violence, the political order forged through military coups, the fragmentation of regional institutions, and the strategic realignment of major powers. Although the deepening cooperation between the AES countries and Russia, together with the reduction of Western military engagement, has the potential to strengthen regime security in the short term, it also poses significant risks to democratization, human rights, and accountability.

The development of a more balanced strategy by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), one that safeguards both constitutional order and humanitarian considerations, and the alignment of international security assistance with inclusive governance and development objectives appear to be among the essential prerequisites for achieving sustainable peace in the Sahel. Otherwise, the multidimensional instability and cycle of violence observed in 2025 are highly likely to continue affecting both the region and the broader international security environment in the years ahead.

Türkiye-Sahel relations, meanwhile, have evolved into a multidimensional framework in which a security partnership centered on the defense industry is reinforced by trade and investment initiatives, as well as soft-power instruments based on humanitarian assistance and education. This approach positions Türkiye as both a new component of the Sahel's regional security architecture and an emerging middle power amid the declining influence of the West.



Civil War in Sudan in 2025: Military Dynamics, Humanitarian Crisis, and External Actors

8

Belma Engin Güder*

1. Introduction

As the African continent prepares to assume a more prominent role in global politics during the first quarter of the twenty-first century, many African countries continue to experience protracted conflicts and devastating civil wars. Since gaining independence, Sudan has been one of the continent's countries most persistently affected by internal conflict and instability despite numerous peace initiatives. Short-lived civilian governments, military interventions, struggles for power and authority, and political and economic inequalities among different ethnic, religious, and regional groups constitute the principal drivers of Sudan's recurring civil wars and enduring fragility.

Having descended once again into a spiral of violence in 2023, Sudan was drawn into civil war as a result of disputes among the military forces that had seized power through a coup. Throughout 2025, Sudan remained the site of unrelenting armed conflict, a deepening humanitarian crisis, and ongoing political and diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the war. This study examines the trajectory of the civil war that began in Sudan in 2023 by analyzing the military balance on the ground, the humanitarian crisis, and the peace initiatives pursued during 2025.

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2. The Background and Main Actors of the Conflicts in Sudan

The principal actors in the Sudanese civil war are the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Originating from the Janjaweed militias formed during the rule of Omar al-Bashir and subsequently transformed into a powerful paramilitary force, the RSF played a decisive role in Bashir's removal from power in 2019 by siding with the Sudanese military during the popular protests. The civilian transitional government established thereafter was overthrown in 2021 through a coup carried out jointly by these two military forces, after which the transition evolved into a military-dominated administration under Burhan's leadership. The power struggle and growing disagreements that emerged between the SAF and the RSF beginning on April 15, 2023, despite their previous cooperation, gave rise to a new civil war that continued to shape Sudan throughout 2025.[1]

1 Center for Preventive Action, "Civil War in Sudan", 07.04.2026, https://www.kisa.link/BouMw Access Date: 10.04.2026.

3. Military Developments, Political Dynamics and the Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan in 2025

At the beginning of 2025, Sovereignty Council Chairman and Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces Abdel Fattah al-Burhan accused the RSF of committing serious crimes, declaring that a return to the pre-conflict status quo was impossible and that the military was preparing to achieve a decisive victory.[2] During this period, the SAF began to establish military superiority in and around the capital, Khartoum, driving RSF forces out of Omdurman, recapturing a strategic oil refinery, and regaining control over much of Bahri. In addition, the approximately two-year RSF siege of El Obeid, a city of strategic importance due to its railway connections, was broken, marking a significant military success.[3]

During the February-April 2025 period, preparations by the RSF and its allies to establish a parallel government in Nairobi heightened concerns over the possible partition of Sudan, a move categorically rejected by the Sudanese government.[4] While the RSF sought political legitimacy through the proclamation of a provisional constitution, the SAF reestablished control over Khartoum and consolidated its authority over key state institutions.[5] Nevertheless, fighting continued, and in April the RSF launched attacks on the Zamzam camp, located south of El Fasher and home to more than half a million displaced persons, making it the largest displacement camp in North Darfur.[6]

Between May and July 2025, the SAF strengthened its political legitimacy by appointing former United Nations (UN) official Kamil Idris as prime minister of the technocratic government based in Port Sudan;[7] in response, the RSF announced the establishment of an alternative administration in Nyala under Hemedti's leadership on July 26, directly asserting a competing claim to sovereignty. This development transformed the conflict in Sudan from a purely military confrontation into a struggle over statehood. The contest for power on the ground intensified further when the RSF announced in October that it had captured El Fasher following an approximately eighteen-month siege.[8]

The RSF's capture of the strategically and logistically critical city of El Fasher on October 26, 2025, represented one of the principal turning points of the war. El Fasher became one of the conflict's fiercest battlegrounds, and after a prolonged siege, the RSF, strengthened by external support, particularly from countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was

2 Sudan Tribune, "Sudan's Burhan Rules out RSF Coexistence, Rejects Famine Claims", 01.01.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/whwaf Access Date: 04.03.2026.

3 Center for Preventive Action, op cit.

4 Xinhua, "Paramilitary Forces' Attempt to Form 'Parallel Government" Raises Concern over Deeper Division in Sudan", 01.03.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/wuTgv, Access Date: 04.03.2026.

5 Ingie Gohar, "A Teamline of Key Events in Sudan", Arab Center Washington DC, 05.03.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/cbUxl, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

6 United Nations Human Rights Office of High Commissioner, "Three Days of Terror with No Safe Refuge", 12.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/zZIuB, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

7 Hamid Khalafallah, "The Civilian Façade in Sudan's War: Rival Governments and the Battle for Legitimacy", The Tahrir Institute, 06.08.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/Sctoi, Access Date: 08.03.2026.

8 Gohar, ibid.

able to erode the SAF's air superiority and consolidate its control over Darfur. This development deepened Sudan's de facto territorial division, reinforcing RSF dominance in the west while compelling the SAF to concentrate its presence in the eastern and central regions of the country.[9]

The RSF's announcement on December 8, 2025, that it had captured the Heglig oil field further underscored the economic and strategic dimensions of the conflict. Owing to its central role in Sudan's energy infrastructure and its position along South Sudan's oil export corridor, Heglig constitutes a critical geopolitical asset in terms of regional power dynamics. Control of Heglig became a significant factor shifting the balance of power in favor of the RSF.[10]

By the end of 2025, the scale of the fighting had starkly exposed the devastating human cost of the conflict in Sudan. Attacks against civilians and widespread human rights violations by both parties gave rise to serious allegations of war crimes, while civilian casualties increased rapidly, particularly in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Darfur. Approximately 25 million people were experiencing acute food insecurity, with nearly 2 million facing famine or the risk of famine. The number of displaced persons exceeded 11 million, more than 4 million of whom had sought refuge in neighboring countries. With the collapse of the healthcare system, a cholera outbreak, the obstruction of humanitarian assistance, and its emergence as one of the world's most dangerous countries for humanitarian workers, Sudan remained at the top of humanitarian crisis monitoring lists for the third consecutive year in 2025.[11]

4. External Actors' Role in Conflicts and Peace Efforts in Sudan

With the outbreak of the civil war in Sudan, institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the European Union (EU), as well as countries including the United States (U.S.), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, launched a range of mediation initiatives. However, these diplomatic efforts gradually evolved into an arena of international competition as external actors provided arms, financial resources, and political support to the conflicting parties in pursuit of their own strategic interests.[12] During this period, Egypt, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Iran aligned themselves with the SAF under Burhan, which represented the internationally recognized state authority, while the UAE supported the RSF, motivated by interests in the gold trade and ideological considerations,

9 Shewit Woldemichael, "El Fasher: A Bloody New Chapter in Sudan's Ruinous War, International Crisis Group, 31.10.2025, https://www.kisa.link/PlEyZ, Access Date: 16.03.2026.

10 Xinhua, "Sudan's Paramilitary RSF Says it Captures Key Oil Hub Heglig", 08.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/LCMdO, Access Date: 16.03.2026)

11 International Rescue Committee, "2026 Emergency Watchlist: New World Disorder", https://www.kisa.link/heMva Access Date: 17.03.2026.

12 John Mukum Mbaku, "Ending Sudan's civil war: A roadmap to peace and reconciliation", The Brookings Institution, 20.01.2026, https://www.kisa.link/kbDxr, Access Date: 12.03.2026.



In cooperation between the Turkish Red Crescent and the Sudanese Red Crescent, humanitarian aid was delivered to people displaced by the conflict in Sudan at the El-Afadh camp in the city of Al Dabbah. (Source: Anadolu Ajansı)

drawing strong criticism from the Sudanese government.[13] At the global level, Russia gradually moved closer to the SAF, while the United States and the European Union became involved through sanctions and other forms of political pressure. Meanwhile, the military and humanitarian assistance provided by regional powers emerged as an important factor influencing the course of the conflict.[14]

Throughout a conflict that claimed more than 50,000 lives and left millions in need of humanitarian assistance, the UN played an active role by calling for ceasefires, coordinating humanitarian aid, and documenting human rights violations. In response to the rapidly worsening humanitarian catastrophe in Sudan, the organization intensified its diplomatic and

13 France 24, "Civilian death toll in Sudan war more than doubled in 2025, UN says", 26.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/HChdt, Access Date: 18.03.2026.

14 Mürsel Bayram, "Sudan'da Bitmeyen İç Savaş ve Derinleşen İnsani Kriz", 12.03.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/gJouO, Access Date: 18.03.2026.

institutional initiatives during 2025.[15] Throughout the same year, the AU continued its diplomatic engagement with Sudan, whose membership had been suspended in 2021, issuing repeated calls for humanitarian ceasefires, condemning external interference, and reaffirming Sudan's territorial integrity. The AU also adopted a coordinated approach with the UN, the League of Arab States, and IGAD.[16] In September 2025, the AU endorsed the roadmap proposed by the Quad countries (i.e. the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt) and, within the framework of the Jeddah Process, emphasized political transition, civilian protection, and the establishment of a ceasefire.[17] During the same period, new U.S. sanctions targeting the SAF and several Islamist groups further underscored the geopolitical dimensions of the conflict.[18]

Toward the end of 2025, peace and ceasefire initiatives in Sudan gained renewed momentum. In November 2025, the RSF expressed its appreciation to Donald Trump for his discussions in Saudi Arabia, as well as to the Quad leaders for their mediation efforts.[19] B few days later, the RSF announced that it had accepted the proposed humanitarian ceasefire and would suspend hostilities with the Sudanese army for a period of three months. Nevertheless, these developments failed to produce any lasting transformation on the ground.[20]

The parties' unwillingness to end the war, together with the involvement of external actors pursuing their own political and economic interests, significantly undermined peace efforts in Sudan throughout 2025.[21] Additional factors including foreign financing of the conflict, the political and economic gains derived from the war by both the SAF and the RSF along with their regional backers, and the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated weaponry by both sides also obstructed prospects for peace.[22] Structural limitations affecting institutions such as the AU and IGAD, Sudan's suspension from AU membership, inadequate coordination among mediators, the confusion created by multiple mediation mechanisms, and the fragmented nature of civilian actors within Sudan further diminished the effectiveness of peace initiatives.[23]

5. Conclusion

By 2025, the civil war in Sudan had evolved into a multidimensional crisis characterized by deepening military, political, and humanitarian challenges. Beyond shifts in the military balance, the emergence of competing governing structures and rival claims to legitimacy transformed the conflict from a

15 United Nations, "The UN and the Crisis in Sudan (Jan-Jul 2025)", 01.09.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/pjgbq, Access Date: 21.03.2026;
United Nations, "The UN and the Crisis in Sudan (Jul-Dec 2025)", 06.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/NLEZH, Access Date: 21.03.2026.

16 Amani Africa, "AU Timeline of Diplomatic Efforts",
https://www.kisa.link/rrLTU, Access Date: 22.03.2026.

17 African Union, "African Union Commission (AUC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Welcome the QUAD Outcome on Sudan", 14.09.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/otELX Access Date: 24.03.2026.

18 Gohar, ibid.

19 Xinhua, "Sudan's Paramilitary RSF Says Monitoring Int'l Peace Efforts with 'Interest'", 22.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OQCzh, Access Date: 17.03.2026.

20 Xinhua, "Urgent: Sudan's Paramilitary Forces Declare Unilateral 3-Month Ceasefire", 25.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/LzmQu, Access Date: 22.03.2026.


21 Center for Preventive Action, op cit.

22 International Rescue Committee, op. cit.

23 Munzoul A. M. Assal & Abdelmageed Yahya, "The Failure of Mediation and Peacemaking Efforts in the Sudan Crisis", ACCORD AJCR 2025/2, 17.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/ZpGHJ, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

conventional civil war into a broader struggle over statehood. The year 2025 also marked a period in which Sudan's humanitarian crisis deteriorated dramatically. Mass displacement, acute food insecurity, the collapse of the healthcare system, attacks against civilians, and the obstruction of humanitarian assistance resulted in widespread violations of human rights and international law.

The interventions of international and regional actors frequently contributed to intensifying the conflict and prolonging the war rather than facilitating its resolution. This underscores the extent to which the Sudanese crisis has been shaped not only by domestic dynamics but also by regional and global geopolitical competition. Under current conditions, the prospects for a durable ceasefire or political settlement in the short term remain limited, while the risk of the conflict evolving into a prolonged war characterized by low-intensity violence, multiple actors, and shifting dynamics persists. The principal uncertainty extending into 2026 is whether the parties will continue to pursue a military solution and whether the international community will be able to establish a more effective, inclusive, and coordinated peace mechanism. In this respect, Sudan's future appears to depend not only on the military balance on the ground but also on the policies and actions of external actors.



G20 South Africa Summit: Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability

9

Fatma Yıldız*

1. Introduction

The G20 is an international platform that brings together the world's leading economies to strengthen global financial stability, coordinate macroeconomic policies, and address international issues. G20 members represent two-thirds of the world's population, approximately 85 percent of global GDP, and 75 percent of global trade. Although the G20 comprises 19 member states as well as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), it does not have a permanent secretariat. Instead, the G20 presidency rotates annually among countries grouped into five regional clusters: Group 1: Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, the United States; Group 2: India, Russia, South Africa, Türkiye; Group 3: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico; Group 4: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom; and Group 5: China, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. Accordingly, each year a country from a different group assumes the G20 presidency, coordinates the agenda, and hosts the meetings.

The group was established in 1999 to provide a forum for Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors following the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1998 Russian financial crisis. However, in 2007, the G20 was elevated to the Leaders' Summit level, expanding its scope to include broader global issues such as health, agriculture, development, trade, climate change, energy security, and anti-corruption. Following Türkiye's G20 Presidency in 2015, South Africa as-

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sumed the presidency in 2025, adopting the theme *Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability*.[1]

The international academic literature on the G20 has examined South Africa's role within the group, the G20's impact on South Africa's development objectives, its alignment with the priorities of African countries, and the contemporary challenges it faces. As a case study, this chapter examines the framework of the 2025 G20 Leaders' Summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa, focusing on South Africa's role and priorities at the summit, the summit's implications for the United Nations and global governance (multilateralism), and its limitations.

2. South Africa's G20 Presidency: The Johannesburg Summit

The G20 Summit, held in South Africa on November 22-23, 2025, is significant as the first G20 summit ever convened on African soil. The summit was also regarded as an opportunity to advance the principles of *Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability* across the African continent. In this context, South Africa positioned the Johannesburg Summit as "Africa's Summit" by emphasizing sustainable development and prioritizing four key areas.

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "G20",
https://www.kisa.link/vecEf, Access Date: 08.04.2026.



The G20 Leaders' Summit was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, on November 22, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

(a) Strengthening global disaster resilience and response capacity in the face of the growing impacts of climate-related disasters; (b) mobilizing financing for a just energy transition by increasing climate finance flows, strengthening multilateral development banks, and leveraging private investment; (c) enhancing debt sustainability for low-income countries by promoting fair and transparent sovereign credit ratings, reducing the cost of capital, and expanding debt relief mechanisms; and (d) harnessing critical minerals as a driver of inclusive growth and sustainable development while ensuring that resource-rich countries and communities benefit from the energy transition.[2]

In addition, the *G20 Africa Engagement Framework* was endorsed at the Johannesburg Summit. The framework focuses on addressing Africa's fiscal and macroeconomic challenges, reducing the cost of capital, expanding private-sector financing, strengthening debt management capacity, improving Africa's institutional and governance architecture, promoting regional infrastructure development in line with the *African Continental Free Trade Area* (AfCFTA), and reinforcing the role of international financial institutions in Africa's development. In doing so, South Africa, together with the AU and other African institutions, committed itself to supporting the framework, thereby "securing Africa's G20 legacy."[3]

3. South Africa's Position Among Global Actors and Its Priorities Within the G20

As one of the continent's most developed countries, South Africa plays a significant role in the global system as a member of leading international organizations such as the AU and BRICS. It has also served as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Owing to its strategic location, population of 64 million, approximately $480 billion GDP, and abundant mineral resources, particularly platinum, gold, and diamonds, South Africa[4] has established strategic partnerships with global actors as both a political and economic power in Africa.

South Africa has sought to leverage these strategic partnerships, particularly its G20 membership and its hosting of the 2025 Johannesburg Summit, to advance Africa's economic development agenda and promote reforms in global economic governance. Accordingly, it placed Africa's priorities, including climate finance, natural resource governance, debt sustainability, and a just energy transition, on the G20 agenda.

2 European Parliament, "Outcome of the 2025 G20 Leaders' Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa", November 27, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/xcUUI, Access Date: 26.04.2026.

3 Utku Teksöz, "Africa's G20 Johannesburg Summit 2025: In pursuit of Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability", *United Nations African Renewal*, 09.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/LxIPi, Access Date: 26.04.2026.

4 International Monetary Fund, "South Africa Dataset",
https://www.kisa.link/aTxrR, Access Date: 18.05.2026.

4. Critical Minerals and Energy Transition

The presence of rare earth elements and strategic minerals in Africa, resources that are critical to the formation of the emerging global order in an age of uncertainty, made critical minerals and the energy transition one of the prominent issues at the G20 Johannesburg Summit. In 2025, rare earth elements, which occupy a central position in geopolitical competition, were widely used in industries such as smartphones, electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, petrochemicals, metallurgical machinery, national defense, military equipment, and guided missile systems.[5] Table 1 presents Africa's rare earth elements and their principal applications, while Table 2 details the continent's strategic minerals and the countries in which they are found.

5 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, "Nadir Toprak Elementleri", https://www.kisa.link/rqHuz, Access Date: 18.05.2026.

6 Turkish Energy, Nuclear and Mineral Resources Agency (TENMAK), "Periodik Tablo", https://www.kisa.link/TwNOw, Access Date: 18.05.2026.

7 Turkish Energy, Nuclear and Mineral Resources Agency (TENMAK), "Periodik Tablo", https://www.kisa.link/TwNOw, Access Date: 18.05.2026.

Table 1. Rare Earth Elements in Africa[6]

Element	Symbol	Key Areas of Use
Yttrium	Y	Laser manufacturing
Neodymium	Nd	Manufacturing of electric vehicles and strong magnets
Cerium	Ce	Catalytic converter manufacturing
Praseodymium	Pr	Manufacturing of high-strength magnets
Lanthanum	La	Manufacturing of optical glass and battery
Dysprosium	Dy	Laser and wind turbine manufacturing
Terbium	Tb	Lighting technologies

Table 2. Strategic Minerals in Africa [7]

Strategic Mineral	Main African Countries with Reserves	Key Areas of Use	Key Information
Cobalt	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Batteries of electric vehicles	Democratic Republic of the Congo holds nearly 70% of global production.
Coltan	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda	Mobile phone and computer manufacturing	Critical for the electronics industry.
Lithium	Zimbabwe	EV batteries, automotive and aviation industry	Key input in energy storage technologies.
Platinum Group Elements	Republic of South Africa	Automotive, pharmaceutics, fiber optics and jewelry industries	South Africa has considerable platinum group metal reserves.
Manganese	Republic of South Africa, Gabon	Battery manufacturing, chemical, ceramics and glass industries	Key input in steel and battery industries.
Gold	Gana, Republic of South Africa, Sudan	Jewelry, finance, electronics and industry	Besides its economic and financial value, gold is used in technology manufacturing.
Uranium	Niger, Namibia	Nuclear energy production	Strategic for nuclear fuel production.
Graphite	Mozambique, Madagascar	Thermal and electrical conductivity, battery manufacturing	Used in anode manufacturing of lithium-ion batteries

The efforts of major powers to secure the supply chains of these rare and strategic resources and to maintain technological dominance have intensified great-power competition across Africa. Competition for control over critical mineral resources has become one of the principal drivers shaping the economic and geostrategic policies of global powers, particularly China and the United States. This dynamic has the potential to intensify both intrastate and interstate competition in Africa, thereby reinforcing existing conflict dynamics. Aware of this reality, South Africa emphasized that critical minerals should be utilized in ways that generate greater contributions to the development and economic growth of African countries. Indeed, a substantial share of the economic value added from the extraction, processing, and utilization of these minerals is currently captured by global powers. By contrast, African countries need to assume a more active role in the production and processing stages of the critical minerals value chain if they are to achieve higher value-added production. Such a transformation could contribute to increasing employment, reducing income inequality, and supporting sustainable economic growth across the continent.[8]

5. Financing Challenges (Development-Climate)

Financing was one of the principal areas of focus within the *G20 Finance Track* at the 2025 Johannesburg Summit. Disruptions in global trade chains, commercial and geopolitical tensions, high debt levels, and natural disasters have profoundly affected the international economy by increasing risks to financial and price stability.

Securing adequate financing is critical to achieving the G20's objectives, particularly with respect to health expenditures, infrastructure investment, and resolving the debt burden, which remains one of the greatest obstacles to Africa's growth. In this regard, development banks play a pivotal role. Ensuring the efficient use of financial resources, preserving macroeconomic stability, and strengthening the international tax system emerged as key policy priorities. Within this framework, expanding access to financial resources for infrastructure investment and development objectives, while enhancing the resilience of Africa's financial system, is of fundamental importance for sustainable development.

The Summit Communiqué emphasized that systemic debt risks have made low- and middle-income economies increasingly vulnerable. It noted that these debt vulnerabilities, together with other factors, constrain fiscal space, weaken countries' capacity to combat poverty and inequality, and limit investment in growth and development. Accordingly, G20 members expressed support for the ongoing reviews of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-World Bank

8 Sait Akman, "G20 Zirvesi Güney Afrika'da Yapıldı: İlk Yirmi Yıl Sonunda Bekleyen Zorluklar", *Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı,* December 5, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/EXhKZ, Access Date: 12.05.2026.

Low-Income Countries Debt Sustainability Framework (LIC-DSF), with the aim of improving the understanding and management of debt vulnerabilities. The Summit also stressed the importance of pursuing development-oriented macroeconomic policies and encouraging both public and private investment to promote long-term growth, fiscal sustainability, and productivity. With regard to minimizing climate risks, particular emphasis was placed on resilient infrastructure, insurance mechanisms, early warning systems, disaster financing, and risk-pooling mechanisms.[9]

6. The UN and Global Governance (Multilateralism)

Against the backdrop of intensifying global competition, the G20 reaffirmed the importance of an international order grounded in international law and multilateralism, recognizing the central role of the United Nations. It therefore emphasized the need for UN reform to address global challenges, arguing that underrepresented regions including Asia-Pacific, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America should enjoy stronger representation on the United Nations Security Council. Achieving this objective requires comprehensive reforms that enhance the Council's transparency, democratic legitimacy, inclusiveness, and representativeness. Such reforms are regarded as essential for addressing instability, economic inequality, environmental challenges, and financial problems through strengthened global cooperation. Ultimately, by focusing on the global development agenda, the G20 underscored the importance of collective action in addressing environmental, social, and economic challenges.[10]

7. Limitations of the Summit

Although the G20 Johannesburg Summit carried significant symbolic importance for the Global South and Africa, several limitations remain evident. These include the absence of a systematic implementation plan for the global governance reforms proposed in the communiqué; the limited decision-making influence afforded to Africa despite the continent's central place on the agenda; the lack of clarity regarding the financial contributions expected from individual countries; continued uncertainty over structural solutions to the debt crisis; the fact that commitments concerning food security, rare earth elements, climate action, and disaster risk reduction remain largely recommendatory rather than legally binding; and the failure to provide effective solutions to the problem of illicit financial outflows from Africa.[11]

9 G20 South Africa Summit, "Leaders' Summit Declaration",
https://www.kisa.link/EBbBU, Access Date: 14.05.2026.

10 G20 South Africa Summit, ibid.


11 G20 South Africa Summit, ibid.



Family photo at the G20 Leaders' Summit. (November 22, 2025) (Source: Anadolu Agency)

8. Conclusion

The G20 Johannesburg Summit was shaped by the philosophy of *Ubuntu*, a concept closely associated with South Africa and commonly expressed as *I am because we are*. Guided by this perspective, the Summit sought to place the priority concerns of the Global South and Africa including debt sustainability, resource governance, financing, and energy, at the center of the international agenda and to promote solutions to these challenges. Nevertheless, Africa's limited influence within global decision-making institutions, the persistent financing gap, and the unresolved structural nature of the continent's debt burden remain among the principal limitations of the G20 process. At the same time, in the context of deepening political polarization and intensifying geopolitical competition throughout 2025, the G20's continued role as a platform for international dialogue and negotiation remains significant for advancing inclusiveness and strengthening multilateral global governance.



Africa's Air Transport Liberalization Process: Developments in 2025

10

Abdullah Özbay*

1. Introduction

Efforts to liberalize air transport in Africa began with the 1988 Yamoussoukro Declaration and were subsequently given a binding legal framework through the Yamoussoukro Decision adopted in 1999. This process aims to liberalize the air transport market among African countries, enhance competition, and promote continental economic integration.[1] These objectives gained new momentum in 2018 with the launch of the SAATM[2], one of the flagship projects of the African Union's Agenda 2063, while implementation has been coordinated by the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC).[3]

As of 2025, significant regulatory progress has been achieved in the implementation of SAATM. Thirty-eight states, representing approximately 80 percent of Africa's air traffic, have joined the initiative, and 26 of them have adopted the implementation commitments.[4] In addition, regulatory mechanisms concerning competition, consumer protection, and dispute resolution have been developed;[5] more than 110 new intra-African routes have been launched, and 60 bilateral air services agreements have been aligned with liberalization principles. Nevertheless, persistent difficulties in

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1 AfricanLII, Declaration of Yamoussoukro on a New African Air Transport Policy, 17 October 1988,

https://www.kisa.link/Zvlet Access Date: April 14, 2026.

2 Single African Air Transport Market

3 AFCAC, The Yamoussoukro Decision (YD),

https://www.kisa.link/oyzaW Access Date: April 18, 2026.

4 The International Air Transport Association (IATA), Africa: Growth Strengthens but Structural Challenges Keep Airline Profitability Marginal,

https://www.kisa.link/jbtHC Access Date: April 19, 2026.

5 African Airlines Association, SAATM Milestone: Inaugural Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) Administrative Council Convened,



The 3rd Luanda Financing Summit for Africa's Infrastructure Development was held in Luanda, the capital of Angola, on October 28-31, 2025. (Source: Luanda Financing Summit for Africa's Infrastructure Development | 28–31 October 2025 | AUDA-NEPAD)

accessing traffic rights, high ticket prices, and limited connectivity indicate that the practical impact of liberalization has fallen short of expectations.[6]

This study evaluates the liberalization process from the Yamoussoukro Decision to SAATM as of 2025, with the aim of analyzing both the regulatory achievements attained and the structural challenges that continue to impede implementation.

2. Economic Expectations and Regional Growth Dynamics

The liberalization of air services is generally expected to reduce airfares, increase passenger and cargo traffic, stimulate tourism, and serve as a major economic catalyst for integrating Africa's remote regions into the global economy, thereby contributing to poverty reduction[7] In this regard, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), African car-

https://www.kisa.link/JWuNt Access Date: April 19, 2026.

6 African Pilot, Africa's Single Air Transport Market: Progress Made, Connectivity Still Elusive, 17.12.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/mxQtY Access Date: April 11, 2026.

7 Charles E. Schlumberger, *The Implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision*, Institute of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2009, p. 387.

riers recorded annual growth of 6 percent in meeting air cargo demand in 2025. They also expanded their operational capacity by 7.8 percent, further strengthening their capabilities. Notably, data released in January 2026 confirmed seven consecutive months of uninterrupted growth, demonstrating that the Africa-Asia trade corridor has become one of the most dynamic routes in the global economy. The gradual removal of trade barriers under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), a key driver of regional development, has triggered a logistics transformation across the continent. Air transport plays a vital role, particularly in delivering perishable agricultural and seafood products to global markets. Furthermore, the restructuring of global supply chains, together with the rapid expansion of e-commerce and the pharmaceutical industry, continues to drive air cargo traffic across African skies.[8]

3. Structural Challenges and Outstanding Issues

Despite the sector's accelerating growth, longstanding structural challenges continue to constrain the development of Africa's air transport industry. Chief among these are AFCAC's lack of enforcement authority and the protectionist aviation policies pursued by many states, both of which are regarded as the principal obstacles facing the sector. In addition, inadequate infrastructure and the de facto restrictions imposed on traffic rights under the SAATM framework continue to slow the continent's integration process.[9]

According to IATA, the global airline industry is engaged in a major liquidity struggle. Nearly all of the $1.2 billion in blocked airline funds that governments have not permitted to be repatriated, approximately 93%, is concentrated in Africa and the Middle East. This financial impasse has significantly reduced the operational flexibility of airlines already struggling with rising fuel and operating costs, while also constituting one of the greatest obstacles to aviation investment in the region.[10]

Indeed, most carriers operate in fragmented markets characterized by relatively low traffic volumes. Currency volatility, blocked funds, and high corporate tax rates of approximately 28 percent adversely affect profitability. High taxes and fees passed on to ticket prices also suppress demand. Although the continent's demographic trends and ongoing commercial in-

8 Rebecca Jeffrey, Air cargo stakeholders back Africa, Air Cargo News, April 8, 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/jFFqe Access Date: April 14, 2026.

9 African Pilot, aforementioned website.

10 IATA, Press Release No: 58, 10.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/Uicam Access Date: March 23, 2026.

tegration provide a strong foundation for future demand, connectivity remains limited, as nearly half of all intra-African travelers are still required to obtain visas prior to departure.

4. Safety Standards and the Need for Reform

Although initiatives such as SAATM and the AfCFTA[11] offer considerable promise for the development of the aviation sector, progress has remained relatively slow.[12] In the short term, the most pressing policy priority for advancing African civil aviation is achieving compliance with international aviation safety and security standards. According to ICAO[13] data, while many African countries fell below the 60% Effective Implementation threshold in 2019, they had surpassed this benchmark by 2025. Nevertheless, despite improvements in Effective Implementation rates, the current average of 61.28% remains below both the 2024 global average of 68.67% and the target threshold of 75%.[14]

African states should implement the Yamoussoukro Decision by abandoning the practice of artificially supporting financially unsustainable national airlines and instead privatizing, divesting, or dissolving such carriers where appropriate. As international experience has demonstrated, countries that have pursued these reforms while opening their markets to foreign airlines have generally achieved more favorable outcomes.[15]

5. A New Era in African Skies: Aviation Reforms in 2025

Within the framework of the African Union's aviation and infrastructure vision, two major milestones were reached. First, at the 38th African Union Summit held in Addis Ababa in February 2025, Malawi signed its commitment to join SAATM, becoming the 38th country to participate in the continental initiative.[16] While this step is expected to reduce airfares, increase flight options, expand cargo services, and generate employment in related sectors such as tourism, the same summit also adopted the SAF[17] and LCAF[18] as well as the revised Abuja Safety Targets [19] aimed at enhancing the environmental sustainability of the aviation sector and ensuring compliance with international safety standards.[20] Later in the year, at the Third Africa Infrastructure Financing Summit held in Luanda in October 2025, a massive $30 billion investment plan was announced to modernize the con-

11 The African Continental Free Trade Area

12 IATA, Global Outlook for Air Transport Trade, AI, and the energy transition, December 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/tSyVR Access Date: March 30, 2026. p. 31.

13 International Civil Aviation Organization

14 ICAO, Safety Reports, State of Global Aviation Safety (2025) Report,

https://www.kisa.link/egqtT Access Date: March 30, 2026. pp. 60, 69.

15 Schlumberger, op. cit., p. 392.

16 African Union, Press releases, African Union Commissioner Outlines US$30 Billion Infrastructure Investment Plan at Luanda Summit, Prioritizing SAATM Modernization, 29.10.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/uJiEN Access Date: April 2, 2026.

17 Sustainable Aviation Fuels

18 Low-Carbon Aviation Fuels

19 The Abuja Safety Targets were adopted at a ministerial meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2012. The initiative aims to reduce aircraft accidents across Africa and bring the continent's aviation safety standards into line with global benchmarks.

20 African Union, Press releases, Malawi becomes 38th African Country to join Africa's Single Air Transport Market, 20.02.2025

https://www.kisa.link/ZShxG Access Date: April 2, 2026.

tinent's aviation infrastructure within the SAATM framework. Based on projections that passenger traffic across Africa will increase from approximately 160 million to nearly 500 million by 2050, more than tripling in size, the plan envisages allocating $10 billion for airport infrastructure and $8 billion for the modernization of communications, navigation, and meteorological systems. This large-scale modernization initiative aims to make African airspace seamless and sustainable by attracting climate-focused "green" investments through projects equipped with advanced technologies such as Airport Collaborative Decision Making (A-CDM) and System Wide Information Management (SWIM), while utilizing renewable energy sources and reducing carbon emissions.

Against this backdrop, the liberalization of air cargo operations has also been proposed as a "tactical opening." Because political sensitivities surrounding passenger transport are generally less pronounced in the cargo sector, this strategy is considered more feasible. Liberalizing cargo transport as a leading force would provide tangible evidence of the economic benefits generated by liberalization and pave the way for broader structural transformation.[21] Projections for 2026 indicate that Africa is poised to assume a more proactive role in the global aviation landscape.[22]


6. Conclusion

Ultimately, with the announcement of a $30 billion infrastructure investment initiative and the adoption of green energy strategies in 2025, African aviation has entered not only a phase of liberalization but also one of comprehensive modernization. To translate SAATM's regulatory achievements into tangible outcomes, liberalizing cargo operations as a "tactical spearhead" represents the most practical means of overcoming the resistance that protectionist policies have failed to break, by demonstrating the economic prosperity that liberalization can generate. If airlines are able to repatriate their blocked funds and aviation safety standards are brought in line with global averages, 2026 could mark the year in which Africa transforms from a passive participant into a proactive hub within global supply chains and international passenger traffic. In this process, the willingness of governments to abandon support for financially unsustainable national carriers in favor of embracing competitive open-skies policies will be the single most decisive factor in achieving the continent's Agenda 2063 vision.

21 African Pilot, aforementioned website.

22 Aviation & Allied Business Publications, 07.01.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/CrCmU Access Date: April 17, 2026.



Meteorological Events in Africa in 2025 and Their Impact in the Food Crisis

11

Mehmet Öten*

1. Introduction

Africa's agricultural sector is among the food systems most vulnerable to climate change on a global scale.[1] The fact that more than 90 percent of agricultural land in Sub-Saharan Africa is rain-fed makes production directly dependent on fluctuations in precipitation patterns and extreme temperatures.[2] Contributing between 23 and 30 percent of the continent's GDP and providing the primary source of livelihood for more than 60 percent of its population, this strategic sector exhibits considerable vulnerability to climate shocks due to limited irrigation infrastructure and low adaptive capacity.[3] Current projections suggest that rising temperatures could reduce yields of staple crops such as maize and wheat by as much as 25 percent by the middle of the century.[4] In this context, the 2024-2025 period constituted a critical threshold marked by unprecedented meteorological extremes across the continent. Concurrent with global warming reaching 1.45°C above pre-industrial levels in 2024,[5] the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) created conditions conducive to severe hydrological anomalies throughout Africa.

Particularly in Southern Africa, drought, together with extreme heat waves exceeding 45°C across the Sahel belt, accelerated evaporation rates, depleted soil moisture reserves, and imposed irreversible stress on rangelands and major crop groups.[6] These climatic pressures, combined with structural socioeconomic vulnerabilities, left more than 50 million people facing acute food insecurity in West and Central Africa alone.[7]

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1 M. Chabwera, et al., "Impacts of climate change on food systems in Africa: A systematic review. Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems", 2026, p 9.

2 D. O. Omokpariola et al., "Climate change, crop yield, and food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. Discover Sustainability", 2025, p. *6*(1).

3 FAO et al., "The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World", 2025, pp. 14-20.

4 D. B. Lobell et al., "Climate Trends and Global Crop Production Since 1980", *Science*, 333, 2011, pp. 616-620

5 R.J. Dunn, et al., "Global Climate [in "State of the Climate in 2023]", 2024, Bull. Amer. Meteor. Soc., 105 (8), 12-155.

6 X Liu, "Climate Change and Sustainable Development in Africa," *Chinese Journal of Urban and Environmental Studies*, 2025, pp. 1-20.

7 W. Wang, et al., Climate change as a game changer: Rethinking Africa's food security-health outcome nexus through a multi-sectoral lens", 2025, *Scientific Reports*, *15*(1).

The primary objective of this study is to assess the effects of the extreme meteorological events observed during the 2024-2025 period on agricultural production within the context of climatic processes and, based on the findings, to present a scientific framework that will contribute to the development of climate-resilient agricultural strategies.

2. Meteorological Factors (2024-2025)

During the 2024-2025 period, Africa experienced severe agricultural losses as a result of record-breaking land temperatures associated with the El Niño phase of the ENSO cycle, persistent atmospheric blocking, and intense hydrological instability.[8] Temperatures in the Sahel and North Africa, in particular, rose to 45-50°C, exceeding long-term averages by 2.5 to 3.5°C.[9] The "Saharan heat dome" affecting these regions increased potential evaporation, depleted soil moisture reserves that are critical for millet and wheat production and caused irreversible physiological heat stress in crops.[10]

8 L. E. Zita, et al., "Spatio-temporal characteristics of climate extremes in sub-Saharan Africa and potential impact of oceanic teleconnections", 2025, *Atmosphere*, *16*(1).

9 O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., "Impacts of 1.5°C global warming on natural and human systems", 2018, *Global Warming of 1.5°C*.

10 R. Meena, "Drought Management in Soils", 2024, *Springer*, pp. 163-175.

11 S. Darmaraki, B. Perez-Gomez et al., "Future evolution of marine heatwaves in the Mediterranean Sea", 2019, *Climate Dynamics*, *53*(3), 1371-1392.

12 A. Malik, M. Usman et al., "Accelerated historical and future warming in the Middle East and North Africa", 2024, *Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres*, *129*(22).

13 R. Almar et al., "A Review of Coastal Zone Changes in West Africa," *Surveys in Geophysics*, 44, 2023, pp. 183-211.

Region	Most Affected Countries	Temperature Range (°C)	Temperature Anomaly	Climatic Impact	Agricultural Impact
Sahel Region	Mali, Niger, Chad	45-48 °C	2.5-3.5 °C above avg.	Permanent sub-tropical high pressure	Heat stress in millet and sorghum
North Africa	Cezayir, Tunisia, Morocco	47-50 °C	3.0 °C anomaly	Saharan heat dome	Severe grain yield loss
East Africa	Sudan, Ethiopia	43-46 °C	2.0 °C anomaly	Regional heat wave circulation	Heat stress in animal husbandry
South Africa	Zambia, Zimbabwe	41-44 °C	2.2 °C anomaly	ENSO-induced warming	Low maize yield

Table 1. Major Heat Wave Events in Africa in 2024-2025

3. Marine Heat Waves

In addition to atmospheric warming, marine heat waves recorded in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean Basin significantly modulated regional climate patterns.[11] Sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies of +1.5 to +2.0°C persisting for extended periods of 6 to 10 months directly affected atmospheric circulation and moisture transport mechanisms along coastal zones.[12] These oceanic anomalies resulted in excessive moisture accumulation and, consequently, unstable precipitation regimes, particularly in coastal countries such as Senegal, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Algeria.[13] This situation constituted a major source of uncertainty that disrupted the accuracy of agricultural planting calendars in these regions.

4. Hydrological Instability

Hydrological variability (Table 2) intensified further during the 2023-2024 El Niño period, disrupting precipitation distribution across the continent.[14] During this period, Southern Africa, particularly Zambia and Zimbabwe, experienced substantial losses in maize production as precipitation fell to between 40 and 60 percent below seasonal averages.[15] During the same period, excessive rainfall was recorded in parts of West and East Africa. Flash floods in Nigeria and Senegal, together with widespread flooding in South Sudan, damaged cultivated land and disrupted rural livelihoods.[16] These combined climatic events clearly demonstrate the growing climate-related pressures on food security in Africa.[17]

Table 2. ENSO-Induced Hydrological Instability (2023-2025)

Region	ENSO Effect	Precipitation Anomaly	Major Event	Agricultural Impact
South Africa	El Niño drought	Between -40 and -60 %	2024 Zambia and Zimbabwe drought	40-50% loss in maize productivity
East Africa	ENSO-related precipitation variability	+20-30% variability	Flooding in South Sudan	Crop and animal losses
West Africa	Monsoon irregularity	Sudden increases of +15-25%	Flash floods in Nigeria and Senegal	Harvest loss in rice and vegetables

5. Long-Term Temperature Changes

Africa's historical temperature records reveal a pronounced and sustained warming trend between 1925 and 2025. Temperature anomalies recorded between 1925 and 1954 remained close to or below the reference-period averages, indicating a relatively stable pattern.[18] The pace of warming began to accelerate from the 1960s onward, coinciding with the Sahel droughts and increasing climate variability. This upward trend, which became more pronounced after the 1990s, reached +1.28°C during the 2020-2023 period and attained a record level of +1.45°C in 2024-2025, driven by extreme heat waves in the Sahel and North Africa.[19]

6. The Impact of Extreme Climate Events on Agriculture in Africa

The climatic anomalies experienced during the 2024-2025 period led to critical yield losses in staple food crops such as maize, wheat, sorghum, and cassava (Table 3). Maize production in Southern Africa declined by 40-50 percent due to the severe El Niño-induced drought,[20] hile cereal production in North Africa decreased by 35-50 percent under the impact of extreme heat waves. In the Sahel belt, rangeland degradation and high livestock mortality were reported, while atmospheric blocking and flooding in coastal regions disrupted fishing activities.[21] These findings demonstrate the comprehensive destructive effects of climate extremes on both terrestrial and marine food systems.

14 Kemgang Ghomsi, M. Raogosha et al., "2023-2024 El Niño amplifies record sea level surges in African marine domains", 2026, *Communications Earth & Environment*, *7*(1).

15 S. Du, and W. Xiong, "Weather Extremes and Maize Production in Africa,", 2024, *Plants*, 13, pp. 1-12.

16 M.T. Taye and E. Dyer, "Hydrologic Extremes in a Changing Climate," 2024, *Current Climate Change Reports*, pp. 98-112.

17 P. I. Palmer, A. Shaaban et al., "Drivers and impacts of Eastern African rainfall variability", 2023, *Nature Reviews Earth & Environment*, *4*(4), 254-270.

18 M. Whitmore, "Effects of Eccentric Exercise on Connective Tissue Damage*"*, 2025, University of Central Arkansas, pp. 18-25.

19 F. Xie, *"*Climate Change Impacts in the Mediterranean Basin and Northern Africa", 2025, University of Toronto, pp. 11-19.

20 Chabwera op. cit.

21 B. Bajaha, "Sahelian Realities of Climate Change", 2024, pp. 45-50.

Region	Country	Major Basic Food Crops	Estimated Productivity Loss (%)	Impact on Animal Husbandry / Fishing	Climatic Variability / Factor	Recently Growing Resilient Crops
North Africa	Morocco	Wheat, Barley	45-60 % loss	Rangeland productivity loss	Severe drought and heat waves	Sorghum, Millet
	Algeria	Wheat, Barley	35-50 % loss	Shrinking pasture lands	Long-term drought	Millet
	Tunisia	Wheat, Barley	~80 % contraction in grain sector	Animal feed supply loss	Record-level heat waves	Sorghum
	Libya	Wheat	30-40 % loss	Desertification pressures	Severe drought	Millet
	Egypt	Wheat, Rice	10-20 % loss	Saline intrusion impacting fishing on the Nile Delta	Rising sea levels and salinity	Salt-tolerant rice varieties
West Africa	Nigeria	Rice, Maize	25-35 % loss	Flood-induced animal losses	Flash floods	Casava
	Ghana	Maize	20-30 % loss	Loss in rangeland quality	Precipitation variability	Cassava
	Senegal	Rice, vegetables	25-30 % loss	Coastal fishing affected by warming seas	Marine heat waves	Millet
	Mali	Millet, Sorghum	15-25 % loss	Rangeland degradation	Sahel droughts	Sorghum
	Niger	Millet	20-30 % loss	Animal deaths	Heat waves and drought	Peas
	Burkina Faso	Sorghum, Millet	20-35 % loss	Rangeland scarcity	Sahel droughts	Millet
	Togo	Maize	15-25 % loss	Stress in local animal husbandry	Irregular precipitation	Cassava
	Benin	Maize	15-20 % loss	Shrinking pasture lands	Climate variability	Cassava
Central Africa	Cameroon	Maize, Cassava	15-20 % loss	Heat and humidity-induced rise in animal diseases	Precipitation variability	Cassava
	Chad	Sorghum	30-40 % loss	Severe animal deaths	Severe drought	Millet
	Central African Republic	Maize	20-25 % loss	Rangeland availability loss	Drought	Cassava
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Cassava, Maize	10-15 % loss	Pressure on inland fishery	Flooding	Cassava
	Kongo	Cassava	10-15 % loss	River flooding	Severe precipitation	Cassava
	Gabon	Cassava	Minimum impact	Variability in fishery	Severe precipitation	Cassava
East Africa	Ethiopia	Wheat, Teff	20-30 % loss	Bovine animal deaths	Heat waves and drought	Teff
	Kenya	Maize	30-40 % loss	Rangeland degradation	Multiseasonal drought	Sorghum
	Somalia	Sorghum	35-45 % loss	Severe animal deaths	Severe drought	Millet
	Sudan	Sorghum, Wheat	25-35 % loss	Rangeland degradation	Heat waves	Millet
	South Sudan	Sorghum	20-30 % loss	Flooding-induced animal losses	Sel	Cassava
	Uganda	Maize	15-25 % loss	Animal disease outbreaks	Precipitation variability	Cassava
	Tanzania	Maize, Rice	20-25 % loss	Shrinking pasture lands	Heat waves	Cassava
	Rwanda	Maize	10-15 % loss	Small-scale animal losses	Precipitation variability	Cassava
South Africa	Zambia	Maize	40-50 % loss	Animal feed scarcity	El Niño drought	Sorghum
	Zimbabwe	Maize	45-50 % loss	Shrinking pasture lands	Severe droughts	Millet
	Malawi	Maize	30-40 % loss	Productivity loss in animal husbandry	El Niño drought	Cassava
	Mozambique	Maize, Rice	25-35 % loss	Coastal fishery stress	Hurricanes and floods	Cassava
	Botswana	Sorghum	20-30 % loss	Rangeland degradation	Heat waves	Millet
	Namibia	Maize	20-25 % loss	Animal deaths	Severe droughts	Sorghum
	South Africa	Maize, Wheat	15-20 % loss	Rangeland productivity loss	Heat waves	Sorghum
	Angola	Cassava, Maize	15-20 % loss	Productivity loss in animal husbandry	Irregular precipitation	Cassava

Table 3. The Impact of Extreme Climate Events on Agriculture in Africa in 2024-2025 and Climate-Resilient Genotypes

7. The Resulting Food Crisis and its Socioeconomic Impact

Climate-induced disruptions in agriculture have deepened socioeconomic pressures across Africa, triggering a widespread food crisis.[22] As of the 2024-2025 period, crop yield losses and supply disruptions have led to inflationary increases of between 30 and 50 percent in the prices of strategic commodities.[23]

As a result of these pressures, more than 50 million people in West and Central Africa have reached the level of acute hunger (IPC Phase 3+).[24] The weakening of rural livelihoods has also accelerated migration flows, creating a "displacement spiral" that heightens the risk of regional conflict.[25] Climate adaptation strategies developed in response to this existential threat are transforming traditional production practices. In place of water-intensive Maize and Wheat, resilient crops with low water requirements, such as Sorghum, Millet, and Cassava, are emerging as a form of "social insurance." In addition, salt-tolerant Rice varieties used in regions such as the Nile Delta aim to safeguard production against rising sea levels. Consequently, this strategic transformation constitutes a tangible indicator of Africa's efforts to strengthen the resilience of its food systems against climatic shocks.

8. Conclusion


The 2024-2025 period demonstrated the extent to which interacting extreme climate events can render Africa's food systems vulnerable. Record continental warming of approximately +1.45°C, combined with extreme heat waves, marine temperature anomalies, and ENSO-induced hydrological variability, resulted in losses of 40-50 percent in maize yields in Southern Africa and 35-50 percent in cereal production in North Africa. These production losses increased the prices of staple foods by 30-50 percent, pushing food insecurity in the region to a critical level. These findings demonstrate that expanding climate-resilient agricultural practices, managing transboundary water resources through an integrated approach, and strengthening the institutional capacity of early warning systems are priority requirements for ensuring sustainable food security.

22 FAO, "The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World", 2024, Rome: pp. 62-69.

23 World Bank, "Food Security Update: Africa Region", 2024, Washington DC, pp. 7-9.

24 WFP, "Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC)", 2025, Rome, pp. 34-36.

25 IPCC, "Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report", 2023, *Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, pp. 37-71.



Defense Industry in Africa in 2025: Developments, Dynamics and Sustainability

12

Levent Kırval*

1. Introduction

In the second quarter of the twenty-first century, Africa has emerged as a region undergoing a profound transformation in its defense industry, shaped by changes in the security environment, technological advancements, and intensifying geopolitical competition. As of 2025, the continent's defense industrial capacity is evolving not only through efforts to reduce dependence on foreign procurement but also through expanded local production, regional cooperation, and technological adaptation. This article examines the current state of Africa's defense industry, its structural challenges, its relationships with global actors, and possible future policy directions, drawing on academic and institutional sources.

2. Structural Characteristics of Africa's Defense Industry

The structure of the defense industry across Africa varies considerably from one country to another. Only a handful of countries – notably South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, and, to a more limited extent, Nigeria – possess relatively advanced defense manufacturing capabilities. Nevertheless, most African countries remain dependent on external suppliers for advanced technolog-

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ical systems and complete weapons platforms. This diversity makes it difficult to analyze Africa's defense industry under a single strategic framework while simultaneously providing a rich comparative perspective for examining different models of industrial development.

South Africa's defense industry is built upon an industrial base that has been sustained for decades, originating from the country's robust domestic production capacity during the apartheid era. Academic studies characterize South Africa's defense industry as a "second-tier" industrial structure integrated into global defense networks. Although the sector faces a range of challenges, it has emerged as a regional hub for the production of conventional weapons systems, armored vehicles, electronic systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Egypt and Algeria constitute two other major actors that have expanded their military production capabilities. Egypt has increased its capacity in areas such as weapons platforms, ammunition production, and military vehicle assembly, while Algeria continues its modernization efforts through regular procurement agreements with Russian and European partners. These differentiated industrial profiles illustrate both the heterogeneous nature of defense manufacturing capacity across Africa and the varying patterns of externally driven dependency.



3. Africa's Defense Industry Trends in 2025

3.1. The Rise of Local Production and Partnerships

The year 2025 marked a significant milestone in strengthening indigenous defense production capacity across Africa. In particular, local manufacturing and international partnership models have gained strate-



The National Combat Aircraft KAAN took the world stage with its next-generation unveiling. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

gic importance at both the public and private sector levels. Many countries have taken concrete steps to invest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies while establishing production partnerships. This trend reflects Africa's efforts to evolve beyond being merely a market for foreign suppliers toward developing capabilities in technology adaptation as well as maintenance and repair activities.

In this context, events such as the Bamako Expo (BAMEX'25) demonstrated not only the growing presence of Turkish defense companies on the continent but also their commitment to establishing long-term partnerships. At BAMEX'25, held in Bamako, the capital of Mali, Baykar, ASELSAN, Roketsan, MKE, and other Turkish defense companies met with military and civilian delegations from across Africa. This engagement reflects ongoing efforts to provide solutions tailored to African countries' defense requirements while fostering technology transfer partnerships.

Beyond these developments, several African countries have established private initiatives and state-supported institutions to strengthen their domestic production capabilities. For example, the Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC) in Ethiopia has developed extensive manufacturing capabilities for both military and civilian products. Such institutions are engaged in producing fundamental defense equipment, including ammunition and armored systems.

3.2. Growing Global Influence and Technology Transfer

In 2025, Africa's defense market was shaped not only by the initiatives of domestic actors but also by the active participation of global defense companies. International defense exhibitions, particularly the Egypt Defence Expo (EDEX) 2025, provided a platform for companies from around the world to showcase advanced UAV technologies, counter-drone systems, and artificial intelligence-enabled defense solutions. Companies from Russia, China, the United States, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates participated in these exhibitions, underscoring the extent to which external actors continue to shape defense procurement across Africa.

The significance of these exhibitions extended well beyond product promotion, serving as catalysts for technology transfer and joint production agreements. In particular, partnerships established between African countries and foreign firms to support local industries increasingly include

technology transfer arrangements and research and development collaborations. Nevertheless, critical issues such as transparency, oversight, and long-term capacity building remain essential to the success of industrial policies.

3.3. Emerging Technologies in the Defense Industry

In 2025, technologies such as unmanned systems, artificial intelligence-enabled command and control networks, autonomous platforms, and advanced cybersecurity solutions emerged as the leading trends in the defense sector. These technologies not only expand military operational capabilities but also create new research and development opportunities for local industries. Major defense actors in Africa are working both with foreign companies to introduce and adapt these advanced technologies to African markets and with domestic institutions to strengthen their own research and development infrastructure.

4. Challenges and Obstacles

4.1. Financing and Structural Constraints

Africa's defense industry continues to face significant financial challenges in its efforts to modernize and expand indigenous production capacity. Reports by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicate that the continent's total military expenditure accounts for only a small share of global defense spending, while defense budgets in many African countries remain insufficient. This limits investment in advanced weapons systems and complicates efforts to establish sustainable domestic production capabilities.

4.2. Challenges in Technology Transfer and Localization

Although African countries frequently emphasize technology transfer as a key objective in their partnerships with external actors, the process remains complex and fraught with uncertainties. There are examples demonstrating that, when effectively implemented, offset[1] programs can facilitate the diffusion of technical expertise into local economies. In many cases, however, such programs have had only limited impact. For instance, while offset arrangements in Morocco and Egypt have strengthened technical ca-

1 When a country purchases a major defense system (such as a fighter aircraft, missile system, or radar) from another country, it may require the supplier to provide economic or technological benefits in return. This system of reciprocal obligations is known as an offset program.

pabilities, shortcomings in information technology infrastructure and research and development capacity have prevented these gains from expanding on a broader scale.

4.3. Limitations in Human Capital and R&D Ecosystem

Across Africa, the specialized engineering workforce and research and development infrastructure required for advanced technological production remain underdeveloped. In many countries, engineering education, research institutions, and the defense industry are not sufficiently integrated, limiting indigenous innovation capacity. As a result, dependence on foreign actors for the design and development of advanced defense systems continues.

5. The Role of External Actors and Geopolitical Influences

The role of external actors in Africa's defense industry has expanded significantly. Russia, China, Türkiye, the United States, and defense companies based in the Middle East are competing for market share across the continent. These actors are engaged not only in arms sales but, in some cases, also in technology transfer and joint production agreements aimed at supporting the development of local defense industries. This trend can be viewed as part of Africa's broader integration into the global defense industrial landscape.

Nevertheless, this engagement also entails certain risks. In some cases, defense products supplied by external actors may further complicate local conflict dynamics or create new forms of political dependency. Consequently, transparency, effective oversight, and adherence to international norms must remain central considerations in defense partnerships with foreign actors.

6. Future Outlook

As of 2025, Africa's defense industry is making a concerted effort to move beyond its traditional role as a market dependent on external suppliers. Indigenous production initiatives, regional coordination mechanisms, and international technology partnerships are creating significant opportunities for industrial development. However, achieving a sustainable defense industry will require prioritizing the following policy areas:

Technology Transfer and Localization: Advanced technology transfer mechanisms, policies that promote domestic manufacturing, and strengthened research and development ecosystems are essential.


Financing Strategies: State-supported funding mechanisms and regional investment instruments should be optimized to finance defense production capacity.

Human Capital Development: Stronger cooperation should be established between technical education institutions, the defense industry, and manufacturing organizations.

Transparency and Regulatory Frameworks: Greater transparency in defense procurement processes and compliance with international norms are fundamental to achieving sustainable economic and security gains and should be further strengthened.

7. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a period of transformation for Africa's defense industry. Across the continent, efforts to strengthen indigenous production capabilities and expand regional cooperation advanced significantly. At the same time, the growing involvement of external actors and the increasing presence of global defense companies in African markets are reshaping the dynamics of defense manufacturing on the continent. Nevertheless, structural challenges, including inadequate financing, persistent obstacles to technology transfer, and shortages of qualified human capital, remain critical barriers to the sustainable development of the industry. Long-term, inclusive policy frameworks and enhanced intra-African cooperation therefore have the potential to strengthen Africa's defense industrial capacity at both the regional and global levels. In this regard, Türkiye's contributions to Africa's defense industry over the years have undoubtedly been significant, and the continuation of these efforts will remain highly beneficial.



Africa in Global Climate Governance: 2025 Energy Policies and Restorative Justice

13

Dilşad Taşkın Kuveloğlu*

1. Introduction

The African continent entered 2025 amid a multilayered crisis shaped by the intersection of global economic, environmental, and geopolitical dynamics. At the same time, this vulnerability marks a transformative threshold that offers Africa an opportunity to reposition itself within global climate governance. Although Africa is responsible for less than 4 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, it is one of the continents most severely affected by the adverse impacts of climate change.[1] The fact that nine of the world's most fragile countries are located in Africa[2] has historically positioned the continent as the "aggrieved party" in international negotiation processes. However, developments in 2025 indicate that this narrative is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

The year 2025 presents an intensive and multilayered landscape for climate diplomacy. The AU's 2025 theme, "Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations," was adopted at the 37th Ordinary Summit and officially proclaimed at the 38th Summit.[3] While the Second Africa Climate Summit, held in Addis Ababa the same year, redefined Africa's climate policy priorities[4], South Africa's G20 presidency culminated in

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1 African Development Bank, "COP30: African Development Bank Group to champion Africa's Push for Climate Finance Reform and Just Energy Transition", 06.11.2025

https://www.kisa.link/IhFDA , Access Date: 31.03.2026.

2 UN, "Time for Reparatory Justice, Permanent Security Council Seats for Africa, Secretary-General Tells Continental Summit", 17.02.2025,


https://www.kisa.link/ddhvc , Access Date: 02.04.2026.

3 Union Africiaine, "Press releases 38th African Union Summit to Focus on Reparatory Justice and Racial Healing Under the Theme: Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations", 28.01.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/scnCa, Access Date: 02.04.2026.

4 World Resource Institute, "What to Watch at the Second Africa Climate Summit", 29.08.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/xRYyn, Access Date: 29.03.2026.



The Second Africa Climate Summit was held in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, on September 8-10, 2025.

the Johannesburg Summit,[5] and COP30, held in Belém, reshaped global discussions on climate finance.[6] These developments demonstrate that Africa's position within international climate governance is being redefined.

This article examines how the AU's vision of "Restorative Justice" is integrated with demands for climate finance and technology transfer, and how the international climate standards promoted by the European Union (EU) are transforming the energy policies of leading African countries. The analysis is based on Kingdon's "multiple streams framework" and demonstrates that the policy window created by the convergence of streams in 2025 enhanced Africa's negotiating capacity and reshaped its energy policies toward green industrialization.

2. 2025 Theme of AU: Restorative Justice and Climate Finance

A At the 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, held in Addis Ababa on February 17-18, 2024, AU Heads of State and Government designated the 2025 theme as "Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations."[7] This theme is grounded in a restorative justice framework that addresses the structural inequalities resulting from historical injustices such as colonialism, the transatlantic slave trade, and apartheid.[8] This approach extends beyond symbolic rhetoric and is directly linked to concrete policy areas, including climate finance, technology transfer, and debt restructuring.[9]

5 Local Government for Sustainability (ICLEI) Africa, "African priorities and perspectives at COP30 and the 2025 G20 Summit", 25.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/MdXKn , Access Date: 02.04.2026.

6 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "COP30 outcomes for Africa", 28.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/Jlcqt , Access Date: 29.03.2026.

7 African Union Commission, "AU Theme Of The Year 2025",15.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/uKvJS , Access Date: 29.03.2026.

8 African Union Commission, "AU Theme Of The Year 2025",15.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/uKvJS , Access Date: 29.03.2026.

9 Pan-African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), "Climate and Economic Justice Campaign Implementation Framework 2025–2026", 14.01.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/ivqcZ , Access Date: 03.04.2026.

The "Second Africa Climate Summit", held in Addis Ababa in September 2025, focused on policy discussions aimed at closing Africa's climate finance gap and accelerating its green transition. The mobilization of more than $20 billion in commitments at the first summit, held in Nairobi in 2023, underscores the central importance of the financing dimension. Within this framework, the Second Summit highlighted the reform of multilateral development banks and the expansion of investment flows.[10] The Baku-to-Belém Roadmap, which gained prominence during the COP30 process, aims to increase climate finance to $1.3 trillion annually by 2035, while the just transition approach plays a central role in transforming fossil fuel-dependent economies.[11] Within the framework of the G20 Johannesburg Summit held in November 2025, South Africa's presidency placed the priorities of developing countries regarding the energy transition, energy security, and critical minerals on the global agenda.[12] UN Secretary-General António Guterres's emphasis that borrowing costs for African countries are up to eight times higher than those of developed countries highlights the continent's need for a more equitable climate finance structure.[13] In this context, it is evident that the continent requires a more balanced and inclusive financing framework aligned with its perspective on restorative justice. This process institutionally reinforces Africa's transition from a reactive actor to a proactive negotiator.

3. The Transformative Impact of International Climate Standards on Domestic Energy Policies

3.1. CBAM and its Macroeconomic Impact on African Exports

The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which entered its transitional phase on October 1, 2023, completed that phase on December 31, 2025, and entered full implementation as of January 1, 2026.[14] Covering the cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizer, electricity, and hydrogen sectors, the mechanism seeks to ensure that the carbon pricing of imported products is equivalent to that applied to producers within the EU, while requiring the carbon content to be reflected in export prices as an "embedded cost."[15]

Modeling specific to the African continent indicates that the economic effects of CBAM could reach significant levels. According to analyses con-

10 World Resources Institute, "Key Themes to Watch at the 2025 Africa Climate Summit", 29.08.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/xRYyn , Access Date: 04.04.2026.

11 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, "COP30 outcomes for Africa", 28.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/Jlcqt , Access Date: 29.03.2026.

12 Local Government for Sustainability (ICLEI) Africa, "African priorities and perspectives at COP30 and the 2025 G20 Summit", 25.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/MdXKn , Access Date: 02.04.2026.

13 UN, "Time for Reparatory Justice, Permanent Security Council Seats for Africa, Secretary-General Tells Continental Summit", 17.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/ddhvc, Access Date: 02.04.2026.

14 European Commission, "Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism",
https://www.kisa.link/KiUHs , Access Date: 06.04.2026.

15 European Commission, "Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism",
https://www.kisa.link/KiUHs , Access Date: 06.04.2026.

ducted by the African Climate Foundation and the LSE, under a scenario in which the mechanism covers all product categories, Africa's GDP is projected to decline by approximately 0.9 percent (equivalent to approximately $25 billion based on 2021 data).[16] On a sectoral basis, export losses are estimated to reach as much as 13.9 percent for aluminum, 8.2 percent for iron and steel, 3.9 percent for fertilizers, and 3.1 percent for cement.[17] Given that a substantial share of Africa's exports in CBAM-covered sectors is directed toward the EU market, these effects constitute a structural risk.[18]

On the other hand, CBAM stands out not only as a cost factor but also as a mechanism that generates pressure for transformation. In particular, North African countries have increasingly directed investments toward renewable energy in order to reduce the carbon costs of their industrial sectors. In this context, the growing importance of embedded carbon in international trade suggests that the mechanism may serve as a catalyst for promoting green industrialization.[19]

Sector	EU Share (%)	Export Loss	Primarily Affected Countries
Aluminum	~12%	-13.9%	Mozambique, South Africa, Morocco
Iron & Steel	~16%	-8.2%	South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia
Fertilizer	~26%	-3.9%	Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria
Cement	~12%	-3.1%	Egypt, Morocco, Algeria
Electricity/H_2	Variable	Uncertain	Morocco, Egypt, South Africa

Table 1: Sectoral Impact of CBAM on African Exports (Estimated GDP and Export Loss)

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from African Climate Foundation & LSE (2023) and ATAF (2026).

3.2. 2025 Energy Policies and Practices in Leading Countries

As of 2025, South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, and Morocco rank among the leading countries in Africa in terms of renewable energy capacity and policy development.[20] The findings presented in Table 2 demonstrate that the continent's energy transition is not taking shape through a uniform model but rather through country-specific resource advantages and policy instruments. In South Africa, mechanisms such as the REIPPPP and the JETP have facilitated investment attraction, while Egypt is advancing toward becoming a regional energy hub through large-scale wind and hydrogen projects. Kenya's geothermal-focused structure and its goal of achieving 100 percent renewable energy point to a more comprehensive transformation vision,

16 London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), "Implicatıons For African Countries Of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism In The EU",

https://www.kisa.link/VFmCx , Access Date: 23.03.2026.

17 London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), "Implicatıons For African Countries Of a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism In The EU",

https://www.kisa.link/VFmCx , Access Date: 23.03.2026.

18 African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), "Technical Note on EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and Implications for African Exports", 15.03.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/AbMnH , Access Date: 21.03.2026.

19 Africian Business, "Africa Braces For İmpact Of EU Carbon Border Tax", 05.11.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/Yqabq , Access Date: 16.03.2026.

20 Energy in Africa, "Renewable Energy in Africa: Capacity, Growth and Trends 2025", 8 Aralık 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/zrWSs , Access Date: 22.03.2026.

whereas Morocco is pursuing an export-oriented green growth strategy by combining solar and wind investments with financial instruments.

In 2025, South Africa increased climate finance mobilization, securing investments totaling approximately ZAR 188 billion, although the persistence of the investment gap was also emphasized.[21] The Grootfontein solar project (273 MW), developed under the REIPPPP, is among the notable examples of this process.[22] In Egypt, financing was secured for the 650 MW Red Sea and the 1.1 GW Suez wind projects, while green hydrogen agreements were also signed with international partners.[23] In Kenya, projects integrating renewable energy with hydrogen continued to advance, with the 180 MW HDF Green Hydrogen Solar PV project standing out in this field. In Morocco, meanwhile, the 105 MW-solar power plant commissioned by the OCP Group in Khouribga provides renewable energy for industrial operations.[24]

Country	RE Capacity	Key Development in 2025	2030 Target	Key Policy Instrument
South Africa	10 GW	New solar projects under REIPPPP (e.g., ~273 MW Grootfontein); $18.8 billion climate finance	≈18 GW	REIPPPP; JETP ($8.5 Billion)
Egypt	12 GW	Large-scale wind projects; green hydrogen initiatives (1.1 GW Gulf of Suez Wind + 650 MW Red Sea Wind; green hydrogen agreements)	42% (by 2035)	BOOT; competitive bidding/tenders; Egypt Vision 2030
Kenya	~1 GW (geothermal)	Olkaria geothermal expansion; hydrogen and solar projects (e.g., 180 MW HDF Green Hydrogen Solar PV Project)	100% RE electricity (by 2030)	Energy Act 2019; Tariffs + Auctions
Morocco	~4 GW	Expansion of solar and wind projects; OCP investments (OCP 105 MW Solar Khouribga); Masdar/AMEA/TAQA $10 Billion investment negotiations	52% electricity (by 2030)	Green Bond; RE Development Law; Net Metering

Table 2: Energy Policies and Capacities in Leading Countries in 2025

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from Energy in Africa (2025), ScienceDirect (2025), and Ethical Business Africa (2025).

4. Policy Windows in Energy Reforms within the Framework of the Multiple Streams Model

Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) explains policy change through the convergence of the problem, policy, and politics streams; at these moments of convergence, "policy windows" open, allowing reform proposals that had previously remained off the agenda to be implemented.[25] 2025 developments in Africa illustrate a pattern within this framework.

21 Climate Policy Initiative, 24.10.2025, https://www.kisa.link/kreim, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

22 Energy in Africa, "Top Five Solar Power Projects Completed in Africa in 2025",12.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/JeGKG , Access Date: 02.04.2026.

23 Fullygreen Africa, "Africa's 2025 Renewable Energy Highlights", 08.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/xBXVX , Access Date: 02.04.2026.

24 Energy in Africa, "Top Five Solar Power Projects Completed in Africa in 2025",12.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/JeGKG , Access Date: 02.04.2026.

25 Fatih Çelik, "Kamu Politikaları Yapımında Çoklu Akımlar Çerçevesi", Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 24 No. 3, 1493 – 1516, 2022.

Stream	2025 Components	Impact on Policy
Problem Stream	Escalating impacts of climate change (drought, flooding); entry into force of CBAM; export risks	Escalating impacts of climate change (drought, flooding); entry into force of CBAM; export risks
Policy Stream	Baku-to-Belém roadmap; JETP financial packages; climate finance and compensation/loss and damage debates	A suite of solutions consisting of financial and policy instruments has emerged
Politics Stream	African Union's 2025 "Restorative Justice" theme; South Africa's G20 Presidency; ACS2; hosting of COP32 designated to Ethiopia; climate summits and international negotiations	Africa's international negotiating capacity has been strengthened, and policy alignment has increased

Table 3: Africa's 2025 Energy Transition through the Multiple Streams Framework

Source: Adapted from Kingdon's (2011) framework; compiled by the author based on empirical components from [2], [7], and 2025 developments in the relevant texts.

From the perspective of the problem stream, 2025 constituted a critical pressure point due to the conclusion of the CBAM transitional period and the commencement of full implementation on January 1, 2026.[26] This development effectively compels Africa to green its production processes in order to maintain its competitiveness in the EU market, thereby moving the energy transition beyond an environmental issue and placing it within the context of industrial competitiveness and economic security.

With respect to the policy stream, the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap, the African Development Bank's initiatives aimed at mobilizing $4 billion in financing by 2025,[27] and the JETP framework demonstrate that concrete instruments supporting the transition are already in place. South Africa's REIPPPP serves as an example of the practical applicability of these instruments through its competitive procurement model.[28]

The politics stream strengthened markedly in 2025. The AU's theme of "Restorative Justice" evolved beyond the level of discourse into a call for action, while South Africa's G20 Presidency and the decisions concerning the hosting of COP32 in Ethiopia demonstrated Africa's growing capacity to shape the global agenda.[29] The simultaneous strengthening of these three streams opened a significant policy window for energy reforms.

Nevertheless, as the MSF approach suggests, such policy windows are not permanent and must be utilized before they close. The failure to translate financing commitments into actual financial flows, or changes in the in-

26 European Commission, "Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism",

https://www.kisa.link/KiUHs , Access Date: 06.04.2026.

27 African Development Bank Group, "On the road to COP30: AfDB Piloting Financial Instruments to Support African Countries in Tackling Climate Change", 06.11.2025 ,

https://www.kisa.link/MsjzO , Access Date: 11.04.2026.

28 Energy in Africa, "Renewable Energy in Africa: Capacity, Growth and Trends 2025", 8 Aralık 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/zrWSs , Access Date: 22.03.2026.

29 Local Government for Sustainability (ICLEI) Africa, "African priorities and perspectives at COP30 and the 2025 G20 Summit", 25.11.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/MdXKn , Access Date: 02.04.2026.

ternational political environment (such as the United States distancing itself from the G20), could jeopardize the sustainability of the current gains.


5. Conclusion

This study demonstrates that, in 2025, the African continent underwent a significant transformation within global climate governance, shifting from the role of a "passive victim" to that of a "strategic partner in solutions." The theme of "Restorative Justice" has evolved beyond a purely symbolic appeal into a framework that legitimizes concrete demands related to climate finance, technology transfer, and debt restructuring.

International climate standards, particularly CBAM, function both as an external source of pressure and as a development opportunity for green industrialization. Leading countries, namely South Africa, Egypt, Kenya, and Morocco, have reflected this dual pressure-opportunity dynamic in their policy reforms, and renewable energy investments in these countries have reached record levels.

From the perspective of the Multiple Streams Framework, 2025 represents a critical turning point in which the problem stream (the conclusion of the CBAM transitional period and climate disasters), the policy stream (international financing mechanisms and the JETP), and the politics stream (the AU's "Restorative Justice" theme, South Africa's G20 Presidency, and ACS2) simultaneously gained strength and opened a policy window. Whether this window can be successfully utilized will largely depend on whether current commitments are translated into actual financial flows in the coming years.

In conclusion, the international climate regime presents Africa with both a source of structural pressure and an opportunity for strategic repositioning. To capitalize effectively on this opportunity, the continent must strengthen its negotiating capacity, institutionalize carbon Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems, and align its energy policies with a long-term green industrialization strategy.



The Start-Up Ecosystem in Africa in 2025

14

N. Ceren Türkmen*

1. Introduction

The year 2025 can be regarded as a significant turning point for the African start-up ecosystem (ASE), not only as a period in which new volumes of investment were secured but also as one in which the entrepreneurial landscape across the continent was fundamentally redefined. The ASE has evolved beyond being merely a collection of "early-stage technology companies" into a multidimensional arena of transformation in which access to finance, regulatory capacity, local talent pools, digital infrastructure, regional integration, and global capital flows collectively shape the rules of the game. In this context, while 2025 generated signals of recovery and scaling, it also demonstrated the persistence of geographic concentration, financing disparities, and institutional vulnerabilities.

Analyzing the global architecture of the ASE through the lens of a singular Silicon Valley-type model is analytically challenging. In this regard, as noted in the approach of Nkontwana and Stam,[1] entrepreneurial ecosystems in Africa must be understood in conjunction with local conditions, societal needs, and development priorities. Similarly, micro-level studies demonstrate that start-up ecosystems in diverse contexts, particularly in Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Namibia, are shaped in different ways by state capacity, informal networks, support organizations, and dependence on ex-

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1 P. Nkontwana andE. Stam, "Entrepreneurial Ecosystems for the Africa we want.", 2023, *U.S.E. Working Papers Series*; S. 23, No. 05, Utrecht University, pp. 1-28.

ternal funding. Consequently, when assessing developments in 2025, it is important to consider not only changes in quantitative indicators, such as the number and volume of start-ups across the continent, but also the institutional structures within which these changes occurred.

2. 2025 Overview of the Start-Up Ecosystem in Africa

At first glance, the 2025 data indicate a notable revival of the ASE. During the first quarter of the year, 116 venture capital transactions were completed in Africa, with a total transaction value reaching approximately $0.6 billion. Although the number of transactions declined slightly on an annual basis, their total value increased, with early-stage seed ventures in particular regaining momentum. This trend strengthened during the first half of the year, with transaction volume increasing by 11 percent year-over-year and transaction value rising by 38 percent. This increase suggests that the ecosystem has begun to recover not merely through a few mega-deals but on the basis of a broader foundation of early-stage ventures.

On an annual basis, according to Disrupt Africa,[2] 178 African technology start-ups attracted more than $1.6 billion in investment in 2025. According to Partech,[3] total funding in the African technology ecosystem reached $4.1 billion, of which $2.4 billion consisted of equity financing and $1.6 billion of debt financing. AVCA[4] also reported 506 transactions with a total value of $3.9 billion in 2025.[5] In this respect, 2025 marked a clear year of recovery following the contraction experienced in 2023 and 2024.

2.1. The Financial Structure of the Start-Up Ecosystem in Africa

One of the most notable features of 2025 was the significant increase in venture debt financing. According to Partech data, debt financing accounted for 41 percent of total funding, while AVCA reported that the number of transactions in this category reached 74, with a total value of $1.8 billion. Nevertheless, this development does not imply that the challenges related to financial deepening have been overcome. According to the IFC[6] (2025) (2025), approximately 80 percent of corporate financing continues to originate from sources outside the continent. This indicates that the ecosystem remains vulnerable to the investment preferences of external investors.

2 Disrupt Africa, "The African tech startups funding report 2025", 21.02.2026, https://www.kisa.link/QgKpr, Access Date: 31 Mart 2026.

3 Partech, "2025 Partech Africa Tech VC report: African tech funding rebounds to US$4.1B driven by record debt activity and disciplined equity growth", 21.01.2026, https://www.kisa.link/wfEkI, Access Date: March 31, 2026.

4 African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (AVCA), "2025 venture capital in Africa report", 10.02.2026, https://www.kisa.link/QhhgM, Access Date: 31 Mart 2026.

5 Note on differences in measurement: Disrupt Africa, Partech, and AVCA use different samples and scopes. Disrupt Africa tracks funded African technology ventures within a relatively narrower framework; Partech provides a broader investment overview by covering technology transactions exceeding $200,000 as well as venture capital investments; and AVCA assesses ventures across the continent as a whole. Therefore, the different figures reported for 2025 should be interpreted not as contradictions but as reflecting differences in scope.

Despite this growth, structural challenges remain significant. The IFC states that only one-third of funded start-ups in Sub-Saharan Africa receive their first venture capital investment within their first five years. This demonstrates that financing is not merely an issue of total volume but also one of timely access.

The academic literature indicates that structural vulnerabilities persist in the ASE despite the increase in financing. In the case of Ethiopia, regulatory gaps, shortages of skilled labor, limited access to venture capital, and weak industrial linkages are identified among the principal bottleneck.[7] A study focusing on Yabacon in Nigeria reveals that public support capacity remains inadequate and that the ecosystem is sustained largely through informal networks and self-help mechanism.[8] K n Kenya, meanwhile, the concentration of entrepreneurial activity in Nairobi, insufficient coordination, and duplication among support programs are emphasized as factors limiting ecosystem efficiency.[9] Therefore, despite the recovery in financing during 2025, problems related to institutional infrastructure have persisted.

Nevertheless, 2025 also generated significant opportunities for the African start-up ecosystem. Foremost among these is regional market integration. The broad economic area envisioned under the AfCFTA offers considerable opportunities for expansion, particularly for ventures with the capacity to scale across borders. However, realizing this potential in the form of tangible economic outcomes depends on achieving harmonization in data governance, payment systems, digital identity infrastructure, and entrepreneurship legislation. Similarly, Africa's youthful population represents a strategic advantage in terms of entrepreneurial capacity. However, translating this demographic advantage into economic value requires support through talent development, technical education, early-stage financing, and predictable regulatory frameworks.

2.2. Geographic Concentration of the Start-Up Ecosystem in Africa

The most prominent characteristic of the ASE in 2025 was the continued concentration of investments in a limited number of countries and regions. In 2024, start-up investments in Africa were largely concentrated in four countries: Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa accounted for 71.5 percent of funded ventures and attracted 88.8 percent of the total investment volume. A similar concentration persisted in 2025. In this context, ecosys-

6 International Finance Corporation, "Venture capital and the rise of Africa's tech startups", 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/DQhNL, Access Date: March 31, 2026.

7 B. Abebe, "Diagnostic study on African startup ecosystem for greater knowledge based-economic growth: The case of Ethiopia", *ASRIC Journal on Social Sciences and Humanities,* 5(2), 205–243.

8 V. O. Manya, "Dynamics of a start-up ecosystem in Africa: A case study of Yabacon in Nigeria" Master's Thesis, *International Institute of Social Studies,* Erasmus University Rotterdam.

9 S. Muathe, S. Maina et al., "Understanding startups ecosystem in Kenya: Drivers, challenges, and opportunities", *Journal of Business and Management Sciences*, 2022 10(3), 138–146.

tem growth across the African continent exhibited a polycentric yet uneven geographical pattern. Within the Sub-Saharan African start-up ecosystem, Lagos, Nairobi, Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Accra emerged as the principal hubs.

According to Startup Genome, Lagos ranks first in its region in terms of funding and second in terms of performance. Its ecosystem is valued at $9.8 billion and hosts three active unicorns. The city is reported to have more than 2,000 start-ups, approximately 40 percent of which operate in the fintech sector. During 2025, major events such as Lagos Startup Expo 2.0 were organized, dozens of start-ups received funding through LASRIC, and the ecosystem was institutionally supported through ease of doing business policies on the regulatory front.

In 2025, Nairobi further consolidated its position as East Africa's primary entrepreneurship hub. The city's ecosystem is valued at approximately $5.1 billion. The more than $500 million infrastructure investment in Tatu City in 2025, the gathering of more than 1,600 participants from over 65 countries at Africa Tech Summit Nairobi 2025, and the establishment of CGIAR-oriented agricultural innovation initiatives in Nairobi demonstrate that the city is not only a destination for capital but also a hub for building regional networks.

2.3. Sectoral Composition of the Start-Up Ecosystem in Africa

The ASE has long been shaped around financial technologies. Indeed, in 2024, fintech was the sector that attracted the highest level of funding, with 51 ventures securing approximately $500 million in investment. According to Partech data, fintech attracted $769 million in investment, accounting for 25 percent of total equity financing. However, the most noteworthy development in 2025 was that although fintech maintained its leading position, the distribution of investment across sectors began to assume a more balanced structure. In this context, the clean technology sector reached $550 million, recording very strong year-over-year growth; health technologies increased to $215 million, while enterprise technologies rose to $238 million. Moreover, AVCA data reveal that climate-related ventures accounted for approximately 40 percent of the total transaction value in 2025.


This transformation demonstrates that the ASE is no longer shaped solely by payment systems and financial inclusion but is also deepening in ar-

eas such as energy transition, access to healthcare, agricultural innovation, and business digitalization. The strengthening of agricultural innovation in Nairobi, the growing prominence of proptech and edtech alongside fintech in Lagos, and the fact that investments in artificial intelligence and clean technology approached the level of fintech investments throughout 2025 indicate that the continent's sectoral composition has begun to mature. Accordingly, 2025 can be interpreted as a year in which the transition from a single-sector innovation structure to a multi-sector innovation ecosystem became increasingly evident within the ASE.

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, rather than representing a homogeneous and inclusive leap forward, 2025 points to a selective growth model for the ASE, characterized by increased debt financing, the revival of early-stage investments, and more pronounced sectoral diversification. Major hubs such as Lagos and Nairobi further strengthened their positions, whereas a balanced geography of innovation extending across the continent has yet to fully emerge.

In this context, as of 2025, the ASE continues to grow but still exhibits a structure whose institutional depth has not yet been fully consolidated. Going forward, the ecosystem's ability to achieve lasting strength will depend not only on attracting greater investment but also on strengthening the local capital base, advancing regulatory harmonization, developing a skilled workforce, and ensuring a more geographically balanced distribution of entrepreneurial opportunities. Therefore, 2025 can be regarded not merely as a year of recovery for the ASE but as a milestone marking the emergence of a transition toward a more multidimensional ecosystem structure.



Israel's Recognition of Somaliland: Changing Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Implications for Türkiye

15

Erdinç Özdemir* | Adem Özer**

1. Introduction

The Horn of Africa has long stood at the center of global geopolitical competition due to its strategic location connecting the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, its pivotal role in maritime trade routes, and persistent regional instability. In this context, Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state represents not merely a diplomatic development between two actors but a significant turning point with implications for regional security balances and the international normative order. This decision has had direct consequences for the African Union's (AU) principle of the inviolability of borders, Somalia's territorial integrity, and regional stability.

The central argument of this study is that Israel's recognition of Somaliland has the potential to transform the existing security architecture in the Horn of Africa and that this transformation generates new risks within the broader context of international security and great-power competition. Given Türkiye's diplomatic, military, and humanitarian presence in the region, it is argued that Israel's decision necessitates a reassessment of Türkiye's policy priorities in the Horn of Africa, particularly those centered on Somalia.

Accordingly, this study first examines the historical and political background of the Somaliland issue, and then analyzes the implications of Israel's recognition for regional and global security. Finally, it evaluates the consequences for Türkiye and assesses the broader impact of this development on the balance of power in the Horn of Africa through a comprehensive analytical framework.

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2. Background to the Somaliland Issue

Somaliland unilaterally declared its separation from Somalia in 1991 following the collapse of the central state authority. It subsequently established its own constitutional order and developed a relatively stable system of governance, yet it has never received formal international recognition as an independent state.[1] The principal reason lies in the importance attached by both the AU and the United Nations (UN) to the principle of preserving colonial-era borders. This principle has served as the cornerstone of the continent's international normative framework, aimed at preventing the spread of secessionist movements and maintaining regional stability.

The Federal Government of Somalia has consistently opposed any attempts to recognize Somaliland's independence, maintaining that the territory constitutes an integral part of Somalia. On this issue, both the UN and the AU have supported Somalia's position. Indeed, the AU observer rejected all initiatives seeking recognition of Somaliland's independence, stating that any action intended to undermine Somalia's unity, sovereignty, or territorial integrity would be "inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the AU."[2]

Nevertheless, Israel's decision to recognize Somaliland is closely linked to its broader objective of expanding its influence along the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb corridor and exploiting the region's security vacuum to its strategic advantage. Consequently, Somaliland's recognition should not be viewed merely as an effort by a political entity to achieve statehood but rather as the product of a complex interaction between the strategic objectives of external actors and the norms of international law.

3. Israel's Policy Toward the Horn of Africa and Somaliland

From Israel's perspective, the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa is closely linked to the security of the Red Sea. The security of the maritime route leading to Israel's Port of Eilat has become increasingly fragile, particularly due to developments centered in Yemen, Iran's growing influence in the region, and the threats posed in the Red Sea by Houthi attacks targeting international maritime shipping as well as the security and economic interests of regional states.[3] These developments have prompted Israel to establish spheres of influence in proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Somaliland's geopolitical position offers Israel significant strategic advantages for intelligence gathering, logistics, and maritime surveillance while providing a relatively stable platform from which to respond to unforeseen contingencies.[4] In fact, the first discussions concerning relations between Israel and Somaliland began well before the Houthi crisis, with the objective of establishing "not full diplomatic recognition, but rather reciprocal trade offices and/or diplomatic missions." Negotiations accelerated fol-

1 Elif Dilan Tütmez and Ayça Eminoğlu, "Somaliland'in Uluslararası Alanda Tanınma Sorunu: Fırsatlar ve Tehditler", International Journal of Social Inquiry, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2025, pp. 185-186.

2 UN, "Israel's Recognition of Somaliland Triggers Sharp Divides, As Security Council Speakers Warn Move Threatens Stability in Horn of Africa", 29.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/gaaEq, Access Date: 17.03.2026.

3 Enver Kasimoğlu and Mehmet Rakipoğlu, "Kızıldeniz Jeopolitiğinde Husi Yayılmacılığı", Ortadoğu Etütleri, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2025, p. 160.

4 Amit Yarom, "After Israel's Recognition of Somaliland, What Comes Next?", The Atlantic Council, 15.01.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/MxYDA, Access Date: 21.03.2026.

lowing the election of Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi as president, ultimately culminating in Israel's recognition of Somaliland.[5]

Another important dimension of Israel's approach to Somaliland concerns its convergence of interests with the Gulf countries. In particular, the United Arab Emirates' investments in Somaliland's ports and its security-oriented engagement in the region have created a favorable environment that enables Israel to operate more effectively in this geography. From this perspective, Israel's recognition of Somaliland may also be interpreted as the diplomatic complement to the emerging Israel-Gulf security architecture in the Horn of Africa. This evolving security framework seeks both to capitalize on regional power vacuums and to extend an anti-Iranian security axis into Africa. While the Gulf countries have not pursued policies aimed at constraining Israel's growing presence in the region, their opposition to expanding Iranian influence remains particularly noteworthy.[6]

The recognition decision described as merely "the tip of the iceberg"[7] represents, in reality, the formalization of longstanding contacts, security cooperation, and strategic planning. This development indicates that Israel's policy toward the Horn of Africa has evolved beyond a temporary and limited engagement into a more permanent and multidimensional strategy. By recognizing Somaliland, Israel has not only strengthened its bilateral relationship with Somaliland but has also created a new source of tension in its relations with the Federal Government of Somalia, the AU, and other regional actors.

4. The African Horn and Implications for International Security

Israel's recognition of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state has further complicated the already fragile security environment in the Horn of Africa, a region characterized by weak state authority, the presence of armed groups, internal conflicts, and external interventions. In this context, the recognition decision affects not only Somalia's internal political dynamics but also the broader international security architecture of the region.

In particular, the potential for armed groups such as al-Shabaab to exploit such political ruptures for their own advantage constitutes a significant risk to international security. The conflict could evolve from an internal dispute within Somalia into a broader assault on the stability of Ethiopia, the second most populous country in Africa, which is already grappling with internal insurgencies and severe drought, potentially producing catastrophic humanitarian consequences for the entire region.[8]

Moreover, Israel's recognition of Somaliland sets a precedent that could encourage an expanded military and security presence of external actors in the Horn of Africa. In a region where the United States, China, France, and several Gulf countries have already established military bases and logistical hubs along

5 Ehud Yaari, "Recognizing Somaliland: Israel's Return to the Red Sea", The Washington Institute, 16.01.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/bLpsz, Access Date: 20.03.2026.

6 Ahmat Mahamat Oumar, "XXI Yüzyılda Afrika Boynuzu'nun Uluslararası Politikada Önemi", AHBV Akdeniz Havzası ve Afrika Medeniyetleri Dergisi, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2020, p. 63.

7 Yalçın Özkütük, "İsrail'in Somaliland'ı Tanıması: Buzdağının Görünen Kısmı-1", Marinedeal News, 12.01.2026, https://www.marinedealnews.com/israilin-somalilandi-tanimasi-buzdaginin-gorunen-kismi-1/, Access Date: 17.03.2026.

8 Abdiweli Garad, "Israel's Somaliland Gamble is Repeating the Bloody History that Created Al-Shabaab", African Arguments, 19.01.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/FwjCG, Access Date: 20.03.2026.

one of the world's most critical maritime trade routes, Israel's deeper and more permanent engagement through Somaliland could accelerate the ongoing militarization of regional security.

Another major implication for international security is the possibility that the Israel-Iran rivalry will increasingly extend into the Horn of Africa. Iran's efforts to threaten security in the Red Sea through the Houthis in Yemen have prompted Israel to adopt a more proactive security posture. While recognition of Somaliland provides Israel with an opportunity to establish a sphere of influence near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, it also risks transforming the region into a new theater of Middle East-centered strategic competition. When considered alongside Ethiopia's pursuit of sea access, Egypt's competition over Nile waters, the conflict in Sudan, and the Gulf countries' involvement in the Sudan dossier,[9] this development further intertwines regional disputes with global power competition.

Finally, the recognition also constitutes a controversial precedent from the perspectives of international law and state recognition practices. Despite the African Union's principle of the inviolability of inherited borders,[10] Israel's decision could serve as a precedent for other separatist regions seeking international recognition. This may trigger a broader process that erodes the norms governing state sovereignty and recognition not only across Africa but also globally. Consequently, although Israel's recognition of Somaliland may be viewed as an attempt to secure short-term strategic gains, in the longer term it is likely to increase uncertainty surrounding both regional and international stability. Given the strategic interests of other powers in the region, they are unlikely to remain indifferent to Israel's move.[11]

5. Implications for Türkiye

Somalia constitutes Türkiye's principal strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa.[12] Accordingly, Israel's recognition of Somaliland represents a strategic turning point for Türkiye. Since 2011, Türkiye has established an increasingly influential presence in the Horn of Africa through its close diplomatic and economic partnership with Somalia. This policy has been built around humanitarian assistance, infrastructure investments, military cooperation, and diplomatic engagement, positioning Türkiye as a trusted regional actor.[13]

At the same time, Somaliland remains significant for Türkiye as a territory where it maintains limited diplomatic contacts and where many of its humanitarian initiatives related to Somalia are concentrated.[14] Israel's recognition is likely to intensify both global and regional competition over Somaliland, thereby narrowing Türkiye's diplomatic room for maneuver while increasing the importance of safeguarding its interests in the region.

9 Tunç Demirtaş, "ABD/İsrail-İran Savaşının Haritası Genişlerken Maliyetin Dili Değişiyor", SETA, 06.03.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/lKKSV, Access Date: 19.03.2026.

10 African Union, "Kahire'de Düzenlenen Devlet ve Hükümet Başkanları Meclisinin Birinci Olağan Oturumunda Kabul Edilen Kararlar", AHG/Res. 16(I), 17-21.07.1964,
https://www.kisa.link/REgzj , Access Date: 20.03.2026.

11 Yalçın Özkütük, "İsrail'in Somaliland'ı Tanıması: Buzdağının Görünen Kısmı-3", Marinedeal News, 19.01.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/XnWxj, Access Date: 17.03.2026.

12 Cengiz Kamil Fırat, "Afrika Boynuzu'nda Türkiye'nin Konumu, İsrail ve Stratejik Rekabet", Yetkin Report, 27.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/ufIRF, Access Date: 18.03.2026.

13 Duygu Atakul, "Somali'nin Türkiye İçin Jeostratejik Önemi", Sakarya Üniversitesi İktisat Dergisi, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2024, p. 325.

14 Mustafa Şahin, "Türkiye'nin Somali Politikasının İncelenmesi: 2011-2020 Dönemi", Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2021, p. 137.

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb corridor are also of critical importance for Türkiye's military cooperation and logistical activities in Somalia. Israel's presence and its potential future military activities could indirectly affect Türkiye's influence and security planning along this strategic route. Consequently, Türkiye should reassess both its regional security policies and its cooperation with other actors operating in the Horn of Africa.

At the same time, Israel's recognition provides Türkiye with an opportunity both to strengthen its close partnership with Somalia and to remain an active participant [15] in shaping emerging political arrangements in the Horn of Africa. While maintaining a delicate diplomatic balance regarding the Somaliland issue, Türkiye can further reinforce its role as a supporter of regional peace while simultaneously expanding its influence among global actors.

In a nutshell, following Israel's recognition of Somaliland, Türkiye will need to reassess its investments, diplomatic engagement, and security partnerships in order to develop new policy options that will enable it to maintain its strategic presence in the Horn of Africa.

6. Conclusion

Israel's recognition of Somaliland as an independent state has had significant implications for both regional and international security in the Horn of Africa. This study demonstrates that the decision represents not merely a diplomatic development but a strategic move capable of reshaping regional security dynamics, intensifying great-power competition, and challenging established international norms.


Viewed against the historical background of Somaliland and the long-standing issue of its recognition, the decision undermines the African Union's principle of the inviolability of borders and Somalia's territorial integrity, thereby increasing both the regional security vacuum and political tensions. Israel's policy toward the region is driven by its strategic interests in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb corridor, while the recognition decision should be understood as part of these longer-term strategic objectives.

For Türkiye, this development presents both challenges and opportunities. While Israel's move necessitates a reassessment of Türkiye's Somalia-centered policy and its broader security planning in the Horn of Africa, it also offers an opportunity to enhance Türkiye's diplomatic influence in the region.

Ultimately, Israel's recognition of Somaliland constitutes a critical turning point that is reshaping the geopolitical and security landscape of the Horn of Africa. By analyzing the implications of this development and evaluating Türkiye's available policy options, this study seeks to explain the ongoing transformation of the region.

15 Abdülkadir Tok, "İsrail'in Somaliland'ı tanıması: Kızıldeniz hattı, Orta Doğu güvenliği ve Türkiye'nin konumu", USKAM Analiz, 09.01.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/tDUGO, Access Date: 18.03.2026.



2025 Developments in the Trans-African Highway Project

16

Nida Günsan* | Haluk Yergin**

1. Introduction

Transportation corridors have become increasingly prominent in the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. They represent geopolitical linkages that support countries' socioeconomic development and improve the living standards of their populations. By strengthening national infrastructure, these corridors facilitate international trade flows, promote economic growth, and foster regional development.[1]

Approximately 60,000 km in length, spanning 37 countries, and linking nine major highways, the Trans-African Highway (TAH) is one of Africa's most significant transportation projects. It has emerged as a strategic transportation corridor within global trade routes.

Research indicates that Africa's infrastructure deficit reduces annual economic growth by approximately 2 percent and can lower productivity by as much as 40 percent. Accordingly, the highway project has the potential to accelerate Africa's development by increasing infrastructure investment that supports trade and economic growth.[2]

This study examines the latest developments concerning the TAH project in 2025, taking into account its economic and political significance within the international trade network. Following the introduction, the scope and character-

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1 Dilek Özdemir and Müsemma Çökerdenoğlu, ''Stratejinin Kalbi: Koridor Savaşları. Zengezur Koridoru'' Zengezur Koridoru: Türkiye-Azerbaycan-Nahcivan Ekonomik, Dış ticaret ve Lojistik Bağlantıları *Ed.* Arzu Tural Dikmen, Efe Akademi Yayınları, Istanbul, 2024, p.84.

2 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. The long winding road to Africa's infrastructure 24.02.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/sHzbU 24.03.2026.

istics of the TAH are outlined, after which the project's progress during 2025 is discussed. The conclusion evaluates the potential of the economic opportunities offered by the TAH to strengthen regional integration in Africa and reinforce the continent's position in the global economy.

2. Trans-African Highway Project

During the 1970s, the TAH was commonly referred to as the "Highway of Unity."[3] Conceived more than forty years ago by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the African Union (AU), in collaboration with regional organizations, the project is a transcontinental road network intended to connect every part of Africa from north to south and from east to west.[4,5]

The TAH consists of nine highways extending more than 60,000 km and is designed to connect major cities, ports, and economic centers across Africa. The network's primary objective is to facilitate intra-African trade, reduce transportation costs, and stimulate economic growth by improving access to markets and resources. It also aims to strengthen connectivity between landlocked countries and coastal regions while promoting regional cooperation.[6] Furthermore, the TAH project closely aligns with the objectives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Vision 2050, the organization's long-term development strategy. ECOWAS's principal objective is to establish an integrated regional economic area, comparable to the European Union (EU), in which people, capital, goods, and services can move freely. In this context, the TAH is regarded as one of the major projects supporting the physical infrastructure dimension of the ECOWAS Vision 2050 strategy.[7]

The TAH is composed of nine major highway corridors. Much like the transformative impact of railroads in Africa in the past, these new highway networks are expected to contribute to the development of service and distribution systems supporting both passenger and freight transportation. This infrastructure is also expected to facilitate the emergence of new settlements in previously inaccessible areas. In particular, by connecting regions rich in mineral resources, agricultural production potential, and tourism assets to transportation networks, the project is expected to diversify economic activity and accelerate regional development.[8]

An examination of Table 1[9] which presents the designated TAH corridors shows that the longest route is the Tripoli-Windhoek-Cape Town corridor, extending 9,610 km, while the shortest is the Beira-Lobito corridor, measuring

3 Kenny Cupers and Prıta Meier, "Infrastructure between statehood and selfhood: The trans-African highway", *Journal of the Society of ArchitecturalHistorians*, 2020, Vol. *79*, No. 1, pp. 61-81.

4 EHS Africa Logistics, Africa's Mega Infrastructure Project: The Trans-African Highway Network Nears Completion, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/JlUSK Access Date: 12. 03. 2026.

5 CTL Up, Review and analysis of the Trans-Africa Highway Network, 2023, https://www.kisa.link/RqvoP Access Date: 12. 03. 2026.

6 AfricaMe-Team, The Trans-African Highway Network: A Continental Lifeline , 24. 01. 2025. https://www.kisa.link/dCLRq, Access Date: 12. 03. 2026.

7 Peter Orengo, Trans-African Highway Project Takes Important Step Forward. https://www.kisa.link/jNDaz, Access Date:27.02.2024.

8 IOA, Trans Sahelian Highway – a modern replacement for the legendary camel caravans, 20.10.2022, https://www.kisa.link/Gmkof , Access Date: 11. 03.2026.

9 African Union, Trans-African Highways network routes, 2026, https://www.kisa.link/xugHM, Access Date: 12. 03. 2026.

Figure 1: Trans-African Highway



3,520 km. The number and length of these corridors, together with their role in linking strategic locations across the African continent, demonstrate that the project extends well beyond being merely a transportation initiative. In this respect, the TAH represents a foundational undertaking for initiatives aimed at enhancing the continent's economic potential and constitutes a major infrastructure project that promotes regional integration and development.

Route Number	Route	Length (km)
1	Cairo – Dakar	8,636
2	Algiers – Lagos	4,504
3	Tripoli – Windhoek – Cape Town	9,610
4	Cairo – Gaborone – Cape Town	8,860
5	Dakar – N'Djamena	4,500
6	N'Djamena – Djibouti	4,220
7	Dakar – Lagos	4,760
8	Lagos – Mombasa	6,260
9	Beira – Lobito	3,520
10	Djibouti – Libreville- Bata	7,000

Table 1: Name, Description and Approximate Length of Routes

3. Project Developments in 2025

Although implementation of the TAH network has progressed slowly, it continues to occupy an important place in Africa's development policies. The project remains a key development framework that guides infrastructure investment across the continent and supports regional economic integration. Particularly over the past few decades, regional integration through infrastructure development has been increasingly instrumental in promoting Africa's economic development.[10] With Africa's population projected to double by 2050 and intra-African trade expected to increase by approximately 50 percent through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), investment in transportation infrastructure represents both a strategic and an economic opportunity.[11]

The Trans-West African Coastal Highway, linking Dakar and Lagos, is nearing completion, with only a few remaining sections, including those in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. The Trans-Sahara Highway, connecting Algiers and Lagos, has been largely completed. Work on the Pan-African Highway linking Cairo and Cape Town is ongoing.[12]

Progress on the TAH project has been delayed by the conflict and political instability in Sudan, as well as construction backlogs in Zambia and Tanzania. Kenya, meanwhile, has completed two major highway projects along the designated corridor. [13]

In February 2025, African heads of state, business executives, government ministers, leaders of multinational organizations, senior policymakers, representatives of business associations, senior officials from the AfCFTA Secretariat, and thought leaders convened in Accra, Ghana, to discuss infrastructure investment across Africa. The meeting emphasized the importance of expand-

10 Jing Zhang and Lingfei Weng, "Financing Railway Construction to Corridor Development Amid Geopolitical Rivalry: Study Two Cases in Africa". Centre for Sustainable Structural Transformation, 2025, SOAS University of London.

11 Big5ConstructSouthAfrica, Transport Evolution Africa 2025 to highlight critical investment opportunities shaping the future of Africa's transport and logistics industry.

https://www.kisa.link/Iojon Access Date: 13.03.2026.

12 Charles Arthur, Have you heard of the Trans African Highway Network?, 11. 03. 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/hhwop, Access Date: 12. 03. 2026.

13 Ed Richardson, Trans African Highway 4 remains under construction, 18.11. 2025

https://www.kisa.link/CLWim Access Date: 11. 03.2026.

ing regional cooperation initiatives, including the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) and the TAH, through sustainable financing and technical assistance. Participants also stressed that development partners should jointly finance projects connecting multiple countries, reducing logistical bottlenecks, and accelerating economic integration.[14]

Investment in and financial support for transportation corridors across Africa continue to grow. The European Union announced €2 billion in funding for the construction of a transportation corridor linking Zambia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic Ocean. This corridor is expected to play a significant role in generating employment and expanding economic opportunities, particularly in the agriculture, energy, and critical minerals sectors.[15]

4. Conclusion

In addition to promoting trade and strengthening regional integration, cross-border road corridors contribute to poverty reduction by improving access to markets and social services. The TAH network stands as one of the most tangible manifestations of Africa's goals for economic integration and development. Despite the challenges encountered, ongoing investments and cooperative initiatives provide a positive outlook for the project's continued progress.

As implementation of the AfCFTA accelerates, the TAH network is expected to play a critical role in strengthening intra-African economic integration and positioning Africa as a more competitive participant in global trade. Nevertheless, a range of challenges including financing constraints, infrastructure deficiencies, and security concerns persist, and the project's long-term impacts can only be fully assessed after its completion. Even so, the TAH is widely regarded as having the potential to permanently transform the continent's economic and logistical landscape, particularly along the West African coastline.

Although Africa is one of the world's richest regions in terms of natural resources, many countries, particularly landlocked states located in the continent's interior, have been unable to translate this potential into sustained economic development. The road links to be constructed under the TAH are expected to provide faster, safer, and more cost-effective access from inland regions to seaports, thereby increasing trade volumes, reducing transportation costs, and supporting regional economic integration. In this regard, the project has the potential not only to improve transportation infrastructure but also to make significant contributions to economic development, trade, and prosperity across the African continent.[16]


14 Africa Prosperity Network Accra, Compact 2025 Presidential and Business Executives Dialogues,

https://www.kisa.link/HcREg Access Date: 29. 03. 2025.

15 The Wall Africa Journal. AB'den Lobito Koridoru için 2,3 milyar dolar fon, 13.11. 2025. Website:

https://www.kisa.link/QaJxa

16 Haluk Yergin, "Analysis of The Dynamics of The Trade Corridors, The Conflict Between Gaza and Israel and The Role of Turkey as an Alternative Route in The Contemporary World", Socrates Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Studies, 2023, Vol. 9, No. 36, pp.1-14.



Türkiye-Africa Summit Diplomacy: Towards the 4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit

17

Baran Yağarcık*

1. Introduction

Türkiye's foreign policy has, over the past year, evolved beyond its traditional axes, assuming a multidimensional character with an expanding geographic scope. One of the most notable dimensions of this transformation has been the increase in diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian engagement with Africa. Türkiye-Africa relations, which acquired an institutional framework following Türkiye's declaration of 2005 as the "Year of Africa," were elevated to the level of a strategic partnership with the First *Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit* held in 2008. These relations were further deepened through the summits held in 2014 and 2021.[1]

political dialogue, trade, development assistance, and security cooperation. At a time when global power competition has intensified, multipolarity has become more pronounced, and Africa's strategic importance has come to the forefront, Türkiye's approach toward the continent is also of critical significance in terms of its positioning within the global system. This article examines the evolution of Türkiye-Africa summit diplomacy over time, its principal dynamics, and the opportunities and risks that have emerged in the lead-up to the Fourth Summit.

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1 Asa, Ramazan, "21. Yüzyılda Zirve Diplomasisi Bağlamında Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri", *Journal of Social and Humanities Sciences Research*, 2024, p. 156.





2. Institutionalization and Historical Development of Summit Diplomacy

The remarkable rise of Türkiye-Africa relations in recent years has largely acquired an institutional character through a process that may be described as "summit diplomacy." The summit diplomacy mechanism shapes the trajectory of relations through regular meetings at the leadership level, establishes strategic objectives, and promotes multilateral cooperation. This model of engagement that Türkiye has developed with Africa represents the manifestation of an approach that extends beyond conventional diplomatic instruments by comprehensively encompassing political, economic, and societal dimensions. The *1st Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit*, held in Istanbul in 2008, marked a turning point in Türkiye's relations with Africa. Through this summit, Türkiye was recognized by the African Union (AU) as a "strategic partner," and bilateral relations became institutionalized.[2] The second summit, held in Equatorial Guinea in 2014, further deepened this partnership by emphasizing increased trade volume, infrastructure projects, and development cooperation.[3] The third summit was held in Istanbul in 2021. The summit introduced new themes to the agenda, including health diplomacy, digitalization, and sustainable development in the post-pandemic period. Consequently, Türkiye's diplomatic presence in Africa also found significant opportunities for expansion. At the *3rd Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit* in 2021, emphasis was placed on strengthening Africa's cooperation with Türkiye over the subsequent five years.[4]

3. Diplomatic and Economic Relations Between Türkiye and Africa

At the beginning of the 2000s, Türkiye maintained only a limited number of embassies on the continent; today, however, it has established diplomatic missions in nearly all African countries. Likewise, the diplomatic representation of African countries in Türkiye has increased, resulting in a marked



The 3rd Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit was held in Istanbul on December 16-18, 2021. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

intensification of reciprocal diplomatic engagement. This demonstrates that Türkiye-Africa relations have acquired an institutional and enduring character.[5] Economic relations also constitute one of the most dynamic dimensions of Türkiye-Africa relations. Türkiye's trade volume with Africa has increased substantially in recent years. Turkish contracting firms have gradually assumed a more active role in infrastructure, transportation, and energy projects across the continent. In particular, the projects undertaken by Turkish companies in Sub-Saharan Africa are regarded as an indicator of Türkiye's economic diplomacy capacity. Furthermore, the expansion of Turkish Airlines' flight network across Africa has contributed to the development of commercial relations between the continent and Türkiye. In this way, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment to pursuing a consistent policy toward Africa.[6]

4. Soft Power, Global Competition and Strategic Perspective

Another notable aspect of Türkiye's Africa policy is its emphasis on "humanitarian diplomacy" and "development cooperation." Projects carried out through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF), the Yunus Emre Institute, and various civil

2 Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu, *Türk Dış Politikasında Afrika: Temel Dinamikler, Fırsatlar ve Engeller*, Ankara: Nobel Yayınları, 2019, pp. 47-50.

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, *"II. Türkiye-Afrika Ortaklık Zirvesi"*, https://www.kisa.link/vzcix , Access Date: 8.03.2026.

4 Hatice Delibaş, "Translation as a Diplomatic Negotiation: Insights on Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit Declaration (2021)," *Journal of Language Research (JLR)* 9, No. 2, 2025.

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, *"Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri"*, https://www.kisa.link/aGaaC, Access Date: 12.03.2026.

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, *Türkiye Yüzyılında Etkin ve Kararlı Dış Politika*, November 2025, https://www.kisa.link/AVKtp, Access Date: 12.03.2026.

society organizations have enhanced Türkiye's "soft power" capacity across the continent. Activities conducted in the fields of education, healthcare, agriculture, and capacity building reinforce the perception that Türkiye offers a development-oriented partnership in Africa.[7] At the same time, Türkiye's presence in Africa has increasingly become part of intensifying global competition. China's large-scale infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States' security- and economy-centered policies, the European Union's (EU) development-oriented and normative influence, and Russia's expanding role in the field of security have positioned Africa as one of the focal points of global power competition. In this context, Türkiye has sought to develop a distinctive model in Africa, drawing attention through its emphasis on a more equitable partnership based on the "win-win" discourse. Furthermore, security cooperation and defense industry exports to certain African countries demonstrate that Türkiye's role on the continent encompasses not only economic development and cooperation but also strategic and military dimensions. This illustrates the multidimensional nature of Türkiye's Africa policy.

As the *4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit* approaches, these multidimensional relations are expected to deepen further. Among the issues expected to feature on the summit's agenda are global challenges such as the digital economy, energy security, the green transition, food security, and combating climate change. Africa's young and rapidly growing population, abundant natural resources, and increasing rate of urbanization present significant opportunities for Türkiye. Projects to be developed for the continent, particularly in the fields of energy and infrastructure, are expected to generate substantial economic and strategic gains for Türkiye. At the same time, however, certain structural challenges remain with regard to the sustainability of Türkiye's Africa policy. Political instability, security risks, and bureaucratic obstacles across Africa may pose significant barriers to Turkish investments. Accordingly, Türkiye is pursuing a long-term and institutionalized strategy in its Africa policy that takes all of these dynamics into account. Summit diplomacy continues to constitute a critical component in this regard. The fourth summit presents an important opportunity to establish a new roadmap that will shape the future of Türkiye-Africa relations. Through this summit, Türkiye has the opportunity to restructure its relations with Africa on the basis of greater balance, sustainability, and mutual benefit. In particular, strengthening institutional cooperation with the AU,

developing closer relations with regional organizations, and increasing engagement with local actors will enhance Türkiye's effectiveness across the continent.

5. Towards the 4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit

The developments recorded prior to the *4th Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit* demonstrate that Türkiye's Africa policy has entered a phase of deepening. Owing particularly to the multidimensional outreach it has developed over the past two decades, Türkiye has positioned itself across the continent as both an economic actor and a reliable political and diplomatic partner. The growing number of Türkiye's embassies across Africa, Turkish Airlines' extensive flight network, the expanding presence of institutions such as TİKA and the Turkish Maarif Foundation, and cooperation in the defense industry have been among the principal factors making Türkiye's presence in Africa a lasting one. One of the most notable dynamics throughout this process has been the positive and constructive attitude of African peoples toward Türkiye. Türkiye's emphasis on a win-win approach and equal partnership has enabled it to project a profile distinct from that of Western actors with colonial pasts, thereby increasing both political and societal acceptance of Türkiye across African countries.[8]

Nevertheless, the fourth summit will constitute a critical juncture at which Türkiye's capacity to deepen its relations with Africa through tangible and sustainable projects will be tested. At a time when competition among actors such as the United States, China, the European Union (EU), and the Gulf countries has intensified across the continent, Türkiye's flexible diplomatic capabilities and the relationships of mutual trust it has established with local actors stand out as its greatest advantages.[9] The favorable perception of Türkiye among African countries is creating new opportunities for cooperation in such areas as defense, infrastructure, energy, and education. In order for these opportunities to translate into lasting gains, Türkiye must strengthen its financing capacity, increase private sector investment, and continue its existing projects within a more institutionalized framework. In this context, the summit should be regarded as a milestone through which the strategic partnership between Türkiye and Africa is elevated to a deeper level.

7 Yüksel, M. Ali, "Türkiye'nin Afrika'ya Yönelik Dış Siyasetinde Yumuşak Güç", *Akademik Sosyal Bilimler İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 2024, pp. 861-863.


8 Mesut Özcan ve Mehmet Köse, "The Quest for Balance: Historical Background of Türkiye-Africa Relations," *Insight Turkey* 26, No. 3 (2024), p. 93.

9 Talha Köse, "Afrika'nın Stratejik Yükselişi ve Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri," *Anadolu Agency*, February 8, 2026,

https://www.kisa.link/nERai Access Date: 12.03.2026.

6. Conclusion

Türkiye-Africa summit diplomacy has emerged over the past two decades as one of the most dynamic dimensions of Türkiye's foreign policy. Institutionalized through these summits, Türkiye-Africa relations extend beyond political dialogue and economic cooperation to encompass a broad spectrum ranging from humanitarian assistance to security cooperation. The 4th *Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit* represents a new phase in this process and is expected to constitute a critical turning point for the future of Türkiye's Africa policy. Türkiye's commitment to developing a long-term and equitable partnership model across the continent is of considerable importance both for the sustainability of its foreign policy vision and for the depth of its relations with African countries. Türkiye's approach toward Africa goes beyond short-term cooperation focused solely on economic gains by promoting a model of engagement built upon capacity building, mutual trust, responsiveness to local needs, and shared development objectives. When Türkiye's infrastructure investments, educational initiatives, humanitarian assistance activities, and diplomatic outreach are evaluated within this framework, the equitable partnership model it has advanced emerges as the defining factor that distinguishes Türkiye as a unique actor in Africa. In conclusion, the period leading up to the 4th *Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit* presents Türkiye with both significant opportunities and serious challenges. Successfully capitalizing on these opportunities and effectively managing the associated risks will further strengthen Türkiye's strategic vision, institutional capacity, and the quality of its engagement with Africa. The momentum generated by summit diplomacy is expected to advance Türkiye-Africa relations to a higher level and position Türkiye as a far more influential actor across the African continent.



Defense Industry Exports from Türkiye to Africa in 2025

18

Güngör Şahin*

1. Introduction

The defense industry is a strategic sector that goes beyond reflecting a state's military capacity by embodying its technological capabilities, foreign policy instruments, and determination to position itself globally. Türkiye has undergone a profound transformation in this field, particularly through the localization and nationalization programs it launched beginning in the 2000s; in 2025, it broke its historical record by increasing its defense and aerospace exports to $10.54 billion. This figure represents a 48 percent increase compared to the previous year and brings Türkiye closer to its goal of becoming one of the world's top 10 defense exporters.[1]

When defense industry exports of goods and services are considered together, the sector exceeded $10 billion in 2025, while new export contracts worth $17.9 billion were signed during the same year. Examining the regional distribution of the new contracts signed in 2025 reveals that agreements worth $1.7 billion were concluded in Africa. According to data from the international research institute SIPRI, Türkiye has been the country that increased its defense exports the most over the past decade compared to the preceding ten-year period. While the defense industry's share of Türkiye's total merchandise exports was 1.7 percent in 2022, it had risen to 3.6 percent by 2025.[2]

Within this broader picture, Africa occupies a distinctive position as a market and area of cooperation of growing strategic importance. Many African countries

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1 Tolga Yanık, "Savunma ve havacılık ihracatta 10 milyar dolar eşiğini aştı", Anadolu Agency, 03.01.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/yErtg, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

2 Ozan Akarsu, "Savunma sanayiinde ihracat ve uluslararası iş birliklerinde yeni dönem", Tabyadijital, 03.02.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/PHmib, Access Date: 05.03.2026.



Turkish defense industry products were showcased to Africa at BAMEX'25 expo, held in Bamako, the capital of Mali. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

struggling with security vulnerabilities, political instability, and inadequate defense infrastructure have shown increasing interest in Türkiye's pragmatic, cost-effective defense products, which are accompanied by an openness to technology transfer, as an alternative to the conditional arms sales policies of Western powers.

This article systematically examines Türkiye-Africa defense industry exports in 2025 through their political, military, economic, and social/cultural dimensions. The study aims to analyze Türkiye's Africa policy not merely from a commercial perspective but also through the broader lenses of geopolitical power projection, geostrategic positioning, geoeconomic gains, and geo-cultural influence. Accordingly, it first evaluates Türkiye's defense industry from conceptual and theoretical perspectives before presenting its historical development covering the period from 2000 to 2025. It then analyzes defense industry exports in 2025 through their political (geopolitical), military (geostrategic), economic (geo-economic), and social/cultural (geo-cultural) dimensions.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

In its broadest sense, the defense industry is defined as the industrial ecosystem encompassing the research and development, production, procurement, and export processes of all types of equipment, systems, platforms, and services intended for a state's armed forces.

Türkiye's defense industry strategy was shaped by the experience of the U.S. arms embargo imposed following the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, within the framework of the strategic autonomy objective envisioned by realism. Since that time, Türkiye has adopted reducing external dependence as its fundamental strategy. At the same time, the liberal objective of creating interdependence through exports has also played a defining role in Türkiye's Africa policy. Indeed, the President of Defense Industries has characterized Türkiye's defense exports not merely as a commercial activity but as a fundamental instrument for building strategic partnerships. Within this new framework, Türkiye positions itself as a strategic power distinguished by its advanced defense industrial infrastructure.[3]

When Türkiye's defense exports to Africa are evaluated within this framework, it becomes evident that Ankara has established a distinctive sphere of influence on the continent by offering a model that is independent of Western institutions, free from political conditionality, and open to technology transfer. This approach has been described by ORSAM as the "Türkiye Model."[4]

3. Türkiye-Afrika Defense Industry Exports

In 2025, when Türkiye's total defense and aerospace exports reached a historic record of $10.54 billion, the African market accounted for a critical share in terms of both proportional growth and geopolitical depth. An examination of export categories indicates that the share of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs/UCAVs), armored land vehicles, naval platforms, ammunition systems, and training-maintenance-sustainment packages sold to countries across the continent has steadily increased within total exports. By 2025, the Turkish defense industry had expanded beyond platform-based exports by adding system-based and integrated network-centric warfare technologies, guidance kits, communication systems, and command-and-control systems to its export portfolio, thereby providing the solutions most sought after by African countries in addressing asymmetric security threats.

For example, in an investor disclosure dated May 30, 2025, ASELSAN announced that it had signed export contracts worth a total of $82 million for guidance kits and communication systems with customers in the Middle East and Africa.[5] Likewise, the steps taken by ASELSAN during IDEF 2025 to expand local production and technology cooperation with its local partners in South Africa demonstrate that the approach of localization and joint production, rather than sales alone, has gained momentum in the African market.[6]

On Baykar's side, it became publicly evident throughout 2025 that the TB2 and AKINCI platforms were increasingly preferred across Africa, with coun-

3 Göksel Yıldırım, "Savunma ve havacılıkta ihracat da hedefler de büyüyor", Anadolu Agency, 30.01.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/qPmZq, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

4 Kaan Devecioğlu, "Türkiye Modeli: Savunma Sanayii Alanında Afrika'yla Derinleşen İş Birliği", ORSAM, 27.11.2024,
https://www.kisa.link/YyrZj, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

5 Mustafa Çalkaya, "ASELSAN IDEF'te yeni anlaşmalara imza attı", Anadolu Agency, 22.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/iGkvN, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

6 Mustafa Çalkaya, "ASELSAN IDEF'te yeni anlaşmalara imza attı", Anadolu Agency, 22.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/iGkvN, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

tries such as Mali, Morocco, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, Togo, Niger, Djibouti, Somalia, Rwanda, and Kenya turning to Türkiye's UAV/UCAV ecosystem.[7] Morocco's decision in 2025 to procure the more advanced AKINCI systems indicates a growing tendency among some African customers to transition to platforms with greater payload and range capabilities.[8]

3.1. Political Dimension and Geopolitical Impact

In 2025, defense industry exports became a visible instrument of "defense diplomacy" in Türkiye-Africa relations. While defense products serve as confidence-building measures in bilateral relations, they also enhance institutional engagement in areas such as training programs, joint military exercises, and security sector reform. In this context, defense industry cooperation agreements and military training arrangements constitute the diplomatic infrastructure underpinning defense exports.

A compilation published by Anadolu Agency in the summer of 2025 indicates that Türkiye has established an extensive network of agreements across Africa based on military framework agreements, military training cooperation agreements, and defense industry cooperation agreements.[9] At the geopolitical level, Türkiye's defense exports to Africa intersect with issues such as the search for enhanced counterterrorism capacity in the Sahel, maritime security along the Red Sea–-Horn of Africa corridor, and the security architecture of North Africa as an extension of the Eastern Mediterranean. In these areas, defense exports serve as leverage that positions Türkiye increasingly as a "security provider partner."

3.2. Military Dimension and Geo-strategic Impact

From a geostrategic perspective, 2025 was marked by the expanding operational use of Turkish-made unmanned aerial platforms across Africa. With their relatively low operating costs and rapid deployment capabilities, UAV/UCAV systems offer an attractive solution for African users seeking enhanced border surveillance, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and precision strike capabilities.

The military impact of defense industry exports is not limited to the provision of platforms alone. Life-cycle components including training, maintenance and sustainment, spare parts, and software updates require the recipient country to establish an ongoing supply and technical support relationship, thereby creating long-term military-technical ties.

3.3. Economic Dimension and Geo-economic Impact

The year 2025 marked a period in which defense and aerospace exports accounted for an increasing share of Türkiye's overall exports. End-of-year data

7 Hürriyet, "Afrika'da TB2 ve AKINCI rüzgarı! Baykar 37 ülke ile anlaşma imzaladı", 12.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/DFYBe, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

8 Joe Saballa, "Morocco Receives First Turkish Bayraktar Akinci Drones", The Defense Post, 06.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/hKRGq, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

9 Ahmed Satti and Gökhan Kavak, "Türkiye-Afrika ilişkileri her alanda güçleniyor", Anadolu Agency, 05.08.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/PvlLt, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

indicate that defense and aerospace exports reached $10.54 billion in 2025. This figure corresponds to approximately 3.68 percent of Türkiye's total merchandise exports, which amounted to $273.4 billion.[10]

The geoeconomic impact of the $1.7 billion in defense and aerospace contracts signed in the African market in 2025 extends beyond export revenues to include the expansion of production scale, the integration of SME subcontractors into global supply chains, and macroeconomic contributions through foreign exchange earnings. Moreover, local production and joint venture models enable Turkish companies to establish long-term service ecosystems, generating recurring revenues through maintenance, modernization, and ammunition resupply.

3.4. Social Dimension and Geo-cultural Impact

At the societal level, defense industry exports can generate soft power through training programs, interactions among technical personnel, institutional networks established through joint military exercises, and perceptions of technological capability. The growing visibility of Turkish-made defense systems across Africa in 2025 has strengthened Türkiye's image as a "technology provider."

4. Conclusion


Within Türkiye's defense industry exports, which reached $10.54 billion and accounted for approximately 3.68 percent of the country's total goods exports, the African market emerged as one of the key contributors to this achievement through its growing prominence.

From a geopolitical standpoint, defense exports bolstered security partnerships and defense diplomacy in Türkiye-Africa relations; at the geostrategic level, they fostered long-term military-technical ties through the UAV/UCAV ecosystem and life-cycle support packages. From a geoeconomic perspective, the expansion of defense exports enhanced the sector's competitiveness through economies of scale and the deepening of supply chains. From a geo-cultural perspective, technical training and institutional engagement have generated soft power effects.

Türkiye-Africa defense industry exports are expected to continue expanding beyond 2025, depending on the development of joint production and localization models, financing instruments, transparency and end-user monitoring capabilities, and the evolving security demands of African countries. The extent to which this growth translates into lasting strategic gains will depend both on advancing technological capabilities and on aligning export governance with international norms.

10 Reuters, "Turkey's 2025 exports hit record $273.4 billion, up 4.5% y/y, says Erdogan", 03.01.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/xbgwK, Access Date: 06.03.2026.



A New Era in the Türkiye-Somalia Energy Partnership: The Strategic Agenda for 2025

19

Tunç Demirtaş*

1. Introduction

For energy cooperation between Türkiye and Somalia, 2025 represented more than a year in which hydrocarbon discoveries or commercial production were announced. Rather, it marked a critical transitional period during which exploration activities evolved into technical data acquisition, the allocation of new licensed blocks, and preparations for drilling. The year began with the *Oruç Reis Seismic Research Vessel* conducting three-dimensional seismic surveys offshore Somalia. During the course of the year, offshore surveys were completed, cooperation expanded to onshore blocks, and the processing of the collected data advanced the project to the stage of identifying drilling targets.

Accordingly, the significance of 2025 should not be assessed solely in terms of the number of square kilometers surveyed by the Oruç Reis. The more consequential development was the transformation of the Türkiye-Somalia energy relationship from one based primarily on political will and bilateral agreements into one characterized by measurable field operations and a long-term exploration portfolio. For Türkiye, the process represented a test of the international operational capacity of its national energy fleet and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). For Somalia, it signified the identification of natural resources, the strengthening of the country's sovereign capacity, and the creation of a technical database for future investments. Within this context, this article examines

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the developments recorded in energy cooperation between Türkiye and Somalia during 2025, Türkiye's energy vision, and the potential mutual benefits that may arise from this partnership.

2. Development of Field Operations in 2025

Although the Oruç Reis arrived in Somalia in October 2024, the mission's principal operational activities took place in 2025. According to a statement issued by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources on January 9, 2025, the vessel had completed approximately one-third of the designated survey area at the beginning of the year during its first overseas mission under the operatorship of TPAO.[1] This phase was particularly significant because it marked the first application of the seismic survey expertise that Türkiye had developed in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean to offshore Africa as part of a long-distance operation.

The primary objective of the three-dimensional seismic survey was to image the geological formations beneath the seabed. The resulting data are used to identify potential reservoirs, geological traps, and structures suitable for drilling. Consequently, the principal outcome of the activities carried out throughout 2025 was not the announcement of a discovery but rather the reduction of geological uncertainty and the provision of a more reliable basis for high-cost drilling decisions. Accordingly, 2025 should be regarded as a year of data acquisition, analysis, and drilling target identification.

The most significant expansion of the project occurred on April 10, 2025. On that date, TPAO and the Somali Petroleum Authority signed hydrocarbon exploration and production agreements covering three onshore blocks.[2] According to statements issued by the Turkish side, seismic surveys




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are planned for the three onshore areas, which together cover approximately 16,000 square kilometers, with drilling to follow based on the survey results. The Somali authorities likewise announced that the agreement encompasses both two-dimensional and three-dimensional seismic surveys as well as drilling operations contingent upon the findings of the exploration activities.[3] On the same date, it was reported that approximately 78 percent of the Oruç Reis's work across three offshore blocks covering roughly 15,000 square kilometers had been completed.[4] As a result, the energy partnership evolved beyond a single offshore exploration mission into a broader exploration portfolio encompassing both onshore and offshore areas. This expansion demonstrated that Türkiye views its energy engagement in Somalia as a long-term investment encompassing multiple exploration areas and various stages of development.

The Oruç Reis completed its offshore field mission on June 6, 2025. During its 234-day deployment, the vessel acquired three-dimensional seismic data across a total area of 4,464 square kilometers within three offshore blocks before departing the Port of Mogadishu on June 15. Upon its return to Türkiye in early July, the vessel was accompanied by support and escort ships as well as units of the Turkish Naval Forces.[5]

It is important to distinguish between the licensed offshore area of approximately 15,000 square kilometers and the 4,464-square-kilometer area in which three-dimensional seismic data were collected. The former refers to the total size of the three offshore blocks allocated to Türkiye, whereas the latter denotes the priority area where the Oruç Reis conducted detailed, high-resolution seismic surveys. This distinction is essential for accurately understanding both the overall scope of the project and the technical work that was actually completed during 2025.[6]

3. From Data to Drilling Decisions: Türkiye's Energy Vision

The Oruç Reis mission in Somalia demonstrated Türkiye's ambition to move its energy diplomacy beyond a model centered solely on signing agreements or purchasing resources from abroad. Within this project, Türkiye integrated the operatorship of TPAO, its nationally owned seismic research vessel, support ships, logistical capabilities, and maritime security capacity into a single operational framework.

This integrated structure demonstrates that Türkiye has positioned itself in Somalia not merely as a license holder but also as an energy actor responsible for financing, planning, and implementing technical operations. The completion

1 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Türkiye, "Gençler dağa çıkıyordu şimdi o gençler petrol üretiminde çalışıyor." January 9, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/FLsCw, Access Date: 01.07.2026.

2 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Türkiye, "Türkiye, Somali'nin Kara Sahalarında da Petrol ve Doğal Gaz Arayacak," April 10, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/pWfeo , Access Date: 01.07.2026.

3 Abdullahi, "Somalia and Turkey sign strategic oil exploration agreement" Somali National News Agency (SONNA), April 10, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/ObDqW , Access Date: 01.07.2026.

4 SavunmaTR, "*Oruç Reis sismik çalışmaların yüzde 78'ini tamamladı",* X post, April 10, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/PVaDu

5 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Türkiye, "*Oruç Reis Somali denizlerinin MR'ını çekti*", June 12, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/CRXJZ , Access Date: 01.07.2026.

6 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Türkiye, "*Oruç Reis Mavi Vatan'da", July 1, 2025,*
https://www.kisa.link/aQWtw

of the Oruç Reis's first intercontinental mission in Somalia also marked a significant milestone in the international operationalization of Türkiye's offshore exploration capabilities. The deployment of Turkish Naval Forces alongside the vessel further demonstrated that energy exploration in distant maritime regions requires not only technical expertise but also security, logistical support, and interinstitutional coordination.[7]

Following the completion of the mission, the collected seismic data entered the processing and interpretation stage in Ankara. During this phase, the objectives include analyzing seismic sections, modeling subsurface geological structures, ranking potential reservoirs, and narrowing down prospective drilling targets. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources has announced that drilling operations will commence at locations identified through these analyses. Consequently, the departure of the Oruç Reis from the survey area did not signify the conclusion of the project but rather marked the transition from visible offshore operations to the technical analysis phase that will inform future investment decisions.

From Türkiye's perspective, the most tangible achievement of 2025 was the strengthening of its international exploration capacity. The Oruç Reis successfully completed its first intercontinental mission, TPAO gained operational experience in a distant geographic region, and Türkiye's national energy fleet underwent a significant test in terms of security, logistics, and supply coordination. The experience acquired in Somalia has established an operational reference for future projects that Türkiye may undertake across Africa, the Indian Ocean, and other maritime basins.

This process is also consistent with the broader transformation of Türkiye's policy toward Somalia. The incorporation of energy cooperation into the relationships that Ankara has developed since 2011 in the fields of humanitarian assistance, healthcare, education, transportation, infrastructure, and security has expanded the partnership into the domains of investment and production. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Türkiye's engagement with Somalia is based on a comprehensive framework of reconstruction and capacity building that spans education, healthcare, transportation, and security.[8] In this respect, the energy agenda represents the economic continuation of the political trust and institutional cooperation that have been cultivated over many years.

For Türkiye, the long-term objective is to diversify its overseas oil and natural gas production portfolio and expand the global operational reach of its national energy companies. For Somalia, the objective is to establish the technical, legal, and institutional capacity necessary to develop the country's natural resources

7 O. Sarı,"*Deniz Görev Grubu, Oruç Reis Araştırma Gemisi'ne refakat etti*", Anadolu Agency, November 4, 2024,
https://www.kisa.link/XiKos , Access Date: 02.07.2026

8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "*Türkiye-Somali siyasi ilişkileri"* July 14, 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/mtpCG, Access Date: 16.07.2026.

under its own sovereign authority. The convergence of these two objectives elevates the energy partnership beyond a conventional resource supply relationship.

4. Somalia's Sovereign Capacity and Economic Expectations

For Somalia, the first tangible outcome of the 2025 activities has been the generation of modern, high-resolution data regarding the country's hydrocarbon potential. Estimates concerning the existence of natural resources can only be confirmed through systematic seismic surveys and drilling. The data collected by the Oruç Reis will enable Somalia to better understand the geological characteristics of its maritime jurisdiction areas, evaluate licensed blocks according to technical criteria, and make future investment decisions on the basis of a more robust body of information. Turkish authorities have likewise stated that the data obtained will provide important guidance in the assessment of Somalia's maritime jurisdiction areas.

A second benefit lies in the linkage between the energy sector and Somalia's state-building and sovereign capacity. Hydrocarbon exploration brings into focus not only the prospect of future production revenues but also institutional functions such as licensing, geological data management, contract oversight, public revenue monitoring, and negotiations with investors. The knowledge and experience developed in these areas are expected to strengthen Somalia's capacity to manage and exercise authority over its own natural resources.

In its 2025 assessment, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that Somalia completed, on March 28, 2025, regulations clarifying the standards governing the publication of production-sharing agreements.[9] This development constitutes an important institutional step toward ensuring that energy-sector agreements are conducted within a clearer regulatory framework and in accordance with enhanced transparency standards.

The World Bank's latest 2025 assessment of the Somali economy likewise emphasizes that the country must strengthen domestic revenue mobilization in response to declining external assistance. According to the report, sectors such as energy, fisheries, agriculture, digital technology, and manufacturing are expected to play a greater role in economic diversification and employment generation.[10] Should a commercial hydrocarbon discovery be made, revenues generated through licensing, taxation, and production-sharing arrangements are expected to provide Somalia with new financial resources to support infrastructure, healthcare, education, and other public services.

9 International Monetary Fund, "*Somalia: Third review under the Extended Credit Facility and request for a modification of quantitative performance criterion—Press release; staff report; and statement by the executive director for Somalia"*, IMF Country Report No. 2025/191, July 16, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/HCnvT, Access Date: 02.07.2026.

10 World Bank, "*Somalia's economic prospects are positive, but foreign aid cuts are downsizing growth*", June 30, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/EGjwN , Access Date: 02.07.2026.


Even prior to any commercial production, exploration activities are expected to generate benefits through local procurement, the development of port and logistics capacity, technical training, and increased international investment visibility for the country. Türkiye's expansion from offshore exploration to onshore blocks has also established a technical foundation for the development of a more comprehensive energy economy across different regions of Somalia.

From Türkiye's perspective, the other dimension of this mutually beneficial relationship extends beyond potential access to natural resources to include the enhancement of technical expertise, diplomatic influence, and long-term economic partnership. Somalia, in turn, benefits from Türkiye's exploration fleet, engineering expertise, and institutional experience, enabling it to evaluate its natural resources in a more systematic manner. Consequently, the energy relationship has evolved beyond a one-sided resource supply arrangement into a partnership model that brings together Türkiye's operational capabilities with Somalia's objectives of sovereignty and sustainable development.

5. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked the transition of Türkiye's energy engagement in Somalia from the intention to explore to the threshold of drilling. The year began with ongoing offshore seismic surveys, followed in April by the expansion of cooperation to onshore blocks. In June, the mission to acquire three-dimensional seismic data covering 4,464 square kilometers was completed, and during the second half of the year, the processing of the collected data initiated the identification of prospective drilling targets.

For this reason, the strategic legacy of 2025 extends well beyond the announcement of any petroleum discovery. Through this project, Türkiye demonstrated that its national energy fleet and TPAO's operational capabilities have become fully functional on an international scale. Somalia, meanwhile, has acquired a new technical database to support the identification and development of its natural resources, while a new pillar centered on production, investment, and long-term economic cooperation has been added to bilateral relations. At the same time, the groundwork for the next phase of the project was laid in 2025 through the conversion of the collected and analyzed seismic data into concrete drilling targets.



Chapter Two

Türkiye-Africa Relations

1 2025 Activities in Africa by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities **167-178**
Presidency For Turks Abroad And Related Communities

2 The 2025 Agenda in Türkiye-Africa Partnership: From Cooperation to a Shared Future **179-192**
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

3 Türkiye's Ministry of National Defense Activities in Africa: 2025 Overview **193-198**
Ministry of National Defense

4 2025 Activities of the Ministry of Trade in Africa **199-208**
The General Directorate of International Agreements and the European Union

5 Türkiye's Energy Collaborations with African Countries **209-214**
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources

6 Türkiye's Industry and Technology Cooperation with Africa in 2025 **215-228**
Ministry of Industry and Technology

7 Mining Diplomacy by the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration toward Niger: MTAIC Niger Mining **229-234**
Mineral Exploration and Research Institute

8 Ministry of Health: A Healing Hand Extended to Africa **235-242**
Directorate General of EU and Foreign Affairs

9 The Communications Aspect to Türkiye-Africa Relations: Cooperation in Public Diplomacy and Media **243-248**
Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications

10 Turkish Maarif Foundation's 2025 Activities in Africa **249-262**
Turkish Maarif Foundation


11 2025 Activities of Anadolu Agency in Africa **263-268**
Anadolu Agency

12 The Unique Roadmap of TİKA: A People-Centered and Sustainable Development Cooperation **269-276**
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

13 Yunus Emre Institute's Cultural, Artistic and Educational Activities in Africa in 2025 **277-284**
Yunus Emre Institute

14 2025 Activities of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation in Africa **285-296**
TRT

15 Humanitarian Diplomacy Activities of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency in Africa in 2025 **297-302**
Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency



2025 Activities in Africa by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities

1

Presidency For Turks Abroad And Related Communities

1. Introduction

Relations between Türkiye and African countries are deepening steadily not only in the areas of political and economic cooperation, but also in education, culture, science, and interaction among societies. Africa's young population and growing need for higher education are making the development of qualified human resources one of the Continent's key priorities for sustainable development. In this context, higher education stands out as a strategic area that contributes not only to expanding individual educational opportunities, but also to establishing long-term human and institutional ties between countries.

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) supports students from African countries in pursuing their education in Türkiye through higher education and academic cooperation programs, particularly Türkiye Scholarships, and aims to sustain these ties by maintaining relations with alumni following the completion of their education. In this respect, African students receiving higher education in Türkiye and Türkiye Alumni serve as an important bridge that enhances the human dimension of Türkiye-Africa relations. As the alumni assume academic, public sector, private sector, and civil society positions in their home countries, the ties established through education develop into tangible forms of cooperation across different fields.



Ambassador Sheikh Abdul Nasiru-Deen, who was appointed as Ghana's Ambassador to Ankara, visited YTB President Abdulhadi Turus.



Minister of Sports and Recreation of the Republic of Ghana Kofi Adams visited YTB on August 18, 2025.



The 5th International Student Awards ceremony, organized by YTB, was held at the YTB headquarters.



The 4th International Young Writers' Meeting, organized by YTB, was held in Bursa.



African students participated in the Youth Camp organized by YTB.



Mozambican students participated in the Ilgaz excursion program organized by YTB.

This article examines YTB's activities targeting Africa in 2025 in the areas of education, human resources, alumni relations, public-academic cooperation, and knowledge production, and analyzes the contributions of these efforts to the social and human dimensions of Türkiye-Africa relations.

2. A Shared Perspective on Africa's Future: Contributing to Human Capital through Türkiye Scholarships

The African Union's (AU) *Agenda 2063 Vision*, launched in 2013, sets out long-term objectives for the Continent's transformation process. Driven by the motto "The Africa We Want," *Agenda 2063* envisions not only a prosperous and inclusive Africa, but also a more integrated and peaceful Continent with good governance and a stronger position on the global stage. A significant part of these objectives focuses on educated and qualified human resources, the empowerment of youth and women, the development of scientific and technological capacity, and Africa having a greater voice in its own development process.

Through activities that support mutual gains within a shared vision for the future with the Continent, Türkiye contributes to establishing long-term, people-centered, and lasting ties through initiatives that align with the objectives of the AU and also contribute to social dynamics. Through various programs implemented in the field of education, which is of vital importance to the Continent, YTB makes significant contributions to deepening relations with Africa on the basis of strategic partnership. In this context, the *Türkiye Scholarships Program*[1], has, since 2012, provided young people with access to high-quality education in line with international standards, serving as one of the key instruments of Türkiye's cooperation with African countries in the field of higher education. From the launch of the program through the end of 2025, 14,364 African students obtained higher education degrees at universities in Türkiye.

In 2025, the *Türkiye Scholarships Program* received 43,195 applications from African countries, and 1,994 students were awarded scholarships to pursue education in various fields at the undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral levels. There is little doubt that these students, who have gained access to educational opportunities in fields such as health sciences, engineering, agriculture, information technologies, social sciences, and public administration in line with the development objectives of African countries, will in the coming years contribute to meeting the qualified human resource needs of their respective countries.

1 For the official website of Türkiye Scholarships see:
https://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/

In addition to the formal education provided under Türkiye Scholarships, YTB also carries out activities that support students' academic, professional, and social development. As indicated in Table 1, a total of 1,002 African students benefited in 2025 from programs such as the International Student Academy, International Student Internship Program, 9th International Student Sciences Congress, 5th International Student Awards, and youth camps. These activities support students not only in developing their academic knowledge and skills, but also in gaining experience in different fields and expanding their social networks. In this respect, Türkiye Scholarships is more than simply a higher education support program; it is a comprehensive program that contributes to students' development of professional and social competencies and to the establishment of lasting ties between Türkiye and African societies.

Table 1. Student Participation in Programs Organized by YTB for International Students

2025		
Programs	**Participants in Total**	**Number of African Students**
9th International Student Science Congress	135	38
International Student Academy	2756	642
International Student Internships	105	31
V. International Student Awards	517	69
Youth Camps	558	222

Throughout 2025, various activities were also organized by YTB's Ankara and Istanbul Offices to strengthen the academic, cultural, and social interaction of African international students. In this context, in addition to academic meetings, world cuisine days, African country presentations, cultural excursions, iftar programs, and independence day celebrations were organized. A total of 24 activities focusing on the cultural and social characteristics of different countries, particularly Cameroon, The Gambia, Morocco, Libya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Mozambique, contributed to enabling students to introduce the values of their home countries in Türkiye and to bolstering communication and solidarity among students from different countries.

3. Bridges of Friendship Established through Türkiye Alumni

The cooperation that Türkiye has developed with African countries in the field of higher education also contributes to the formation of *people-to-people* ties that extend beyond students' education. After returning to their home coun-

tries, alumni carry the knowledge and experience they have acquired, as well as the ties they have established with Türkiye, into their own communities and professional fields, thereby reinforcing the long-term impact of this cooperation. In this respect, the *Türkiye Alumni Program* enables alumni to maintain their relations with Türkiye, come together with alumni from different countries, and establish a strong communication network around a shared sense of belonging.

Having acquired Turkish, alumni return home and serve as natural bridges between Türkiye and their respective home countries, carrying the relationships they developed during their education into their professional and social lives. Indeed, many alumni view the years they spent in Türkiye not merely as a period of education, but one that left lasting impressions on their lives, and they regard Türkiye as their second home. This strong sense of belonging and personal connection strengthens the humanitarian and social dimension of Türkiye's relations with Africa while also constituting an important foundation for long-term cooperation between the countries.

Today, African Türkiye Alumni serve in a wide range of fields, from public institutions to universities and from the private sector to civil society organizations. As of 2025, the total number of Türkiye Alumni in Africa was recorded as 17,182, of whom 5,892 completed their education as Türkiye Scholars. Türkiye Alumni Associations operating in cooperation with YTB also continue to sustain these relations at the country level. Social, cultural, and academic activities continued with great dedication in 2025 through 16 Türkiye Alumni Associations active in 14 African countries.

As part of the *Türkiye Alumni Program* implemented by our Presidency, job postings from our public institutions and organizations operating in Africa, as well as private-sector investors, were announced to alumni through the *Türkiye Alumni Portal*[2] in 2025. The alumni were hence able to access employment opportunities suited to their qualifications. In this regard, our Presidency serves as an intermediary facilitating alumni's participation in professional life after their degrees and connecting them with Türkiye-based institutions and organizations in Africa.

3.1. Academic Support

In order to support alumni in their academic work, a total of 57 applications were received from Africa in 2025 under the *Türkiye Alumni Academic Incentive Program*, and 25 African Türkiye Alumni academics were provided with the

2 For the official website of Türkiye Alumni Portal see:
https://www.turkiyemezunlari.gov.tr/

relevant incentive. This support for the academic work of alumni from different parts of the Continent, particularly Sudan, Nigeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Benin, encourages alumni to continue producing knowledge in their home countries and in their respective academic fields, while also contributing to the development of academic ties between Türkiye and Africa.

3.2. Achievements of Türkiye Alumni

The achievements of Türkiye Alumni represent some of the strongest manifestations of the lasting nature of the people-to-people ties Türkiye has established with African countries. One notable example of these achievements is H.E. Ambassador Sheikh Abdul Nasiru-Deen, who was appointed Ghana's Ambassador to Ankara in 2025. Nasiru-Deen came to Türkiye in 1998 to study pharmacy at Ankara University. He was nominated as Ghana's Ambassador to Türkiye on June 23, 2025, and began his post in Ankara after presenting his letter of credence to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on November 4, 2025. The return to Türkiye, years later, of a Türkiye Alumni with an educational background in the country, now as an ambassador representing his home country in Ankara, concretely demonstrates the long-term impact of educational programs and the importance of the human resources developed through Türkiye-Africa relations.

3.3. Türkiye Alumni Reunions

The relations established with Türkiye Alumni beyond their education evolved into a tangible framework in 2025 through Türkiye Alumni Reunion held in different countries. In this context, the *Türkiye Alumni Reunion in Libya*, held on December 9, 2025, reunited Libyan alumni with previous studies in

The Libya Türkiye Alumni Gathering was held in Tripoli on December 9, 2025.



Türkiye, creating opportunities for direct communication and cooperation between alumni and Türkiye's institutions in Libya. The program, hosted by our Presidency and the Tripoli Yunus Emre Cultural Center, invited all Libyan alumni and provided an occasion to foster alumni's existing ties with Türkiye through the participation of representatives from the Turkish Embassy in Tripoli, TİKA's Tripoli Program Coordination Office, and Anadolu Agency. At the event, alumni who had studied in Türkiye during different periods shared their experiences, brought together not merely as stakeholders with a common educational background, but as part of a network capable of contributing to the development of people-to-people and institutional relations between Türkiye and Libya.

With one-on-one meetings and new connections forged after the program, communication among alumni was deepened, and the network acquired a more sustainable structure. In this respect, the *Türkiye Alumni Reunion in Libya* constituted an important example of how relations established through higher education in Türkiye can be kept active after graduation and that the knowledge, experience, and professional expertise possessed by alumni can be employed in different fields.

4. Sharing Türkiye's Practices in the Public Sector and Academia

In Africa's development agenda, strengthening the capacity of public institutions and academic communities receives equal weight as education itself. In relations between Türkiye and Africa, this area is developing not only through inter-institutional agreements, but also through direct human contact. The *Turkish Language Program for Public Officials and Academics* (KATİP), implemented by YTB, serves a distinct function in this context. Implemented since 2014, KATİP enables public officials, diplomats, and academics from African countries to receive Turkish-language education in Türkiye and become closely acquainted with Türkiye's public institutions and academic communities.

In 2025, 440 applications were received from African countries, with 8 diplomats and public officials from Libya, Tanzania, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe admitted into the program. From the launch of the program through the end of 2025, a total of 230 participants joined from 35 different African countries. Accordingly, participants had the opportunity not only to receive Turkish-language education, but were also introduced to public institutions, universities, and various organizations and attended a number of seminars and cultural activities.







The certificate ceremony was held following the completion of the 2025-2026 term of the KATİP Program.

KATİP Program executed by YTB was launched for the 2025-2026 Period.

YTB President Abdulhadi Turus presented certificates to the participants who completed their training under KATİP.

The long-term value of KATİP lies in participants' ability to draw on the experience they gained in Türkiye relevant to their professional fields when they return to their home countries. Accordingly, the program not only facilitates communication of Türkiye's practices in the public and academic spheres but also lays the groundwork for in-person contact between relevant institutions in the countries.

5. Understanding Africa through Current Developments: Africa Yearbook 2024

Another dimension of YTB's work on Africa consists of publishing activities aimed at producing knowledge about the Continent and making the academic body of knowledge in this field more visible. In this regard, the *Africa Yearbook* series, which our Presidency first compiled based on developments in 2021, continues to serve as an up-to-date and comprehensive work of reference in the academic literature on Africa by examining developments that took place across the Continent throughout the relevant year from an interdisciplinary perspective.

Africa Yearbook 2024[3], completed and published in 2025, builds on the body of publications from previous years, examining current developments in Africa and making an original and valuable contribution to the literature. Published in Turkish and English, the book consists of 5 main sections, 47 original articles, 12 institutional contributions, and 7 book reviews, for a total of 66 articles. Covering diverse fields such as politics, economics, society, the environment, Türkiye-Africa relations, the Africa policies of global and regional actors, as well as culture, education, and the arts, the book aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of 2024 from an African perspective.

The *Africa Yearbook* is more than a record of current developments over the course of a year; it serves as a resource that enables comprehensive monitoring of important agendas across Africa. Read alongside volumes from previous years, each new book constitutes an academic body of knowledge enabling readers to trace the transformation of the Continent, the course of Türkiye-Africa relations, and changes in international interest in Africa. In this respect, the *Africa Yearbook 2024* serves as an essential reference work underpinning the continuity of African studies in Türkiye.

3 For the online version of the Africa Yearbook 2024 see:


https://www.kisa.link/pRFZk

6. Conclusion

For Africa to harness its potential and sustain its development through qualified human resources and institutional capacity, fostering education and knowledge emerges as a fundamental priority. Accordingly, international cooperation based on the foreign policy priorities of African countries is important for developing existing capacity and increasing the sharing of experience. To serve this vision, YTB carries out various initiatives in the areas of human resources and cultural interaction. In this framework, YTB's activities in 2025 demonstrate an approach in which the social and human dimensions of Türkiye-Africa relations were supported through various instruments.

With activities carried out throughout the year, including international student mobility events, initiatives targeting public officials and academics, efforts to support alumni employment, academic incentives, and alumni reunions held in different countries, individuals from different professions and communities seized the opportunity to maintain their engagement with Türkiye. Türkiye Alumni contribute to the development of their respective countries after graduation, representing the enduring legacy of our efforts to help develop the qualified human resources that will shape Africa's future, drawing on the Continent's own values and dynamics.

The activities undertaken in 2025 demonstrate the importance of approaching Africa not merely to meet existing needs, but with a long-term perspective that takes into account the objectives concerning the shared future of Türkiye and Africa. Accordingly, further boosting relations based on mutual trust, identifying new areas of cooperation, and passing the experience gained to date on to future generations are among the main objectives for the period ahead.



The 2025 Agenda in Türkiye-Africa Partnership: From Cooperation to a Shared Future

2

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1. Introduction

Our relations with the African continent are conducted in accordance with the framework established by our Africa Partnership Policy, based on the principles of "equal partnership" and "win-win" cooperation.

In line with this understanding, our country directly contributes to efforts aimed at promoting peace, security, stability, and development across the continent while supporting capacity-building processes.

In 2025, our active engagement continued across all regions of Africa, taking into account regional conditions and local needs.

2. Africa Policy and Relations with the African Union

In addition to our bilateral relations with African countries, our relations with the African Union (AU) continue to grow stronger and become increasingly institutionalized.

It was agreed that a *Ministerial Review Conference* would be held once between the summits scheduled to take place every five years with the AU. Accordingly, the first meeting of the "Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Working Group" (JMEWG) between our Ministry and the African Union (AU), established pursuant to the de-

cision adopted at the Third Türkiye-Africa Partnership Ministerial Review Conference hosted by Djibouti, was held in Addis Ababa on March 28, 2025, under the co-chairmanship of Ambassador Volkan Işıkçı, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the AU, and Steve Patrick Lalande, Director of the AU's Partnerships Management and Resource Mobilisation (PMRM).

The third meeting of the JMEWG was held at our Ministry on October 14, 2025, under the co-chairmanship of Ambassador Volkan Işıkçı, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the AU, and PMRM Director Steve Lalande, with the participation of Ambassador Hidayet Bayraktar, Coordinator of the Fourth Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit, and representatives of the AU.

3. Developments in East Africa and the Horn of Africa Region


2025 was marked by significant achievements in the relations between our country and Somalia, which continue to progress positively across all areas. The "Ankara Declaration," adopted between Somalia and Ethiopia through the mediation of our country, remained the most tangible example of the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, the high-level dialogue and contacts established between Somalia and Ethiopia continued throughout 2025.

The first round of technical negotiations under the Ankara Declaration was held in Ankara on February 18, 2025, hosted by our Minister, with the participation of delegations led by Dr. Gedion Timothewos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, and Ali Mohamed Omar, State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Somalia.


Efforts were made to deepen multidimensional relations through high-level visits. In this context, Somalia paid three presidential visits and two foreign ministerial visits to our country in 2025, in addition to various visits by other ministers and senior officials on different occasions.

Important developments took place in 2025 regarding the "win-win" projects carried out by our country with Somalia in the fields of hydrocarbons, fisheries, and space. In April, an agreement was signed between the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) concerning hydrocarbon exploration and production activities in Somalia's onshore areas, with the aim of strengthening bilateral cooperation in the energy sector. Our seismic research vessel Oruç Reis completed its 234-day mission on June 12, 2025, collecting three-dimensional seismic data in Somalia's maritime areas.

On December 17, 2025, OYAK and Somalia's Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy signed the "Strategic Cooperation and Services Agreement" to support the development of Somalia's technical capacity in the fisheries sector and contribute to its efforts to combat illegal fishing.







Following the meeting held in our country with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on December 30, 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced to the public that the feasibility and project design studies for the Spaceport being constructed in Somalia had been completed and that the initial phase of construction activities had commenced.

Our relations with friendly and brotherly Sudan, one of the African countries with which we share deep-rooted historical ties, advanced in 2025. Despite the ongoing conflict since 2023 and the challenges on the ground, Türkiye remains one of the few countries to have maintained its diplomatic and institutional presence in Sudan. Our Embassy in Khartoum continues its operations temporarily from Port Sudan.


The visits of Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council Abdulrahman El Burhan to our country in April 2025, on the occasion of the *IV. Antalya Diplomacy Forum*, and again in December for a working visit, provided an important opportunity to address bilateral relations at the highest level.


TİKA opened its Port Sudan office in January 2025, while Ziraat Katılım Bankası (ZKB) inaugurated its Port Sudan branch in July 2025. Turkish Airlines (THY) launched Istanbul-Port Sudan flights

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council Chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on December 25, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who came to Türkiye upon his invitation, at the Presidential Dolmabahçe Office. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received Gabonese President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on July 31, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)









President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received South African Deputy President Paul Shipokosa Mashatile at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on October 15, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan officially welcomed Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who was visiting Türkiye, on January 23, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Guinea-Bissau President Umaro Sissoco Embaló at the Dolmabahçe Presidential Office on March 21, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on August 7, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency

in September, becoming an important link connecting Sudan and the Sudanese people to the rest of the world. The activities of our Embassy and other institutions have served as concrete manifestations of our cooperation and solidarity with Sudan.

Türkiye supports all diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the conflict that has caused a major humanitarian crisis and widespread destruction in Sudan. At the same time, our country has not remained indifferent to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Sudan and, with the contributions of Turkish NGOs, continued throughout 2025 to deliver humanitarian and emergency relief supplies to Sudan in cooperation with local and international partners. Within this framework, from the summer of 2024 through the end of 2025, a total of eight ships transported 10,000 tons of relief supplies and 30,000 tents to Sudan.

A meeting with South Sudan was held at the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs level on September 2, 2025. The then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nuh Yılmaz, met with South Sudan's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ambassador Akuei Boba Malwal Madut, to discuss our bilateral relations and regional issues.

Our relations with Djibouti, which continue at an excellent level and have progressed positively across all fields, gained further momentum through engagements in 2025. Turkish Foreign Minister held bilateral meetings with Djiboutian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdoulkader Houssein Omar on the margins of the 50th *Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation*, held in Istanbul on June 22, 2025, and the 21st *Extraordinary Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation* on Palestine, held in Jeddah on August 25, 2025.

Within the framework of the Fourth Round of Türkiye-Djibouti Political Consultations, hosted by our Ministry in Ankara on September 4, 2025, Mohamed Ali Hassan, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Djibouti, met with the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nuh Yılmaz.

Political consultations at the Director General level were held with Eritrea, with which we share common cultural and historical ties dating back to the Ottoman period, on December 1-2, 2025. In addition to bilateral relations, regional developments were also discussed.

Our engagement with Uganda, an important actor in the Horn of Africa, continued through high-level visits in 2025. Jeje Abubakhar Odongo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda, participated in the *IV. Antalya Diplomacy Forum*, held on April 11-13, 2025, where he delivered a speech on "Connecting Africa: A Prospect for Continental Integration."

Our economic engagement with Kenya, one of our key trading partners in the region, continued throughout 2025. Kenya's Deputy Minister of Trade responsible for Investment, Abubakar Hassan, participated in TABEF and stated that Kenya seeks to benefit from our country's strength in the textile sector.

On October 21-22, 2025, Adan Keynan, Chair of the Kenya-Türkiye Parliamentary Friendship Group, paid a visit to our country, during which he held meetings with İsmail Güneş, Member of Parliament for Uşak, and the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nuh Yılmaz.

In 2025, engagements with Seychelles focused on finalizing agreements that would establish the legal framework for exploring areas of cooperation and enabling our bilateral relations to reach their full potential.

4. Developments in West Africa

West Africa continues to face numerous challenges, including terrorism, climate change, food security, and economic and social problems. In 2025, the Sahel region once again recorded the highest number of terrorism-related deaths in the world as a result of the increasing activities of international terrorist organizations and their affiliated armed groups. Terrorism and violent extremism have begun to threaten not only the Sahel countries but also the countries of the Gulf of Guinea.

Türkiye continues to be regarded as a reliable partner in the region because of its sincere approach and support in addressing these challenges. In this context, our country continues to support regional states across a broad spectrum extending from security to social and economic development, not only by contributing to counterterrorism efforts but also by addressing the conditions that give rise to terrorism. Strengthening the capacities of regional countries and supporting their sustainable development remain fundamental priorities.

The growing influence of Pan-Africanism in the region, along with concrete steps such as the establishment of a joint military task force within the Confederation of Sahel States founded by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, and the initiation of efforts toward a common currency, point to a process of strategic change/transformation whose repercussions across a broad geographical area should be closely monitored. Türkiye is closely following these developments and strives to contribute to peace, security, sovereignty, and development through a holistic approach based on its historical ties, responsiveness to the needs of the peoples and states of the region, the principle of equal partnership, and the integrated consideration of development and security.

As part of its principled stance, Türkiye has consistently stated on every platform that military interventions and attempts to isolate the region internationally through sanctions, which could further destabilize the region, would be mis-

guided, and has maintained its bilateral relations with the Sahel countries on the basis of the principle of the continuity of inter-state relations.

In 2025, activities were carried out with African countries in numerous fields, primarily in political relations, as well as trade, investment, agriculture, energy, security and military cooperation, and particularly development projects in the areas of health and education.

The reciprocal official and working visits conducted in 2025 contributed to the advancement of bilateral relations with the countries of the continent across numerous fields. During meetings held within the framework of high-level official contacts, *Joint Economic Commission* meetings, and political consultations, our bilateral relations were comprehensively reviewed; new opportunities for cooperation were explored; and views were exchanged on current regional issues. The agreements signed on the occasion of high-level visits strengthened the treaty-based foundation of our relations with African countries.

Türkiye attaches great importance to supporting African countries through a holistic approach extending from security to social and economic development, based on the understanding that the fight against terrorism and development can only be achieved through integrated, capacity-building efforts. Within this framework, our foreign policy approach responds to the needs of the peoples and states of the region and is based on the principle of equal partnership, with our activities in 2025 contributing to peace, security, stability, and development in Africa.


President of Gabon Brice Clotaire Nguema visited our country from July 29 to August 2, 2025. On the occasion of the visit, eight agreements were signed in the fields of military affairs, vocational education, energy, mining, hydrocarbons, and protocol. Furthermore, our President also attended the *Türkiye-Gabon Business and Investment Forum* held on the margins of the visit.

Our President met with the President of Sierra Leone on the margins of the *IV. Antalya Diplomacy Forum*.

Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo Anatole Collinet Makosso visited our country from August 2 to 5, 2025, and was received by our Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz on August 4.

Prime Minister of Senegal Ousmane Sonko was received by our President on August 7 during his visit from August 6 to 11, 2025. On the occasion of the visit, agreements were signed in the fields of military affairs, culture, and education, and the *Türkiye-Senegal Business Forum* was held.

Thanks to high-level engagements and visits, Turkish companies were enabled to undertake roles in infrastructure investments in Central and West African countries, particularly in the energy and contracting sectors, on the basis of



Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz officially welcomed South African Deputy President Paul Mashatile at the Presidential Complex. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

the "win-win" principle. During our engagements, the importance of the security situation in the Sahel region for the stability of the entire African continent was emphasized on every occasion, and the importance of long-term development and capacity building for the security and stability of the Sahel countries was underscored.

In 2025, *Joint Economic Commission* meetings were held with Chad (January 22-23), Cameroon (May 8-9), and Mauritania (May 20-22), during which bilateral relations were addressed across a broad spectrum and roadmaps were formulated.

In 2025, bilateral political consultations were held with Mali (February 10), Togo (March 13), The Gambia (April 22), Benin (June 19), and Equatorial Guinea (October 23-24). In addition, consultations focusing on developments in the Sahel region were held in 2025 with Azerbaijan (January 22), Hungary (September 18), France (October 10), and Germany (November 6).

5. Relations with North African Countries

Between our country and Egypt, two visits at the level of Foreign Minister were carried out in 2025. During his visit to El Alamein from August 8 to 10, 2025, our Minister was received by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and held meetings with his Egyptian counterpart Badr Abdelatty and Secretary-General of the League of Arab States Ahmed Aboul Gheit. The first meeting of the Joint Planning Group (JPG), co-chaired by our Minister and his Egyptian counterpart Abdelatty, was held in Ankara on November 12, 2025, to discuss preparations for the second meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC), which will be co-chaired by our President and his Egyptian counterpart, President El-Sisi.

As a result of elevating our relations with Algeria to the strategic level, the third meeting of the JPG, co-chaired by our Minister and his Algerian counterpart Ahmed Attaf, was held in Algiers on April 20-21, 2025, as part of the preparations for the first meeting of the HLSCC.

Our relations with Morocco and Tunisia continued to progress throughout 2025. Morocco became our second-largest trading partner in North Africa in 2025.

Our efforts to further advance our bilateral relations with Libya in every field continued throughout 2025, with reciprocal engagements and visits maintained within this framework. Our President received Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh of the Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU) in Ankara in January 2025, subsequently in Antalya in April on the margins of the *IV. Antalya Diplomacy Forum*, and in Istanbul in August on the occasion of the *Türkiye-Italy-Libya Cooperation Summit*. In addition, our Minister of Trade, Mr. Ömer Bolat, visited Tripoli in April and, together with GNU Minister of Transport Mohammed Al-Shahoubi, co-chaired the second meeting in Ankara in September of the Joint Working Group mechanism established during that visit with the aim of resolving the problems experienced by our companies in Libya. During the visits to our country by Al-Shahoubi and GNU Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammed Al-Huweij on the occasion of the 5th *Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum*, a joint declaration was signed on the establishment of a Joint Economic and Trade Commission between Türkiye and Libya. The then Minister of Interior, Mr. Ali Yerlikaya, also paid a visit to Libya in November.

6. Relations with Countries of Southern Africa

Upon the invitation of our President, President of Rwanda Paul Kagame and the First Lady paid an official visit to Türkiye from January 23 to 25, 2025. This visit constituted the first official visit to our country from Rwanda at the presidential level. On its occasion, four memoranda of understanding were signed between our country and Rwanda on cooperation in the fields of civil aviation, media and communications, the defense industry, and radio and television.

At the *IV. Antalya Diplomacy Forum*, held on April 11-13, 2025, the countries of the Southern Africa region were represented at the level of Foreign Minister by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia; at the level of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs by Malawi and the Republic of South Africa (RSA); and at the level of Political Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Eswatini.

Among Africa's regional and international organizations, participation at the Forum was secured at the level of Secretary General by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Executive Secretary by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), President of the Commission by the Economic Com-



An Africa-focused reception was held following the 3rd Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF). (Source: Anadolu Agency)

munity of West African States (ECOWAS), and Deputy Executive Secretary by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).

Within the framework of the Forum, a panel entitled "Connecting Africa: A Prospect for Continental Integration" was held on April 13, along with a roundtable meeting entitled "Africa's Rising Role in World Politics" on Tuesday, April 12.

In addition, a reception hosted by the Turkish Foreign Minister was organized for ministers and senior participants from Africa.

The Queen Mother of Eswatini, Ntfombi Tfwala, accompanied by her delegation, paid a private visit to Istanbul from May 22 to 28, 2025, and met with the First Lady, Mrs. Emine Erdoğan, in Istanbul on May 23.

The Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meeting between our country and Angola was held in Ankara on July 1-2, 2025.

The Declaration on the establishment of the Joint Trade Committee (JETCO) between our Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Tanzania was signed on July 23, 2025, by the Turkish Minister of Trade, Prof. Dr. Ömer Bolat, and Tanzania's Minister of Industry and Trade, Selemani Saidi Jafo.



First Lady Emine Erdoğan met with Queen Mother Ntfombi Tfwala, the mother of King Mswati III of Eswatini, in Istanbul on May 23, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

The 8th Political Consultation Meeting with the RSA was held at the Director General level in Pretoria on August 4, 2025.

As part of the Kingdom of Lesotho's efforts to open an embassy in our country, a meeting was held with a Lesotho delegation on August 8, 2025.

At the invitation of our Minister, Botswana's Minister of International Relations, Phenyo Butale, visited our country from August 12 to 14, 2025. On the occasion of the visit, the "Agreement on Visa Exemption for Holders of Diplomatic, Official, Service, and Special Passports" and the "Memorandum of Understanding on Political Consultations" were signed between our country and Botswana.

The first Political Consultation Meeting with Rwanda was held at the Director General level in Kigali on September 11, 2025.

The first meeting of the Bilateral National Commission (BNC), the counterpart of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC), between our country and the RSA was held at the Vice Presidential level in Ankara on October 15, 2025.

On the occasion of the BNC, Deputy President of the RSA Paulus Shipokosa Mashatile, who visited our country, was received by our President on October 15, 2025, and held a tête-à-tête meeting with our Vice President, Mr. Cevdet Yılmaz.

Following the BNC meeting, the "Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Joint Economic and Trade Commission between the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Türkiye and the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition of the Republic of South Africa," the "Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of

Trade of the Republic of Türkiye and the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition of the Republic of South Africa on Cooperation in the Field of Free Zones," the "Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Youth and Sports of the Republic of Türkiye and the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture of the Republic of South Africa on Cooperation in the Field of Sports," and the "Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Higher Education" were signed, and a Joint Press Conference was held following the signing ceremony. A Joint Declaration on the development of bilateral cooperation was also adopted during the BNC.

Preparations for the first meeting of the BNC were carried out in close coordination and consultation with the relevant ministries, institutions, and organizations of our country. Under the auspices of our Ministry, which also serves as the Secretariat of the BNC, four online meetings were held on September 12, 25, and 30, 2025 (with two held on September 30). In addition, a Senior Officials Meeting was held at our Ministry on October 13, 2025. As part of the preparations for the BNC meeting, two meetings were also held with officials from the Embassy of the RSA in Ankara.

A delegation headed by Thobias Makoba, Director General for Global Strategies and Geopolitics at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation of Tanzania, paid a visit to our country from October 19 to 23, 2025.

The first Political Consultation Meeting with Burundi was held at the Director General level in Bujumbura on October 22, 2025.

Throughout 2025, meetings were held with Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mozambique in the field of defense industry cooperation. The *Mozambique-Türkiye Defence Industry Cooperation Forum*, held in Maputo on November 19-20, 2025, was the first meeting with Mozambique in this field.

The Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Bilateral Cooperation Joint Commission (BCJC) between our Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation of Tanzania was signed by our Minister on December 22, 2025.

Agreements That Entered into Force / Agreements with Scheduled Dates of Enforcement:

The "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of the Republic of Zambia on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture" was approved by Presidential Decision dated March 21, 2025, and published in the Official Gazette dated March 22, 2025.

The Presidential Decision determining that the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (TECA), signed with Zimbabwe in 2018, entered into force on May 9, 2024, was published in the Official Gazette dated June 1, 2025.

The date of entry into force of the "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of the Republic of Zambia on Cooperation in the Fields of Fisheries and Livestock" was determined by Presidential Decision as September 11, 2025. The Decision was published in the Official Gazette No. 33084 dated November 21, 2025.

The date of entry into force of the "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of the Republic of Zambia on Security Cooperation" was determined by Presidential Decision as September 11, 2025. The Decision was published in the Official Gazette No. 33084 dated November 21, 2025.


The date of entry into force of the "Protocol between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of the Republic of Zambia on Cooperation in Law Enforcement Training" was determined by Presidential Decision as September 11, 2025. The Decision was published in the Official Gazette No. 33084 dated November 21, 2025.

7. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a period in which the Türkiye-Africa partnership was not only quantitatively expanded in terms of bilateral relations but was also advanced to a deeper and more sustainable level through institutional mechanisms, high-level political engagement, and multi-sectoral areas of cooperation. The strengthening of the institutional dialogue with the AU, intensive diplomatic engagement across all regions of the continent, political consultations, economic partnership mechanisms, and the agreements signed constituted concrete manifestations of Türkiye's long-term and comprehensive approach toward Africa. In addition, projects implemented in the fields of energy, transportation, defense, trade, agriculture, education, health, and capacity building demonstrated that the partnership has assumed an increasingly comprehensive and strategic character.

At a time when geopolitical competition in the international system has intensified and security, energy, food, and climate-related challenges have directly impacted the African continent, Türkiye has continued to pursue an approach to cooperation that is grounded in the priorities of African countries and based on the principles of respect for sovereignty, mutual benefit, and shared development.

Activities spanning a broad spectrum, from mediation initiatives and humanitarian assistance to development projects and economic partnerships, have further reinforced Türkiye's position as a reliable and constructive partner in Africa. Looking ahead, the objective is to elevate the Türkiye-Africa partnership to an even higher level through the strengthening of institutional cooperation mechanisms, the diversification of economic relations, and new initiatives that will contribute to shared prosperity and stability.



Türkiye's Ministry of National Defense Activities in Africa: 2025 Overview

3

Ministry of National Defense

1. Introduction

The Ministry of National Defense, which resolutely continues its fight against all threats and dangers that may be directed toward our country and serves as the guarantor of our independence, the indivisible integrity of our homeland, and our national unity and solidarity as the deterrent force of our country, contributes to regional and global peace through more than 20 different missions with approximately 70,000 personnel.

Aiming to strengthen regional peace and security and deepen military relations with friendly and brotherly countries, the Ministry of National Defense stands by our friends and allies as part of the solution, from Syria to Libya and from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caucasus.

Our primary objective is to share our historical experience, as well as our social, political, and cultural heritage, together with the capabilities and resources we possess, with the countries of the African Continent, with which we have deep-rooted historical and cultural ties, in line with the principle of "African solutions to Africa's problems." In this context, the relations we have developed with African countries on the basis of equal partnership and mutual benefit contribute to the peace, security, and stability of both the continent and our region.



President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the 17th International Defence Industry Fair (IDEF 2025), held in Istanbul on July 22, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

2. Activities Carried Out in 2025

In 2025, the Ministry of National Defense focused on enhancing the capabilities of the national armed forces of our security partners across the continent, strengthening their counterterrorism capacities, and supporting the professionalization of their institutions. Türkiye's security policy on the continent is based on the principles of military training, doctrinal transfer, and enhancing the capabilities of the armed forces of partner countries.

2.1. Defense Industry Cooperation

The high level of participation from African countries in the IDEF'25 International Defence Industry Fair, which we held at the end of July 2025, attracted considerable attention. On the margins of the fair, the Minister of National Defense, Mr. Yaşar GÜLER, held bilateral meetings with the Ministers of Defense of 15 African countries. It was observed that defense systems



A protocol amending the agreement on military financial cooperation between Türkiye and The Gambia was signed at IDEF 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)



A "Military Framework Agreement" was signed between Türkiye and Mauritania as part of IDEF 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

produced by our domestic and national defense industry companies attracted significant interest, particularly from our African friends.

In line with our objective of strengthening defense cooperation, Military Attaché Offices were established within our Embassies in Chad, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone in 2025. As a result, the number of resident Military

Attaché Offices on the African continent has increased tenfold since 2003, reaching 31. In addition, our Military Attaché Offices are accredited to 19 more countries. This has enabled us to obtain up-to-date information on current and military affairs concerning African countries, with which our military relations continue to expand, much more rapidly, while also establishing direct channels of dialogue with our friends across the continent.

2.2. Military Framework Agreements and Military Training

To establish a legal foundation for our relations with African countries, Military Framework Agreements have been signed to date with 36 countries in Africa, while Military Training and Cooperation Agreements have been concluded with 23 countries. The interest shown by military personnel from African countries in the courses and programs organized at our training centers and facilities continues to grow each year. In this context, a total of 1,886 African Guest Military Personnel participated in courses and training programs organized in Türkiye during the period from September 2024 to September 2025. Through the training delivered by our experienced personnel, our country's capabilities and competencies are demonstrated firsthand, thereby promoting the development of military relations and expanding areas of cooperation. The "Train-the-Trainer" approach has created a sustainable human resource network within Türkiye-Africa military relations.

Meanwhile, with the support of the Maarif Foundation and the Yunus Emre Institute, on-site Turkish language training is provided in 12 African countries for military personnel who will participate in education and training programs in Türkiye. To date, this training program attracted 1,342 personnel, thereby minimizing the adaptation period of participants to our country while increasing the benefits derived from the training received in Türkiye.

The positive results of the education and advisory support provided by Türkiye to strengthen the capacity of the Somali Armed Forces have begun to emerge. In addition, through the Libya Task Force Command, support continues to be provided for the transition of the Libyan Armed Forces into a

regular army. The Turkish Armed Forces also aims to respond to the requests of the Sahel countries for security and counterterrorism assistance, as it does in other regions of the continent, within the framework of international law and existing bilateral agreements. In particular, our cooperation activities in the field of military training with the Sahel countries – especially Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso – which focus on enhancing their capacity to increase effectiveness in counterterrorism operations, continue on the basis of existing bilateral agreements.


2.3. The Principle of Human Security in Military Relations

Another distinctive feature of the Ministry of National Defense's vision for Africa is the integration of military activities with the principle of "human security." In this context, military health diplomacy has become one of the most important elements of our country's soft power on the continent. Under the *Military Health Training and Cooperation Protocols* that have been signed, Turkish military physicians provide first aid and medical training to the medical personnel of the armed forces of friendly and allied countries in various parts of the continent.

Humanitarian assistance activities carried out to support education, nutrition, and social peace also demonstrate the Ministry of National Defense's capacity to respond rapidly to regional instability and humanitarian crises.

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, as a reflection of the responsibility derived from our deep-rooted historical heritage and our strategic vision, the Turkish Armed Forces, which undertakes critical missions across a wide geography, continues to make significant contributions to security, peace, and stability in Africa.



2025 Activities of the Ministry of Trade in Africa

4

The General Directorate of International Agreements and the European Union

1. Introduction

Developing trade and economic relations with the African continent has been an important foreign trade policy objective for our country. Within this framework, in 2003, our Ministry formulated the "Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with Africa" to enhance our trade and economic cooperation with the continent and establish new partnerships based on the win-win principle.

In parallel with this strategy, comprehensive steps have been taken to further strengthen our relations with Africa each passing day. In this context, bilateral and multilateral engagements with African countries are conducted on a regular basis, and close relations with the region have been established through the *Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forums*, which have been held since 2016.

Within this framework, the activities carried out by our Ministry in 2025 were marked by the engagements undertaken by our Minister of Trade and our Deputy Ministers of Trade, the convening of Joint Economic Commission meetings, the organization of the 5th Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum (TABEF), and the updating of the "Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with Africa."



The Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum was held in Istanbul on October 16-17, 2025, with the participation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

2. Trade Relations with African Countries

Since the implementation of the "Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with Africa" in 2003, a significant increase has been observed in our trade with the African continent. Türkiye's trade volume with Africa, which stood at US$ 5.4 billion in 2003, reached approximately US$ 40 billion as of 2025. During the same period, our exports to the continent increased from US$ 2.1 billion to approximately US$ 24 billion, while our imports rose from US$ 3.3 billion to approximately US$ 16 billion.

In 2025, approximately US$ 16 billion of our exports to the continent were destined for North African countries, while US$ 8 billion went to Sub-Saharan African countries. During the same period, approximately US$ 10 billion of our imports from the continent originated from North African countries, while US$ 6 billion came from Sub-Saharan African countries.

In addition to trade activities, our contracting and investment activities in Africa also occupy an important place. The market value of Turkish investors' investments in African countries has reached US$ 15 billion. To date,

Turkish contractors have undertaken 2,085 projects across the continent with a total contract value of approximately US$ 99.4 billion. This figure corresponds to 17.8 percent of the total value of projects undertaken by our country's companies worldwide.

The "2025 Target Countries for Exports" list included 14 African countries, the "Distant Countries Strategy" included 2 African countries, and the "Strategy for Enhancing Exports with the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation" included 8 African countries.

In 2025, support for individual participation has been provided for 184 trade fairs held in Africa, while 33 trade fairs were organized for African countries with the participation of Turkish attendees.

3. Engagements with African Countries

Throughout 2025, bilateral meetings were held with both North African and Sub-Saharan African countries. During this period, high-level meetings were held particularly with Libya, Morocco, and Algeria among the North African countries, while engagement between the business communities was further strengthened through forums and roundtable meetings.

With regard to Sub-Saharan African countries, on the occasion of the visits to our country by President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, President Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema of Gabon, Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko of Senegal, and Prime Minister Anatole Collinet Makosso of the Republic of the Congo, our Minister held bilateral meetings with his counterparts from these countries and participated in the forums organized during their visits.

At the same time, our Minister continued his bilateral engagements by participating in events such as the *13th World Cooperation Industries (WCI) Forum*, the *41st Ministerial Meeting of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation*, the *11th World Halal Summit*, and *Halal Expo 2025*.

4. Joint Economic Commission (JEC) and Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) Mechanisms

As part of the "completion of the legal framework," one of the principal components of the 2003 "Strategy for the Development of Trade and

Economic Relations with Africa," Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation (TETC) Agreements were signed with African countries, and Joint Economic Commission mechanisms were established under these agreements.

In 2025, Joint Economic Commission meetings were held with five African countries. During these meetings, opportunities for cooperation in numerous fields, including trade, investment, health, education, energy, agriculture, and tourism, were evaluated. In addition, high-level engagements were carried out, and business representatives from the two countries were brought together through roundtable meetings, thereby strengthening private sector contacts.

Table 1: JEC Meeting Locations in 2025

Joint Economic Commission Meetings	Date / Location
Türkiye-Chad Joint Economic Commission 2nd Term Meeting	January 22-23, 2025 / N'Djamena
Türkiye-Cameroon Joint Economic Commission 3rd Term Meeting	May 5-7, 2025 / Yaoundé
Türkiye-Mauritania Islamic Republic Joint Economic Commission 1st Term Meeting	May 21-22, 2025 / Nouakchott
Türkiye-Angola Joint Economic Commission 3rd Term Meeting	July 1-2, 2025 / Ankara
Türkiye-Ethiopia Joint Economic Commission 9th Term Meeting	November 19-20, 2025 / Addis Ababa

At the same time, the Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) Mechanism, which serves as an instrument exclusively for monitoring the course of bilateral trade and economic relations and focuses primarily on trade and investment, was established with three African countries in 2025.

Joint Declaration Signatory	JETCO Enforcement Date
United Republic of Tanzania	July 23, 2025
Republic of South Africa	October 15, 2025/Ankara
State of Libya	October 16, 2025/ Istanbul

Table : 2 JETCO Mechanisms Launched in 2025

5. Türkiye-Africa 5th Business and Economic Forum (TABEF)

As a result of the 2nd Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summit held in Malabo on November 19-21, 2014, it was decided to organize the Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forums, with the strong participation of both the public and private sectors, in order to bring a new dimension to trade and economic relations with African countries. Pursuant to this decision, the



Minister of Trade Ömer Bolat delivered a speech at the opening panel of the Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum, held in Istanbul on October 16, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum has been held in Istanbul every two years since 2016.

Within this framework, the *Türkiye-Africa 5th Business and Economic Forum* (TABEF) was held in Istanbul on October 16-17, 2025, under the auspices of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, under the theme "Navigating Global Economic Uncertainty: Strengthening the Türkiye-Africa Partnership." The Forum was organized by our Ministry in cooperation with the African Union Commission and the Foreign Economic Relations Board.

The Forum commenced with the Ministerial Session, co-chaired by our Minister of Trade, Prof. Dr. Ömer Bolat, and Francisca Belobe, Commissioner for Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Mining of the African Union Commission, during which high-level representatives from approximately 24 African countries took the floor and contributed to the discussions. During the Session, emphasis was placed on the significance of an African country (the Republic of South Africa) assuming the G20 Presidency for the first time in 2025 and of the *14th Ministerial Conference of the World*

Trade Organization being scheduled to take place in Cameroon in 2026 for Africa's position within the multilateral trading system, while the current state of Türkiye-Africa relations was also addressed. At the same time, manufacturing, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, health, and digital transformation emerged as prominent areas of cooperation.

The Forum was attended by official delegations from 37 African countries, including 28 represented at the ministerial or deputy ministerial level, while the Republic of South Africa was represented at the vice presidential level. High-level representatives from four regional organizations in Africa also participated. In addition, approximately 4,000 African and Turkish private sector representatives from all 54 African countries and Türkiye had the opportunity to come together through bilateral business meetings during the Forum.

The nine thematic panels organized within the scope of TABEF provided a platform for an in-depth discussion of potential areas of cooperation and for the sharing of national experiences. In this context, Abdel Aziz Alsherif, First Undersecretary and Head of the Egyptian Commercial Service of the Arab Republic of Egypt, participated in the panel entitled "Competitive and Collaborative Textile Value Chains"; Turkish Minister of Health, Kemal Memişoğlu, and Omar Hejira, Secretary of State for Foreign Trade of the Kingdom of Morocco, participated in the "Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies" panel; Turkish Deputy Minister of Trade, Ö. Volkan Ağar, participated in the "Türkiye-Africa Logistics Center" panel; Emine Erdoğan, First Lady of the Republic of Türkiye, Turkish Minister of Trade, AU Commissioner Belobe, and the Minister of Family and Social Services, Mahinur Özdemir Göktaş, participated in the "Women's Leadership and Entrepreneurship Dialogue" panel; Turkish Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, İbrahim Yumaklı, participated in the "Food Security and Sustainable Food Production" panel; Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar; Nani Juwara, Minister of Petroleum, Energy and Mines of the Republic of The Gambia; and António Grispos, Secretary of State for Trade of the Republic of Mozambique, participated in the "Energy and Mining" panel; Turkish Minister of Transport and Infrastructure, Abdulkadir Uraloğlu and Muhammed Salem Shahoubi, Minister of Transport of the Government of National Unity of the State of Libya, participated in the "Türkiye-Africa International Civil Aviation Cooperation" panel; and Turkish Minister of Industry and Technology, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, delivered remarks during the "Technology, Digital Trade and Manufacturing" panel.

During TABEF, bilateral meetings were held with representatives of 16 countries and regional organizations at the ministerial and deputy ministerial levels. During the meeting with H.E. Kassahun Gofe, Minister of Trade and Regional Integration of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, a memorandum of understanding concluding Türkiye's market access negotiations regarding Ethiopia's accession to the World Trade Organization was signed. Türkiye became one of the first countries to complete its bilateral negotiations.

During the bilateral meeting with Muhammed Salem Shahoubi, Minister of Transport of the Government of National Unity of the State of Libya, and Muhammed El-Huveyc, then Minister of Trade and Economy of the Government of National Unity of Libya, the Joint Declaration establishing the "Joint Economic and Trade Committee" and the "Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Türkiye-Libya Joint Working Group" were signed.

Lastly, the *South Africa Business Forum*, bringing together Mr. Paul Mashatile, Vice President of the Republic of South Africa, and our Minister, was organized as a side event during TABEF.

TABEF concluded on October 17, 2025, with the closing session honored by the participation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Mr. Paul Mashatile, Vice President of the Republic of South Africa.

6. "2025-2029 Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with African Countries"

Reflecting the multidimensional nature of our foreign policy, the "Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with African Countries," which was launched in 2003 and subsequently revised to cover the 2019-2023 period in light of developments in the global economy, has served as a roadmap for our trade and economic relations with the African continent.

In light of developments shaping the global economy, the current conjuncture in Africa, and the existing constraints and opportunities for our country, the "2025-2029 Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with African Countries" has most recently been prepared.

Our updated Strategy includes our fundamental objectives toward Africa, namely the development of trade mechanisms, the diversification of Africa's export products, the development of mechanisms to facilitate financing for



South African Deputy President Paul Mashatile delivered a speech at the closing program of the Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum, held in Istanbul. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

expanding business opportunities between Türkiye and Africa, the creation of new employment opportunities in the region, the enhancement of Africa's technological base, the development of the continent's infrastructure, and the promotion of overall prosperity across the continent.

At the same time, the Strategy identifies thirteen actions to support our country's trade and economic interests in line with our objectives toward the continent. These actions primarily focus on priority sectors, infrastructure projects in Africa, critical minerals and mineral resources, Türkiye-Africa trade corridors, the establishment of branches of Turkish banks in Africa, the establishment of Türkiye Trade Desks, the institutional presence of the Turkish private sector in Africa, trade diplomacy instruments, and coordination with other stakeholders.

Through these actions, it is envisaged that both public and private sector representation across the African continent can be strengthened; that

high-level engagements and business forums with both African countries and the continent's regional economic communities can increase engagements and facilitate the exploration of cooperation opportunities; that the establishment of branches of Turkish banks in Africa and the creation of Türkiye Trade Desks can constitute an important step toward addressing the financing challenges faced by our companies on the continent; that increasing the number of our Trade Counselor Offices will enable closer monitoring of both the other challenges encountered by our companies in Africa and our trade and economic interests across the continent; and that the expansion of the JETCO mechanism with African countries will allow trade and economic engagements to be conducted more frequently and in a more focused manner.


7. Conclusion

Guided by the "Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with African Countries," which was launched in 2003 and revised to cover the 2019-2023 period, our relations with African countries have deepened on the basis of the principles of equal partnership and mutual benefit, gaining significant momentum.

This progress has been reflected in our stronger institutional presence across the continent, in the nearly eightfold increase in our trade volume compared to 2003, and in the growth of both the contracting projects undertaken in Africa and our investments across the continent.

Our activities on the continent continued throughout 2025 through the conduct of high-level bilateral engagements, the organization of business and investment forums, the convening of Joint Economic Commission meetings, and the organization of the 5th Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum.

The Ministry of Trade will continue to pursue its trade and economic relations with Africa on the basis of the "2025-2029 Strategy for the Development of Trade and Economic Relations with African Countries," which was updated in 2025 in light of global developments.



Türkiye's Energy Collaborations with African Countries

5

Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources

1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, Türkiye's relations with African countries have gained significant momentum in the political, economic, and commercial spheres, with the energy and natural resources sector emerging as one of the principal pillars of this cooperation. Türkiye views the African continent not only as a region with substantial natural resource potential but also as a strategic partner with which long-term and sustainable partnerships can be developed.

Within the framework of energy diplomacy activities carried out under the coordination of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, multidimensional opportunities for cooperation with African countries are being explored in such fields as hydrocarbon exploration and production, mining, electricity, renewable energy investments, energy infrastructure development, and technical capacity building. Türkiye's institutional expertise, technical capacity, and investment experience in the energy sector, when combined with the growing energy demand, abundant natural resources, and development objectives of African countries, provide a strong foundation for robust and sustainable cooperation between the parties.

In this context, our country does not limit its energy cooperation with Africa solely to commercial activities but has adopted a comprehensive approach with technology transfer, local capacity building, human resource develop-



A Memorandum of Understanding aimed at developing cooperation between Türkiye and The Gambia in the field of energy was signed as part of the 5th Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

ment, and the strengthening of energy infrastructure. The initiatives carried out within this framework contribute both to our country's energy supply security objectives and to the goals of African countries regarding access to energy, economic development, and sustainable growth. Accordingly, this article examines, on a country-by-country basis, the cooperation mechanisms established and the activities carried out in the fields of energy and natural resources with African countries.

2. Niger

Within the framework of our country's policy of strengthening relations with Africa and the energy diplomacy activities conducted by our Ministry, long-term cooperation has been established with Niger in the fields of energy and mining. In this context, our country continues its activities through our international state-owned mining company, MTAIC, under the gold exploration licenses it holds in Niger. Accordingly, our country's first gold production project abroad is expected to commence in Niger in 2026.

3. Egypt

Energy cooperation between Türkiye and Egypt has recently gained significant momentum within the framework of the energy diplomacy activities carried out by our Ministry. In this context, on May 13, 2025, a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at strengthening cooperation in the fields of hydrocarbons and mining was signed between our Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Egypt.

4. Libya

Our energy cooperation with Libya is progressing within a framework aligned with the country's reconstruction and economic development process. In this context, efforts to assess Libya's hydrocarbon potential in both onshore and offshore areas are being carried out through our national oil company, TPAO, in coordination with the Libyan authorities.

In this regard, the Memorandum of Understanding signed in June 2025 between TPAO and the National Oil Corporation (NOC) of Libya has become one of the most recent indicators of the ongoing energy cooperation between the two countries in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, cooperation activities between our state-owned company TPIC and Libya in the field of petroleum trade are also continuing successfully.

Meanwhile, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, paid a visit to Tripoli in November 2025 to meet with the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity of Libya in order to evaluate ongoing energy projects and those planned for further development.

On the margins of the visit to Tripoli by our Minister, who also serves as the Co-Chair of the Türkiye-Libya Joint Economic Commission (JEC), the Protocol of the 22nd Türkiye-Libya JEC Meeting was signed on January 24, 2026.

5. Somalia

Energy relations between Türkiye and Somalia are rapidly advancing on the basis of mutual benefit as one of the most significant examples of Türkiye's active energy diplomacy with Africa. Cooperation between the two countries aims not only to develop energy resources but also to contribute to Somalia's economic development.

In this context, the Intergovernmental Agreement on Hydrocarbons, signed on March 7, 2024, established an institutional framework for bilateral cooperation in the energy sector. On the same date, the Memorandum of Understanding on Data Sharing Regarding Onshore and Offshore Blocks was signed, providing for the sharing with Türkiye of the technical data held by the Somali Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources concerning these blocks.

Accordingly, a Production Sharing Agreement was signed between TPAO and Somalia on July 24, 2024, and the three-dimensional seismic data acquisition activities subsequently launched were the first ever conducted in Somalia's history. Our national seismic research vessel, Oruç Reis, departed from Istanbul for Somalia on October 5, 2024.

Seismic data acquisition activities carried out across three offshore blocks in Somali waters lasted a total of 234 days, and the operations were completed on June 6, 2025. Having completed its mission on June 12, 2025, the Oruç Reis departed from the Port of Mogadishu on June 15, 2025, and returned to our country.

Following the ongoing analysis of the geological and seismic data, our ultra-deepwater drilling vessel Çağrı Bey departed from Taşucu Port in Mersin on February 15, 2026, to undertake its first mission at the drilling location identified in Somali maritime areas. The vessel arrived at the Port of Mogadishu in April 2026 and commenced drilling operations. Thus, for the first time, one of our deepwater drilling vessels has been deployed outside the Blue Homeland.

Meanwhile, activities relating to Somalia's onshore areas are also continuing. In this context, on April 10, 2025, three new Production Sharing Agreements covering seven onshore blocks in the Somali onshore areas were signed between TPAO and the Somali Petroleum Authority. In the coming period, these cooperation initiatives are expected to be expanded beyond hydrocarbon activities to encompass mining and other areas of the energy sector.

6. Algeria

In line with Türkiye's objective of strengthening its energy supply security, increasing the diversification of energy sources and suppliers constitutes a strategic priority. Within this framework, Algeria is one of Türkiye's key partners, with whom long-standing relations based on mutual trust have been developed through energy diplomacy.

Natural gas cooperation between the two countries began with the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Purchase and Sale Agreement signed in 1988 and has continued uninterrupted for more than 30 years. Under this agreement, LNG has been supplied to Türkiye since 1994.

In 2025, the volume of LNG supplied from Algeria to our country amounted to approximately 4.4 billion cubic meters, corresponding to roughly 25 percent of Türkiye's total LNG imports.

7. Imports of Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Petroleum Products from African Countries in 2025


Natural gas was imported to Türkiye from Algeria, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Senegal, Angola, Egypt, Mauritania, and Mozambique.

Crude oil or petroleum products were imported into our country from Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Angola, Algeria, and Tunisia.

8. Conclusion

Energy cooperation developed with African countries over a long period has been one of the prominent elements of Türkiye's Africa strategy in 2025. Encompassing hydrocarbon exploration and production, natural gas trade, mining, and energy infrastructure, these cooperation initiatives have strengthened the international operational capacity of Türkiye's state-owned energy companies while also contributing to the country's energy supply security and resource diversification objectives. In particular, the initiatives undertaken with Somalia, Libya, Egypt, Niger, and Algeria have emerged as the most prominent examples of this process.

In the coming period, Türkiye-Africa energy cooperation is expected to diversify further beyond hydrocarbon activities to include such fields as renewable energy, critical minerals, and technical capacity building. In this regard, the energy diplomacy activities carried out under the coordination of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources will continue both to strengthen Türkiye's energy security and to contribute to the sustainable development objectives of African countries.



Türkiye's Industry and Technology Cooperation with Africa in 2025

6

Ministry of Industry and Technology

1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, relations between Türkiye and African countries have gained significant momentum in the diplomatic, economic, and technical spheres. The relations that Türkiye has developed with African countries have been shaped within the framework of a multidimensional foreign policy approach and have gradually acquired the character of a strategic partnership. Africa is assuming an increasingly important position in the global economic system with its young population, rapidly growing cities, and expanding productive capacity.

The "Strategy for the Development of Economic Relations with African Countries," pursued under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has marked an important turning point in strengthening Türkiye's political, economic, and cultural relations with the continent. Within the framework of this policy, Türkiye's approach toward Africa is based not only on enhancing trade relations but also on supporting industrialization processes, facilitating technology transfer, promoting capacity building, and advancing sustainable development objectives.



President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held an inter-delegation meeting with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud at the Dolmabahçe Presidential Office in Istanbul on December 30, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

Through the programs and projects implemented under the coordination of the Ministry of Industry and Technology, Türkiye's cooperation with Africa in the fields of industry and technology has acquired an institutional framework. The activities carried out by our Ministry and its affiliated and related institutions aim to develop industrial infrastructure, enhance technological capacity, and strengthen innovation ecosystems in African countries.

Within this framework, this article examines Türkiye's cooperation with African countries in the fields of industry and technology, focusing on the organized industrial zones model, technology development zones, scientific research partnerships, support for entrepreneurship ecosystems, and programs aimed at strengthening quality infrastructure.

2. General Framework for Türkiye-Africa Industry and Technology Cooperation

In recent years, relations between Türkiye and African countries have evolved beyond an approach based solely on increasing trade volume toward a multidimensional understanding of cooperation encompassing industry, technology, and innovation. Guided by the vision of the "National Technology Initiative," Türkiye's industry and technology policies aim not only to promote national development but also to develop regional and global cooperation networks. Within this framework, Türkiye seeks to develop international partnerships in science, industry, and technology while sharing its technological capabilities with friendly and partner countries. This approach reflects Türkiye's commitment to contributing to a common and prosperous future by sharing its accumulated expertise in industry, technology, and innovation with its African partners. Türkiye's strong manufacturing infrastructure, R&D capacity, and innovative ecosystem provide a solid foundation for achieving ambitious joint objectives with African countries in the fields of industry and technology, thereby enabling cooperation to advance to a higher level based on lasting prosperity and equitable development.




Image: STI³ (Science, Technology, Innovation, Industry and Investment) Cooperation Framework

Within the scope of the activities carried out under the coordination of the Ministry of Industry and Technology, cooperation between Türkiye and African countries in the fields of industry and technology is being advanced through institutional mechanisms. Accordingly, consolidating industrial infrastructure, supporting technology transfer, developing innovation ecosystems, and enhancing human resource capacity constitute the fundamental pillars of Türkiye-Africa cooperation.

The cooperation initiatives are also being developed within the framework of Science, Technology, Innovation, Industry and Investment (STI^3).[1] In the "2030 Industry and Technology Strategy," global integration and industry and technology diplomacy are identified as fundamental elements of Türkiye's approach to international cooperation. Within this framework, Türkiye aims to share its experience in industry and technology through international partnerships and to actively participate in global research networks. Accordingly, various initiatives are being undertaken to expand scientific research cooperation, strengthen technology development capacity, and support innovation ecosystems. The ongoing memorandum of understanding processes with the Republic of South Africa, Senegal, Uganda, and Gabon in the fields of science, technology, and innovation constitute concrete examples of this approach. These initiatives provide an important foundation for the development of technology-based cooperation with African countries.

With respect to the development of industrial infrastructure, "Türkiye's Organized Industrial Zones (OIZ) Model"[2] is among the practices that have been closely examined by African countries. Based on Türkiye's experience with planned industrialization, the OIZ model serves as an example for many countries in terms of developing production infrastructure, improving the investment environment, and establishing industrial clusters. Within this framework, technical delegations from African countries visit organized industrial zones in Türkiye to examine the model firsthand and benefit from Türkiye's experience in industrial planning.

In addition, technology development zones and the innovation ecosystem constitute important areas of expertise that our country shares with African countries. The technopark model developed in Türkiye provides a framework that strengthens university-industry cooperation and supports technology-based entrepreneurship. This model is regarded as an important reference point for enhancing innovation capacity and promoting technology entrepreneurship in African countries.

1 Science, Technology, Innovation, Industry, and Investment (STI^3) diplomacy is the international cooperation approach developed within the framework of the "2030 Industry and Technology Strategy," announced on March 26, 2025. This model aims to strengthen Türkiye's global cooperation in the fields of science, technology, and innovation while enabling public institutions, research organizations, and industrial stakeholders to play a more active role in joint projects.

2 "Organized Industrial Zones (OIZs)" are production areas with pre-developed infrastructure designed to support planned industrialization and are developed in Türkiye under the coordination of the Ministry of Industry and Technology. As of 2026, there are a total of 416 OIZs in Türkiye, of which 371 fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Technology and 45 under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Another important institutional platform for our country's cooperation with African countries in the fields of science, technology, and innovation is the "United Nations Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries." Established in Gebze in 2017 with the support of Türkiye as the host country, the Technology Bank aims to support the development of the scientific and technological capacities of the least developed countries. The Bank carries out programs focusing on technology needs assessments, boosting research capacity, supporting technology transfer processes, and developing innovation ecosystems. Since a significant number of African countries fall within the category of least developed countries, the institution plays an important role in advancing science- and technology-based cooperation between our country and African countries.

The development of human resources also stands out as an important element in ensuring the sustainability of cooperation in the fields of industry and technology. In this context, the "Deneyap Technology Workshops" model,[3] which aims to encourage young people to pursue science and technology, has emerged as an important initiative for fostering a culture of technology development from an early age. Within the framework of the "Technology Makers Lab Project"[4] implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Technology Bank, the Deneyap model is intended to be implemented in the least developed countries, with Niger designated as the first pilot country.

Another important mechanism for human resource development is the scholarship programs implemented jointly by the "Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye (TÜBİTAK)" and "The World Academy of Sciences (TWAS)."[5] Under this program, researchers from the least developed countries are provided with opportunities to pursue doctoral and postdoctoral research at universities in Türkiye and at TÜBİTAK research centers. By enabling scientists from African countries to benefit from Türkiye's research infrastructure, the program contributes to the development of scientific cooperation and the strengthening of research capacity.

Our country's cooperation with African countries in the fields of science and technology is also being advanced through international research programs. In this context, the 2025 joint call for proposals was launched under the "LEAP-SE (Long-Term Joint EU-AU Research and Innovation Partnership on Sustainable Energy)"[6] initiative, implemented through the cooperation of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). Within the framework of the program, international R&D projects focusing on sustainable energy solutions are supported, including the development of Africa-fo-

3 The "Deneyap Technology Workshops" are a program implemented under the coordination of the Ministry of Industry and Technology to provide young people with hands-on education in the fields of science, technology, and engineering. Implemented in cooperation with TÜBİTAK and the Türkiye Technology Team Foundation (T3 Foundation), the program aims to enhance students' technology development and innovation skills. As Türkiye's technology education model for youth, the Deneyap Technology Workshops are being transferred to African countries through the Technology Makers Lab project implemented in cooperation with the United Nations Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries. Within the scope of the project, Niger has been designated as the pilot country, and efforts have been initiated to develop the country's technology education infrastructure. As part of the program, training modules have been developed in areas such as robotics, software technologies, the Internet of Things, and cybersecurity, while TÜBİTAK has provided financial support and educational materials for the project.

4 The Technology Makers Lab is a capacity-building program implemented by the United Nations Technology Bank to enhance young people's skills in science, technology, and innovation.

5 https://tubitak.gov.tr/tr/twas-dunya-bilimler-akademisi

6 An innovative research and development initiative launched through the cooperation of the European Union and the African Union to support sustainable energy solutions, including the development of energy technologies focused on the African continent, the integration of renewable energy sources, and the strengthening of smart grids.

cused energy technologies, the integration of renewable energy sources, and the strengthening of smart grids through the use of digital innovations. Following an international peer-review process, the selected projects are financed by the respective national funding agencies of the participating countries.

3. International Platforms, Diplomatic Engagements and Mutual Visits

Throughout 2025, intensive diplomatic engagements and mutual visits in the fields of industry and technology took place between Türkiye and African countries. These engagements contributed to strengthening the institutional framework of our country's cooperation with African countries in the fields of industry and technology while creating opportunities to explore new areas of cooperation in production infrastructure, technology development, innovation, and investment.

Within the framework of the 5th *High Committee Meeting of the Industrial Partnership for Sustainable Economic Development*, held in Doha, the State of Qatar, on February 9, 2025, engagements were conducted to strengthen industrial cooperation between Türkiye and African countries, including the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Morocco.

As part of the SME Forum held in Dakar on February 18-20, 2025, Türkiye participated as the guest of honor, and technical negotiations were conducted on a comprehensive action plan between the two countries within the framework of the cooperation between KOSGEB and Senegal's SME support agency, ADEPME. In addition, under the online B2B matchmaking project approved by the Islamic Development Bank in 2025, it is aimed to enhance cooperation between SMEs in Türkiye and Senegal through digital platforms.

In 2025, the Turkish Academy of Sciences (TÜBA) actively participated in the *G20 Science 20 (S20) Summit* and the Chief Science Advisers Roundtable (CSAR) processes, hosted by South Africa, and contributed to the preparation of joint scientific statements. Within this framework, TÜBA President Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Şeker and Prof. Dr. Ahmet Nuri Yurdusev attended the S20 Inception Meeting held in Pretoria on February 25-27, 2025, contributing to the preparation of the joint statement titled "Climate Change and Well-Being."

As a continuation of this process, the outcome statement titled "Equity-Based Science, Technology and Innovation" was adopted at the Main CSAR Meeting, held in Pretoria on September 21, 2025. These processes constituted an important platform for advancing science diplomacy and research cooperation between Türkiye and African countries.

On August 4, 2025, a delegation composed of representatives of the Republic of South Africa's Department of Trade, Industry and Competition and officials responsible for selected Special Economic Zones (SEZs) visited the Ministry, during which presentations were delivered on "Organized Industrial Zones" and "Technology Development Zones."

During the meeting between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the Prime Minister of Senegal, Ousmane Sonko, on August 8, 2025, consultations were held with the Minister of Industry and Trade of Senegal, Serigne Gueye Diop, during which issues related to industrial infrastructure, technology transfer, and the deepening of bilateral cooperation were discussed. Another significant event reinforcing the economic dimension of the visit was the Türkiye-Senegal Business Forum, held in Istanbul on August 9, 2025, with the participation of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Senegal, Ousmane Sonko. During the Forum, the objective of increasing bilateral trade volume to $1 billion in the medium term was emphasized, and new opportunities for cooperation in the fields of investment, contracting, renewable energy, and industry were explored. Bilateral consultations conducted by our Minister of Industry and Technology, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, with the Minister of Industry and Trade of Senegal, Serigne Gueye Diop, on the sidelines of the interdelegation meetings laid the groundwork for taking concrete steps in such areas as the organized industrial zones model, technology development, and innovation ecosystems.

Diplomatic engagement in the fields of industry and technology also continued within the framework of international events. As part of the 17th *International Defence Industry Fair* (IDEF 2025), held in Istanbul on July 22-27, 2025, our Minister, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, met with the Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi. Furthermore, within the scope of TEKNOFEST, held in Istanbul, meetings were held on September 18, 2025, with the Minister of Ports and Maritime Transport of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, and the State Minister for Defense, Omar Ali Abdi, during which opportunities for cooperation in the fields of technology and the defense industry were explored.

The Turkish delegation, headed by Deputy Minister of Industry and Technology Muhammet Kasım Gönüllü, participated in the G20 Digital Economy Ministers' Meeting and the first-ever G20 Artificial Intelligence Task Force Ministers' Meeting, held in Cape Town under the presidency of the Republic of South Africa on September 29-30, 2025. These meetings, the first of their kind to be held in Africa, addressed critical issues ranging from universal connectivity and digital public infrastructure to the digital transformation of SMEs, artificial intelligence, data governance, and sustainable development. Türkiye emphasized the great importance it attaches to bridging the digital divide and ensuring the equitable distribution of the benefits of digital transformation. It was also stated that the United Nations Technology Bank for the Least Developed Countries, which is hosted in Gebze, plays a critical role in this regard for the least developed countries.

On October 12, 2025, a meeting was held with the Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation of the Republic of South Africa, Bonginkosi Emmanuel Nzimande, at Boğaziçi University, during which issues related to enhancing cooperation in the fields of science and technology were discussed. Furthermore, on the sidelines of the *Türkiye-South Africa Binational Commission Meeting*, chaired by our Vice President, Cevdet Yılmaz, our Minister, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, held bilateral meetings with the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition of the Republic of South Africa, Mpho Parks Franklyn Tau, and the Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation, Bonginkosi Emmanuel Nzimande. During the meetings chaired by our Vice President, Cevdet Yılmaz, and the Vice President of the Republic of South Africa, Paul Mashatile, opportunities for cooperation between the two countries in the fields of trade, industry, and technology were evaluated.

The *Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum* (TABEF) also served as an important platform for diplomatic engagement with African countries. Within the framework of the Forum, our Minister, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, held meetings with Francisca Tatchouop Belobe, AU Commissioner for Economic Development, Trade, Tourism, Industry and Minerals, and Abdoulaye Seydou, Minister of Trade and Industry of the Republic of Niger. These meetings addressed industrial policies, investment opportunities, and technological cooperation. During the meeting between our Minister, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, and Niger's Minister of Trade and Industry, Abdoulaye Seydou, opportunities for cooperation regarding the organized industrial zones model, SME partnerships, joint projects in technology and innovation, and quality infrastructure were discussed. Furthermore, within the framework of the Tech-

nology Makers Lab project, implemented by the United Nations Technology Bank with the objective of transferring the Deneyap Workshops model to the least developed countries, the selection of Niger as the pilot country was regarded as an important example of technological cooperation between the two countries.

Visits to Türkiye by technical delegations from African countries constituted another important dimension of bilateral cooperation. A delegation from the Rwanda Defence Force Command and Staff College visited our Ministry on February 10, 2025, during which a presentation was delivered on Türkiye's industrial and technology policies as well as the activities of the Ministry. As part of a study visit conducted by a delegation from the Tanzania National Defence College, our Ministry was visited on May 28, 2025, and information on Türkiye's industrial policies was shared with the delegation.

A delegation composed of representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Republic of Zimbabwe visited the Ministry on July 1, 2025, during which a briefing was provided on Türkiye's steel sector. As part of the visit program, the delegation visited the facilities of Erdemir, Kardemir, and Tosyalı Holding, gaining the opportunity to examine Türkiye's industrial production capacity and infrastructure firsthand.

Visits by technical delegations from African countries aimed at examining Türkiye's industrial infrastructure on-site also continued throughout the year. A delegation from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives of the Republic of Uganda visited our Ministry on August 14, 2025, during which a presentation was delivered on Türkiye's Organized Industrial Zones. As part of the visit, the delegation also conducted study visits to TÜBİTAK Marmara Research Center (MAM) in Gebze and the Gebze Organized Industrial Zone.

A delegation from the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Republic of Senegal visited the Organized Industrial Zones in Gebze and Kocaeli on November 3-4, 2025, where Türkiye's Organized Industrial Zones model was assessed as an exemplary practice for Senegal's industrial planning. Similarly, a delegation composed of representatives of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Competition of the Republic of South Africa, together with officials responsible for special economic zones, visited Türkiye and received information on Organized Industrial Zones and Technology Development Zones.

Another dimension of diplomatic engagement with African countries consisted of political consultation processes. In this context, the Ministry

contributed to the preparatory work for the political consultation meetings held with Benin and Togo in March 2025.

4. Agreements Signed and MoU Processes

Throughout 2025, various cooperation agreements in the fields of industry and technology were signed between Türkiye and African countries, while processes for the preparation of additional agreements were also carried out. In this context, cooperation initiatives developed particularly in the fields of science, technology, and innovation, together with joint efforts to strengthen industrial infrastructure, constituted an important dimension of Türkiye's industry and technology diplomacy with African countries.

Within the framework of the visit to Türkiye by the Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of Gabon, Marcelle Ibinga Itsitsa, on February 25, 2025, a Memorandum of Understanding on science and technology was signed between the Ministry of Industry and Technology of the Republic of Türkiye and the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Technological Innovation of the Gabonese Republic. This agreement is regarded as a strategic step that will further deepen Türkiye's knowledge and technological expertise with Africa by creating new opportunities in such areas as joint R&D projects, exchanges of scientists, and the integration of innovation ecosystems. Within the framework of the visit, the Gabonese delegation visited OSTİM Organized Industrial Zone, OSTİM Technopark, and OSTİM Technical University on February 26, 2025, where it conducted examinations of Türkiye's industrial and innovation ecosystem.

Technical visits and industrial study programs conducted with African countries throughout 2025 also contributed to the advancement of cooperation processes. In this context, a delegation headed by Lynette Bagonza, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives of the Republic of Uganda, visited our Ministry on August 14, 2025. The delegation also visited TÜBİTAK Marmara Research Center (MAM) in Gebze and the Gebze Organized Industrial Zone, where it conducted on-site examinations of Türkiye's research and production infrastructure. During this visit, it was decided to prepare a Memorandum of Understanding between Türkiye and Uganda within the framework of STI[3] diplomacy.

During a meeting held on July 23, 2025, between Türkiye's Ambassador to Ouagadougou and the Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Innovation of Burkina Faso, Adjima Thiombiano, opportunities for co-

operation between the two countries in the fields of scientific research and technology were discussed. The meeting also addressed the development of cooperation mechanisms between TÜBİTAK and its counterpart institutions in Burkina Faso, as well as the possibility of signing a Memorandum of Understanding within this framework.

Engagements carried out within the framework of the *Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum* (TABEF) also contributed to the development of new cooperation initiatives. In this context, our Minister, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, held a meeting with the Minister of Trade and Industry of the Republic of Niger, Abdoulaye Seydou, on October 17, 2025. During the meeting, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries in the fields of industry and technology was brought onto the agenda.

5. Economic Cooperation Mechanisms and Corporate Cooperation Activities

Türkiye's cooperation with African countries in the fields of industry and technology has been institutionally strengthened not only through bilateral projects but also through the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) mechanisms. In this context, JEC meetings were held with Chad and Angola in 2025. At the Second Türkiye-Chad JEC Meeting, discussions focused on enhancing cooperation in such fields as science, industry, technology, standardization, energy, and mining, and it was decided to initiate efforts toward cooperation between the Turkish Standards Institution (TSE) and the Chadian Standardization Agency. At the Third Türkiye-Angola JEC Meeting, cooperation was evaluated in various fields, particularly energy, mining, industry, science, and infrastructure. While the target of increasing bilateral trade volume to $500 million was reaffirmed, concrete steps toward renewable energy and industrial investments were identified. Our Ministry contributed to the preparation of the joint minutes of these meetings.

Our Ministry's affiliated and related institutions have also played an important role in cooperation with Africa. In January 2025, TÜBİTAK launched a sustainable energy R&D call under the LEAP-SE Partnership. The call supports joint projects with the African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia, while TÜBİTAK provides funding for stakeholders in Türkiye.

In September 2025, the TÜBİTAK National Metrology Institute (UME) provided training on metrology and quality infrastructure to the Uganda

National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) and the Sudanese Standards and Metrology Organization (SSMO). The training took place in Kampala on September 9-11 and covered measurement standards and calibration. A total of 12 experts from the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) and the Sudanese Standards and Metrology Organization (SSMO) participated in the program. The second phase of the training program, prepared by TÜBİTAK UME researchers and covering the fields of physics, mechanics, and chemistry, consisted of laboratory-based applications and was conducted at TÜBİTAK UME on October 1-2, 2025.

The Turkish Standards Institution (TSE) and the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) held consultations on cooperation in the fields of standardization, conformity assessment, and quality. The discussions covered training, the exchange of information and experience, and strengthened TSE's international engagement.

6. Cooperation in Space and Advanced Technologies

The technological cooperation developed between our country and African countries is not limited to industry and innovation but also encompasses space technologies and advanced technology projects. In this context, one of the most notable initiatives of Türkiye-Africa technological cooperation is the spaceport project planned for Somalia. Within the framework of the project carried out by the Turkish Space Agency (TUA) under the coordination of the Ministry of Industry and Technology, the launch infrastructure to be established in Somalia is intended to enhance Türkiye's satellite launch capacity and strengthen its capability for independent access to space.

The project was announced to the public during the inter-delegation meeting held in Istanbul on December 30, 2025, between our President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Planned to be implemented at an estimated cost of approximately $350 million and structured in three phases, the project is regarded as a strategic investment for enhancing our country's capabilities in space technologies. Somalia's geographic location near the equator offers technical advantages for satellite launch activities, making the project an important example of advanced technology cooperation between Türkiye and Somalia.


7. Conclusion

Throughout 2025, cooperation between Türkiye and African countries in the fields of industry and technology gained significant momentum through official visits, the preparation of agreements, technical projects, and diplomatic initiatives. The engagements and the joint projects contributed to strengthening the institutional framework of the economic and technological relations between the two sides. During this process, the development of industrial infrastructure, technology transfer, research and development cooperation, and capacity-building activities constituted an important dimension of Türkiye-Africa relations.

Türkiye's cooperation with Africa in the fields of industry and technology is also aligned with the objectives set forth in the 2030 Industry and Technology Strategy. Prepared within the framework of the "National Technology Initiative" vision, the Strategy is built upon five principal pillars: high technology, the digital economy, the green transition, global integration, and structural transformation. In this context, particularly under the objective of "global integration," the Strategy seeks to strengthen Türkiye's international cooperation in the fields of science, technology, innovation, industry, and investment, while enabling the country to attain a more influential position within global value chains in these areas.

Accordingly, the Industry and Technology Diplomacy approach envisages strengthening international cooperation mechanisms encompassing the fields of Science, Technology, Innovation, Industry, and Investment (STI^3). The Memoranda of Understanding processes, joint projects, and technical cooperation carried out with African countries constitute one of the principal areas in which this approach is implemented. Through these cooperation initiatives, the objective is to develop a more inclusive partnership model among public institutions, research organizations, industrial actors, and entrepreneurs.

In the coming period, the Türkiye-Africa partnership is expected to be further strengthened through new projects in such fields as digital transformation, green technologies, innovation, and space technologies. These cooperation initiatives are aligned with the development objectives of African countries and will also contribute to strengthening our country's role within the global technology and innovation ecosystem.



Mining Diplomacy by the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration toward Niger: MTAIC Niger Mining

7

Mineral Exploration and Research Institute

1. Introduction

Energy security, access to critical minerals, and the resilience of supply chains have become central to national foreign policies and economic strategies in recent years. Gold, uranium, rare earth elements, and other strategic raw materials are now among the fundamental components not only of industrial production but also of the defense industry, advanced technology, and geopolitical competition. Against this backdrop, the African continent has become a principal arena of global power competition due to its abundant mineral resource potential. Niger, located in the Sahel region, stands out for its geological diversity, high-potential reserves, and the resource base that has not been fully untapped.

Under the auspices of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Türkiye's Opening to Africa has significantly deepened the political, economic, and institutional relations with African countries. Within this framework, cooperation with Niger has taken on a particularly tangible dimension in the mining sector. As one of the most visible actors in this process, MTAIC Niger Mining has developed a distinctive model by conducting technical activities alongside diplomatic, economic, and institutional initiatives. This model encompasses not only resource exploration and development but also represents a practice of mining diplomacy that enables Türkiye to establish a multidimensional sphere of influence in Niger and, more broadly, throughout the Sahel region. This article examines Türkiye's mining diplomacy toward Africa, with particular reference to Niger, within the framework of MTAIC Niger Mining.



The Istanbul Natural Resources Summit was held on May 2, 2025, with the participation of ministers from Türkiye and African countries. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

2. Process of Establishment and Development

MTA International Mining Inc. established MTAIC Niger Mining Limited Company in Niger in 2020. Following the completion of the licensing procedures, the company initiated geological sampling, airborne geophysical surveys, and other multidisciplinary exploration activities in its licensed areas. As a result of these activities, a systematic drilling program was launched in late 2022 at one of the identified high-potential targets, and by 2024, an economically viable gold resource had been identified.

Following the acquisition of the environmental impact assessment permit for this resource, the completion of the approval process for the feasibility report, and ultimately the issuance of the operating license, the project entered the facility construction phase. According to the current schedule, the facility is expected to begin production in the fourth quarter of 2026.

This process should not be regarded merely as a technical investment. Drilling, resource verification, and site development activities have also contributed to deepening institutional trust between Türkiye and Niger. Indeed, the establishment of the operating company Niger Türkiye Mining Company through the partnership of the two states clearly demonstrates that technical progress has strengthened the diplomatic foundation.

The growing mutual trust and institutional coordination between Türkiye and Niger have also created new opportunities in the mining sector. In particu-

lar, the acquisition of highly prospective gold licenses in the Agadez region for Türkiye is regarded as one of the concrete outcomes of this relationship of trust.

Agadez is a sensitive region not only in geological terms but also with respect to regional security, transportation, logistics, and its strategic location. Being able to operate in this region means gaining acceptance in the field, establishing trust, and achieving a certain degree of operational mobility. Accordingly, the licenses obtained in Agadez strengthen Türkiye's presence in the Sahel region not only economically but also from a geostrategic perspective.

Moreover, the activities of MTAIC Niger Mining in Niger are not limited to gold exploration and production. The company is also conducting exploration activities for critical minerals. Today, critical minerals possess significance beyond their economic value, playing a vital role in national security, industrial policy, and strategic autonomy. Therefore, the activities carried out in this field in Niger provide a strategic foundation that can strengthen Türkiye's position within global supply chains.

3. Institutional Coordination and Political Dialog

The National Energy and Mining Policy is the institutional framework for Türkiye's strategic orientation in the fields of energy and mining. Ensuring resource security, reducing external dependence, and securing an effective position within global supply chains are among the principal objectives of this policy framework. Within this context, the emerging approach to mining diplomacy reflects a comprehensive understanding that addresses resource development activities not only from technical and economic perspectives but also through the lenses of diplomatic trust, mutual benefit, political dialogue, and long-term strategic partnership.



Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar met with Nigerien Minister of Mines Ousmane Abarchi in Istanbul on May 2, 2025, as part of the Istanbul Natural Resources Summit. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

The management model of MTAIC Niger Mining represents the practical implementation of this approach. The coordinated management of technical activities and diplomatic engagement has been a determining factor in ensuring the sustainability of the project. The regular engagement between Türkiye's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, and Deputy Minister Ahmet Berat Çonkar, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors of MTAIC, with their Nigerien counterparts has contributed to the close monitoring of field op-

erations, the prompt resolution of challenges, and the further strengthening of mutual trust.

4. The Impact of Türkiye's Educational Policies in the Field

One of the noteworthy aspects of the activities carried out in Niger is that Türkiye's long-standing education and human resource policies in Africa have found concrete expression in the field. The employment of Nigerien engineers and administrative personnel who received their education in Türkiye has made a significant contribution to the more rapid and efficient execution of operational processes. In particular, the involvement of personnel who studied in Türkiye under the Türkiye Scholarships program supported by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), as well as graduates of Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) schools, has contributed to strengthening the institutional and cultural ties between the two countries.

The presence of local personnel who speak Turkish and have been educated in Türkiye provides a significant advantage in regions where administrative procedures, local relations, and bureaucratic processes can at times become complex. These personnel serve as a bridge both in the implementation of technical activities and in communication and coordination with public institutions, enabling operations to progress more efficiently. Thus, it is evident that Türkiye's educational policies in Africa generate not only academic outcomes but also tangible economic benefits.

5. Potential Contribution of Mining Diplomacy to Defense Industry

The case of Niger demonstrates that mining activities are not limited solely to resource development and economic investment. When evaluated within an appropriate institutional framework, the partnership model developed by MTAIC has the potential to establish an indirect yet significant financial and strategic foundation for Türkiye's defense industry companies.

In a considerable number of African countries, limited public finances and cash flow constraints make it difficult to undertake high-cost investments in defense and technology. This situation constitutes a financing-based obstacle for companies seeking to operate in these countries. Consequently, there is increasing importance attached to developing more flexible, mutually beneficial models of cooperation that go beyond conventional sales relationships.

Within this framework, the development of mining sites through a partnership model under MTAIC and their transformation into revenue-generating assets creates economic value for the countries concerned while also establish-

ing a sustainable basis for cooperation that Türkiye can utilize across different sectors. Such an approach could reduce the pressure of upfront cash payments for defense industry companies entering African markets and contribute to the establishment of longer-term economic relationships.

From this perspective, mining diplomacy constitutes a comprehensive instrument of cooperation that encompasses not only the development of natural resources but also supports the stronger positioning of Türkiye's defense industry and other strategic sectors throughout Africa.

6. Conclusion


The activities carried out by MTAIC in Niger reflect a broader strategic vision that extends beyond technical exploration, investment planning, and production objectives. This process, which began in 2020, will enter a new phase with the commencement of production in 2026.

The expansion of gold licenses, the acquisition of new sites in the Agadez region, and exploration activities targeting critical minerals are strengthening Türkiye's position in Niger and, more broadly, across the Sahel region. At the same time, the resulting model provides Türkiye not only with access to natural resources but also with diplomatic trust, institutional cooperation, local legitimacy, financial influence, and strategic leverage.

Particularly in African countries experiencing cash flow constraints, the development of mineral resources through a partnership model with MTAIC presents an innovative approach to cooperation that can provide Türkiye with both a long-term presence in the field and a new market and financing framework for its defense industry companies. In this respect, the model developed in Niger reflects a comprehensive approach that integrates resource development activities with foreign policy, economic cooperation, and defense industry strategy.

Furthermore, the contribution of Turkish-speaking local human resources, developed through Türkiye's educational policies in Africa, to field operations stands out as an important factor strengthening the institutional and societal foundations of this model of cooperation.

In conclusion, the case of Niger demonstrates that, from Türkiye's perspective, mining diplomacy extends far beyond mining activities alone; it has become an instrument for establishing an effective presence in the economic, political, institutional, and geostrategic spheres. In this regard, the model taking shape in Niger represents a noteworthy example in which technical capacity and diplomatic trust converge, translating the objectives of Türkiye's national mining policy into concrete practice on the ground.



Ministry of Health: A Healing Hand Extended to Africa

8

Directorate General of EU and Foreign Affairs

1. Introduction

Health services constitute one of the key components of our Africa Partnership Policy, which began 21 years ago as the "Africa Initiative" and has since evolved into a framework through which deep-rooted partnerships have been established with the African continent.

In order to ensure universal health coverage and the right of access to healthcare – one of the most fundamental human rights – for the people of Africa, Türkiye provides all forms of political support as the voice of the global conscience in the international arena while carrying out various initiatives. Our health diplomacy opens important doors to strategic partnerships across the continent. This article examines Türkiye's cooperation in the field of health with different African countries.

2. Tangible Documents of our Cooperation

The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Türkiye currently has bilateral agreements in force with Benin, Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Morocco, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia in the field of health, which form the basis of our cooperation.

In addition, the process for bringing bilateral agreements into force is currently in progress with eight countries on the continent, while efforts to conclude cooperation agreements with 13 countries continue without interruption.

3. The Path to Healing from Türkiye to Africa

Patients who are unable to receive the necessary treatment in their own countries due to inadequate infrastructure and shortages of medical devices, medicines, equipment, and personnel are able to receive healthcare services within the scope of health tourism at our exemplary healthcare facilities, which are equipped with our professional healthcare workforce, advanced technology, and strong infrastructure capacity. As the quality of the healthcare services provided in our country has become increasingly recognized worldwide, the flow of health tourists from many African countries has continued.

In addition, we have Bilateral Cooperation Agreements with The Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, and Sudan. Within the framework of these agreements, patients, most of whom have complex medical conditions that cannot be treated in their own countries for various reasons, are admitted to hospitals in Türkiye and provided with free treatment as part of humanitarian assistance. In 2024, 94 patients from the African continent were admitted, while in 2025, 72 patients were admitted and returned to their countries in good health.

4. Health Investments

As part of our health diplomacy, our healthcare investments in Africa strengthen our bonds of friendship with the people of Africa while reflecting the strength of Türkiye's healthcare system. These efforts go beyond assistance by also supporting countries in developing their own healthcare capacities.

The friendship hospitals we have established in certain countries on the continent are a testament to our commitment to providing sustainable and high-quality healthcare services to local populations. Through these hospitals, the people of the continent have the opportunity to become familiar with our healthcare system and gain access to the healthcare services they need.



Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital has been contributing to healthcare services and the training of healthcare workers in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, since 2015. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

4.1. Nyala Sudan-Türkiye Training and Research Hospital

The Nyala Sudan-Türkiye Training and Research Hospital began providing services on February 28, 2014. It has approximately 11,000 square meters of indoor space and was built with a capacity of 150 beds; it currently operates with a capacity of 135 beds.

To date, 26,990 patients have received inpatient treatment at the hospital, while 447,048 outpatient examinations and 25,110 surgical procedures have been performed.

4.2. Mogadishu Somali-Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital

The 285-bed Mogadishu Somalia-Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital, constructed in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, began admitting patients on September 29, 2014. Officially inaugurated with the participation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the hospital is operated jointly by the Ministries of Health of the two countries under a collaborative model.

The 63,000-square-meter campus also includes residential accommodations and a nursing school. Physicians and healthcare personnel sent from Türkiye work alongside their Somali counterparts at the hospital, while our physicians also provide specialty training to Somali resident physicians.

The hospital employs a total of 1,064 personnel, including 87 specialist physicians, 120 resident physicians (including dentistry), 3 dentists, 286 nurses, 8 midwives, and 560 other healthcare personnel. Patients are treated in the specialties of obstetrics and gynecology, pediatrics, urology, neurosurgery, plastic surgery, internal medicine, general surgery, anesthesiology, ophthalmology, and dentistry. The hospital has 13,500 square meters of indoor space and includes 12 intensive care beds, 15 neonatal intensive care beds, and 15 incubators. It also provides services through 4 operating rooms, 1 delivery room, radiology and laboratory units, a dialysis unit, a cardiovascular surgery unit, an angiography laboratory, a blood center, a wound and burn unit, and an orthotics and prosthetics department.

Services Provided in 2025:

Emergency Patients	24,328
Outpatient Treatments	408,644
Inpatient Treatments	18,810
Surgeries	8,295
Laboratory Tests	2,361,389
Radiological Imaging Services	133,904

To date, our hospital in Somalia has successfully performed operations that had never before been carried out in the country. Examples of these achievements include the first pacemaker implantation and the first Whipple procedure (pancreaticoduodenectomy).

Hospital personnel provide services not only within the hospital but also in the field, reaching individuals in need of treatment through screening activities.

Our hospital was honored with the Public Service Provider of the Year Award as part of Somalia's 2025 National Quality Awards.

In cooperation with the University of Health Sciences, specialty training programs are provided in Somalia, and after completing their clinical rotations in Türkiye, physicians return to work at our hospital in their own country.

4.3. Niger- Türkiye Friendship Hospital

Upon the signing of the "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Türkiye and the Government of the Republic of Niger on Cooperation in the Fields of Health and Medical Sciences," and upon the instructions of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, our hospital began providing services as a Women's Health and Maternity Hospital in September 2019.

The hospital operates under a joint management model with 27 Turkish personnel (5 specialist physicians, 1 general practitioner, and 21 other personnel) and 185 local personnel. An area of 4,000 square meters behind the existing hospital has been allocated for an In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) Center, and the center has been established.

Services Provided in 2025:

Emergency Patients	29,428
Outpatient Treatments	32,125
Inpatient Treatments	4,368
Surgeries	3,031
Laboratory Tests	145,920
Radiological Imaging Services	1,793
Deliveries	2,449



Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital has been contributing to healthcare services and the training of healthcare workers in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, since 2015. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

5. Humanitarian Assistance

In every humanitarian crisis, Türkiye demonstrates its solidarity with the people of Africa through the provision of health assistance. In 2025, five pallets (2.5 tons) of humanitarian aid supplies were sent in response to Djibouti's request for humanitarian assistance arising from irregular migration and the refugee situation. A total of 104 pallets (64 tons) of medicines and medical consumables were donated to Somalia. As part of efforts to combat the cholera outbreak in Sudan, medicines and medical consumables were delivered to Sudan.

6. Training Programs

Enhancing the quality of services provided locally is of critical importance for sustainable development. With this understanding, various training programs are organized to improve the qualifications of healthcare personnel who will serve the people of Africa. Within this framework, since 2017, our Ministry has been implementing the "Project for Strengthening Coordination and Capacity Building in Emergency Health Preparedness and Response" with the aim of enhancing the professional capacities of healthcare personnel working in emergency medical services in African countries through training programs and fostering a shared spirit of emergency and disaster response across the African continent. Under the project, during 2024–2025, a total of eight training programs were conducted, including two Training of Trainers (ToT) programs at our Urla Training and Simulation Center in İzmir, four training programs in Tanzania, and two in Burkina Faso, providing training to a total of 229 healthcare professionals.

7. Visits

Minister of Health Prof. Dr. Kemal Memişoğlu and senior officials of the Ministry have welcomed health officials from African countries at every opportunity and have undertaken numerous visits to countries across the continent to evaluate bilateral relations. South Africa, Egypt, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Algeria, Niger, Somalia, Senegal, and Sudan are among the countries where these visits and official meetings took place.

Cooperation in the field of health was discussed during the First *D-8 Meeting of Health Ministers*, held under the chairmanship of the Arab Republic of Egypt.


Türkiye also participated in the *Second G20 Health Working Group Meeting* held in South Africa, where our productive healthcare model was presented during the G20 2025 Health Ministers' Meeting.

8. Conclusion

Türkiye's health diplomacy on the African continent is strategically oriented and based entirely on mutual solidarity and shared development. This diplomatic approach has evolved into genuine success stories that have touched the lives of thousands of people and transformed healthcare systems across the region.

Our cooperation with Africa in the field of health continues to deepen through the mutual exchange of experience and joint projects. As a country, we share the knowledge, expertise, and experience we have gained in the field of healthcare with health officials and specialists across the continent. Every form of support is provided to enable countries to establish their own healthcare systems.

With its broad vision encompassing healthcare investments across the continent, hospital operations, health screening programs, personnel training, patient treatment, and humanitarian assistance, our Ministry will continue to extend a healing hand to Africa.



The Communications Aspect to Türkiye-Africa Relations: Cooperation in Public Diplomacy and Media

9

Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications

1. Introduction

The international system is undergoing a period of transformation characterized by increasing uncertainty, intensifying power competition, and the erosion of multilateralism. Against this backdrop, enhancing our relations and cooperation with Africa emerges as a fundamental priority of Türkiye's multidimensional foreign policy. Shaped by the principle of "African solutions to Africa's problems" and the understanding of mutual benefit, our relations strengthen cooperation with African countries on the basis of equal partnership and constitute an important pillar of Türkiye's multidimensional foreign policy vision.

The Directorate of Communications of the Presidency carries out activities in line with its vision of developing comprehensive and multidimensional relations with national and international public opinion, decision-making actors, and the media; ensuring Türkiye's effective representation in every field by utilizing all means and methods of communication; and strengthening the Türkiye brand accordingly. Within this scope, the Directorate continues its work in the fields of strategic communication, public diplomacy, and combating disinformation. In this framework, communication and public diplomacy activities directed toward Africa have assumed critical importance for the Directorate in line with the continent's growing strategic significance in Turkish foreign policy. Effectively and accurately conveying Türkiye's multidimensional political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation with African countries to the international public; establishing sustainable communication networks with public opinion and media actors across the continent; and strengthening



The "Ongoing Conflict in the Heart of Africa: The Quest for Peace in Sudan" panel, organized by the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, addressed the conflict and humanitarian crisis in Sudan. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

mutual understanding remained among the Directorate's priorities in 2025, as in previous years.

2. Activities Conducted by the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency Toward the African Continent in 2025

In 2025, various events and programs were implemented both domestically and abroad within the framework of public diplomacy and media cooperation activities with African countries. The information activities, media engagements, and strategic communication initiatives carried out within this scope were supported through organized events, as well as cooperation protocols and memoranda of understanding that were signed. In addition, initiatives aimed at combating disinformation were also implemented. Collectively, these efforts seek to enhance the visibility of Türkiye-Africa relations and boost Türkiye's constructive role on the continent.

2.1. Panel Discussions and Events on Africa

Within the framework of Türkiye's multidimensional foreign policy approach toward Africa, communication and public diplomacy activities occupy an important place. Accordingly, through events addressing issues related to Africa and Türkiye-Africa relations, awareness is raised regarding Türkiye's diplomatic and humanitarian activities in Africa while also creating a multilateral platform for discussion among academic, media, diplomatic, and policy circles. These events contribute to addressing issues of peace, security, and development in Africa in light of global and regional developments, while also serving to communicate Türkiye's role in these processes to the international public.

Accordingly, on February 28, 2025, the *Türkiye-Africa Media Forum* was held in Istanbul with the aim of strengthening cooperation in the fields of media and communication between Türkiye and African countries and enhancing mutual communication capacity. The Forum brought together media representatives, academics, communication experts, and public officials from Türkiye and African countries with the objective of institutionalizing media interaction between the two sides. Within the framework of the Forum program, three separate panels were organized. The sessions, held under the titles "Strengthening the Media and Communication Ecosystem in Türkiye-Africa Relations," "Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication," and "Accurate Information Flow and Combating Disinformation in Türkiye-Africa Media Relations," comprehensively addressed strengthening the media and communication ecosystem in Türkiye-Africa relations, opportunities for cooperation that could be developed based on a shared vision in the context of public diplomacy and strategic communication, and ensuring the accurate and balanced flow of information.[1] In addition, topics such as combating disinformation in the international media environment, the effective use of digital communication tools, and the development of sustainable cooperation mechanisms among media institutions were also discussed.

Analyses shared at the event emphasized that media and communication play an important role in international relations and drew particular attention to the problem that Africa is often represented in global media narratives in an incomplete, one-dimensional, or negative manner. In this context, it was stated that the *Türkiye-Africa Media Forum* constitutes an important platform for ensuring a more balanced, multidimensional, and accurate flow of information between Türkiye and African countries. Participants also underscored the importance of increasing cooperation between Türkiye and African countries through media organizations, academic circles, and communication experts, emphasizing the need to develop shared narratives, overcome entrenched stereotypes about Africa, and undertake joint efforts to combat disinformation. Within this framework, it was stated that the Forum would contribute to strengthening institutional networks in the field of media within the context of Türkiye-Africa relations and that a shared understanding had emerged regarding encouraging initiatives to organize similar meetings in African countries in the future. The Forum is regarded as an important initiative that strengthens the communication dimension of Türkiye's multidimensional relations with Africa and provides an important platform for enhancing mutual understanding and developing sustainable media cooperation.

This approach that Türkiye has developed in the fields of communication and public diplomacy with Africa is supported through concrete initiatives implemented via thematic events organized across different countries on the continent. In line with the progress achieved in Türkiye-Africa relations in the fields of the defense industry and technology, a media gathering titled *Collective Wisdom for Peace, Development, and Security: Türkiye-Mozambique Defence Cooperation* was organized by the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency within

1 Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications, "Türkiye-Afrika Medya Forumu",
https://www.kisa.link/HtiTe, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

the framework of the *First Türkiye-Mozambique Defence Industry Cooperation Forum*, held in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, on November 20, 2025.[2] The primary objective of the gathering was to introduce Türkiye's technological capabilities in the defense industry and its vision for international cooperation to the Mozambican media. Within this scope, participants were informed about the advances Türkiye has made in recent years in defense technologies, its production capacity, and expanding opportunities for cooperation on a global scale. The gathering was regarded as an important step in terms of strategic communication, as it directly conveyed Türkiye's technological capabilities in the defense industry to the African media. It also contributed to strengthening diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries and became one of the significant initiatives supporting Türkiye's multidimensional approach to cooperation with Africa.

Beyond cooperation in the fields of media and communication, Türkiye's diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives in Africa also stand out through a multidimensional approach, with peace and development efforts being addressed at the panels and events organized within this framework. Accordingly, on November 21, 2025, the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency organized a panel in Johannesburg, South Africa, titled *Türkiye's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Assistance in the Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts*.[3] The panel addressed Türkiye's mediation initiatives, its contributions to peace processes, and the effectiveness of the rapid, inclusive, and coordinated intervention model it has adopted in crisis regions during a period marked by deepening humanitarian crises on a global scale. Furthermore, Türkiye's growing role in Africa was evaluated within the framework of the approach of being "an actor that builds partnerships rather than merely providing aid"; particular emphasis was placed on Türkiye's position as a peace actor that employs diplomatic, political, security, and development instruments from a holistic perspective, especially through the examples of Somalia, Libya, and Sudan.

In addition, on December 4, 2025, the Directorate hosted a panel discussion titled *The Ongoing Conflict in the Heart of Africa: The Quest for Peace in Sudan*.[4] The panel discussion, attended by media representatives, academics, public officials, and subject-matter experts, examined human rights violations in Sudan, the conflict's impact on regional security, and the role of diplomatic initiatives in restoring peace from a multidimensional perspective. In his opening remarks, Burhanettin Duran, Head of Communications of the Presidency, emphasized that Türkiye-Africa relations had gained significant momentum over the past two decades and stated that, within the framework of the "Opening to Africa and Partnership Policy," Türkiye had adopted a determined approach to developing its political, economic, and institutional relations with African countries.[5] It was underscored that Türkiye seeks to develop relations with African countries based on the principles of equal partnership, mutual benefit, and sustainable cooperation.

2 Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications, "Türk savunma sanayisi temsilcileri Mozambik medyasıyla bir araya geldi", 20.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/GhQWS, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

3 Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications, ""Türkiye'nin Çatışmaların Barışçıl Çözümünde Yürüttüğü İnsani Diplomasi ve Yardımları" paneli", 22.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/RXLwJ, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

4 Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications, ""Afrika'nın Kalbinden Süregelen Çatışma: Sudan'da Barış Arayışı" paneli düzenlendi," 04.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/aPujl, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

5 Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications, "İletişim Başkanı Duran, "Afrika'nın Kalbinde Süregelen Çatışma: Sudan'da Barış Arayışı" panelinde konuştu", 04.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/thKyI, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

2.2. Cooperation Protocols and Memoranda of Understanding Signed in the Fields of Media and Communications


Since 2018, the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency has taken significant steps toward strengthening institutional relations with the African continent in the fields of communication and public diplomacy. Within this framework, cooperation protocols and memoranda of understanding have been signed with counterpart institutions and organizations in a total of six African countries (Senegal, Algeria, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, and Nigeria) with the aim of establishing cooperation in the fields of media, communication, and public diplomacy, strengthening existing partnerships, and supporting joint initiatives. These agreements cover areas including enhancing the exchange of information and experience, promoting mutual interaction among media professionals, conducting capacity-building activities, undertaking joint work in the field of strategic communication, and developing cooperation in combating disinformation.

In this context, on January 23, 2025, a "Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields of Media and Communication" was signed with the Office of the Government Spokesperson of Rwanda.[6] The Memorandum of Understanding aims to enhance the exchange of information and experience between the two countries in the fields of media and communication, organize joint training and capacity-building programs, encourage reciprocal visits by media representatives, and develop joint projects in the field of strategic communication. While this cooperation contributes to strengthening institutional relations between Türkiye and Rwanda in the field of communication, it also makes an important contribution to advancing Türkiye's public diplomacy activities in Africa on an institutional basis.

3. Conclusion

Throughout 2025, the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency continued its activities directed toward Africa within a multidimensional framework. Through the panels organized, the *Türkiye-Africa Media Forum* held, and the memoranda of understanding signed, the Directorate sought to strengthen institutional relations between Türkiye and African countries in the fields of media, communication, and public diplomacy. These activities contributed to the communication dimension of Türkiye's multidimensional relations with Africa while also facilitating the establishment of a common framework for cooperation in the areas of strategic communication, ensuring the accurate flow of information, and combating disinformation. The initiatives carried out in this direction demonstrate an important public diplomacy dimension that strengthens Türkiye's relations with Africa on the basis of mutual understanding, equal partnership, and sustainable cooperation.

6 Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications, "Türkiye ile Ruanda arasında medya ve iletişim alanında iş birliği", 23.01.2025, https://www.kisa.link/Hgivy, Access Date: 06.03.2026.



Turkish Maarif Foundation's 2025 Activities in Africa

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
Turkish Maarif Foundation

1. Introduction

In contemporary international relations, states place among their priorities the promotion of their cultural and educational values as a source of global attraction. Türkiye has advanced the institutionalization of its public diplomacy, initiated in the post-Cold War period through institutions such as TİKA, the Yunus Emre Institute (YEE) and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) to a strategic level focused on education with the establishment of the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMV) in 2016. Through these institutions, Türkiye has embraced the pursuit of the story of "virtue" that humanity has sought to rediscover since the twentieth century and has attracted international attention through its public diplomacy activities carried out across six continents.

Established under Law No. 6721, the TMF is a public foundation that carries out formal and non-formal education activities abroad on behalf of Türkiye, guided by the vision of "adding value to education" through the integration of Türkiye's longstanding tradition of wisdom with modern pedagogy. Holding both private and public legal status, the TMF possesses a flexible institutional structure that enables it to adapt rapidly to the local legislation of the countries in which it operates and to develop dynamic solutions during times of crisis.

TURKISH MAARİF FOUNDATION SCHOOLS IN AFRICA IN 2025



TOTAL
208
SCHOOLS

In 2025, the Foundation conducted activities in 64 countries and provided education to more than 72,000 students through a total of 545 educational institutions, including 517 schools, 2 universities, 15 education centers, and 11 Türkiye Research Centers in 56 of these countries.

2. Strategic Structuring and Academic Standards in Africa

As of 2025, the TMF has evolved into a vast educational network operating in 27 African countries. This network represents a professional structure serving 24,000 students through 208 schools, 2 education centers, and 8 Türkiye Research Centers, covering a broad educational spectrum from preschool to higher education. The schools comprise preschool, primary, and secondary education institutions; the education centers refer to certified non-formal education centers; and the Türkiye Research Centers represent higher education centers equivalent to academic chairs and institutes established at prestigious universities in various countries.

2.1. Growth in Size and Quality: The Djibouti Case

One of the Foundation's most significant physical investments in 2025 was the opening of a new 67-decare campus in Djibouti. Equipped with modern laboratories and robotics classrooms, this campus represents not merely the construction of a new educational facility but also a symbol of Türkiye's commitment to raising educational quality in the region to international standards. This qualitative growth is further supported by expansion strategies targeting new areas of operation, including Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria.

2.2. International Accreditation and Assessment

While TMF schools implement local curricula, international curricula, and the Foundation's own International Maarif (IM) programs, the Foundation also develops partnerships with internationally recognized accreditation programs. In this respect, TMF schools have become standard-setters for international educational quality in the countries where they operate. In particular, the examination center established in Somalia through OxfordAQA accreditation has enabled students to take internationally recognized IGCSE and A-Level examinations within their own country. According to the 2025 data, the high levels of achievement attained in the fields of science and foreign languages demonstrate the Foundation's academic maturity.

3. Social Integration through Science, Sports and Culture

Extending its educational activities beyond the classroom, the TMF has reinforced its mission of serving as a unifying force across the continent through a range of social initiatives.

3.1. International Science Festivals

3.1. 1. Gabon Science Expo

Primary and secondary school students from 14 African countries, as well as Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, had the opportunity to exhibit more than 40 projects at the *Gabon Science Expo*. Organized around four main competition categories, namely Artificial Intelligence, Renewable Energy and Agriculture, Robotics, and Accessible Living, the *Gabon Science Expo* also demonstrated the Foundation's Africa-centered approach by welcoming participants from outside the continent, thereby reflecting a significant policy orientation.

Held for the fourth time in 2025 and having become an established institutional tradition, the Gabon Science Expo provides participants with the opportunity to showcase their innovative projects. The sharing of scientific and technological developments among participants from different countries has further demonstrated the value of expanding the fair in the coming years to include an even broader range of participants.

Science Fest Abidjan (SFA) was held in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, on April 29, 2025, with the participation of students from local schools and Maarif Schools in 22 African countries.



3.1.2. Science Fest Abidjan

Science Fest Abidjan (SFA), held on April 29, 2025, in Abidjan, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire, brought together students from local schools operating in Côte d'Ivoire and Maarif Schools from 22 different African countries. This science- and technology-oriented event was organized around four main themes: project competitions, panel discussions, a start-up fair, and university exhibitions.

The festival also featured an international education fair with the participation of 20 public and foundation universities from Türkiye, alongside leading universities from Côte d'Ivoire.

Bringing together young people from across Africa through a scientific festival, the event is planned to continue in the coming years under the name *Africa Science Festival*. Just as the Maarif Sports Games demonstrates the unifying power of sports, the *Science Fest Abidjan* likewise illustrates that science can serve the same unifying purpose.

In the Electronics and Robotics category, first place was awarded to the "Automated Entry Control System for Personnel Management" project from Gabon, while second place went to the "Smart Home" project from Mauritania, and third place was awarded to students who developed waste collection and sorting robots.

In the Information Technologies, Software, and Artificial Intelligence category, the "Maarif Connect" project from Côte d'Ivoire won first place, followed by the "InfinityLearn" project from Djibouti in second place, while the facial recognition-based attendance system project from Togo placed third.

In the Agricultural Technologies and Greenhouse Cultivation category, the "Healing from the Sky" project from Cameroon won first place. The greenhouse tomato cultivation project from Chad placed second, while Senegal's solar-powered greenhouse system project ranked third.

In the Renewable Energy and Recycling category, the project on producing energy and fertilizer from coffee grounds from Ethiopia won first place, followed by Koumassi High School's "Compost Energy" project from Côte d'Ivoire in second place and Mali's autonomous ecological campus project in third place.

In the Accessible Living category, the sensor-equipped glove project developed for visually impaired individuals from Madagascar won first place. Mali's "GuideSens" project ranked second, while the "IndepArm" artificial arm project from the Democratic Republic of the Congo placed third.

In addition, the SFA Special Award was presented to students from Attécoubé High School in Côte d'Ivoire for their "Pharmatech" project.

3.1.3. Togo Maarif Cultural Festival

Owing in particular to Lomé's status as an international city, Togo Maarif Schools have a highly diverse student profile. In order to transform this diversity into a source of richness and a celebration of unity, the *Maarif Cultural Festival* is organized, enabling students and parents from 22 different countries to establish exhibition booths.

The tradition continued at the 4th *Traditional Maarif Cultural Festival*, organized under the theme "Living in Peace." The cultures of the world were brought together through performances presented at the booths of 22 countries including Türkiye, Togo, Algeria, France, Brazil, Lebanon, Vietnam, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, South Korea, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Syria, Egypt, Mauritania, Niger, Benin, Gabon, Madagascar, Chad, and Guinea. As part of the event, food stalls, dance performances, concerts, and country exhibition booths organized by the participating countries attracted considerable appreciation from attendees.

3.2. 2nd Africa Maarif Sports Games (Mali)

Following the success of the first *Africa Maarif Sports Games* in 2023, the TMF held the second edition in Mali on February 18, 2025, with the participation of 2,025 athletes from 20 countries. Demonstrating the diplomatic power of sports, the competitions were held at the Bamako March 26 Stadium, the country's largest sports complex with a capacity of 50,000 spectators.

During the three-day event, competitions were organized in 12 different disciplines, including soccer, basketball, volleyball, and handball, as well as the 100-meter and 400-meter races, relay races, shot put, javelin throw, high jump, long jump, and swimming. In total, 127 competitions were held, amounting to 261 hours of sporting events.

The competitions held across the twelve disciplines represented not only sport competition but were also enriched by cultural diplomacy initiatives, including the introduction of the first Bambara-Turkish dictionary and an exhibition of archival documents on Mali from the Ottoman archives. At the conclusion of the competitions, organized under the slogan "Take Action for Africa, Compete, Run Toward Victory," the successful athletes were honored with awards.

Mauritania Maarif School



4. Strategic Language Diplomacy and Turkish Language Instruction

Promoting Turkish as a language of science and culture constitutes one of the TMF's principal strategic objectives. The Foundation aims for every student enrolled in its educational institutions to learn their native language, Turkish, and one foreign language. In African countries, Turkish is taught as a foreign language as a formal course in accordance with national education legislation and the structure of the respective school systems.

The Foundation implements Turkish language instruction through four different dimensions:

- **Formal Education:** Within the framework of the ", Teaching Turkish as a Foreign Language Program," developed by the Turkish Maarif Foundaiton and approved, approved by the Board of Education of the Ministry of National Education, students are expected to graduate with Turkish language proficiency at the B2 level. Turkish language instruction is delivered systematically through the Maarif Turkish Coursebook series and supplementary instructional materials prepared in alignment with the program. Students' proficiency levels are assessed regularly at every educational stage, while both curricular and extracurricular activities are designed to enhance their language skills. In addition to

three to four hours of Turkish language instruction per week, the course "Turkish Culture and Civilization" is incorporated into the middle school curriculum at Maarif Schools, further reinforcing students' Turkish language proficiency.

- **Higher Education and Research:** Turkish language instruction at the higher education level continues through the Türkiye Studies Centers operating in eight African countries (Djibouti, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, Cameroon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo). Turkish language courses offered at these centers as elective, credit-bearing courses are officially recorded on students' academic transcripts, and the total number of students studying Turkish is 525. Senegal has the highest enrollment with 392 students. Turkish language courses at the university level also continue in Togo, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali.

- **Public and Private Groups:** Under a protocol signed with the Ministry of National Defense of Türkiye, Turkish language training is provided to 333 military personnel in selected African countries. Programs organized for civilian participants and local personnel likewise contribute to establishing a strong communication network between Türkiye and local bureaucracies. Courses offered by the Foundation range from pre-A1 to B1 proficiency levels. The highest participation among civilian groups has been recorded in Madagascar, with 168 participants, while public Turkish language courses are also organized in Chad, South Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Equatorial Guinea.

Turkish language courses for local personnel and teachers are also organized in 13 African countries. These courses, attended by a total of 398 participants, are conducted primarily at the A1 level, with A2- and B1-level instruction also offered in certain countries. In 2025, the countries with the highest participation included Cameroon (100 participants), Tanzania (66 participants), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (57 participants). In addition, public Turkish language courses continue in Ethiopia, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Togo, South Africa, Burundi, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Tunisia, and Djibouti.

- **Social and Cultural Activities:** Alongside Turkish language instruction, considerable importance is attached to social and cultural activities promoting Turkish culture. Within this framework, *Türkiye Promotion Days*, national holiday celebrations, cultural programs, and language-themed events are organized in various countries with the aim of fostering students' intercultural interaction and awareness.

1. 1st International Debate Tournament: Since 2023, the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF) has organized the *International Debate Tournament*. Designed to foster the holistic development of students' communication and language skills, the event encourages both native Turkish-speaking students and bilingual students to use Turkish effectively.

The tournament also attracted significant interest from Africa in 2025. During the year, Debate Workshops were conducted in 25 countries, and the tournament was completed following an eight-week program. In the Foreign Language Group, Ethiopia and Syria competed in the grand final.

2. 6 Continents, 1 Language Project: The project was designed to bring together middle and high school students from diverse cultural backgrounds who study at TMF-affiliated schools and education centers in 43 different countries, encouraging them to use Turkish as a common language and engage in cultural exchange. The project aims to promote cultural interaction among students through the use of Turkish as a shared language, enhance students' cultural awareness, develop their digital, communication, and presentation skills, and strengthen the bonds of cultural diplomacy and friendship among countries. As part of the project in 2025, students delivered presentations entirely in Turkish in an online environment. Following the competition, one student each from Ethiopia, Chad, Syria, Tunisia, Albania, France, and Afghanistan was awarded a three-day trip to Istanbul.

3. Physical Education Classes in Turkish: Togo Maarif Schools, one of the few schools in the region offering a sports program and producing licensed athletes, has developed an innovative method for fostering students' interest in Turkish: Physical Education Classes in Turkish. During these classes, students use Turkish while participating in sports activities and games, expressing sports terminology, body development-related expressions, greetings, everyday conversations, basic language structures, objects, numbers, colors, and their personal needs in Turkish, while keeping rhythm with Turkish songs. Preparations for activities organized on special occasions are likewise carried out through Turkish-language instructions and musical pieces. This initiative, which seeks to integrate Turkish directly into students' daily lives through sports, has also been observed to improve students' academic performance in Turkish language classes.

5. Pedagogical Innovation: Exporting Educational Models and Local Partnerships

The TMF has evolved into an institution that exports educational materials and pedagogical methodologies. In particular, the "(IM) International Maarif Preschool Program" has been regarded as "inspirational" by the Ministries of Education of host countries owing to its pedagogical depth.

Adopting a philosophy of continuous renewal and improvement, the Foundation's administration also carries out activities to support the personal and

professional development of its personnel through scientific methods. Within this framework, the TMF Directorate of Basic Education organized a training program for preschool teachers at The Gambia International Maarif School between April 23 and 27, providing content designed to enhance teachers' knowledge and skills in effectively implementing the IM Preschool Education Program, which is officially applied in the country. Likewise, during the summer of 2025, the Directorate of Basic Education held evaluation meetings on the IM Preschool Education Program in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Istanbul. School administrators and teachers from Ethiopia, Tunisia, Somalia, Mauritania, Niger, Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Togo, and Mali participated in these meetings, which were organized to evaluate the implementation of the program officially applied in 18 countries across five continents.

In order to support the professional development of school psychological counselors working in the Foundation's overseas schools, establish a common Maarif guidance and counseling approach among specialists, and strengthen interaction in counseling services, the Maarif Guidance Professional Development Training program was organized. As part of this initiative, an in-service training program for French-speaking African countries was held in Gabon between June 23 and 27. The program was attended by psychological counselors and psychologists from a total of 17 schools in Burkina Faso, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia. The same program was also organized for English-speaking African countries between September 2 and 6 for school psychological counselors from Tanzania, Zambia, Somalia, Ethiopia, and The Gambia.

The TMF Department of School Administrator and Teacher Training and Development organizes both in-person and online teacher training programs. On various dates, teachers working at Maarif Foundation Schools in Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Guinea received a total of 16 hours of training from Professional Development Specialists Iba Diop Cissé and Mamadou Simpara, thereby continuing activities aimed at supporting teachers' professional development.

6. A Process-Oriented Development Approach

At Maarif Foundation Schools, while students' academic achievement is taken into consideration, the pedagogical approach emphasizes not merely the final outcomes of learning (grades, report cards, or diplomas), but rather the pathways students follow in acquiring knowledge, the effort they demonstrate, and their cognitive development. Unlike the traditional product-oriented system, this approach transforms students from passive recipients into active architects of their own learning journeys. Within this framework:

- The MAKES (Maarif Character Education Set) activities, designed to support students' character and values development, are implemented in Mali, Zambia, Niger, Ethiopia, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, Senegal, Chad, Burkina Faso, Tunisia, the Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, and South Africa.

- MAGİS, the entrance examination administered for admission to Maarif Schools, was implemented in 2025 in Burundi, Madagascar, Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tunisia, Senegal, Chad, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon, The Gambia, Niger, Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, Somalia, and Mauritania.

- Question-writing training programs are provided for educators in countries where MAGİS is administered. Teachers from Maarif Schools in Cameroon, Tanzania, the Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Chad, Niger, Togo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Gabon, Tunisia, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Mauritania participated in these training programs.

7. Education Fairs by Maarif Agency

Established by the TMF, the Maarif Agency organizes international education fairs on a global scale to support the overseas promotion strategies of Turkish universities and to provide Türkiye's higher education institutions with direct access to prospective students. Within this framework, the Agency organized comprehensive education fairs in Morocco, Kenya, and Tunisia during 2025, with the participation of Türkiye's leading public and foundation universities.

These events attracted considerable international attention and were visited by approximately 5,000 participants. As a result of the Foundation's high-quality guidance and promotional activities, students who gained detailed knowledge of Türkiye's higher education system chose to pursue their academic futures at Turkish universities.

As a tangible outcome of this strategic guidance, 3,500 graduates of TMF schools are currently continuing their higher education at universities in Türkiye. This process not only increases Türkiye's share of the international higher education market but also lays the foundation for long-term cultural and academic cooperation.

8. Achievements of Maarif in 2025

Through the high-quality projects and sustainable educational models it has implemented in the regions where it operates, the Foundation has attained a re-

spected position internationally. The outstanding performances demonstrated by its students in regional and national competitions have confirmed that its educational processes are not confined to academic achievement alone but also cultivate concrete competencies in such areas as strategic thinking, self-discipline, team spirit, and physical development.

Students enrolled in TMF schools continued to achieve significant accomplishments in 2025. Some of these achievements include the following:

Students from the Zambia Maarif Foundation School earned second place in the Midlands (Lusaka Region) Under-19 Chess Championship and third place in the National Under-19 Chess Championship. They also won a silver medal in the 1,500-meter race at the ISAZ (Independent Schools Association of Zambia) *Athletics Tournament*, a bronze medal in the long jump at the *ISAZ Athletics Tournament*, and fourth place in the *National Youth Day Football Tournament*.

Students graduating from Tanzania Maarif Foundation Schools' Form Four (Grade 4) in 2025 demonstrated outstanding academic achievement in the national examinations. Grade 7 students achieved an A average in the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), marking a significant accomplishment at the primary education level. In terms of overall academic performance, more than 90 percent of the students who took the national examinations in 2025 achieved outstanding results, while all students earned Division 1 classification.

At the beginning of 2025, students from Tanzania Maarif Foundation School qualified to receive certificates and medals for their performances in public speaking and debate competitions organized by the *Tanzania Competitive Rhetoric Organization* (TCRO) in February. In addition, by participating in the Public Junior Festival Qualifiers held on February 14-15, 2025, students further developed their public speaking, analytical thinking, and effective presentation skills.

Students from the Turkish Maarif Foundation Arusha Campus (Tanzania) successfully represented their school by achieving notable distinctions at the *East Africa Debate Championship* held on September 4, 2025. They received awards in the categories of Best School in the Quiz Competition, Best School in Public Speaking, Most Promising Team in Public Speaking, Best Public Speaking Coaches, Best Team in the Writing Competition, Best Quiz Team, and Best Quiz Master (Student).

Adnan Abdiweli Muhammed Yusuf, a student at Somalia Maarif Foundation Schools, achieved remarkable success by ranking eighth nationwide among 34,000 students and second in the Banadir region. He is currently continuing his education with a merit scholarship in the Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering at Marmara University. This achievement provides concrete evidence of the success of Turkish Maarif Foundation schools in facilitating international academic transition.

The international representation of students also increased significantly during 2025. Students from Somalia Maarif Foundation Schools participated in the *Model Organization of Islamic Cooperation* held in Istanbul, where they engaged in negotiations on global issues alongside delegates from various countries and contributed to the drafting of the Istanbul Declaration.

Students from Ghana Maarif Foundation School achieved remarkable success in the *Kangaroo Mathematics Competition* organized by the Ghana Olympic Academy as part of its Academic Talent Development Program. Among a total of 5,812 students from 241 public, private, and international schools across the country, Maarif students distinguished themselves, with three students taking first place in their respective categories. Huzaifa, Hamza Ibrahim, and Anas Ibrahim finished at the top of their categories and were awarded gold medals.


Turkish Maarif Foundation Schools achieved success rates of up to 100 percent in the national middle school and high school graduation examinations held in Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Togo.

In the *HIPPO English Language Competition* held in Tunisia, Maarif schools successfully qualified for the finals.

At the *Canadian School Cup Sports Tournament* held in Togo on November 13, 2025, students won two championships and one runner-up title. The Under-14 soccer and basketball teams both secured first place, while the girls' basketball team finished second. Also in Togo, a student from Maarif Foundation Schools placed second in the *Spanish Language Knowledge Competition* organized by the French High School.

9. Conclusion

In light of the Foundation's 2025 activity reports, the TMF represents not only Türkiye's educational experience in Africa but also its vision of cultivating virtuous individuals. By constructing a multidimensional success story spanning academic excellence, sports competitions, technological innovation, and language education, the TMF has succeeded in establishing lasting, humanitarian, and strategic ties between Türkiye and Africa. Through its performance in 2025, the TMF has continued to stand as a trusted brand in the global education sector and as Türkiye's most compelling "virtue" narrative on the international stage.



2025 Activities of Anadolu Agency in Africa

11

Anadolu Agency

1. Introduction

Anadolu Agency (AA), in line with its objective of becoming one of the world's largest news agencies, attaches strategic importance to all regions on a global scale and, within this framework, demonstrates its interest in Africa through the comprehensive news content and media activities it produces. Accordingly, the Agency's activities in Africa encompass a broad range of content, including not only the close monitoring and international dissemination of political, economic, and social developments across the continent but also the production of news focusing on nature, the environment, and culture.

Anadolu Agency supports its journalism activities related to Africa not only through content production but also through various media partnerships and institutional initiatives developed with local and international stakeholders, thereby contributing to reportage from the continent. This article examines how Anadolu Agency's journalistic approach, shaped by its future vision, has been implemented in Africa and the reflections of this approach on its media activities related to the continent.

2. Institutional Structure of Anadolu Agency in Africa

From an editorial perspective, AA's Africa News Directorate coordinates its operations from a single center. This is where one director sets the editorial policy, thematic priorities, and institutional strategy, while one senior correspondent and five correspondents closely monitor current developments and ensure the continuous flow of news. One senior correspondent is based in Senegal, while two correspondents are based in Istanbul and one correspondent each covers developments from South Africa, Cameroon, and Nigeria. In addition, freelance correspondents in Sudan, Somalia, Chad, and Central Africa support these operations. Furthermore, regular field reporting is provided through thirteen freelance journalists actively working in Francophone African countries. As of September 2025, the French News Desk was relocated from Tunisia to Istanbul. The Desk continues to monitor developments in Francophone African countries through freelance journalists working in the field and produces uninterrupted, original and verified news for international audiences. Given the geographical challenges and security risks, AA's network of staff and freelance correspondents spread across the continent plays a critical role in delivering firsthand reporting from the field and conducting exclusive interviews. Through this extensive network of journalists operating in different countries, the Agency both produces news in Turkish and translates its content into various languages for international audiences. In addition to the activities carried out by the Africa News Directorate, news related to Africa is produced in all thirteen languages in which AA publishes regularly; this content is sometimes prepared as original reporting and, at other times, translated for distribution through different language services.

In 2025, a total of 2,392 news reports related to Africa were produced, including 2,147 routine reports and 245 special reports. While routine reports aim to provide timely, impartial, and reliable coverage of developments across the continent, special reports enrich the news flow through in-depth research, field visits, and interviews conducted by field correspondents. AA frequently supports these special reports with visual materials, generating considerable attention in both national and international media. Within the scope of these activities, 2025 also presented numerous challenges for journalism in Africa. Security risks, geographical conditions, and infrastructure deficiencies significantly complicated the fieldwork of correspondents. Nevertheless, AA's team of staff and freelance correspondents succeeded in closely monitoring and reporting major developments across the continent despite these challenges. In particular, logistical difficulties and security concerns encountered while accessing conflict and crisis zones were largely overcome through intensive coordination and planning efforts, enabling both the uninterrupted continuation of routine news coverage and the ongoing production of special reports.

3. Anadolu Agency's Collaborations in Africa

In addition to its editorial activities, AA continues to maintain news-sharing agreements, joint projects, and training programs with media organizations across African countries. Within the framework of these collaborations, Turkish and African journalists have increased knowhow exchange, strengthening mutual interaction in the field of media. As a result, the capacities of local journalists have been enhanced, while lasting ties in the media sector have been established between Türkiye and African countries.

In this context, approximately twenty different training programs were provided to a total of 400 participants from Africa. These training programs were organized in cooperation with institutions such as the Directorate of Communications of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, TİKA, YTB, SESRIC, the Union of Turkish World Municipalities (TDBB), and the Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (ICYF), covering a wide range of subjects including next-generation journalism, energy, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, economics and finance, media representation, health, local governance, election reporting, and journalism in war and crisis zones.

Meanwhile, cooperation processes are ongoing between AA and the news agencies of various African countries. In this regard, active cooperation agreements are in place with the news agencies of Algeria, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Morocco, and Cameroon. Negotiations to renew agreements with Senegalese news agencies have been completed, and appropriate conditions are being awaited for the signing of the agreements. In addition, negotiations are continuing with the news agencies of Ethiopia, Angola, South Africa, Kenya, Republic of the Congo, Libya, and Egypt, while planning is underway for new initiatives with the news agencies of Equatorial Guinea and Mauritania. As part of AA's marketing activities, the Agency also has four subscribers from Somalia, Egypt, and South Africa. Accordingly, cooperation processes involving the news agencies of a total of nineteen African countries remain actively on AA's agenda.

4. News Projects of Anadolu Agency in Africa

Despite challenging geographical and political conditions, AA correspondents went beyond routine news reporting to produce notable special reports and interviews. Among the most prominent was an interview with South Africa's Ambassador to The Hague, Vusi Madonsela, in which he shared his assessments regarding his country's genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice. In addition, the Agency closely monitored the principal

developments shaping the African agenda. The humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing civil war in Sudan, shifts in the security balance across the Sahel region, and the diplomatic tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia were among the major developments covered during this period.

During the same period, elections and political transformation processes across the continent were also regularly monitored by AA. In addition, ongoing security challenges and the activities of armed groups in certain regions remained among the major topics in the news flow. In East Africa, the long-standing diplomatic negotiations among Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam continued to occupy a prominent place on the regional agenda.

Furthermore, a number of in-depth feature reports introducing individual African countries were prepared. Through these reports, the political, economic, and cultural structures of various countries were examined with the aim of contributing to a greater body of knowledge about Africa in Türkiye.



The book "Türkiye's Hand of Peace," published in 2025 under the AA Books imprint, was prepared under the leadership of AA and addresses Türkiye's political, military, economic, and cultural cooperation with the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden.

Although Africa is often portrayed in the global media primarily through narratives of coups, conflicts, and poverty, AA places particular importance on highlighting the continent's cultural richness and social diversity. Accordingly, the Agency publishes special features focusing on local festivals, traditional arts, music, and handicrafts. In addition, gastronomy features and travel reports on African cuisine are among the noteworthy topics covered. These reports, focusing on nature, culture, and everyday social life, attract attention not only in Türkiye but also in the international media. Within this framework, documentary projects were carried out on The Gambia, Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique, Botswana, and Côte d'Ivoire, while special reports focusing on human-interest stories were prepared from South Africa, Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria, and Somalia.

5. Türkiye's News Coverage in Africa

To develop an accurate view of Africa, it is necessary to move beyond reductionist approaches that view the continent solely through the lenses of crises and great-power competition. In this context, Türkiye's Africa policy is based on an understanding of relations shaped by equality, mutual respect, and partnership, rather than defining the continent as an arena of competition.

Türkiye's approach to Africa is founded on the principles of respect for mutual sovereignty, humanitarian responsibility, win-win cooperation, and long-term sustainable partnership. This policy, which has developed steadily over the past two decades, has contributed to institutional continuity in Türkiye-Africa relations by offering a multidimensional framework encompassing security, economics, diplomacy, and media.[1]

AA plays an important role in the media dimension of Türkiye's multifaceted relations with Africa. News concerning Africa is processed by the Agency's editorial team and delivered to audiences in Türkiye and around the world, while exclusive interviews and photographic and video content highlight both the continent's humanitarian challenges and its potential. Moreover, the distribution of AA's news reports, photographs, and videos to international media outlets enables these materials to be used by media organizations in different countries, thereby contributing to greater awareness of developments related to Africa.


AA also carries out its work on Africa through printed publications. A notable example is the book titled *Türkiye's Hand of Peace*,[2] published under the AA Books imprint in 2025. Compiled by AA with contributions from leading scholars in the field, the volume examines Türkiye's political, military, economic, and cultural cooperation with the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden from a comprehensive perspective.

6. Conclusion

Throughout 2025, Anadolu Agency continued its journalistic activities related to Africa through its strong network of correspondents, multilingual publishing capacity, and international partnerships, regularly and reliably conveying the continent's political, social, and cultural developments to the public. Despite the challenging field conditions, its news reports, interviews, and feature stories contributed to presenting Africa not only through the lens of crises but also in terms of its cultural richness and social dynamism. In doing so, AA played an important role in strengthening the flow of information about Africa in both Türkiye and the international media.

1 Talha Köse, "Afrika'nın Stratejik Yükselişi ve Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri", Anadolu Agency, 08.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/iSCTD, Access Date: 14.03.2026.

2 Anadolu Agency, *Türkiye'nin Barış Eli*, AA Kitap, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/ulwRL, Access Date: 08.03.2026.



The Unique Roadmap of TİKA: A People-Centered and Sustainable Development Cooperation

12


Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency

1. Introduction

In 2025, as the global development architecture underwent a period of change and transformation, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) continued its activities in Africa without slowing down, guided by a "people-centered" and "sustainable" development cooperation approach rooted in Türkiye's own development experience. As the driving force behind Türkiye's development cooperation efforts, TİKA concluded 2025 by implementing projects designed and carried out in line with local needs and priorities, demonstrating that its vision for Africa is founded on a "genuine partnership." Within this framework, projects were implemented following comprehensive and inclusive analyses of their short-, medium-, and long-term impacts, thereby contributing to the "genuine" development of the African people and the continent while creating opportunities for mutual learning and the sharing of experience.

Türkiye's "Opening to Africa Policy," launched in 1998 and encompassing numerous political, economic, humanitarian, and cultural dimensions, has evolved over the past quarter century into a multidimensional, multi-stakeholder, principled, and long-term partnership vision. Throughout this process, TİKA – which has undertaken significant responsibilities by defining the framework of Türkiye's international development cooperation efforts, coordinating these efforts, and implementing them through its projects and programs – has

TİKA in Africa



centered all its activities around understanding Africa and its people, striving together in a spirit of shared destiny and cooperation, and achieving development together. The purpose of this article is to examine, through the lens of development cooperation, Türkiye's Africa-related projects and activities in 2025 as undertaken by a country that regards African nations as partners, builds its relations with Africa upon a vision of a long-term and sustainable future, and develops multidimensional forms of cooperation. It also aims to present TİKA's experience throughout 2025 by highlighting how the Agency employed its instruments and methods to generate rapid, effective, and sustainable solutions to Africa's development challenges.

2. Africa: A General Overview

The year 2025 witnessed geopolitical transformations, the intensification of the devastating effects of climate and environmental crises, growing inequalities across all aspects of life, rising internal conflicts and instability, and increasingly large-scale migration movements. With deepening crises and accelerating structural transformations, the repercussions of 2025 were felt acutely across Africa. In a year when development assistance originating from the United States and Europe declined significantly, giving rise to growing concerns in this regard, standing alongside African countries in their development efforts and enabling them to look toward the future with hope became more important than ever.

Throughout 2025, Africa encountered both new opportunities and new challenges arising from emerging economic, political, social, technological, and environmental trends. Rising inequality and poverty, the environmental and climate crisis, food security, demographic transformation and mobility, conflict and instability, and technological change and digital transformation emerged as the principal factors shaping the continent. Confronted with numerous mutually reinforcing challenges, Africa nevertheless continued to stand out as a region possessing demographic and economic windows of opportunity, characterized by its rich cultural heritage, dynamic young population, substantial economic potential, and steadily increasing strategic importance.

3. Overview of TİKA's 2025 Activities

Guided by Türkiye's entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy, TİKA completed its activities in 2025 as an active and influential actor within the development cooperation architecture through both development- and human-



TİKA implemented a project to set up a carpentry workshop at the Kaoussar Orphanage in Niamey, the capital of Niger.

itarian assistance-oriented initiatives directed toward African countries. The most tangible manifestations of Türkiye's growing commitment to unlocking Africa's potential can be observed in the increase in the number of TİKA's Program Coordination Offices, from the opening of its first office in Ethiopia in 2005 to a total of 23 today, and in the corresponding expansion of its activities. In this regard, initiatives were carried out not only in countries where Program Coordination Offices are located but also, with the valuable support of regional offices and Türkiye's embassies, in countries where no such offices exist, addressing needs across every field. To date, approximately 7,000 projects, programs, and activities have been implemented for African countries, with all available resources and capabilities mobilized in line with the principle of making a genuine difference in the lives of the African people.

An examination of TİKA's project portfolio for 2025, as a pioneering actor in Türkiye's development diplomacy, reveals a broad range of projects spanning from traditional development assistance sectors to emerging global trends across the African continent. Within this framework, projects, programs, and activities were implemented in a spirit of mutual learning and development across numerous sectors, including education, healthcare, agriculture, production, the empowerment of women and youth, the green economy, the effective use of digital technologies, and clean energy. Particular care was taken to transfer Türkiye's accumulated knowledge and experience in ways that would unlock the potential of the African continent and its people while generating sustainable solutions. Accordingly, activities were carried out in cooperation

with local public institutions and organizations, civil society organizations, as well as international and regional organizations, ensuring that TİKA's field experience was reflected in projects in the most effective and efficient manner. In coordination with Türkiye's public institutions and organizations, universities, local governments, and civil society organizations, efforts were undertaken to promote inclusive, sustainable, and resilient development. At the center of these efforts was Türkiye's experience and expertise, which were adapted to the needs and development priorities of partner countries before being transferred.

Throughout 2025, TİKA designed and implemented projects aimed at eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions while promoting sustainable development. In this context, while following its own distinctive roadmap, TİKA also closely monitored global developments. Accordingly, the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the global level and the African Union Agenda 2063 at the continental level were carefully integrated into project design and implementation processes. The project portfolio primarily consisted of production- and employment-oriented, micro-scale, income-generating projects. Through projects implemented in such areas as education, healthcare, agriculture, livestock, vocational training, the provision of social services, emergency humanitarian assistance, water and sanitation, and the preservation of shared cultural heritage, TİKA supported countries' development efforts. Particular attention was paid to reaching all segments of society through these projects and activities, especially women, persons with disabilities, children, older adults, and refugees.



TİKA established a Robotics Coding Classroom at Crosby Academic Primary School in the Republic of South Africa.



TİKA provided equipment to the Biochemistry and Pharmacology Laboratories of the Faculty of Medicine at Islamic University in Uganda.

In 2025, TİKA attached particular importance to implementing projects that strengthened local capacity, encompassed multiple dimensions of development, generated multiplier effects, and produced multiple benefits. For example, in the field of education, the "Installation of a Robotics and Coding Classroom at Crosby Academic Primary School in South Africa" integrated digital literacy, coding, and robotics education into the school system through the effective use of modern technologies. In the healthcare sector, the "Libya - Hope Room Pediatric Chemotherapy Center" enabled children with cancer to receive treatment in a safe and child-friendly environment in the field of pediatric oncology, with the aim of providing them not only with healing but also with hope throughout their treatment journey.


"The Greenhouse Support for Young Somali Farmers" project contributed to empowering young people and promoting modern agricultural practices. Through the "Chad - Agricultural Transformation in the Hadjer Lamis Region: Development of Peanut Production and Oil Processing Infrastructure" project, the objective was to comprehensively support food security, employment, women's participation in economic life, and sustainable rural development. As part of efforts to strengthen local livelihoods, the "Establishment of a Fishing Boat Production Workshop in Djibouti" supported the strengthening of the fisheries sector and the enhancement of local production capacity. In line with the clean energy concept, the "Establishment of a Solar Energy Training Laboratory at the Djelfa Chamber of Traditional Handicrafts in Algeria" provided young people in the region with training on the installation, operation, maintenance, and repair of solar energy systems, with the aim of training the qualified technical personnel needed in this field.

Within the framework of promoting the active participation of persons with disabilities in all aspects of life and reducing inequalities, the "Establishment of a Computer Laboratory for Persons with Disabilities at the Uganda National Union of Disabled Persons" sought to promote digital inclusion among persons with disabilities while strengthening their individual independence and social integration. As part of efforts to empower women, the "Tanzania 'Binti Jasiri' (Brave Sisters) Training and Production Workshop" supported young women who had dropped out of education and faced the risk of social exclusion by enabling them to become productive, self-confident, and economically independent individuals through interdisciplinary technical training based on locally available raw materials.

In 2025, under TİKA's coordination and in line with the objective of "Transforming National Experience into Global Impact in the Century of Türkiye," a coordination meeting was held with Türkiye's distinguished public institutions that cooperated in training programs for various African countries stretching from the north to the south and from the east to the west of the continent. During the meeting, views were exchanged on how to design and implement projects and activities more effectively. Likewise, every effort was made to generate solutions to Africa's development challenges through cooperation and partnerships established at the local, regional, and global levels wherever opportunities existed.

4. Conclusion

In 2025, Africa remained among the regions where TİKA maintained the greatest number of offices and implemented the largest number of projects. Within a development ecosystem in which African countries sought to make their voices heard, TİKA emerged as a strong and reliable development actor through projects implemented in accordance with an approach that not only listened to Africa's voice but also responded with openness and genuine commitment. At a time when global humanitarian crises continued to deepen, TİKA contributed to the multidimensional development of African countries through a sustainable and people-centered development cooperation framework, mobilizing available resources for the global common good. By implementing projects that placed people at their center, prioritized quality over quantity, enhanced the development capacity of the African people, and enabled them to look toward the future with hope, TİKA made a meaningful difference in people's lives.



Yunus Emre Institute's Cultural, Artistic and Educational Activities in Africa in 2025

13

Yunus Emre Institute

1. Introduction

Throughout 2025, cultural, artistic, and educational activities carried out across the African continent made significant contributions to cultural diplomacy, enhancing interaction among societies, and strengthening mutual understanding. Through events organized in various countries, different elements of Turkish culture were introduced through music, performing arts, traditional handicrafts, gastronomy, and educational activities.

These activities were not limited to artistic events alone; educational programs for children and young people, social responsibility projects, and cultural interaction activities also occupied an important place. The objectives were to strengthen cultural exchange, build connections among societies through art, and foster lasting relationships among younger generations. This article compiles Yunus Emre Institute's (YEI) 2025 activities in Africa with a focus on the prominent activities carried out in different African countries, presenting each country separately.



The Yunus Emre Institute organized a whirling dervish ceremony as part of the Fez Festival of World Sacred Music.

2. Morocco: Sacred Music Festival and Sema Performance

As part of the 28th *Fez Festival of World Sacred Music* held in the historic city of Fez, renowned for its cultural heritage, the Istanbul Meydan Meşkleri Ensemble from Türkiye performed at the festival. The performance, held at the Bab Al Makina stage, was artistically directed by Yüce Gümüş, while Mehmet Fatih Çıtlak served as the *postnişin*. During the event, performed by a twenty-member ensemble, the *Acemaşiran Mevlevi Sema Performance* and *Devran-ı Şerif* were presented, accompanied by traditional Turkish musical instruments such as the *ney*, *kudüm*, *kanun*, and oud. Art enthusiasts who

filled the festival grounds to watch the approximately one-hour-and-fifteen-minute performance showed great interest in the event. At the conclusion of the performance, the artists received a prolonged standing ovation. The event enabled art lovers in Africa to experience Sufi music and the Mevlevi tradition, while also contributing to the strengthening of cultural relations between the two countries.[1]

In Rabat, the capital of Morocco, traditional Turkish calligraphy was presented at the *Republic Day* reception. Calligraphic works prepared by Ali Rıza Özcan, a faculty member at Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, were exhibited. The event was attended by the Kingdom of Morocco's Minister of Industry and Trade, Ryad Mezzour, along with representatives of diplomatic missions and numerous guests. At the event, numerous participants had their names written in Turkish calligraphy and received the works as gifts. Özcan also delivered a presentation and conducted a practical calligraphy workshop at the Dar El-Hadith El-Hassania institution in Rabat. The event contributed to the promotion of traditional Turkish calligraphy and the enhancement of cultural interaction.

3. The Gambia: April 23 Children's Festival

In Banjul, the capital of The Gambia, a children's festival was organized for children deprived of parental care on the occasion of April 23 National Sovereignty and Children's Day. Approximately forty children residing at SOS Children's Village were invited to participate in the event.

Throughout the event, the children played traditional games, participated in dance and music activities, and produced works in various art workshops. Storytelling sessions and painting activities were among the key components of the event. Prior to the event, the children were asked about their dream professions, and portraits representing the professions each child aspired to pursue in the future were created using artificial intelligence technology. These portraits were presented to the children as gifts during the event. As part of the event, artist Njogu Touray created a mural with an April 23 theme on the exterior wall of the center building. The children also contributed to the artwork by leaving handprints on the wall with paint-covered hands. In addition to contributing to the children's social and cultural development, the event also provided an opportunity for the holiday to be shared internationally.[2]

1 Enes Yıldırım, "Fes'te Uluslararası Kutsal Müzik Festivali'nde Sema Mukabelesi", Anadolu Agency, 20.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/NjCJn , Access Date: 15.03.2025.

2 23.04.2025, Anadolu Agency, Dünyadan 23 Nisan Kutlamaları
https://www.kisa.link/fQAsz, Access Date: 15.03.2025.

4. South Africa: Hacıvat and Karagöz Shadow Plays

In South Africa,[3] performances of the Hacıvat and Karagöz shadow play, one of the most significant forms of Turkish performing arts, were delivered. In addition to the cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria, the event was held in Cape Town for the first time. As part of *Africa Day* celebrations, hundreds of students had the opportunity to watch the performances at schools affiliated with the South African Department of Education.

Following the performances, workshops were organized to provide students with information about the history, characters, and staging techniques of the shadow play. The event particularly aimed to reach schools serving students with limited opportunities. This series of events reached approximately four thousand South African students.

In Johannesburg, a handicrafts course was also organized with the joint participation of Turkish and South African children. During the four-week event, the children worked in various handicraft workshops and produced a variety of artistic works.

5. Egypt: Empower Her Art Forum and Marbling Workshop

At the *Empower Her Art Forum*, a contemporary art fair held at the Grand Egyptian Museum in Cairo, a Türkiye pavilion was established. Organized as part of the centennial of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Egypt, the event highlighted the works of women artists.

As part of the event, a marbling (*ebru*) workshop was organized, providing participants with hands-on instruction in traditional marbling techniques. In addition, academic presentations addressing environmental awareness and the climate crisis in art were delivered. The performance art piece *Transparent Scream*, staged by Associate Professor Tuğba Çelebi, was among the fair's most notable events. Works by artists from different countries were exhibited throughout the fair, and thousands of visitors toured the exhibitions during the event. [4]

In Cairo, an additional event was organized for children receiving treatment at Al Nas Children's Hospital as part of the *April 23 National Sovereignty and Children's Day* celebrations. Within the scope of the event, play areas were created for the children, and various gifts were distributed.[5]

3 23.11.2025, TRT Haber, https://www.kisa.link/jMYqQ, Access Date: 15.03.2025.

4 20.05.2025, Anadolu Agency, https://www.kisa.link/kebPA, Access Date: 15.03.2025.

5 Amer Fouad Fouad Solyman, https://www.kisa.link/IeiFp, 24.04.2025, Anadolu Ajansı, Access Date: 15.03.2025.



The Yunus Emre Institute organized an event for young people in Somalia as part of the May 19 Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day.

6. Senegal: Turkish Cuisine Week and Laylat al-Qadr Event

In Dakar, the capital of Senegal, a gastronomy-themed event was organized as part of Turkish Cuisine Week. The event was carried out through the cooperation of the Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye in Dakar and the Dakar Yunus Emre Institute. During the workshop led by Chef Yunus Emre Akkor, participants made *yağlama*, a traditional dish from the Kayseri province in Türkiye, through hands-on practice. The event continued with a dinner featuring prominent dishes from Turkish cuisine. In attendance were diplomats serving in Dakar among other guests.[6]

Also in Dakar, an iftar was organized on the occasion of Laylat al-Qadr during the month of Ramadan. The event, held at one of the city's iconic landmarks, Phare des Mamelles, was attended by representatives from Senegal's art, political, and sports communities, as well as members of foreign diplomatic missions. Following the iftar, Emin Bayram and Samet Tengiz presented a performance of Sufi music. The event attracted considerable interest from participants and helped further cultural exchange.

6 28.05.2025, The Wall Africa Journal (Türk), https://www.kisa.link/oCycy, Access Date: 15.03.2025.

7. Somalia: May 19 Youth Events

In the Somali capital of Mogadishu, a large-scale youth festival was organized as part of the *May 19 Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sports Day*. Within the framework of the event, an exhibition of photographs of Atatürk was opened, alongside a booth promoting cultural activities.

The event featured competitions in football, table tennis, painting, and traditional Turkish archery. Young people from different regions of Somalia participated in the competitions. In the Turkish archery competition, Nor Ali Mohamud, a student enrolled in Turkish language courses, won first place.

8. Tunisia: Turkish Sufi Music

In Tunisia, a *sema* performance was organized to introduce the thought of Mevlânâ Jalal al-Din Rumi and the Mevlevi tradition. The event was held under the auspices of the Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye in Tunis. Staged in cooperation with the Konya Metropolitan Municipality, the performance featured the Turkish Sufi Music and Sema Ensemble with a cast of twenty-two performers. The event attracted significant interest from Tunisian art enthusiasts.[7]

9. Rwanda: Recycling and Art Workshop

In Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, a recycling handicrafts workshop was organized under the theme of environmental awareness and sustainable art. During the ten-day event, participants created various works of art using plastic and recycled materials. As part of the workshop, Rwandan artist Brave Japhet delivered a talk on sustainable art. The event was organized to raise environmental awareness and promote cultural cooperation.

10. Nigeria: Turkish Reading and Student Gatherings

Library reading activities were organized for children learning Turkish at the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in Abuja. As part of the

7 Mehmet Akif Turan, https://www.kisa.link/sButh, Anadolu Agency, 17.02.2025, Access Date: 15.03.2025.


series of events, students met regularly at the library to read books in Turkish.

In addition, online conversation sessions were organized between students in Abuja and students from the Ankara Gölbaşı Science and Art Center. During the online meetings, the students exchanged information about national holidays, cultural traditions, and everyday life.

11. Conclusion

Throughout 2025, cultural, artistic, and educational activities carried out across Africa generated significant interaction over a wide geographical area. Activities organized in diverse fields, ranging from art festivals and gastronomy events to the promotion of traditional arts and educational programs for children, reached a large number of participants.

Through these activities, various elements of Turkish culture were shared with African societies which boosted cultural interaction and understanding. Especially events targeting children and young people contributed to establishing long-term cultural ties. Bringing together art, music, and gastronomy, these activities produced significant gains in terms of cultural diplomacy and contributed to the development of cultural relations between Türkiye and African countries.



2025 Activities of the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation in Africa

14

TRT

1. Introduction

Türkiye's strategic partnership with Africa, which is deepening with each passing day, and within the framework of the *Africa Partnership Policy*, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) continued its broadcasting and communication activities directed toward the Continent with increasing momentum throughout 2025. TRT's broadcasting vision is aimed at taking the lead in the media sector in the effort to build a fairer global system. In this regard, TRT has adopted a broadcasting approach that places the Continent's young population, dynamism, and rich culture at the center, reflecting Türkiye's constructive and friendly approach in the media sector.

In line with the "Afrika, as it is" vision, the Continent's true stories that have not been adequately told to date, its cultural depth, and its local voices are being conveyed to global audiences in the most accurate manner possible. Through multilayered activities, ranging from news broadcasting to high-quality documentary productions, digital platforms, and international capacity-building training programs, TRT is positioned not only as a broadcaster in the Continent but also as a strategic communications stakeholder. Its multilingual broadcasting network in English, French, Hausa, and Swahili, along with its strong reach across digital media, is a tangible indicator of



TRT World conducted an exclusive interview with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

TRT's credibility throughout Africa. At the same time, training programs for media professionals and the expansion of digital platforms such as *tabii* into the region have been critical steps reinforcing Türkiye's cultural diplomacy objectives.

This study presents a cross-section of TRT's major Africa-focused activities in 2025, including television and radio broadcasting, digital news platforms, content licensing, and institutional cooperation, and examines the strategic outcomes of our institutional presence on the Continent.

2. News Broadcasts to Africa

2.1. TRT Afrika Digital News Platform

Established as part of TRT's objectives to increase its broadcasting in foreign languages and its international impact, and launched on March 31, 2023, TRT Afrika closely follows developments in different regions of the Continent through dynamic and innovative approaches to news broadcasting. Accord-

ingly, in addition to becoming a reliable source of news in Africa, TRT Afrika brings important stories concerning the countries of the Continent to the forefront and connects local issues with broad audiences. In line with its founding mission, and unlike Western media organizations, TRT Afrika conducts digital broadcasting activities under the slogan "Afrika, as it is" as a reflection of Türkiye's constructive and positive approach toward the countries of the Continent in the media sector, producing content in a total of four languages: English, French, Hausa, and Swahili.

In 2025, TRT Afrika followed major developments in the world and across Africa in real time with great diligence and determination, bringing them to its followers as they unfolded. While keeping its finger on the pulse of the Continent, TRT Afrika also plays an important role in presenting Africa's true image to the world. With its people-centered approach, TRT Afrika has taken a leading role in transforming negative media discourse on sensitive issues such as racism, colonialism, and discrimination. In line with this vision, the Continent's true history, deep-rooted culture, and natural wealth are presented to global public opinion through opinion pieces, interactive content, and documentaries. As part of its digital broadcasting activities during this period, TRT Afrika rapidly grew to reach an exceptionally broad audience and became one of the Continent's leading news sources. The total number of followers across TRT Afrika's four digital channels reached 13.8 million by the end of 2025.

Offering the broadest range of news coverage and the highest level of engagement within TRT Afrika, *TRT Afrika English* reached 4.1 million followers by the end of 2025.

TRT Africa's second channel broadcasting in an international language, *TRT Afrika Français*, focuses particularly on developments in Africa's French-speaking regions. Giving significant coverage in its editorial policies to Africans opposing neocolonialism in the Sahel region and to issues concerning media manipulation, *TRT Afrika Français* reached 3.9 million followers by the end of 2025.

Amplifying the voices of Hausa communities in West Africa across the globe, and one of the few media organizations broadcasting in the local language, *TRT Afrika Hausa* reached 3.9 million followers by the end of 2025.

Aiming to convey the voices of communities in the Swahili language, spoken by approximately 170 million people in East Africa, to international audi-

ences, and being one of the few media organizations broadcasting in the local language, *TRT Africa Swahili* reached 1.8 million followers by the end of 2025.

2.2. TRT Arabi Digital News Platform

TRT Arabi Digital provides international audiences with a comprehensive perspective on Arab-speaking countries in the Continent, such as Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, by addressing the agenda not solely through the lens of crises but also in terms of their social structures, economic transformation, cultural heritage, and political developments.

Through freelance correspondents in these regions, *TRT Arabi Digital* delivers news, human stories, and developments directly from the field to audiences around the world, while also bringing the Continent's development projects, progress in education, technological initiatives, and cultural production to global public opinion.

2.3. TRT Français Digital News Platform

TRT Français is an international digital news platform that covers the political, economic, social, and cultural issues of European states such as France and Belgium, as well as Francophone countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon, through original content. Reaching an audience of more than 320 million people, including audiences in the said African countries, TRT Français produces content highlighting Africa's diverse achievements. At the same time, TRT Français publishes news reports, videos, and special documentaries on the responses and struggles of countries in the region against neocolonial efforts on the Continent.

2.4. TRT World Digital News Platform

TRT World brings human stories, as well as human rights violations, atrocities, and genocides taking place in African countries that do not receive sufficient visibility in the international mainstream media or are often ignored, to audiences around the world through verified content from the field. In addition, while the global agenda is brought to the Continent through mobile-focused broadcasting strategies, short- and long-form videos and interactive storytelling content produced for social media platforms are also presented to followers.



TRT World conveys developments from across the continent to the world through its weekly "Africa Matters" program.

Digital broadcasting activities for audiences on the Continent are carried out through a multilingual and cross-platform strategy that addresses breaking developments within local dynamics, takes into account the media consumption habits of the youth, and prioritizes reaching global audiences. TRT World also produces news reports covering current developments in Africa and Türkiye's important activities on the Continent.

2.5. TRT World Television

In the face of increasing geopolitical tensions, misinformation, and global media polarization in 2025, TRT World continued its international journalism with a view of public responsibility, reporting developments and providing context to events, presenting different perspectives, and questioning dominant narratives. In line with this perspective, it carried out broadcasting and activities for African audiences with the same editorial perspective. The Africa desk within TRT World has been in operation since the channel was launched, where 28 African citizens are currently employed. Developments from the Continent are reported in real time by approximately 60 journalists working in more than 30 countries across Africa. In 2025, TRT World's news

bulletins featured 368 news packages from Africa, and 329 live broadcasts were conducted.

Throughout 2025, reports covered ongoing conflicts in Africa, particularly in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; elections in different countries, some of which led to significant changes; regional summits addressing political and economic issues; and stories highlighting the cultures of different countries across the Continent.

Last year, two special documentaries on Africa were produced, and 11 special interviews were also conducted with African leaders on current issues.

In addition to reporting all developments from the Continent in real time, TRT World offers its viewers a weekly special program dedicated exclusively to Africa, *Africa Matters*, which reaches global audiences each week from a different location on the Continent. The program has been on air since 2020, and in 2025, 52 episodes addressing current issues were broadcast, featuring 60 guests.

2.6. TRT Arabi Television

TRT Arabi supports Africa's struggle for independence, its right to self-determination, and its efforts to make its truth heard by global public opinion. Through documentaries, analyses, and special interviews focusing on the Continent's social, economic, cultural, and political structure, it aims to convey the realities of Africa to broader audiences.

Journalists stationed in critical countries, particularly Somalia, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, South Africa, and Ethiopia, report on the developments on the ground firsthand. Cooperation with local media professionals enables Africa to tell its own story in its own voice. Ensuring that the Continent is represented from the perspective of its own people, rather than through the perspectives of others, is adopted as a fundamental principle.

2.7. TRT Voice of Türkiye Broadcasts

TRT Voice of Türkiye Radio conducts radio broadcasts to African countries in Arabic, French, English, Hausa, and Swahili via shortwave, the internet, and satellite.

Following the launch of radio broadcasts in Hausa and Swahili via satellite and the internet in 2015, shortwave radio broadcasts were also launched in 2017 on two new frequencies in order to reach more people in the target geography. While news bulletins, press summaries, programming blocks, and music broadcasts are included in radio broadcasts in these languages, commentary and analysis on regional developments, originally produced in Turkish, are also translated into the relevant languages and broadcast.

Our radio broadcasts have also featured special content on the announcement and promotion of the activities of institutions such as TİKA, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, and the Yunus Emre Institute in the region.

3. *tabii*: International Digital Platform

TRT's first international digital platform, *tabii*, launched to respond to changing audience habits and make international interest in local productions sustainable, began broadcasting in four African countries – Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia – as of January 23, 2025. By combining universal themes with narratives rooted in cultural and social values, the platform aims to offer viewers strong and cohesive storytelling worlds through original productions localized in English and Arabic and a global content catalog of more than 3,000 hours in total.

tabii is positioned as a platform that strengthens Türkiye's cultural representation in Africa and increases engagement through digital content. While presenting Türkiye's lifestyle, family structure, and social values to African audiences through Turkish series, historical narratives, and social stories, it supports a discourse of cultural affinity through content that references historical Türkiye-Ottoman-Africa relations and shared civilizational ties. In line with TRT's public broadcasting approach, the platform aims to offer an alternative narrative to a one-way flow of content as part of Türkiye's international cultural diplomacy.

4. Strategic Media Summits and Events Concerning Africa

TRT is pursuing strategic initiatives that expand its sphere of influence and deepen cooperation with international stakeholders in line with its vision of strengthening its global position in the media and broadcasting sector. In

this context, through media summits and thematic events concerning Africa, it strengthens regional communication networks and increases multilateral engagement by providing visibility to priority issues on the Continent and relevant stakeholders on international platforms.

4.1. TRT World Forum 2025

TRT World Forum, as an international dialogue platform addressing global issues, places particular importance on Africa and considers the political, humanitarian, and economic developments facing the Continent among its priority areas of focus. In line with a multidimensional perspective, a roundtable discussion was held with experts focusing on Africa as part of the 2025 event.

At the aforementioned session held at the *TRT World Forum 2025*, the dynamics of conflict and reconciliation in East Africa were examined comprehensively. Extensive discussions covered the humanitarian crisis in Sudan and the regional repercussions of conflicts, the lasting effects of the civil war in Ethiopia, the state-building process in Somalia, and the fragile peace environment in South Sudan.

The session also addressed the importance of regional ownership, the mediation capacity of regional mechanisms, particularly the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the role of the United Nations; attention was drawn to the responsibilities of the international community under international humanitarian law. Türkiye's diplomatic, humanitarian, and development-oriented engagements and their contribution to regional efforts to achieve peace and stability were also among the issues discussed. The session enabled issues concerning Africa to be evaluated holistically, beyond their security dimension, through the perspectives of governance, humanitarian assistance, development, and public diplomacy.

4.2. TRT World Citizen Awards

With a view to upholding the principle of social awareness, the founding purpose of the TRT World Citizen brand, awards are presented each year to individuals whose work draws attention to global problems, seeks solutions, and aims to raise awareness in relevant areas. The awards, first presented in 2018, are given in the categories of Communicator, Youth, Educator, Accessibility, TRT Special Award, World Citizen of the Year, and Lifetime Achievement.

At the ceremony in 2025, Nigerian youth climate activist and "Preserve Our Roots" founder Amara Nwuneli received the award in the "Youth" category. Amara Nwuneli is a young climate activist and the founder of "Preserve Our Roots", a youth-led initiative working on climate change, inequality, and environmental justice. Growing up in Nigeria, Nwuneli witnessed firsthand the impact of weather events on vulnerable communities. This experience inspired her to advocate for youth-led climate action grounded in local needs.

5. International Training, Research, and Broadcasting Activities Conducted with Organizations in Africa

TRT, which shares knowhow and experience in the fields of media, broadcasting, and communications through engagement with international media organizations, contributes to sustainable institutional development through training and capacity-building programs held in cooperation with organizations in Africa. These activities, carried out in various areas, particularly television and radio broadcasting, news production, and digital media, support the strengthening of local media ecosystems and the development of qualified human resources.

5.1. Corporate Training Activities

The "Digital Media Broadcasting: News, Content Production, and Social Media Strategy Training Program," attended by a total of 15 media professionals from organizations that are members of the Permanent Conference of Mediterranean Audiovisual Operators (COPEAM), including Algeria's EPTV and Algeria's EPRS, was held at TRT General Directorate on January 30-31, 2025, with two media professionals participating from Algeria. The training program addressed content production in line with changing trends, journalism practices suitable for digital media, content production processes and target audience identification, news production for different social media platforms, content and engagement strategies, video editing (CapCut/Premiere Pro), and infographic content production (Canva), providing participants with both theoretical and practical skills.

A total of 19 media professionals from Mozambique and Nigeria participated in the "Social Media and Digital Media Journalism Training Program," in which news formats in digital media, content production in digital media, social media journalism, combating disinformation and new threats, social

media strategies and digital storytelling, and mobile journalism (MOJO) were comprehensively addressed, helping to increase participants' knowledge and skill levels in digital journalism.

5.2. Journalism for Juniors by TRT

Within the scope of the *Journalism for Juniors* project, a social awareness initiative based on TRT's people-centered approach to news broadcasting with a focus on resolving global humanitarian issues, developing a culture of coexistence, and enabling young people to adapt to the digital age and produce and consume digital content appropriately, two mobile journalism training workshops were held in Tunisia in 2025. Three TRT media professionals served as trainers, reaching a total of 60 students.

6. Cooperation Protocols and Memoranda of Understanding with African Organizations

In line with its objectives of increasing its effectiveness internationally in the fields of media, broadcasting, and communications, while also strengthening its comprehensive communications network and ensuring its sustainability, TRT has concluded cooperation protocols and memoranda of understanding with organizations based in Africa in various areas. Accordingly, as of 2025, TRT has cooperation protocols and memoranda of understanding that it has signed with more than 20 institutions and organizations from approximately 20 different African countries and that remain in effect.


7. Circulation of TRT Productions Across the Continent

Through licensing agreements concluded with broadcasters in Africa, TRT's television series and film productions are reaching increasingly wider audiences across the Continent and, through universal themes such as justice, family, solidarity, and social values, are bolstering intercultural engagement and Türkiye's capacity for cultural diplomacy. In this context, TRT content licensed in 2025 for broadcasting in 17 different languages, including English, French, and Swahili, makes a significant contribution to the development of cultural ties and mutual understanding between Türkiye and African countries.

8. Conclusion

The activities carried out throughout 2025 have demonstrated that TRT's approach for African audiences has evolved beyond broadcasting into a multi-dimensional and strategic communications partnership. Reaching broad segments of the Continent through multilingual broadcasting across television, radio, and digital media, TRT has adopted a constructive broadcasting perspective in line with its "Afrika, as it is" approach, portraying Africa not only with its challenges but also highlighting is young population, cultural assets, and potential.

In addition to its broadcasting activities, TRT has reinforced its presence across the Continent through content licensing, strategic partnerships, media summits, and training programs, thereby contributing to the development of regional media capacity through sustainable partnerships established with African stakeholders. This comprehensive approach has both translated Türkiye's constructive vision for Africa into concrete action in the media sector and has underpinned a strong strategy enhancing regional cooperation, multilateral engagement, and Africa's visibility in the international media landscape.



Humanitarian Diplomacy Activities of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency in Africa in 2025

15

Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency

1. Introduction

The year 2025 stood out as a period during which multidimensional humanitarian crises deepened across Africa. Natural disasters, such as floods and droughts intensified by climate change, ongoing armed conflicts, forced migration movements, and fragile state structures contributed to growing humanitarian needs in many African countries. Developments in particular in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and the Horn of Africa demonstrated that humanitarian assistance mechanisms are of strategic importance not only for meeting urgent needs but also for supporting regional stability.

In line with its understanding of equal partnership with Africa, Türkiye continued its humanitarian diplomacy activities throughout 2025, taking significant steps to identify needs on the ground, strengthen coordination with local authorities, and maintain rapid response capacity. The activities carried out by the Presidency, in cooperation with relevant public institutions, Türkiye's diplomatic missions in Africa, and international organizations, not only contributed to addressing urgent humanitarian needs but also reinforced Türkiye's identity as a reliable and sustainable development partner on the continent. In this context, the humanitarian assistance activities carried out throughout 2025 in Botswana, Burundi, South Sudan, Somaliland, and Sudan, as discussed in this article, provide concrete evidence of Türkiye's capacity for rapid crisis response and its people-centered foreign policy approach.



AFAD sent 30,000 tents to Sudan in cooperation with the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM). (Source: Anadolu Agency)

2. Humanitarian Assistance Activities in 2025

2.1. Botswana

In 2025, heavy rainfall and flooding across many parts of Botswana, particularly in the capital, Gaborone, resulted in fatalities and caused damage to

numerous buildings, vehicles, and infrastructure. The authorities of Botswana reported that several dams, including the Gaborone Dam, had reached full capacity, creating a risk of flooding that could lead to further loss of life and property in settlements located downstream. Accordingly, they requested food, blankets, drinking water, and temporary shelter materials from the international community.

Within this framework, under the coordination of our Embassy in Gaborone, 50 stretcher beds, 23 generators, 25 gas stoves, 50 sleeping bags, 50 gas heaters, 50 gas cylinders, and 25 tents were procured locally and delivered to disaster victims. The assistance provided contributed to meeting urgent humanitarian needs in the aftermath of the disaster and demonstrated Türkiye's capacity for rapid response to natural disasters.

2.2. Burundi

As a result of the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC throughout 2025, approximately 30,000–35,000 people were forced to seek refuge in Burundi, significantly increasing the country's humanitarian burden. The Burundian authorities and the United Nations issued an emergency appeal for assistance to refugees, emphasizing the urgent need for essential living supplies.

Within this framework, financial resources were transferred through our Embassy in Bujumbura to enable the local procurement of the required humanitarian assistance materials. As part of this support, aid packages consisting of beds and food parcels were delivered to 200 refugee families. This initiative contributed to meeting the basic needs of families affected by forced displacement while also reflecting Türkiye's approach of solidarity in responding to regional humanitarian crises.

2.3. South Sudan

The Secretariat of the Islamic Council of the Republic of South Sudan planned to distribute food parcels to 10,000 families, provide clothing assistance to 1,000 families during the month of Ramadan, and serve hot meals to approximately 50,000 people in iftar tents. It reported that funding amounting to US$ 920,080 was required to implement these activities.

Within this framework, US$ 20,000 was transferred through our Embassy in Juba for use in the procurement of humanitarian assistance materials. The support provided contributed to meeting the basic needs of vulnerable groups during the Ramadan period and became one of the significant examples reflecting Türkiye's understanding of social solidarity and humanitarian diplomacy in practice.

2.4. Somaliland

At the end of 2024, due to the conflicts in the region, it was reported that a large number of people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, prompting the Somaliland authorities to appeal to the international community for support. Assessments conducted by our Consulate General in Hargeisa identified an urgent need for humanitarian assistance materials, particularly blankets, drinking water, and basic food supplies. Accordingly, financial resources were transferred to facilitate the local procurement of humanitarian assistance materials.

Meanwhile, Somaliland experienced one of the most severe droughts in recent years, with approximately 120,000 families facing serious difficulties in accessing food. It was reported that the humanitarian situation had reached a critical level, particularly in the Awdal, Sahil, Selel, and Sanaag regions. As the capacity of local institutions proved insufficient to manage the crisis, the Somaliland authorities requested food assistance from Türkiye. Within this framework, financial resources were transferred through our Consulate General in Hargeisa for the procurement of humanitarian aid supplies consisting of flour, rice, and cooking oil. In doing so, Türkiye contributed to addressing humanitarian needs in Somaliland, where conflict- and climate-induced crises were occurring simultaneously.

2.5. Sudan

Following the attack by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on fuel storage facilities in Port Sudan on May 5, 2025, which triggered a fire that remained out of control for an extended period, the Sudanese authorities requested urgent assistance from Türkiye. Within this framework, 50 fire hoses, 50 gas masks, and 50 firefighting suits procured by our Presidency were airlifted to Sudan.

In addition, a humanitarian assistance team assigned by our Presidency conducted field operations in Port Sudan to help meet the basic needs of civilians displaced by the ongoing conflict in the El Fasher area of Darfur State. A total of 1,500 food parcels procured locally were delivered to families in need across different areas.

The effects of the civil war that began in 2023 continued to intensify throughout 2025, making shelter one of the most critical components of the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. In addition to the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF, disasters such as floods and droughts forced millions of people to relocate either within the country or to neighboring countries.


Within this framework, a total of 30,000 tents were planned to be shipped to Sudan in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In the first phase, 10,080 tents were dispatched aboard the Ningbo on December 6, 2025; in the second phase, another 10,080 tents were shipped aboard the Senator on December 9, 2025; and in the third and final phase, 9,840 tents were sent from Mersin Port to Port Sudan on December 26, 2025. Accordingly, the shipment of all 30,000 tents was successfully completed. This operation stood out as one of the most comprehensive shelter support initiatives carried out by Türkiye in Africa in recent years, demonstrating both its humanitarian assistance capacity and its ability to coordinate effectively with international organizations.

3. Conclusion

The humanitarian assistance activities carried out across Africa in 2025 demonstrated that the simultaneous occurrence of natural disasters, armed conflicts, and forced migration movements in different parts of the continent significantly increased humanitarian needs. The activities conducted by the Presidency in coordination with diplomatic missions, relevant public institutions, and international organizations enabled the delivery of needs-based and rapid solutions in areas including disaster response, food security, shelter, refugee assistance, and emergency humanitarian aid.

In particular, the large-scale tent shipment to Sudan, the emergency assistance provided in response to the Port Sudan fire, and the interventions addressing the humanitarian crisis stemming from Darfur demonstrate that Türkiye has adopted an approach to humanitarian assistance that extends beyond short-term emergency relief and embraces sustainable humanitarian support. Similarly, the activities carried out in Botswana, Burundi, South Sudan, and Somaliland strengthened Türkiye's visibility and position as a reliable partner in the field of humanitarian diplomacy in Africa.

In conclusion, 2025 was a period during which Türkiye implemented its humanitarian assistance policies toward Africa in accordance with the principles of rapid response, effective coordination, and sensitivity to local needs. The activities carried out not only contributed to meeting the urgent needs of communities affected by crises but also strengthened the humanitarian dimension of Türkiye-Africa relations, emerging as an important complement to Türkiye's multidimensional partnership approach on the continent.



Chapter Three

Global and Regional Actors' Relations with Africa

1
Relations between the Turkic World and Africa in 2025 **305-310**
Fevzi Kırbaşoğlu

2
China-Africa Relations in 2025 **311-316**
Yavuz Çelik

3
India-Africa Relations in 2025 **317-322**
Emre Yürük

4
Japan-Africa Relations in 2025 **323-328**
Gökberk Durmaz | Acar Boray Bıldırcın

5
South Korea-Africa Relations in 2025 **329-334**
Ezgi Kılıçarslan Gül

6
Russia-Africa Relations in 2025 **335-342**
Burak Kolot

7
Indonesia-Africa Relations in 2025 **343-348**
Kamil Tarhan

8
BRICS-Africa Relations in 2025 **349-356**
Yücel Bulut

9
Brazil-Africa Relations in 2025 **357-362**
Segâh Tekin

10
France-Africa Relations in 2025 **363-368**
Halil Kaya

11
Germany-Africa Relations in 2025 **369-374**
Ahmet Bülbül


12
United Kingdom-Africa Relations in 2025 **375-380**
Mehmet Ali Mert | Gökhan Sırmalı

13
Italy-Africa Relations in 2025 **381-386**
Raşit Yenigün

14
United States of America-Africa Relations in 2025 **387-392**
Meysune Yaşar

15
Relations Between the Gulf Countries and Africa in 2025 **393-398**
Hamdullah Baycar

16
Israel-Africa Relations in 2025 **399-404**
Sevinç Ebru Temel



Relations between the Turkic World and Africa in 2025

1

Fevzi Kırbaşoğlu*

1. Introduction

In line with the expanding global vision of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the institutionalization of the Turkic World as a collective actor on the African continent has ushered regional relations into a new phase. As of 2025, these relations have evolved beyond trade volume and economic cooperation, acquiring a broader scope encompassing defense diplomacy, energy security, and multilateral institutional integration. This new stage has materialized through proactive security and mediation initiatives as well as the multilayered joint outreach of OTS member states toward the continent via the Turkic Investment Fund and logistics corridors.

This study analyzes the presence of the Turkic World in Africa in the context of the security architecture, energy geopolitics, and soft power elements, while evaluating the fundamental dynamics of this emerging model of cooperation.

In 2025, one of the principal dynamics of Türkiye's Africa policy was its proactive capacity for mediation and crisis management across the continent. The clearest manifestation of this was Ankara's assumption of a mediating role in the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, moving beyond the framework of conventional bilateral relations in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, in this process, the high-level

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contacts initiated through the Ankara Declaration of December 11, 2024, established a sustainable framework for dialogue between the parties through Türkiye's shuttle diplomacy and the technical negotiations held on February 18, 2025.[1]

This diplomatic role in crisis management was also integrated with energy diplomacy. Under the Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production Agreement signed on April 10, 2025, between the Turkish Petroleum Corporation and the Somali Petroleum Authority, it was announced that Türkiye would conduct exploration activities across three separate onshore blocks covering approximately 16,000 square kilometers.[2] In the maritime jurisdiction areas, following the completion of the Oruç Reis Seismic Research Vessel's operations, the first cross-border deep-sea drilling activities are planned to commence in early 2026.[3]

Türkiye's outreach was not confined to the Horn of Africa but also extended to West Africa and the Sahel. In particular, as a result of high-level diplomatic engagements with Niger in May and December 2025, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to establishing a long-term strategic energy partnership encompassing oil exploration, production, and technology transfer.[4]

Another critical component of the Türkiye-centered security architecture on the continent has taken shape within the geopolitics of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. The hydrocarbon trade agreement concluded on February 18, 2025, between the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Egypt was not recognized by Ankara and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. However, this diplomatic confrontation did not prevent the continuation of the institutional dialogue that Ankara had established with Cairo.[5] Indeed, the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council mechanism was maintained through meetings held on February 4 and November 12, 2025. Consequently, Türkiye has preserved its relations by managing the competition in the Eastern Mediterranean and the normalization process with Egypt through a policy of strategic balance.[6]

3. The Institutional Integration of the OTS and Kazakhstan's Multidimensional Outreach

As of 2025, the most notable turning point in Africa policy has been the integration of the Africa outreach into the OTS's multilateral institutional mechanisms, rather than limiting it to a network of bilateral relations. Defined in the

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kolaylaştırıcılığıyla Etiyopya Federal Demokratik Cumhuriyeti ve Somali Federal Cumhuriyeti'nin Ankara Bildirisi", 11.12.2024,* https://www.kisa.link/Uzrdx, Access Date: 15.03.2026.;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "Ankara Süreci kapsamında Somali ve Etiyopya arasında gerçekleştirilen teknik müzakerelerin ilk turuna ilişkin açıklama", 18.02.2025, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/somali-ve-etiyopya-arasinda-gerceklestirilen-teknik-muzakerelerin-ilk-turuna-iliskin-aciklama-18-02-2025.tr.mfa, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

2 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Türkiye, "Türkiye, Somali'nin kara sahalarında da petrol ve doğal gaz arayacak", 10.04.2025, https://enerji.gov.tr/haber-detay?id=21480, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

3 Gülşen Çağatay, "Türkiye nisanda Karadeniz ve Somali'de hidrokarbon arama ve sondaj çalışmalarını hızlandıracak", Anadolu Agency, 30.03.2026, https://www.kisa.link/EvNca, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

4 Başak Erkalan, "Bakan Bayraktar, Nijer Petrol Bakanı ile enerjide işbirliği imkanlarını görüştü", Anadolu Agency, 30.05.2025, https://www.kisa.link/yLegq, Access Date: 15.03.2026.;
Gülşen Çağatay, "Bakan Bayraktar, Nijer Maden Bakanı ile görüştü", Anadolu Agency, 01.05.2025, https://www.kisa.link/RwZnD, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

5 Reuters, "Eni signs deal to bring Cypriot offshore gas to Europe, via Egypt", 17.02.2025, https://www.kisa.link/ayICS, Access Date: 15.03.2026.;
Mehmet Kemal Firik, "KKTC'den GKRY ile Mısır arasında imzalanan hidrokarbon ticareti anlaşmasına tepki", Anadolu Agency, 18.02.2025, https://www.kisa.link/CuuCR, Access Date: 15.03.2026.;
TRT Haber, "MSB kaynakları: GKRY, KKTC'nin haklarını gasp etme siyasetine devam ediyor", 20.02.2025, https://www.kisa.link/KinMB, Access Date: 15.03.2025.



Kazakhstan's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Murat Nurtleu met with Benin's Minister of Foreign Affairs Olushegun Adjadi Bakari, who was on a working visit to Astana, on April 18, 2025. (Source: Kazakhstan and Benin Foreign Ministers Agree to Enhance Bilateral Relations)

OTS's official documents as an instrument for promoting economic integration, encouraging foreign investment, and supporting development projects, the Turkic Investment Fund[7] constitutes the strategic financing pillar of this period. In addition, TurkIPAnet (the Turkic Investment Promotion Network), established in Tashkent on June 12, 2025, institutionalized a framework enabling member states to develop joint projects in target continents.[8] This institutional architecture was formally recognized as an investment and innovation mechanism in the 2025 Gabala Declaration.[9]

The multilateral vision centered on the OTS has been translated into concrete commercial and logistics projects within Kazakhstan's Africa outreach. Having reached a trade volume exceeding US$ 700 million with Africa by 2024, the As-

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "*Joint Statement Between the Foreign Ministers of Türkiye and Egypt", 04.02.2025,* https://www.kisa.link/HASaM, Access Date: 15.03.2026.;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "*Türkiye ve Mısır Dışişleri Bakanlarının Ortak Bildirisi", 12.11.2025,* https://www.kisa.link/Spehu Access Date: 15.03.2026.

7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, "*Bishkek declaration of Eleventh Summit of Organization of Turkic States", 06.11.2024,* https://www.kisa.link/CGvSN, *Access Date: 25.03.2026.*

8 Organization of Turkic States, "*Meeting of heads of investment promotion agencies of Turkic States was convened in Tashkent", 12.06.2025,* https://www.kisa.link/AqggS, *Access Date: 25.03.2026.*

9 Organization of Turkic States, "*Gabala declaration of Twelfth Summit of the Organization of Turkic States", 07.10.2025,* https://turkicstates.org/u/gabala-declaration-.pdf, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

tana administration advanced this process to the stage of physical integration in 2025 through the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Benin. The most tangible outcome of the talks was the integration of supply chains. In this context, efforts were launched to physically connect the Port of Cotonou (Benin), one of West Africa's key trade gateways, with the Middle Corridor route, in which Kazakhstan occupies a central position.[10]

Kazakhstan's strategic vision also demonstrates thematic diversity. During the diplomatic meeting held with the Ambassador of Seychelles on August 22, 2025, the parties explored next-generation cooperation opportunities in areas such as tourism, sustainable development, and environmental protection, thereby taking the initial steps toward a structural partnership.[11]

Another pillar of the OTS's vision for Africa is economic diplomacy, which has materialized in the field of food security. By transforming its record grain harvest of 27.1 million tons in 2025 into a strategic foreign policy instrument, Kazakhstan designated North Africa as a target market. Indeed, the shipment of 390,000 tons of wheat to Algeria, valued at more than US$ 100 million, demonstrated the Turkic states' capacity to integrate its presence on the continent into Africa's critical food supply chains.[12]

4. Soft Power and Hybrid Strategies within the OTS Ecosystem: The Roles of Hungary and Azerbaijan

The OTS's visibility in Africa has expanded into the fields of environmental diplomacy and socio-cultural engagement through the activities of Hungary, an observer state of the organization. As of 2025, Hungary has exhibited a hybrid foreign policy profile on the continent by simultaneously mobilizing infrastructure development, security, and education initiatives. The economic dimension of this hybrid strategy has materialized through the industrial partnership established with Egypt. The order for railway vehicles worth EUR 1.1 billion placed by Egypt with a Hungarian manufacturer in February 2025 represented a strategic supply chain initiative.[13] This infrastructure diplomacy was further expanded to include an environmental dimension when renewable energy and tourism investments in Egypt's Aswan Governorate were brought to the agenda in April 2025.[14] Meanwhile, the comprehensive Hungarian mission in Chad, focusing on healthcare, agriculture, and regional stability, constitutes a structural contribution to the continent's internal dynamics.[15]

10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Kazakhstan and Benin foreign ministers agree to enhance cooperation", 18.04.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/eBuJY, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Kazakhstan and Seychelles expand horizons of cooperation", 22.08.2025,
https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa-addis-ababa/press/news/details/1055715?lang=en, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, "Kazakhstan exported 390 thousand tons of wheat to Algeria", 30.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OuQHq, Access Date: 25.03.2026.;
Meiramgul Kussainova, "Kazakistan, bu yıl tahıl hasadı en yüksek seviyesine ulaştı", Anadolu Agency, 04.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/EGEUC, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

13 About Hungary, "FM: Hungary-Egypt industrial cooperation is worth hundreds of billions of forints", 11.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/JrrWj, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

14 About Hungary, "House Speaker meets Governor of Aswan in Egypt", 30.04.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/QbgHg, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

15 About Hungary, "Azbej: Hungary Helps mission in Chad saves lives and supports the country's stability", 05.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/udHTe, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

The principal socio-cultural complement to these structural and economic investments on the ground has been educational diplomacy. The Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship program, the most institutionalized soft power instrument of Hungary's hybrid strategy, has established a strategic network encompassing countries from different regions of the continent, including Morocco, Seychelles, Chad, Kenya, and South Africa. The program's ultimate objective is to create lasting social, political, and economic ties among countries through its alumni networks.[16]

Another actor reinforcing the visibility of the OTS ecosystem on the continent is Azerbaijan, whose diplomatic presence as of 2025 has been shaped through environmental diplomacy and its representation in multilateral platforms. For the first time in its history, the Baku administration was elected to the Bureau Presidency of the United Nations Environment Programme Committee of Permanent Representatives, thereby assuming a strategic responsibility in global environmental governance for the 2025-2027 period.[17] As a concrete reflection of this vision pursued in Nairobi – the hub of Africa's environmental policymaking – , Azerbaijan's Ambassador to Kenya presided over the 172nd meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives on November 24, 2025.[18] This role demonstrates that Baku has institutionalized its diplomatic influence on the continent through ecological initiatives.


5. Conclusion

In 2025, relations between the Turkic World and Africa evolved into an institutionalized partnership rather than a conjunctural rapprochement. Türkiye's proactive diplomacy centered on energy and security in critical regions such as Somalia and Niger, combined with the initiatives of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Hungary spanning the integration of logistics corridors, food security, infrastructure development, and environmental diplomacy, has strengthened the OTS's operational capacity. The financial and technical mechanisms established under the auspices of the organization demonstrate that relations with Africa have evolved beyond individual state initiatives into a collective and multilayered Turkic model.

16 Stipendium Hungaricum, "Sending Partners and Available Study Programmes", n.d., https://stipendiumhungaricum.hu/partners, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

17 The Azerbaijan State News Agency, "Azerbaijan elected as chair of UNEP CPR Bureau", 24.06.2025, https://www.kisa.link/IHqCn, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

18 UN Environment Programme, "172nd meeting of Committee of Permanent Representatives", 24.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/nBAWx, Access Date: 25.03.2026.



China-Africa Relations in 2025

2

Yavuz Çelik*

1. Introduction

China-Africa relations have evolved throughout the twenty-first century into a multidimensional framework characterized by increasingly deep economic, political, and diplomatic engagement. These relations have extended beyond trade alone through direct investment, financial flows, and institutional cooperation mechanisms. In particular, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has played a significant role in the institutionalization of this process.[1] While China's growing demand for raw materials, its search for new markets, and its global outreach strategy have shaped this orientation, African countries have regarded China as an alternative and complementary partner to Western actors.[2]

Rather than marking a period of major new large-scale initiatives in China-Africa relations, 2025 stands out as a year in which the decisions adopted at the 2024 *FOCAC Beijing Summit* were put into practice.[3] In this context, the period may be regarded as a transitional year characterized less by abrupt shifts than by the continuation of existing areas of cooperation and the emergence of efforts to recalibrate relations in certain fields.[4] During this process, African countries have not acted as passive actors. On the contrary, they have become actors that strategically manage their relations with China in line with their priorities of industrialization, infrastructure development, and economic growth.[5] Accordingly, this article examines the developments recorded in China-Africa relations during 2025.

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1 Abebe Aemro Selassie et al., *Africa-China Linkages: Building Deeper and Broader Connections*, International Monetary Fund (IMF), 09.07.2025.

2 Miria A. Pigato and Wenxia Tang, *China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an Evolving Global Context*, Washington DC: World Bank Group, 01.03.2015, https://www.kisa.link/iBVsd.

3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's Regular Press Conference on January 3, 2025," 03.01.2025, https://www.kisa.link/ufBmH Access Date: 06.03.2026.

4 Deborah Brautigam, "Integrating China into Multilateral Debt Relief: Progress and Problems in the G20 DSSI," China Africa Research Initiative (SAIS-CARI), 03.04.2023, https://www.kisa.link/vUuSH, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

5 Messay Mulugeta, "Africa in the Global South's Future Development Trajectory: The Role of Africa-China Relations," *Asian Review of Political Economy*, 2025, 4:21.



The Ministerial Meeting of Coordinators on the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in China on June 11, 2025. (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China)

2. Diplomatic Continuity and Policy Framework

As of 2025, the continuity of diplomatic engagement has remained a notable feature of China-Africa relations. As a long-standing tradition in Chinese foreign policy, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs makes the first official overseas visits of each year to Africa. The continuation of this practice in 2025 once again demonstrates Africa's priority status in Chinese foreign policy.[6] At the same time, these diplomatic engagements are not merely symbolic. Rather, they serve as a strategic instrument through which China institutionalizes and ensures the continuity of its relations with Africa.[7]

The visit to Africa by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the beginning of 2025 stands out as a concrete step toward implementing the decisions adopted at the 2024 *FOCAC Beijing Summit*.[8] Within this framework, development cooperation, infrastructure projects, and the deepening of economic relations ranked among the principal agenda items of the meetings.[9] At the same time, this process reflects China's efforts to place its cooperation with Africa within a more systematic policy framework.

Indeed, policy proposals put forward by China during 2025 identify trade liberalization, support for industrialization, agricultural modernization, human resource development, and the strengthening of multilateral cooperation as priority areas.[10] This demonstrates that China-Africa relations are not confined solely to diplomatic engagement. At the same time, it indicates that they are evolving toward an institutional framework of cooperation shaped by long-term strategic objectives.

6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, op. cit.

7 Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah and Christian Kaunert, "China Is Reshaping Global Power Dynamics Through Diplomatic Ritual," *LSE Blogs*, 06.08.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/GpqqO, Access Date: 02.04.2026.

8 MFA, op. cit.

9 Paul Nantulya, "What to Expect from Africa-China Relations in 2025," Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 07.01.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/jmhuc, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

10 "Wang Yi Puts Forward China's Five-Point Proposal to Promote High-Quality Development of China-Africa Cooperation," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, 11.06.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/AXVOc

3. Trade, Investment and Infrastructure

As of 2025, China-Africa trade relations have maintained their high volume while expanding in certain areas. Trade volume between the two sides reached a record US$ 295.6 billion in 2024 and continued to increase on a year-on-year basis during the first quarter of 2025. During this period, particular attention has been drawn to China's expansion of its zero-tariff policy for African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations and to the measures taken to facilitate African products' access to the Chinese market. In addition, technical regulations and cooperation mechanisms have been developed to increase exports of African products to China, particularly agricultural goods.[11] These developments indicate that China–Africa trade relations are undergoing not only quantitative expansion but also structural transformation.

This trend is also closely linked to geopolitical developments in global trade. In particular, following the United States' adoption of protectionist trade policies toward African countries, the continent has demonstrated a marked shift in its trade orientation toward China. During this period, China's exports to Africa, especially industrial products such as machinery and automobiles, have increased rapidly.[12] In this context, China's implementation of a zero-tariff policy covering imports from 53 African countries as of 2025 demonstrates that trade relations are not only expanding in volume but are also beginning to evolve toward a more balanced and export-oriented structure.[13]

As of 2025, cooperation in the fields of industry and investment has continued to strengthen within China-Africa economic relations. In particular, increasing local production capacity, developing value chains, and supporting industrialization in Africa have emerged as priority areas. In this regard, one of the principal constraints on sustainable growth in China-Africa trade relations is the insufficient development of the export capacity and competitiveness of African countries. Consequently, industrialization, value-added production, and the expansion of productive capacity are of critical importance for the future of cooperation between the two sides.[14] The continued investments of Chinese companies in Africa and the implementation of new investment projects indicate that economic ties between the two sides are acquiring a more structural character. This trend is also supported by tangible investments. In particular, during 2025, Chinese companies signed multibillion-dollar agreements in Egypt and several other African countries in the fields of electric vehicle manufacturing, energy, and logistics. These projects stand out as significant steps toward increasing local production capacity.[15]

Within this framework, infrastructure and connectivity projects continue to constitute one of the fundamental pillars of China-Africa relations. As of 2025, China has continued its investments in Africa's transportation and logistics

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "List of the Outcomes of the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation," 11.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/ooStq, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

12 Bloomberght, "Afrika ticarette yüzünü ABD'den Çin'e dönüyor," 27.08.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/vTVAQ, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

13 Stephen Ndegwa, "Sino-African trade links to benefit from market access," *China Daily Global*, 16.04.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/XTQvO

14 Arkrbe Oqubay, "China, Africa Relations: Building Sustainable Global South Partnerships," Sunday Independent, 23.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/DJIzT, Access Date: 05.04.2026.

15 Nathan Schoonover, "China in Africa: May 2025," Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 19.08.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/BUgVm, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

networks. Railway, port, and air transportation projects play an important role in facilitating trade. This process contributes to achieving stronger alignment between China's *Belt and Road Initiative* and Africa's development objectives.[16] Furthermore, financing provided by Chinese financial institutions for large-scale infrastructure projects in Africa has strengthened the institutional character of cooperation in this field.[17]

4. Cooperation in Agriculture, Technology and Development

In 2025, China-Africa economic relations were observed to extend beyond the general domains of trade and infrastructure, encompassing more specific areas such as agricultural modernization and technology transfer. The China-Africa Forum on Agricultural Science, Technology and Industrial Cooperation, held in Nairobi in June 2025, provides a concrete example of this trend. During the forum, agricultural modernization was emphasized as one of the priority areas of the China-Africa partnership. The development of agricultural technology and value chains emerged as among the key topics of discussion. Furthermore, China's announcements regarding the expansion of its zero-tariff policy for the 53 African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations are regarded as a significant development, particularly in terms of improving the access of agricultural products originating from Africa to the Chinese market.[18]

In 2025, China-Africa relations were observed to expand not only at the interstate level but also at the local and regional levels. The China-Africa Economic, Trade and Cultural Cooperation Forum, held in the city of Jinhua in Zhejiang Province in November 2025, served as a concrete example of this trend. As part of the forum, numerous events were organized in the fields of trade, agriculture, the digital economy, and cultural interaction. Communication between representatives from African countries and Chinese institutions took place on multiple levels. In particular, the increase in Jinhua's trade volume with Africa and the growing visibility of African products in the Chinese market demonstrate that China-Africa relations have also deepened at the local level.[19] Such initiatives indicate that relations between the two sides are developing not only through central governments but also through local actors.

In parallel with these developments, China's development assistance to Africa continued in a diversified manner throughout 2025. Within this framework, programs covering numerous countries were implemented, particularly in the areas of health and education. In the health sector, activities such as hospital construction, the provision of medical equipment, and the training of healthcare personnel were especially prominent, while cooperation in combating infectious diseases, along with support for medicines and vaccines and technical training programs, strengthened the humanitarian dimension of cooperation between the two sides.[20]

16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "List of the Outcomes of the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation," 11.06.2025, https://www.kisa.link/ooStq, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

17 Schoonover, op. cit.

18 Chinese Embassy in Kenya, "Chinese Ambassador to Kenya Guo Haiyan Attends 2025 Africa-China Forum on Agri-tech and Industrial Cooperation," 25.06.2025, https://www.kisa.link/FeMbN, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

19 China-Africa Cooperation Forum, "China-Africa Cooperation Forum Opens in Jinhua," 10.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/VpgyT, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

20 MFA, op. cit.

As of 2025, China-Africa relations have also expanded into innovation- and technology-based fields. The *China-Africa Innovation Cooperation and Development Forum*, held in Wuhan in November 2025, stands out as one of the most significant indicators of this transformation. Furthermore, while areas such as industrial cooperation, technological innovation, modern agriculture, and green development were highlighted during the forum, various agreements were signed between the parties, and new research and service platforms were established.[21]

These developments demonstrate that China-Africa relations are becoming increasingly deepened along the axes of knowledge, technology, and innovation. In this regard, recent studies reveal that African countries do not occupy a passive position in their relations with China. On the contrary, these countries have become actors that strategically shape and negotiate this cooperation in line with their objectives of infrastructure development, industrialization, and regional integration.[22] Furthermore, digital transformation and green development projects have emerged among the new focal areas of bilateral relations.[23]

5. Conclusion


As of 2025, it is noteworthy that China and African countries, particularly through the shared identity of the "Global South," have developed a common discourse and cooperation aimed at establishing a more inclusive and equitable international order. In 2025, China-Africa relations underwent not only expansion but also a more institutionalized and multilayered structural transformation. Simultaneous progress in the fields of trade, investment, infrastructure, agriculture, and technology indicates that the relationship has evolved into a more comprehensive partnership model. This transformation is not confined solely to economic cooperation but is also closely linked to the pursuit of a more balanced and inclusive international order at the global level. During this process, the continuity of diplomatic engagement was maintained, concrete steps were taken to implement the decisions adopted at the 2024 *FOCAC Beijing Summit*, and the areas of economic cooperation were further diversified.

As of 2025, China's presence in Africa appears to have expanded beyond the economic sphere into areas such as security cooperation and international peace operations. This demonstrates that economic activities have, over time, acquired the capacity to generate diplomatic and strategic influence. Nevertheless, the limited production capacity of African countries and the structural imbalances in trade relations continue to pose significant challenges to the sustainability of these relations. In this context, industrialization, value-added production, and the strengthening of local productive capacity emerge as decisive factors for the future of China-Africa relations.

21 China Global Television Network (CGTN Türk), "2025 Çin-Afrika İnovasyon İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Forumu başladı," 20.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/vSQMq, Access Date: 15.04.2026.

22 Mulugeta, op. cit.

23 China Global Television Network (CGTN), "China-Africa Relations in 2025," 30.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/oHZXS, Access Date: 15.04.2026.



India-Africa Relations in 2025

3

Emre Yürük*

1. Introduction

Historically, relations between India and Africa have been based on anti-colonialism, the Non-Aligned Movement, and South-South solidarity; however, 2025 marked a period in which this relationship was redefined through more concrete and institutional mechanisms. Predictions at the beginning of the year that 2025 would be a "critical" year were largely confirmed by developments in diplomatic visits, maritime security initiatives, trade negotiations, and cooperation in the fields of health and digital collaboration.[1]

Throughout 2025, the most prominent feature of India's Africa policy was its approach to relations not only at the bilateral level but also in alignment with continental frameworks. In a statement issued by India's Ministry of External Affairs on August 1, 2025, it was emphasized that engagement with Africa was being evaluated in connection with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Agenda 2063, while energy, agriculture, health, infrastructure, capacity building, and digital public infrastructure were identified as priority areas of cooperation. This approach demonstrates that India views Africa through the framework of a comprehensive partnership rather than fragmented bilateral relationships.[2]

At the same time, country-specific diplomatic engagements continued to retain their importance. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Ghana in July 2025, he was awarded the country's highest civilian honor, "The Officer of the Order of the Star of Ghana"; during his visit to Ethiopia in December 2025, he was honored with the country's highest state decoration, the "Great Honor Nishan of Ethiopia," reflecting the level of diplomatic visibility and political

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Qazi, B.H., Abbas, H. & Qaisrani, I.H., "Explaining India's Africa Policy: Power Ambitions and Pro-Active Strategies", *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, Vol. 12, 2025, p. 934,

https://www.kisa.link/MCmCB, Access Date: 01.03.2026;

Samir Bhattacharya, "A Pivotal Year in India-Africa Ties", *Observer Research Foundation (ORF)*,

https://www.kisa.link/qsQSW, Access Date: 01.03.2026;

Samir Bhattacharya, "India's Vision for Africa: Supporting AfCFTA in 2025", *Observer Research Foundation (ORF)*,

https://www.kisa.link/VEArd, Access Date: 01.03.2026.

2 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "Question No. 2166: Strategic Partnership with Africa", Lok Sabha, 01.08.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/HPNHI, Access Date: 02.03.2026.

prestige India has attained in Africa.[3] Within this context, this article examines the major developments that characterized India-Africa relations in 2025.

2. AfCFTA, Agenda 2063 and the Global South

The explicit reference to AfCFTA and Agenda 2063 in the strategic partnership statement issued by India's Ministry of External Affairs demonstrates India's effort to align its relationship with Africa with the continent's own development agenda. India views AfCFTA not merely as a trade opportunity but as a pathway for integrating itself into Africa's continental transformation project. This normative framework has been reinforced by the discourse of the "Global South." In the joint statement issued by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of Angola on May 3, 2025, emphasis was placed on the shared legacy of the struggle against colonialism between India and African countries, while the AU and India were described as "partners in progress" and "pillars" of the Global South.[4] Similarly, Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar's Africa Day address on May 28, 2025 sought to establish a common political discourse between India and Africa centered on post-colonial justice, the unequal global order, and issues of representation. This discourse reflects India's effort to present its relationship with Africa not only as an economic partnership but also as a normative one.[5]

3. Growth in Trade and Negotiations in Economic Relations

The year 2025 witnessed the continued expansion of India-Africa economic relations. According to the Confederation of Indian Industry's report titled "India-Africa 2025," bilateral trade between India and Africa reached $103 billion in FY2025, representing a 17 percent increase compared to the previous year. According to the same report, India's exports to Africa amounted to $45 billion, while its imports from Africa reached $58 billion. These figures indicate that the economic relationship has continued to expand in volume while also demonstrating the sustained importance of energy- and raw material-based imports.[6]

The economic relationship is not limited to trade figures alone, as evidenced by efforts toward commercial institutionalization. According to the Africa trade page of India's Ministry of Commerce, negotiations concerning a preferential trade agreement with SACU (India and the Southern African Customs Union) were revived in 2025. The same source emphasizes that the "Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement" signed with Mauritius constitutes India's first trade agreement in Africa and serves as an institutional model for trade in goods and services. This demonstrates that India attaches importance not only to the expansion of trade volumes with the continent but also to rules-based, agreement-driven economic expansion.[7]

Economic relations were further bolstered through country-specific engagements. The Joint Working Group meeting held in South Africa in April 2025

3 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "Prime Minister Receives the Highest Award of Ethiopia", 16.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/xyojr, Access Date: 02.03.2026.

4 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "English Translation of Prime Minister's Press Statement during Joint Press Statement with President of Angola", 03.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/kGBbe, Access Date: 02.03.2026.

5 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "EAM's Address at the Africa Day Celebrations", 28.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/jvmUK, Access Date: 03.03.2026.

6 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), *India-Africa Momentum: A Purpose-Driven Partnership*, August 2025, p. 5,
https://www.kisa.link/ufPxc, Access Date: 03.03.2026.

7 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, "Foreign Trade – Africa",
https://www.kisa.link/IUWda, Access Date: 03.03.2026.



Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid an official visit to Ghana on July 2-3, 2025. (Source: (Kaynak: PM's remark during acceptance of 'The Officer of the Order of the Star of Ghana' | Prime Minister of India)

created a positive platform for increasing trade and investment, resolving pending issues, and intensifying mutual engagement.[8] During the meeting between Modi and President Cyril Ramaphosa of the Republic of South Africa in Johannesburg in November 2025, emphasis was placed on facilitating mutual investments in infrastructure, technology, innovation, mining, and start-ups. Thus, 2025 marked a period in which India-Africa economic relations were deepened at both the continental and country-specific levels.[9]

4. Development Partnership: Lines of Credit, Training and Capacity Building

Data from 2025 indicate that India has not based its relationship with Africa solely on trade but has also continued to sustain development partnership mechanisms. According to a parliamentary response issued by India's Ministry of External Affairs on July 25, 2025, India has extended more than 190 lines of credit worth approximately $12 billion to more than 40 partner countries in Africa and has contributed to the completion of more than 200 projects. The same statement notes that approximately 1,260 ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation) training slots are allocated annually for West African countries and that more than 6,200 professionals have received training to date. These data demonstrate that capacity building and investment in human resources continue to occupy a central place in India's Africa policy.[10]

8 Press Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India, "Indian Delegation visits Pretoria, South Africa for the second session of the India-South Africa JWGTI", Nisan 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/DOJDP, Access Date: 04.03.2026.

9 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "Prime Minister Meets with President of South Africa on the Sidelines of G20 Summit in Johannesburg", 23.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/mWdYR, Access Date: 04.03.2026.

10 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "Question No. 1015: India-Africa Development Cooperation", Lok Sabha, 25.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OGftq, Access Date: 04.03.2026.

Prime Minister Modi's joint statement with the President of Angola in May 2025 embodies the official stance. The statement highlighted more than $12 billion in lines of credit for Africa, $700 million in grant assistance, vocational training centers established in eight African countries, and digital public infrastructure cooperation with five African countries. Therefore, India's presence in Africa in 2025 can be characterized as a hybrid development partnership composed of lines of credit, education, vocational capacity building, and digital infrastructure rather than a traditional aid model.[11]

5. Security and Maritime Affairs: Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME)

One of the most noteworthy developments of 2025 was AIKEYME 2025, the first large-scale maritime security initiative between India and Africa. Launched in Dar es Salaam in April 2025, the initiative was co-hosted by India and Tanzania. Kenya, Mozambique, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Djibouti, Comoros, and Madagascar also participated in the process. According to official statements, the objective of AIKEYME is to jointly address shared regional maritime challenges, enhance interoperability, and strengthen cooperation in maritime security.[12]

This initiative demonstrates that the security dimension has become central rather than secondary in India-Africa relations. An ORF analysis published at the beginning of the year had likewise stated that 2025 would be a defining year for defense cooperation. Prime Minister Modi's specific emphasis on AIKEYME in his statement with Angola further confirms this new approach. Consequently, India has expanded its relationship with Africa beyond the axes of development and trade to include areas such as Indian Ocean security, counter-piracy, search and rescue, and disaster relief.

6. Health, Digital Public Infrastructure and Emerging Sectors

Another prominent trend in India-Africa relations in 2025 was the growing emphasis on "next-generation" areas of cooperation such as health and digital public infrastructure. According to the AU's statement of June 13, 2025, discussions with the Indian delegation addressed access to affordable and high-quality medicines, capacity building, artificial intelligence, digital health, and telemedicine. The statement also indicated that India's experience in traditional medicine was regarded as a resource that could be integrated into African healthcare systems. This framework demonstrates that health diplomacy acquired a more institutionalized and technology-oriented character in 2025.[13] These developments indicate that, in 2025, India sought to expand its influence in Africa not only through physical infrastructure but also through digital governance and public service delivery.

11 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, ibid.

12 Press Information Bureau (PIB), "Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) 2025",

https://www.kisa.link/eFtPV, Access Date: 05.03.2026; PIB, ibid.,

https://www.kisa.link/yeiHZ, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

13 African Union, "Strengthening Africa-India Cooperation in Health Humanitarian Affairs, and Social Development", 13.06.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/zUooI, Access Date: 01.03.2026.

7. Multilateral Politics and the Geopolitical Dimension

In 2025, India-Africa relations extended beyond the bilateral level to multilateral platforms. During the meeting between Modi and Ramaphosa in November 2025 within the context of the G20 in South Africa, emphasis was placed on amplifying the voice of the Global South and strengthening IBSA cooperation. During the meeting with Ethiopia in December 2025, both sides also emphasized their commitment to cooperating in multilateral forums, including the United Nations, and to advancing the interests of the Global South.[14] These developments demonstrate that India no longer views Africa as a passive region from which to seek support in international institutions but rather as a network of partners with which to act collectively in global governance.

At the same time, the 2025 literature does not present an entirely idealized view of India's Africa policy. A number of studies argue that India's policy toward Africa is also shaped by factors such as energy security, the need for raw materials, market expansion, and competition with China.[15] This assessment is significant because the expansion of trade, the pursuit of cooperation in critical minerals and clean energy, defense and naval engagements, and the intensification of diplomatic contacts observed throughout 2025 all suggest that India's Africa policy is simultaneously driven by both solidarity and strategic interests. Accordingly, 2025 should be understood as a period in which the normative discourse of *South-South* cooperation interwove with geo-economic and geopolitical calculations in India-Africa relations.

8. Conclusion


Rather than being marked by a single high-profile summit, 2025 was a year characterized by numerous medium-scale yet strategically complementary initiatives in India-Africa relations. During this period, India sought to align its relationship with Africa with AfCFTA and Agenda 2063; expanded trade volume; continued to provide development financing, education, and capacity-building initiatives; strengthened the security dimension through AIKEYME 2025; and established health and digital public infrastructure as new areas of cooperation. By the end of the year, the elevation of relations with Ethiopia to a strategic partnership and the deepening of multilateral coordination with South Africa demonstrated that this orientation had evolved beyond rhetoric into a concrete and institutionalized framework.

In conclusion, 2025 was not a year of "rediscovery" in India-Africa relations but rather a period in which the existing partnership was reorganized in a more structured, strategic, and continent-wide manner. Nevertheless, this partnership cannot be explained solely through the discourse of solidarity. Factors such as economic interests, maritime security, critical minerals, competition with China, and the struggle for global representation also continued to play a decisive role. Therefore, 2025 should be regarded both as an example of South-South cooperation and as an extension of the politics of rising powers in India-Africa relations.

14 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, "Prime Minister Holds Bilateral Talks with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia", 16.12.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/DNcuy Access Date: 02.03.2026.

15 Qazi et al., op. cit.



Japan-Africa Relations in 2025

4

Gökberk Durmaz* | Acar Boray Bıldırcın**

1. Introduction

Japan is one of the major actors actively engaged on the African continent in both political and economic terms. Following the end of the Cold War, it launched multilateral initiatives such as TICAD on the continent and provided official development assistance. Although the foundations of Japan's diplomacy toward Africa are based on economic assistance, trade, and cooperation, examining only the economic dimension would be insufficient. The continent also occupies a vital position in Japan's geopolitical calculations, such as its "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" vision, and in the global order it seeks to promote.

In this context, this article sheds light on both Japan's cooperation with the continent and the way it positions the region within its national security strategy in order to evaluate Japan's position and objectives in Africa. Accordingly, the historical background of Japan's diplomacy toward Africa, the fundamental parameters of its Africa policy, and the 9th TICAD, held in 2025, are examined, followed by a discussion of Japan's role in the great power competition on the continent.

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2. Historical Background of Japan's Africa Diplomacy

The first African state with which Japan established diplomatic relations was the Republic of South Africa. In 1959, it opened its first embassy in Ghana. The independence of 17 African countries in 1960 was also positively reflected in

the Japanese media. Due to the continent's economic stagnation during its new era, Japan initiated official development assistance.[1] During the 1970s, Japan began to play a more active role in Africa in pursuit of energy and raw materials, and Japanese foreign ministers visited African countries for the first time.[2]m During this period, Japan's objectives on the continent were generally economic in nature. The prioritization of trade despite Cold War polarization can also be observed in the close relations developed with Nyerere, the leader of socialist Tanzania.[3]

Expectations of Japan, which had focused exclusively on economic development for many years, increased after the Cold War. Beginning in the 1980s, the United States criticized Japan for being a "free rider," and Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" during the Gulf War was met with negative reactions.[4] In the early 1990s, Japan's relations with Africa reflected the country's transformation from an "economic power to a political power." During this period, Japan both aspired to become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and called for the reform of the UNSC. In this context, African countries constituted an important voting bloc within the UN. Accordingly, in the early 1990s Japan deployed troops to UN peacekeeping operations in countries such as Cambodia and Mozambique and organized the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), a multilateral initiative.[5] As part of UN peacekeeping operations, Japan combated piracy off the coast of Somalia in 2009 and established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2011.[6] Thus, following the Cold War, it positioned Africa as an important region for its own security, national interests, and global influence.

3. Fundamental Parameters of Japan's Africa Diplomacy

As also stated in the 2022 and 2024 editions of the Africa Yearbook, the principal pillars of Japan-Africa relations consist of economic cooperation, development,[7] and infrastructure assistance.[8] Emboldened by the fact that it has no colonial past on the continent, Japan has gradually strengthened its image in Africa and become a reliable partner.[9] According to the Diplomatic Bluebook 2025 published by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Africa is a continent with significant demographic potential, characterized by a young and dynamic population. With its abundant resources and high growth rates, the region is important for Japan's economic security.[10] Since the launch of TICAD in 1993, Japan has supported Africa's development.[11] In addition to multilateral cooperation with Africa, the Bluebook provides relatively detailed coverage of Japan's relations with countries in East Africa and Southern Africa. As is evident from the Diplomatic Bluebook, TICAD is an extremely important instrument in Japan's diplomacy toward Africa.

1 Yumi Nakayama, "Nihon to Afurika no kankei ni tsuite oshiete kudasai [Japonya-Afrika İlişkileri Nasıldır?]", *Q & A de yomu Nihon gaikō nyūmon [Soru-Cevapla Japon diplomasisine giriş]*, Ed. Yoshitaka Katayama and Wataru Yamaguchi, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, Tokyo, 2024. pp. 176–177.

2 Samir Bhattacharya, "Japan's New Africa Playbook", Observer Research Foundation, 12.02.2026,

https://www.kisa.link/vfccH, Access Date: 19.04.2026.

3 Hiroki Nakamura, "Midoru pawa- to iu gainen kara mita Nihon no Afurika gaikō", Seiji Keizai kenkyūjo nenpō, No. 23, 2024, pp. 357-375.

4 Masayuki Tadoko, "Japanese Diplomacy and the First Gulf War", *The First Gulf War in Historical Perspectives*, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 2022, pp. 81-89.

5 Nakamura, op. cit., pp. 357-375.

6 Takanori Nakada, "Japanese Self-Defense Forces' Base in Djibouti Becoming Increasingly Important for Situations Occurring in Middle East, Africa", The Japan News, 21.08.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/FJhZh, Access Date: 21.04.2026.

7 Muhammed Yasir Okumuş, "2024 Yılında Japonya-Afrika İlişkileri", *Afrika Yearbook 2024*, Ed. Soyalp Tamçelik and Tunç Demirtaş, YTB Yayınları, 2025, Ankara, pp. 293-297.

8 Vuslat Nur Şahin (2023). "Japonya-Afrika İlişkilerinde Özgür ve Açık Hint-Pasifik Stratejisi Sonrası Yeni Dönem: TICAD-8", *Afrika Yearbook 2022*, Ed. Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu and Mürsel Bayram, YTB Publications, 2023, Ankara, pp. 213-221.

9 Bhattacharya, op. cit.

10 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Diplomatic Bluebook 2025", 30.09.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/FIINy , Access Date: 13.04.2026. p. 175.

11 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ibid. p. 22.



The 9th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 9) was held in Yokohama, Japan, on August 20-22, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

4. The 9th TICAD Summit

The TICAD conferences were held in Japan every five years from the inaugural conference in 1993 until 2013, and since 2013 they have been organized every three years on a rotating basis between Japan and Africa. These conferences constitute one of the principal pillars of Japan's Africa policy. African ownership, partnership,[12] multilateral cooperation, and sustainable development have formed the overarching framework.[13]

At the first conference in 1993, development was highlighted alongside democratization and good governance.[14] The Tokyo Declaration adopted at the First TICAD emphasized the Asian experience.[15] Following the 2nd TICAD in 1998, the Third TICAD in 2003 underscored education and health within the framework of the initiative on "poverty reduction through economic growth." At the 4th TICAD in 2008, the importance of official development assistance, trade, and investment was reaffirmed.[16] Following the 5th TICAD in 2013, Prime Minister Abe announced Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) vision at the 6th TICAD, held in Kenya in 2016. He stated that the key to a stable and prosperous international community lay in the dynamism of the "two continents", Asia and Africa, and the "two oceans" – the Pacific and the Indian.[17] Following the 7th TICAD in 2019, the 8th TICAD was most recently held in Tunisia in 2022. The conference focused on "investing in people and the quality of growth" under the themes of economy, society, peace, and stability. The Tunis Declaration was adopted at the meeting.[18]

Following the *TICAD Ministerial Meeting* and the *3rd Japan-Africa Public-Private Economic Forum* organized in 2024, the *9th TICAD Conference* was finally held in Yokohama, Japan, on August 20-22, 2025. Representatives from 49 African countries participated in the conference. Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba

12 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ibid. p.14.
13 Bhattacharya, op. cit.
14 Nakayama, op. cit.
15 Nakamura, op. cit.
16 Nakayama, op. cit.
17 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit. p. 26.
18 Şahin, op. cit.

held a total of 34 bilateral meetings, while Foreign Minister Iwaya conducted 30 bilateral meetings.[19] Based on the conference theme "Co-Create Innovative Solutions," consultations focused on the principal themes of "economy, society, peace, and stability." Cross-cutting topics included "sustainable growth, youth and women, regional integration, and intra-regional and inter-regional connectivity."

Under the theme of Peace and Stability, Japan stated that sustainable growth and an inclusive society constitute the foundations of peace and stability.[20] It also emphasized that democracy and governance occupy a central place in the FOIP vision.[21] Under the Economy theme, discussions focused on private sector-led sustainable growth, regional integration, connectivity, and the production ecosystem. Regarding Society, Japan presented its initiatives in Africa related to education, human resources, health, and disaster prevention.[22] Japan launched various initiatives to support young entrepreneurs and promote research and technological cooperation, while also reaffirming its commitment to Global Health Insurance.[23] Prime Minister Ishiba announced that Japan would accelerate its efforts in Africa in the areas of investment, private capital, digital transformation, connectivity, health, the empowerment of youth and women, and Africa's peace and stability.[24]

As part of the conference, JETRO organized a large-scale "TICAD Trade Fair and Conference" attended by Japanese and African companies. At the conclusion of the conference, the Yokohama Declaration was adopted. Under the economic pillar, the declaration addressed FOIP, regional integration, connectivity, digital transformation, and poverty reduction; under the societal pillar, it covered health, human resources, and disaster prevention; and under the peace and stability pillar, it addressed human security, development and peace, governance, diplomacy, and UNSC reform.[25]

5. Africa in Japan's Realist Vision

Another dimension of Japan's engagement in Africa is its realpolitik strategy. It would be hard to assess Japan's economic assistance and its emphasis on multilateral cooperation on the continent without an understanding of its competition with China, its pursuit of regional stability, and its desire to strengthen its global position through UNSC reform.

In recent years, Africa has become one of the regions where China, which has heightened Japan's security concerns,[26] has expanded its presence and influence most rapidly.[27] As of 2024, with a trade volume of US$ 295.6 million, China is the continent's largest trading partner.[28] This influence is a highly significant factor behind Japan's intensification of its activities in Africa. In response to China's growing influence on the continent, Japan has been advancing its FOIP vision.[29] Within the framework of this vision, a perspective encompassing both the Indian and Pacific Oceans is presented to address instability and security threats

19 Gaimushō, "Dai-kyūkai Afurika Kaihatsu Kaigi (TICAD 9) Kekka gaiyō", 31.10.2025, https://www.kisa.link/wtqqb, Access Date: 17.04.2026.

20 Gaimushō, Dai-kyūkai Afurika Kaihatsu Kaigi.

21 Bhattacharya, op. cit.

22 Gaimushō, Dai-kyūkai Afurika Kaihatsu Kaigi.

23 Bhattacharya, op. cit.

24 Gaimushō, Dai-kyūkai Afurika Kaihatsu Kaigi.

25 Gaimushō, Dai-kyūkai Afurika Kaihatsu Kaigi.

26 Gaimushō, "Nihon no anzen hoshō to kokusai shakai no heiwa to antei", 05.04.2023, https://www.kisa.link/dDZaw, Access Date 22.04.2026.

27 Linda Calabrese, "Why China is seeking greater presence in Africa – the strategy behind its financial deals", The Conversation, 17.09.2024, https://www.kisa.link/ieWJy, Access Date: 22.04.2026.

28 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China, "List of the Outcomes of the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation", 11.06.2025, https://www.kisa.link/ooStq , Access Date: 22.04.2026.

in the region. As clarified at the Ninth TICAD, as in recent conferences, East and Southern Africa constitute one of the two halves of this strategy.

With its young population, dynamic economy, and abundant natural resources, Africa is also indispensable for securing the critical minerals required by Japanese industry, ensuring energy security, and promoting Japan's economic diversification. In addition, the voting power of African countries within the UN presents an important opportunity for Japan's calls for UNSC reform. In this context, Japan's aspiration to transform itself from an "economic power to a political power," which began in the 1990s and continues to the present day, has been the most important factor driving its proactive engagement in Africa.[30] Japan continues to emphasize on numerous platforms that the UN should be reformed and restored to an effective position.[31]

6. Conclusion


This section aims to evaluate Japan's presence in Africa and its future objectives. To this end, it first discusses the historical background of the relationship and concludes that, after the 1990s, Japan increasingly approached the continent with political objectives. The third section addresses the fundamental parameters of Japan's diplomacy toward Africa and highlights the importance of TICAD conferences in the areas of development assistance and soft power. In this context, the Ninth TICAD was held in 2025 under the slogan "Co-Create Innovative Solutions." Under the first of its three main themes, "Peace and Stability," sustainability, inclusiveness, and stability were emphasized. The second theme, "Economy," focused on the private sector, growth, regional integration, and connectivity. Under the final theme, "Society," projections concerning education, human resources, health, and disaster prevention were presented. In addition to these themes, Prime Minister Ishiba stated that Japan would intensify its efforts in the areas of investment, capital, digital transformation, connectivity, health, youth and women, and peace and stability. The Yokohama Declaration adopted at the conference also addressed the FOIP vision, poverty reduction, human security, and UNSC reform in addition to these topics.

Following an analysis of the historical background of TICAD and the outcomes of the most recent conference, the final section examines the realist perspective, another dimension of Japan's diplomacy toward Africa. In this context, Africa's role in Japan's competition with China, its economic security, its pursuit of regional stability, and its efforts to increase its influence in the global arena through UNSC reform is evaluated. Japan's activities in Africa are expected to continue to grow, expand into diverse fields in a multilayered manner, and contribute to increasing competition between great powers on the continent. It is yet to be seen the extent to which Japan will cooperate with other major powers, such as the United States and India, in response to China's increasingly pronounced dominance.

29 Bhattacharya, op. cit.

30 Nakamura, op. cit.

31 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op. cit.



5

South Korea-Africa Relations in 2025

Ezgi Kılıçarslan Gül*

1. Introduction

The year 2025 marked a period in which Africa reinforced its strategic autonomy within global geopolitical competition and took determined steps toward diversifying its external partnerships. In this context, African countries' relations with South Korea moved beyond a traditional donor-recipient relationship and began to offer a model aligned with the continent's own development priorities, centered on technology and based on mutual interdependence. In line with the AU's "Agenda 2063" vision, the partnerships established with Seoul in 2025 served as a critical lever for the continent's industrial transformation and digital sovereignty.[1]

Developments in 2025 reflect Africa's aspiration to position itself not merely as a repository of natural resources but also as an influential actor within the context of global values. Throughout the year, the convergence between South Korea's "Global Pivotal State" strategy and Africa's "Africa Rising" objective was reinforced through concrete projects and strategic partnerships.[2] This section analytically examines the diplomatic, economic, and technological outcomes of the South Korea partnership as it evolved in 2025 from the perspective of Africa.

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1 Ufuk Tepebaş, "Afrika'da Yükselen Rekabet ve Kore Cumhuriyeti – Afrika Zirvesi", TASAM (*Turkish Asian* Center for Strategic Studies), June 11, 2024,

https://www.kisa.link/mCjqb, Access Date: 16.04.2026.

2 Andrew Yeo, "South Korea as a Global Pivotal State", Brookings Institution, December 19, 2023,

https://www.kisa.link/YhLMW, Access Date: 16.04.2026.



2. Africa's Strategic Autonomy and Diplomatic Framework

In 2025, African diplomacy was built upon the principle of "avoiding dependence on a single external center."[3] In this context, relations with South Korea were regarded by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as a balancing factor capable of maximizing the continent's strategic interests. The "Ministerial-Level Follow-up Mechanism," implemented in 2025 following the major summit held in 2024, enhanced the decision-making and implementation capacity of African countries throughout the process.[4]

3 NIYITUNGA, Eric Blanco and JAHED, Mohammed Iqbal, "Planning diplomacy: A remedy to ugly aid dependency and contributor to sustainable development in Africa", Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development, Vol. 9 (No. 4), 2025, p. 1,

https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd11654, Access Date: 20.04.2026.

4 ACCORD, "2025 Korea-South Africa Future Dialogue", October 2, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/mFwhg, Access Date: 16.04.2026.

The 1st Korea-Africa Summit was held in South Korea on June 4, 2024, under the theme "The Future We Build Together: Shared Growth, Sustainability, and Solidarity." (Source: Joint Declaration 2024 Korea-Africa Summit View|Ministry News | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea)

On the diplomatic front, 2025 was a year in which Africa's efforts to make its own voice heard found a positive response in its relations with South Korea. In their discussions with the Seoul government, African countries placed not only bilateral assistance but also the enhancement of Africa's representation in global governance mechanisms on the agenda.[5] In particular, the defense and security memoranda signed in 2025 under the leadership of countries such as Ethiopia aimed to strengthen the technological infrastructure of the continent's peace and security architecture.[6] This development symbolizes a transformation in which Africa has come to expect not only financial assistance but also institutional and technical capacity building from its external partners.

3. Economic Dynamics: Critical Minerals and Added Value Production

An examination of the economic data for 2025 indicates that Africa-South Korea trade underwent a qualitative transformation. In 2025, African countries strengthened their bargaining power with South Korean investors not only regarding the export of raw materials but also with respect to processing these resources locally and generating value-added production.[7] At the center of South Korea's Africa strategy in 2025 was the "Critical Minerals Dialog," which is of vital importance for the energy transition. Within this framework, strategic partnerships with resource-rich actors on the continent aimed at ensuring supply chain stability became the primary priority of bilateral economic relations.[8]

The most strategic pillar of economic cooperation was integration with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). In 2025, the special economic zones established across the continent for South Korean investors made a direct contribution to Africa's industrialization objectives. South Korea's experience in automotive and battery technologies translated into concrete investments in 2025 aimed at establishing local assembly lines in numerous African countries, particularly Nigeria.[9] This wave of investment reduced Africa's vulnerability within global supply chains while also facilitating the expansion of intra-African trade. The economic momentum achieved in 2025 demonstrates the extent to which Africa has consistently implemented the principle of "win-win" cooperation in its external partnerships.[10]

5 ACCORD, ibid.

6 Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) of the Republic of Korea, "Korea-Africa Summit: Strengthening Economic Cooperation and Investment Frameworks", September 4, 2024, https://www.kisa.link/dyMhN, Access Date: 16.04.2026.

7 AFREXIMBANK, African Trade Report 2025: Climate Change and the Future of Trade in Africa, Cairo, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/cwRUr, Access Date: 20.04.2026

8 Republic of Korea Government, Joint Declaration of the 2024 Korea-Africa Summit: Shared Growth, Sustainability, and Solidarity, Seul, 2024, https://www.mofa.go.kr], Access Date: 16.04.2026.

9 Business Insider Africa, "Nigeria signs deal with South Korea to launch Africa's first electric vehicle factory", February 3, 2026, https://www.kisa.link/hjMyg, Access Date: 16.04.2026.

10 Kang Seung-woo, "Seoul, Africa seek 'win-win' cooperation", The Korea Times, December 14, 2022, https://www.kisa.link/ctWpA, Access Date: 16.04.2026.

4. The African Perspective in Technology Transfer, Agriculture and Digital Transformation

Technological independence emerged as one of the foremost priorities on Africa's development agenda in 2025.[11] South Korea's support for digital transformation materialized in 2025 through "Innovation and Startup Centers," which enhanced the employability of the continent's young population.[12] In response to the demands of African countries, South Korea stated that it would provide not only the purchase of equipment and software but also the transfer of the technical expertise required for these technologies to be produced locally and sustained over the long term.[13] In this context, the digital education programs launched in 2025 provided substantial momentum to the continent's efforts to bridge the digital divide.

In the field of agricultural development, the expansion of the "K-Ricebelt" project in 2025 became a central component of Africa's food security strategy.[14] The increase in crop yields achieved during the 2025 harvest season in countries such as Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria demonstrated the compatibility of South Korea's rice production technologies with African agricultural conditions. From Africa's perspective, however, the most significant aspect of this success was that the project was built entirely upon training local farmers and strengthening local ownership.[15] In 2025, these projects were regarded as strategic instruments that reduced Africa's external dependence and stimulated rural development.[16]

5. Defense Industry and Security Partnership

The year 2025 marked a period in which South Korea emerged as a "smart power" partner in African countries' efforts to modernize their defense capabilities.[17] Defense industry agreements signed in 2025 to address threats to Africa's peace and security, such as terrorism and piracy, are particularly noteworthy.[18] In particular, technology transfers involving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), coast guard patrol boats, and intelligence software enhanced the operational capabilities of African armed forces.[19] For African countries, the significance of this partnership lies not only in the durability and cost-effectiveness of the equipment provided by South Korea under African conditions but also in the fact that it offers a framework for cooperation free from political preconditions.

11 Valdai Discussion Club, "The Future of Africa: Toward Technological Sovereignty", July 31, 2023,
https://www.kisa.link/PGyko, Access Date: 19.04.2026.

12 AfricaRise, "Korea-Africa Foundation: Global Mentorship & Export Program (KAF-GMEP) 2025", 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/IeCmP, Access Date: 19.04.2026.

13 AfricaRise, ibid.

14 Nadia Helmy, "Korea's Rice Belt vs. China's BRI: The Africa Play", Modern Diplomacy, April 22, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/cLTlR, Access Date: 19.04.2026.

15 Rice Today, "Korea brings its 'miracle' rice and agri-technologies to Africa", June 23, 2023,
https://www.kisa.link/CFKOp, Access Date: 19.04.2026.

16 Niyitunga and Jahed, op. cit., p. 11.

17 KBS World, "S. Korea, Africa Launch Critical Minerals Dialogue, Pledge Deeper Cooperation", November, 18 2024,
https://www.kisa.link/hVQoX, Access Date: 19.04.2026.


18 KBS World, ibid.

19 Houda Barroug, "The Strategic Importance of Africa in Global Geopolitics", Gulf Research Center (GRC), June 22, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/aYAnb, Access Date: 20.04.2026.

6. Conclusion

The year 2025 can be regarded as a year of mutual gains and implementation commitment in Africa-South Korea relations. The African continent successfully leveraged this multidimensional partnership with the Seoul government to its advantage within the evolving global balance of power. The steps taken throughout 2025 reinforced Africa's objective of establishing itself as a prominent actor across a broad range of areas, from economic diversification and technological independence to food security and defense capacity.

In conclusion, the solid foundation established in 2025 set a new standard for Africa's relations with its Asian partners in 2026 and the years that followed. This standard is measured not only by the volume of bilateral trade but also by its contribution to the welfare of African peoples and to the continent's position within the global system. The year 2025 marked a period in which Africa consolidated its position as an equal partner in its engagement with South Korea. The developments observed during the first months of 2026, particularly in the area of trade, are also regarded as indicators that relations will continue to deepen.



6

Russia-Africa Relations in 2025

Burak Kolot*

1. Introduction

The year 2025 can be regarded not as a period of dramatic expansion in Russia-Africa relations but rather as a phase of institutional consolidation and strategic selectivity. The Russia-Africa dialogue, symbolically initiated with the 2019 Sochi Summit and placed within an institutional framework through the 2023 St. Petersburg Summit, entered a phase of implementation and deepening as of 2025. This process should be understood not only within the context of bilateral relations but also in light of the structural transformation of the global system, Russia's systemic tensions with the West, and the reflection of the discourse of "multipolarity" in foreign policy practice.[1]

In the Russian Federation's 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, Africa is defined as "one of the important centers of the multipolar world order." This statement is more than rhetorical; it demonstrates that Moscow views Africa not only as an arena of economic opportunity but also as a platform for generating diplomatic leverage within the international system. The sanctions regime imposed after 2022 and the deepening rupture with the West accelerated Russia's turn toward the "Global South," with Africa emerging as one of the most visible arenas of this reorientation.[2]

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1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *Russia–Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan 2023–2026*, Moscow: MFA Russia, 2023,

https://www.kisa.link/rxpfY Access Date : 03.02.2026.

2 Президент Российской Федерации, Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, Москва: Кремль, 31.03. 2023 г.,

https://www.kisa.link/DdmNn Access Date : 03.02.2026.



Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Burkinabè President Ibrahim Traoré in the Russian capital, Moscow. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

Scholarly literature highlights three principal approaches to Russia's presence in Africa. The first views Moscow's presence on the continent as a projection of symbolic power despite its limited capabilities.[3] The second emphasizes a strategy of generating asymmetric influence through security engagement.[4] The third interprets Russia's Africa policy not as an effort to create an anti-Western bloc but rather as a model of low-cost and selective engagement. The year 2025 represents a period in which these three approaches converge. Russia is not a hegemonic actor in Africa. However, it is seeking to establish durable and strategic ties in selected areas.

This article examines the transformation of Russia's presence in Africa in 2025. In this context, it addresses the evolution of Russia's activities on the continent from a phase of expansion to one of consolidation and institutionalization, its shift in the security domain from semi-autonomous structures to a

3 Akinlolu E. Akinola and Olusola Ogunnubi, "Russo-African Relations and electoral democracy: Assessing the implications of Russia's renewed interest for Africa", *African Security Reviwe*, Vol. 30, 2021, p. 396.

4 Samuel Ramani, *Russia in Africa: Resurgent Great Power or Bellicose Pretender?,* London: Hurst & Company, 2023, p. 265.

state-centered model, and its prioritization of deepening engagement in strategic sectors rather than pursuing quantitative growth in its economic relations.

2. Capacity-Building in Security: From the Sahel to Central Africa

This article examines the transformation of Russia's presence in Africa in 2025. In this context, it addresses the evolution of Russia's activities on the continent from a phase of expansion to one of consolidation and institutionalization, its shift in the security domain from semi-autonomous structures to a state-centered model, and its prioritization of deepening engagement in strategic sectors rather than pursuing quantitative growth in its economic relations.[5] By 2025, however, this structure appears to have been integrated more directly into state control under the name *Africa Corps*. Russia's transition from the Wagner model to the *Africa Corps* model represents not merely an organizational name change but a more profound process of state institutionalization. The first reason for this transformation is the crisis of autonomy and oversight exposed by the 2023 Prigozhin mutiny. While Wagner's semi-independent structure provided the Kremlin with flexibility in external operations, it also created a security actor that accumulated power outside the central chain of command.[6] Second, Moscow seeks to conduct its military activities in Africa within a framework directly aligned with the Ministry of Defense. This enables closer coordination of operations on the ground with Russian foreign policy, security priorities, and bilateral agreements. Third, the debates over human rights violations and accountability that emerged during the Wagner era, particularly in relation to Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), compelled Moscow to project the image of a more official and accountable structure. Accordingly, the transition to the Africa Corps should be understood not as an effort to dismantle Russia's security presence in Africa but rather as an attempt to transform it into a more centralized, more accountable state instrument that is more closely aligned with its foreign policy objectives. This transformation is associated with the pursuit of greater international legitimacy and the need to centralize operations on the ground.[7]

The Sahel region, particularly Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, lies at the center of Russia's security engagement. France's termination of its military operations in the region and the decline of the Western presence created a strategic opening for Moscow.[8] However, Russia's approach differs from the traditional model of military expansion. Rather than deploying large-scale combat forces directly, Moscow maintains its presence through military training, advisory services, systems integration, and support for regime security.[9]

5 Kimberly Marten, "Russia's Use of Private Military Companies: The Case of Wagner," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2019, p.191.

6 Nicodemus Minde, "Russia's Africa Corps – more than old wine in a new bottle," *ISS Today*, 7.4.2024,
https://www.kisa.link/rsoWV Access Date : 06.02.2026.

7 Christopher Spearin, "Russia's Wagner Group and the sustainment of authoritarianism in Africa: Implications for China at home and abroad", *Contemporary Security Policy,* 46:3, 2025, p. 512; "Closed Doors, Open Windows?", *CSIS Features*, 2024,
https://www.kisa.link/swTok Access Date : 07.02.2026.

8 "Russia vows military backing for Sahel juntas' joint force", *Reuters*, 04.04.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/wRGlG Access Date : 07.02.2026.

9 "Reorienting Europe's Approach in the Sahel", *International Crisis Group*, 30.06.2024,
https://www.kisa.link/rMLfb Access Date : 07.02.2026.

Country	Africa Corps Activities	Characteristic	Strategic Impact
Mali	Training and advisory services; regime security	Post-Wagner state-controlled structure	Maintaining power in the Sahel
Burkina Faso	Advisory services and logistics support	Official security cooperation with military juntas	Balancing the influence of the West
Niger	Military training and equipment	Strategic resource area	Direct presence

Table 1. Russia's Security Strategy in the Sahel

Table 1 demonstrates that the regime stability focus of Russia's security strategy continues through state institutions. In the case of Mali, the Africa Corps' continuation as the principal actor following Wagner's withdrawal has strengthened Moscow's strategic objective in the security domain. This model concentrates on areas such as developing operational capacity, protecting political elites, and providing military technical infrastructure support. Similar trends can also be observed in Burkina Faso and Niger. In these countries, Russia's role is framed as providing an alternative to the West's conditional security cooperation.[10]

SIPRI[11] data indicate that continuity has been maintained in Russia's arms transfers to Africa.[12] However, as of 2025, military cooperation extends beyond arms sales alone. It is supported by maintenance, training, and technical interoperability processes.[13] This demonstrates that Moscow aims to establish long-term relationships of dependence rather than pursuing short-term arms sales.

The CAR presents the most institutionalized example of Russia's security model. The military advisory process that began in 2018 continued through 2025. In the CAR, the linkage established between security and the protection of natural resource sites reveals the political economy dimension of Russia's security policy. Although international reports regard the Russian presence as controversial, from the perspective of the CAR government, Moscow is a security partner grounded in an emphasis on sovereignty.[14]

Libya, meanwhile, represents an arena where Russia's security and energy interests intersect. In 2025, Russia's presence in Libya was observed to be more limited and primarily diplomatic compared to previous years.[15] Rather than pursuing direct military expansion, Moscow prioritized the security of energy facilities and engagement connected to political processes. This demonstrates that Russia's security policy in Africa is not implemented with the same level of intensity in every country.[16]

10 Monika Pronczuk, John Leicester and Michael Biesecker, "Russia skirts Western sanctions to ramp up its military footprint in Africa", *Associated Press*, 10.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/EDwlD Access Date : 09.02.2026;
"Africa Corps to stay in Mali after Russia's Wagner mercenary group leaves", *Reuters*, 06.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/NwRfY Access Date: 09.02.2026.

11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

12 Mathew George, Katarina Djokic, Zain Hussain, Pieter D. Wezeman ve Siemon T. Wezeman, "Trends in International Arms Transfers 2024", *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*, Mart 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/EVfEz , Access Date: 10.02.2026.

13 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "International Arms Transfers", *SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2025, p. 6,
https://www.kisa.link/RsBoY Access Date: 10.02.2026.

14 "Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic", *United Nations Security Council*, S/2025/XXX, New York: United Nations, 2025, p. 9,
https://www.kisa.link/LBmdl Access Date: 10.02.2026.

15 Robert Harvey, Ahmad Ghaddar and Enes Tunagur, "Exclusive: Libya brings in Western traders in blow to Russian fuel flows", *Reuters*, 19.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/PkWHd Access Date: 11.02.2026.

16 Jalel Harchaoui, "The Pendulum: How Russia Sways Its Way to More Influence in Libya", *War on the Rocks*, 07.01.2021,
https://www.kisa.link/BjOwh Access Date: 11.02.2026.

Overall, Russia's security strategy in 2025 exhibits three principal characteristics: (i) state-centered institutionalization, (ii) prioritization of regime security, and (iii) low-cost but strategically high-yield engagement. This model differs markedly from the ideologically driven military expansion of the Soviet period.[17]

3. Geo-economic Selectivity and Room for Diplomatic Maneuver

Russia's economic presence in Africa is not comparable in scale to that of China or the European Union. Comparing Russia's approach with China's is useful for understanding its economic engagement on the continent. China's presence in Africa is based on a comprehensive model of economic integration centered on large-scale infrastructure investments, lending mechanisms, and trade volume. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has constructed ports, railways, and energy infrastructure while establishing deep financial and commercial ties with African economies. By contrast, Russia's approach is more limited but focused on strategically important sectors. Lacking the economic capacity to finance large-scale infrastructure projects, Moscow has developed a selective engagement strategy concentrating on sectors of high strategic value, including energy, nuclear technology, military cooperation, and natural resources. Consequently, China's presence in Africa can be characterized as "economic influence based on infrastructure and trade," whereas Russia's presence is more appropriately defined as "political-economic influence established through security and strategic sectors." For most African countries, these two models constitute a complementary framework of multiple partnerships rather than one of competition.[18] As of 2025, this selective approach has been particularly salient in energy, mining and food security sectors.

The El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant project in Egypt is Russia's most significant and longest-term investment in Africa. Implemented by Rosatom, the project occupies a central place in Moscow's strategy of establishing enduring infrastructure ties through nuclear diplomacy.[19] Construction of the project continued throughout 2025, and it was announced that its financing and nuclear fuel supply mechanisms would be maintained.[20] This project carries not only economic but also geopolitical significance. Nuclear energy projects inherently create long-term relationships of technical dependence and specialized expertise.

In the energy sector, cooperation with the CAR and the Republic of the Congo on oil infrastructure has also attracted attention. Agreements approved by

17 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 240.

18 Paul Stronski, "Late to the Party: Russia's Return to Africa", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2019,

https://www.kisa.link/pExfR Access Date:15.02.2026.

19 Государственная корпорация «Росатом», *Проект АЭС «Эль-Дабаа»: официальный отчёт 2025 года*, Москва: Росатом, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/Ntgoc Access Date: 03.02.2026.

20 "Presidents launch El Dabaa reactor pressure vessel installation", *World Nuclear News*, 19.11.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/HJyiJ Access Date: 03.02.2026.

the Kremlin demonstrate that Russia is seeking to establish a lasting position in the CAR through energy infrastructure.[21] However, the scale of these projects remains limited when compared with China's infrastructure investments on the continent.

The mining sector represents the intersection between security and economics. In regions rich in strategic resources such as gold and diamonds, security cooperation and economic interests are observed to overlap. This demonstrates that Russia's presence in Africa encompasses not only a military dimension but also a political economy dimension.

Food security remained an important diplomatic instrument in 2025. Following the global grain crisis that emerged after 2022, Russia combined grain and fertilizer shipments to Africa with its political messaging.[22] Moscow has presented this policy within the framework of supporting the Global South.[23] This has strengthened Russia's diplomatic capital in Africa.

Voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly reveal the multilateral dimension of Russia's Africa policy. Throughout 2025, the fact that a significant number of African countries either abstained or did not collectively adopt anti-Russian positions created diplomatic room for maneuver for Moscow.[24] Africa is not a monolithic bloc; however, its tendency to avoid full alignment has limited Russia's global isolation.

Following the expansion of BRICS, the positions of Egypt and Ethiopia within the platform enhanced Africa's visibility in multilateral mechanisms.[25] From Russia's perspective, BRICS represents an important instrument in the search for alternatives to the Western-centered financial architecture.[26] However, considering the platform's capabilities and China's predominance within it, Moscow's capacity to transform the global financial order through Africa remains limited.[27]

4. Conclusion

The year 2025 emerged as a period of strategic restructuring and consolidation rather than quantitative expansion in Russia-Africa relations. The findings of this study demonstrate that Moscow's Africa policy is shaped around three principal axes: state-centered institutionalization in the security domain, selective engagement focused on strategic sectors in economic relations, and efforts to create diplomatic room for maneuver through multilateral platforms. The

21 Федеральный закон от 7 июня 2025 г. N 130-ФЗ «О ратификации Соглашения между Правительством Российской Федерации и Правительством Республики Конго о сотрудничестве в сфере строительства нефтепродуктопровода "Пуэнт-Нуар - Лутете - Малуко-Трешо" на территории Республики Конго», Российская Газета, 11.06.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/aRQtl Access Date: 03.02.2026.

22 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2025*, Rome: FAO, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/GZqWV Access Date: 03.02.2026.

23 Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации. "О гуманитарных поставках российского зерна в страны Африки." Брифинг официального представителя МИД России. Москва, 2024–2025,

https://www.kisa.link/tHspo Access Date : 03.02.3036.

24 Voting Records, 79th Session, *United Nations General Assembly*, New York, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/wZXhd Access Date:27.02.2026.

25 Российский совет по международным делам (РСМД), *Россия и Африка: перспективы стратегического партнёрства*, Москва: РСМД, 2024, С.12,

https://www.kisa.link/Ongeq Access Date:03.02.2026.

26 BRICS. XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration: BRICS and Africa-Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development and Inclusive Multilateralism. Johannesburg, 23 August 2023,


https://www.kisa.link/WdwBS Access Date:27.02.2026.

27 Андрей Маслов, "Россия в Африке после 2022 года", *Россия в глобальной политике*, Т.24, No.2, 2025, Vol. 225.

transition from the Wagner model to the *Africa Corps* structure is part of Russia's strategy to transform its security presence in Africa into a more centralized instrument that is more closely aligned with its foreign policy objectives, rather than reducing that presence. This transformation demonstrates Moscow's tendency to shift its military activities in Africa away from semi-autonomous security networks toward a security architecture based on direct state control.

From an economic perspective, Russia's presence in Africa appears to be driven not by quantitative expansion but by a logic of geoeconomic selectivity. Cooperation in areas such as nuclear energy projects, energy infrastructure, natural resources, and food security reflects Moscow's objective of establishing long-term relationships of technical dependence and strategic partnerships on the continent. This demonstrates that, unlike China's model of large-scale infrastructure development, Russia's Africa policy is based on a strategy of generating influence in more limited but highly strategic sectors.

In light of these trends, the principal direction of Russia-Africa relations in 2026 and beyond will not be large-scale expansion but rather the institutionalization of existing security networks, the advancement of energy and nuclear projects, and the enhancement of diplomatic coordination with African states through multilateral platforms. Accordingly, Russia's presence in Africa is likely to evolve not into a model of hegemonic expansion in the short term but into a selective yet enduring model of geopolitical presence that balances Western-centered pressures within the global system while providing Moscow with strategic flexibility.



7

Indonesia-Africa Relations in 2025


Kamil Tarhan*

1. Introduction

Indonesia's relationship with African countries began with the 1955 Bandung Conference. The relationship, described as the Bandung Spirit, evolved in a manner that mutually reflected the solidarity between African countries and Indonesia in the post-colonial period. Particularly during President Sukarno's administration, the anti-colonial movement between Indonesia and African countries demonstrates that relations have developed on the basis of mutual respect and solidarity since their historical origins.[1] As of 2015, Indonesia's foreign policy of deepening relations with the Global South has continued into 2025, ushering in a new era of strategic and economic partnership. Indonesia's BRICS membership and the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Spirit highlight the country's emergence as an independent actor in the Global South and its balancing role against Western hegemony. Indonesia's relations with Africa are supported by record-high trade volumes, particularly with countries such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa, as well as by tangible cooperation in areas including critical minerals, the defense industry, and health technologies. In particular, Indonesia's indigenous industrialization model is regarded as a development example for African countries, and the ties between the two regions appear to have been placed on a pragmatic foundation. Furthermore, through platforms such as the G20 and educational scholarship programs, these relations can be

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1 Amie Ceesay, 2026. "Indonesia-Africa Relations Through Constructivist Lens: Reinterpreting Bandung Spirit in Contemporary South-South Diplomacy", *International Journal of Social Science and Human Research,* 2026, 9(1): 393-400.



Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa met in Jakarta on October 22, 2025. (Source: Laman Resmi Presiden Republik Indonesia • Presiden RI)

said to have been reinforced not only economically but also diplomatically and on a people-to-people level. It is possible to position Jakarta's Africa strategy as one of the fundamental pillars of the *Golden Indonesia 2045 Vision*[2] Against this backdrop, this study provides a general analysis of Indonesia-Africa relations during 2025.

2. The 70th Anniversary of the Bandung Spirit

Although 70 years have passed since the *Bandung Conference,* Indonesia's relations with African countries have continued to develop within a framework of mutual cooperation while preserving the original spirit of the conference. For the Global South, the Bandung Spirit represents not only a historical commemoration but also a strategic compass and a call for reform in the face of contemporary global crises.[3] The principal motivation that brought together the newly

2 I Putu Hedi Sasrawan, 2025. "Toward Golden Indonesia 2045: Policy Shifts, Governance Challenges, and Future Directions", *Asian Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting*, 2025, 25(8): 412-20.

3 Mark P. Stadler, '2025. "Remembering the 1955 Conference that Shaped Decolonial Solidarity and Still Echoes Today", *EuropeanLEFT*,

https://www.kisa.link/FWgyT, Access Date: 20.02.2026.

independent African and Asian states participating in the Bandung Conference was their shared experience of colonialism and their desire to pursue an independent path of development. The conference also took place under the shadow of the nuclear threat and global tensions created by the Cold War. In this environment, Sukarno emphasized that reason, solidarity, and peace should take precedence over fear. Although the risk of war and nuclear conflict was extremely high, the anticipated crises did not materialize during the conference; instead, diplomacy and dialogue came to the forefront. Overall, Bandung became a symbol of peace, cooperation, and the collective will to act together despite the prevailing global crisis.[4] The contemporary significance of the Bandung Conference continues to shape relations between African countries and Indonesia across several key areas.

2.1. Global Governance Reform and Multipolarity

Indonesia continues to represent opposition to Western-centered hierarchies and the pursuit of a more equitable, inclusive, and multipolar world order.[5] It advances this objective through its active participation in international organizations such as BRICS. Together with South Africa in particular, Indonesia amplifies the voice of the Global South through platforms such as BRICS and the G20, using the Bandung Spirit as a lever.[6] Although the envisioned order has not yet been fully realized, the Bandung Spirit continues to serve as a source of inspiration for the continuity of multilateralism.[7]

2.2. Cooperation against Emerging Challenges

In the face of the political crises of the 21st century, Indonesia as a member of the Global South places considerable importance on cooperation with African countries in areas such as climate change, the energy transition, food security, and digital sovereignty.[8] In the fields of energy and climate, coalitions such as IBSA+Indonesia offer a Global South-led model for the energy transition by transcending traditional North-South hierarchies.[9] Moreover, as digitalization increasingly threatens state sovereignty, developing countries have sought to adopt common positions on issues such as artificial intelligence governance and data sovereignty in order to prevent becoming subjects of technological colonialism.[10] Indonesia's domestic industrialization policy serves as both an incentive and a model for African countries seeking to transition from exporting raw materials derived from critical minerals to value-added production.[11]

2.3. Transition from Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment

The principle of non-alignment that characterized the Cold War era has evolved into the more pragmatic strategy of multi-alignment, or hedging. Coun-

4 Leyatt Betre and Zia Mian, 2025, "The Strength of Our Weakness": Bandung at 70, *Journal for Peace And Nuclear Disarmament*, 2025, 8(2): 468 472.

5 Piyush Verma, "'IBSA+Indonesia' can be a new Global South-led force in climate and energy leadership", 18.08.2025, *World Economic Forum*,

https://www.kisa.link/rknfb, Access Date: February 15, 2026.

6 Mutia Salsabilla and Bambang Wahyu Nugroho, "Analysis of the Impact of Indonesia's Membership in BRICS: Opportunities and Challenges in the Global Era", 2025, *Journal of Social Research,* 4(11): 3030-3039.

7 Dima Al-Khatib, Nabil Fahmy et. al., Bandung at 70: Multilateralism in a New Era of Multi-Alignment", 2025, *Körber Stiftung*,

https://www.kisa.link/FDmYq, Access Date: 20.02.2026

8 Naek Tua Pasaribu et. al., "Green Arms Race: Indonesia's Critical Minerals and its Sprint for Renewable Energy Sovereignty", 2025, *Security Intelligence Terrorism Journal (SITJ*), 2(1): 27-47.

9 Benita Sashia Jayanti, 2025, "Can Indonesia's Climate Diplomacy and Clean Energy Benefit Much From BRICS Membership?", 18.04.2025, *Global South Forum*,

https://www.kisa.link/FDmYq, Access Date: 24.02.2026.

10 Yang Liu AND WenLong Song, 2026, "Navigating digital colonialism: Sovereignty models and development paths in the Global South", *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 2026, 13, 102546.

11 Bradford Simmons and Julien Marcilly, 2025, "Resource nationalism and downstreaming: Lessons for African producers of critical minerals from Indonesia", *Atlantic Council Africa Center*, 31.01.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/coPIf, Access Date: 25.02.2026.

tries of the Global South no longer merely reject choosing sides between competing blocs; they also seek to establish simultaneous partnerships among equals with both the West and alternative centers of power such as BRICS in pursuit of their own development priorities.[12]

3. Institutionalization of Africa-Asia Relations

The 70th anniversary of Bandung is regarded as an opportunity to deepen relations between ASEAN and the African Union (AU). During this process, countries such as South Africa and Morocco have served as ASEAN's gateways to African markets, while Indonesia has positioned itself as a reliable technology and investment partner for Africa's industrialization efforts. Indonesia's policies toward Africa appear to be focused on joint action for the shared future of both sides. Indonesia has consistently declared in international platforms that it views Africa as an important part of a shared future and that it is determined to build that future together with Africa.[13]

4. The Increasing Strength of Indonesia-Africa Relations

President Prabowo Subianto appears to have played a particular role in further strengthening Indonesia's relations with Africa in 2025. Prabowo signaled that he would pursue deeper relations with Africa as soon as he took office, which was encapsulated by his statement, "I see Africa as a continent close to my heart."[14] After taking office, Prabowo emphasized that relations between Africa and Indonesia had fallen short of their potential. In his view, it is possible to move relations with African countries beyond ideological symbolism and establish them on a realistic foundation based on tangible economic interests and strategic calculations.[15]

One of the most significant developments in Indonesia's foreign policy toward Africa has been its BRICS membership. Having become a full member of BRICS in January 2025, Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian country to join the organization. This decision to join the ten-member intergovernmental bloc is regarded as a major step taken during the Prabowo administration. In general, it is important for strengthening relations with countries of the Global South and, more specifically, with African countries such as South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia.[16] Likewise, this membership contributed to the deepening of relations with South Africa within the same year. During his official visit to Jakarta in October 2025, South African President Ramaphosa reaffirmed with Prabowo their commitment to increasing bilateral trade and investment, strengthening

12 Nathan Gardels, "From Bandung to BRICS+", Noema, 08.09.2023,
https://www.kisa.link/dyniB, Access Date: 21.02.2026.

13 Dani Aswara, "VP Gibran Discusses Investment, Visa Facilitation at Indonesia-Africa CEO Forum 2025", 22.11.2025, *Tempo English*,
https://www.kisa.link/OiRKm, Access Date: 06.03.2026.

14 Prabowo Subianto, "The Road Ahead for Indonesia—One of the Fastest Growing Economies in Asia | Opinion", 12.06.2024, *Newsweek*,
https://www.kisa.link/feQPF, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

15 Allan Dharma Saputra, "Beyond Bandung: Indonesia's Evolving Africa Policy Under Prabowo", 13.12. 2024, *The Diplomat*,
https://www.kisa.link/BBhDu, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

16 Gemma King, "Six Months of Prabowo: Indonesia's Diplomatic Charm Offensive", 05.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/eYPdW, Access Date: 13.03.2026.

multilateral cooperation, and deepening coordination within the frameworks of BRICS and the G20.[17]

Prabowo's special attention on the Global South was also evident at the 2025 *G20 Summit* held in South Africa. Concurrently with the G20 Summit, the *Indonesia-Africa CEO Forum* was organized. At international forums, official statements emphasized the reinforcement of investment opportunities, boosting trade, and the strategic deepening of bilateral relations.[18]

Beyond its general Africa policy, establishing close relations and engaging in economic cooperation with all countries on the African continent has become a priority for Indonesia. A concrete example of this is Angola's opening of an embassy in Jakarta in May 2025.[19] It has been stated that trade conducted through the energy sector will be expanded to encompass all areas of the economy.[20] Another example is the initiatives launched regarding visa liberalization with South Africa. It appears that both countries have initiated such an undertaking from a strategic perspective in order to strengthen bilateral and commercial ties.[21]

5. Conclusion

Although Indonesia's relations with the African continent have a history spanning 70 years, they have yet to reach their full potential. However, with Prabowo's rise to power, the deepening of policies toward Africa has come onto the agenda. At present, after Asia, Africa hosts the second-largest share of Indonesia's overseas investments.[22] In line with its *Golden Indonesia 2045* goals, the Indonesian government seeks to become a more influential and inclusive actor at the global level and, to this end, accords a special place to the African continent in strengthening international cooperation. Accordingly, initiatives are underway to enhance bilateral relations and trade with many African countries. Beyond economic developments, Indonesia's principal political stance toward Africa is anchored in its belief that a non-Western international system can be created by the Global South. Although Indonesia acknowledges the liberal international order and its fundamental principles, it has developed policies advocating the need for this system to change. It prefers to preserve strategic autonomy and support continuity in its national vision regarding the international order.[23] This approach provides a critical framework for understanding Indonesia's multilateral coordination with African countries.

17 *APA NEWS*, "South Africa, Indonesia to deepen political, trade ties", 22.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/rpSXq, Access Date: 14.03.2026.

18 Dani Aswara, "VP Gibran Discusses Investment, Visa Facilitation at Indonesia-Africa CEO Forum 2025", 22.11.2025*, Tempo English,*
https://www.kisa.link/OiRKm, Access Date: 06.03.2026.


19 *VOI*, "Angola Opens Embassy In Indonesia, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tata: Strengthen Bilateral And South-South Cooperation", 01.05.2025,
https://voi.id/en/news/479416, Access Date: 14.03.2026.

20 Antara, "Indonesia, Angola share great economic cooperation potential: Minister, 01.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/tBUxS, Access Date: 14.03.2026.

21 Theressia Silalahi, "VP Gibran Pushes Deeper Africa Ties, Announces Visa-Free Deal with South Africa", 22.11.2025, *Jakarta Globe.ID*,
https://www.kisa.link/PQLzl, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

22 *OECD*, "Development Co-operation Profiles: Indonesia", 11.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/iXiiy, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

23 Ralf Emmers, "Continuity and non-alignment shape Indonesia's worldview". In Competing visions of international order Responses to US power in a fracturing world, Eds: Leslie Vinjamuri et al., *Chatham House*,
https://www.kisa.link/vLFyu, Access Date: 20.03.2026.



8

BRICS-Africa Relations in 2025

Yücel Bulut*

1. Introduction

In the post-Cold War period, efforts led by Russia drew Russia, China, and India closer, with the aim of reducing excessive dependence on the West and establishing a new multipolar world order in economic and political terms, culminating in the formation of the first BRIC group in 2009, with the inclusion of Brazil in 2008. Initially, the group consisted of countries from Asia and South America, while the first African country to join was South Africa, which officially became a member in 2011, giving rise to the current acronym BRICS.[1] Subsequently, the idea of expanding BRICS was introduced through China's initiatives, and by 2017 the BRICS+ concept[2] had emerged, with the objective of strengthening and making more effective South-South cooperation among developing countries with additional partners. Within this framework, the *16th BRICS Summit*, held in Kazan, Russia, in 2024, marked the organization's largest expansion to date with the admission of four new BRICS+ members, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. In the same year, the Partner Country status was introduced to broaden BRICS activities and cooperation by allowing non-member states to benefit from the advantages offered by the platform.[3] Subsequently, during the meetings held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 2025, nine countries, including the African states of Nigeria and Uganda, were granted Partner Country status.[4]

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1 "The History of BRICS", BRICS Council, https://l24.im/3B5t, Access Date: 01.03.2026.

2 "Wang Yi: 'BRICS Plus' Pattern to Fully Release Vitality of BRICS Cooperation", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 06.06.2024, https://l24.im/K3mLq, Access Date: 07.03.2026.

3 Vinay Kaura, "Expansion of BRICS", Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 37(1/2), 2024, p. 165.

4 "Nine Nations Announced as BRICS 'Partner Countries'", BRICS Brasil, 17.01.2025, https://l24.im/GfWIM, Access Date: 07.03.2026.



The 17th BRICS Summit was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 6-7, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

The year 2025 marked a period in which African countries, within the framework of BRICS' expanding structure, deepened their cooperation with developing economies and became more visible in discussions on global governance. Sustainable development, more equitable representation in the international system, and humanitarian crises such as the situation in Gaza were among the prominent agenda items at BRICS meetings throughout the year. During this period, several African countries became more actively involved in the political and economic cooperation mechanisms offered by the platform as BRICS members or partner countries. In this context, the article examines BRICS-Africa relations, the position of African countries within

the platform, and the principal areas of cooperation in light of developments in 2025.

2. Ethiopia's First High-Level BRICS Participation

Under Brazil's presidency in 2025, BRICS introduced the theme "Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance,"[5] which is of particular relevance to African countries, aiming with it to strengthen economic ties and to mobilize financing to combat climate change.[6] The first high-level BRICS meeting of 2025 was held in Brazil on March 28. This meeting became one of the first high-level platforms at which Ethiopia, having joined BRICS in 2024, participated as a full member state. Ethiopia was represented by its Ambassador to Brazil, Leulseged Abebe, and participated in BRICS decision-making processes as a full member for the first time.

The meeting addressed the Israel-Palestine conflict as well as developments in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, emphasizing the contributions of institutions such as the AU and IGAD to the resolution of these issues. Ethiopia, for its part, underscored the importance of safeguarding trade security in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea while reaffirming its support for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and a two-state solution.[7] The thirty-five-point joint declaration issued at this meeting was subsequently expanded and adopted at the 2025 *BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting*.

3. BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting of Member States and African Countries

BRICS held one of its most significant meetings of 2025 during the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of Member States, convened in Rio de Janeiro on April 28-29, 2025. The meeting addressed global and regional developments and once again reaffirmed the commitment to strengthening the core areas of BRICS strategic partnership: politics and security, the economy and finance, and cultural and people-to-people exchange.

Paragraph 8 of the meeting declaration stated support for the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration, which call for increasing the represen-

5 "Brazilian Presidency", BRICS Brasil 2025, 05.02.2025,
https://l24.im/uW2n7Uw, Access Date: 08.03.2026.

6 "Brazil Takes over the BRICS Presidency in 2025", Planalto, 11.02.2025,
https://l24.im/TKodE, Access Date: 09.03.2026.

7 "BRICS Meeting on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Held in Brasilia", Ethiopian Embassy Canada, 04.04.2025,
https://l24.im/dKkrcZ, Access Date: 09.03.2026.

tation and influence of African, Asian, and Latin American countries within the United Nations (UN) and seek to address inequalities in representation. Paragraph 15 emphasized support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and, in this context, highlighted the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice in the case brought by South Africa against Israel. It stated that these provisional measures reaffirmed Israel's obligation to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance in Gaza. The declaration also expressed support for Libya's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity.

4. BRICS and African Countries in 2025

South Africa

The annual summit, the group's largest and most significant meeting, was held in Rio de Janeiro on July 6-7, 2025, under the auspices of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Alongside South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia also participated in the summit, marking the first time that three African countries attended as full members.

President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa, one of the founding countries whose initials form the BRICS acronym, stated that through its relationship with BRICS, the country seeks to achieve "a better South Africa and a better Africa." He further explained that South Africa's objectives within BRICS are to support the country's growth and development, strengthen cooperation in the fields of politics, security, the economy, and culture, and contribute to a global governance system that is more equitable, balanced, and representative.[8] At the same time, South Africa emphasized that Israel's actions in Palestine must come to an end and once again called for enhancing Africa's influence in international affairs and supporting the continent's development.

Egypt

Egypt, which first participated in the BRICS summit as a full member under the leadership of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2024, was represented at the 2025 summit by Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly. Egypt has contributed approximately $240 million to the BRICS New Development Bank to date and is expected to contribute a total of $1.2 billion over the next six years.[9] During the summit, Egypt emphasized the importance of projects

8 "President Cyril Ramaphosa Arrives in Brazil to Participate in XVII BRICS Summit", The Presidency Republic of South Africa, 06.07.2025, https://l24.im/rPKfzT, Access Date: 09.03.2026.

9 "The BRICS", State Information Service Your Gateway to Egypt, 27.09.2025, https://l24.im/W6o79, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

and economic cooperation to be carried out through the New Development Bank. It also called for stronger cooperation among the central banks of BRICS member states and for expanding the use of local currencies in international payments. Egypt argued that such measures would constitute an important step toward easing the debt burden of developing countries and facilitating their access to financing, while stressing that the New Development Bank should provide greater support to these countries, particularly through infrastructure investments.[10]

Ethiopia

Ethiopia was represented by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at its first BRICS Leaders' Summit as a member state. Throughout the summit, Ethiopia emphasized in various meetings that the international system should be reformed to make it more equitable and inclusive. It further stressed the need for stronger representation of Africa and Global South countries in international decision-making mechanisms, as well as enhanced cooperation in the fields of climate finance, health, artificial intelligence, and the economy.[11]

In addition, bilateral meetings were held on the sidelines of the summit, including a meeting between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Chinese Premier Li Qiang. During the meeting, Li Qiang stated that the two countries stand ready to expand trade and investment and will continue supporting the sustainable development of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. He further noted that Ethiopia occupies a leading position in China-Africa cooperation thanks to the strong relationship that has existed between the two countries for more than fifty-five years, and highlighted China's zero-tariff policy toward African countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations.[12]

5. BRICS Partner Countries: Uganda and Nigeria

In 2025, Nigeria and Uganda were among the nine countries from across the world, including two from Africa, invited to the BRICS Summit under the "Partner Country" category. Although these countries do not possess voting rights, they obtained the right to participate in the summit, attend its sessions, and endorse its declarations.[13]

10 "Egypt Calls for Stronger Central Bank Cooperation, Local Currency Use at BRICS Summit", Daily News Egypt, 07.07.2025, https://l24.im/SdJCVh, Access Date: 09.03.2026.

11 "Ethiopia Calls for Key Reforms at BRICS Summit", Ethiopian Embassy Your Gateway to Ethiopia, https://l24.im/KkV0PB, Access Date: 18.03.2026.

12 Africa News Redaction, "China and Ethiopia Reaffirm Alliance at Meeting on Sidelies of BRICS Summit", Africanews, 07.07.2025, https://l24.im/io8UdZv Access Date: 15.03.2026.

13 BRICS Brasil, op. cit.

Prior to the summit, Uganda was represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Odongo Jeje Abubakar at the *Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs* held on April 28-29, 2025. During bilateral meetings with Brazil, Uganda stated that it attaches importance to the partnership opportunities, economic relations, and technological prospects offered by BRICS and expressed its support for Global South cooperation.[14] Subsequently, Uganda participated in the *Leaders' Summit* held on July 6-7, 2025, for the first time as a partner country, led by Vice President Jessica Alupo.[15]

With Nigeria's accession to BRICS as a partner country in 2025, the organization also expanded into West Africa. As Africa's most populous country, with a population of approximately 220 million, Nigeria is expected to benefit from the New Development Bank in the areas of the economy, infrastructure, and climate, while simultaneously contributing economically by supplying energy and raw materials to major economies such as China and India and enhancing the region's international visibility.[16]

6. Extraordinary BRICS Meeting

The final major development before Brazil transferred the BRICS presidency to India[17] took place in September. At the invitation of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, BRICS leaders convened an extraordinary virtual meeting on September 8, 2025, to discuss the current state of the global economy, ongoing wars and political tensions, and ways to enhance trade relations among member states. Representatives of all nine full member countries participated in the meeting. Presiding over the session, Lula da Silva emphasized the importance of diversification and Global South solidarity in response to unipolar trade pressures, an approach that was supported by the other participating leaders.[18] Within this context, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa called for the development of joint solutions to global geopolitical crises and the establishment of a more inclusive and equitable system for the Global South, while reiterating South Africa's support for a two-state solution to the Palestinian issue.[19]

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, for his part, drew attention to double standards and violations of international law within the international system, emphasizing that BRICS is a platform that strengthens multilateralism. He also underscored the importance of economic cooperation among

14 Rogers Atukunda, "Uganda, Brazil Pledge Stronger Ties at BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting", SoftPower News, 29.04.2025, https://l24.im/lRf7gG, Access Date: 18.03.2026.

15 Walugembe, "VP Alupo Attends Uganda's First BRICS Summit in Brazil", Monitor, 07.07.2025, https://l24.im/XWZA, Access Date: 19.03.2026.

16 Hans Dieter Holtzmann and Akim Van der Voort, "BRICS: BRICS 2025", Fredrich Naumann Foundation, 28.01.2025, https://l24.im/UE30heR, Access Date: 18.03.2026.

17 "Brasil Hands Over BRICS Presidency to India", BRICS Brasil 2025, 15.12.2025, https://l24.im/MyTDI, Access Date: 19.03.2026.

18 "BRICS Nations Convene for Extraordinary Virtual Summit", TV BRICS, 08.09.2025, https://l24.im/Jej3bR, Access Date: 18.03.2026.

19 "President Cyril Ramaphosa: Extraordinary BRICS Leaders Meeting", South African Government, 08.09.2025, https://l24.im/Mk3Y9L, Access Date: 19.03.2026.


BRICS countries and highlighted the need for reform of the international financial system. Strongly criticizing Israel's attacks in Gaza, el-Sisi called for a ceasefire, increased humanitarian assistance, and the recognition of the State of Palestine. He further stated that Egypt would play an active role in the reconstruction process and reaffirmed its support for a two-state solution.[20]

7. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a period under Brazil's leadership in which African countries sought to make their voices heard more effectively within BRICS, being represented by a total of five countries (three full members and two partner countries) out of the platform's nine participating African and partner states. Within this framework, despite the United States characterizing BRICS as "anti-American," African countries sought to expand their cooperation with BRICS without undermining their relations with Washington, while simultaneously pursuing alternative sources of financing and developing economic channels independent of the West.

Throughout the year, African countries also received support for increasing their visibility and representation in other areas of the international system through their participation in and cooperation within BRICS. This development strengthens the future potential of African countries to attract greater investment from BRICS members such as China and India while also presenting a promising outlook for the implementation of new projects through the New Development Bank in areas such as technology, trade, and climate.

20 "President El-Sisi Participates in BRICS Extraordinary Summit", State Information Service Your Gateway to Egypt, https://l24.im/vuHce, Access Date: 20.03.2026.



9

Brazil-Africa Relations in 2025

Segâh Tekin*

1. Introduction

Historical and demographic ties, in addition to sharing the Atlantic maritime space and Brazil's aspiration to become an influential diplomatic and economic actor on the global stage, particularly among countries of the Global South, are the driving factors behind Brazil's current foreign policy toward Africa. Brazil's turn toward Africa within the framework of its policy of increasing cooperation with developing countries, initiated in the 1970s, laid the foundations for the contemporary dynamics of these relations. During this period, the independence of Portugal's African colonies, the opportunities the region offered particularly in the oil sector which brought the two sides of the Atlantic closer together both economically and in terms of security, as well as demographic ties, played an important role in this opening. Under the administration of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the Workers' Party (PT), who was elected President for two consecutive terms beginning in 2003, Brazil emerged both as a regional power in South America and as a rising global power. Combining this position with ambitious foreign policy objectives, Brazil became a significant diplomatic and economic power in Africa. The country's South-South Cooperation (SSC) policy toward Africa, initiated in the 1970s, was updated, and the scope and budget of technical cooperation assistance were expanded. However, beginning in 2013, Brazil's economic and political problems, Jair Bolsonaro's pursuit of a foreign policy agenda that contrasted sharply with Lula's during his presidency, and corruption investigations involving several Brazilian companies operating in Africa

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led to a reduction in the resources allocated to diplomatic initiatives as well as to the country's economic engagement with the region. During this period, the ASPA and ASA initiatives, launched under Brazil's leadership during the Lula administration with the aim of bringing together South American countries with the African Union and the Arab League countries, also became ineffective. However, Lula's return to the presidency for a third term in 2023 led to the revitalization of the PT's foreign policy objectives, and Africa once again became one of Brazil's priority regions after 2023.

This study will examine the major developments of 2025 in Brazil's relations with Africa within the framework of the country's bilateral relations with North Africa, the Portuguese-speaking African countries, and the African countries with which Brazil cooperates, which together constitute the three pillars of Brazil's Africa policy.

2. Brazil-North Africa Relations

Relations with North Africa are important not only for Brazil's Africa policy but also for its Middle East policy, which aims to strengthen ties with the Arab countries. Having become an observer member of the Arab League in 2003, Brazil has sought both to strengthen relations with the countries of the region in order to contribute to resolving global diplomatic issues, particularly the Palestinian issue, and to develop its diplomatic and economic relations. In 2025, Brazil's relations with North Africa were primarily focused on increasing trade volume and promoting tourism.

Brazil's principal partners in North Africa are Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco, with which it has been strengthening its relations. As one of the world's leading producers of agricultural and livestock products, Brazil also holds a significant share of the processed food market and has long been one of the world's leading exporters of Halal food products. In this context, the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East are among Brazil's target markets. Egypt, in particular, is of strategic importance to Brazil because of its position as a gateway to Africa and the Middle East. Accordingly, Brazil participated in Food Africa 2025, Africa's largest food exhibition held in Egypt, with a delegation that included eight food and beverage companies producing Halal products.[1] In 2025, Egypt was Brazil's largest export market in Africa and its second-largest market among Arab League countries after the United Arab Emirates. Brazil's initiatives targeting the Halal products market are not limited to food produced for export. Municipal-level Halal tourism initiatives have also been launched in Brazil, targeting North Africa and the Arab countries in order to increase the interest of Muslim tourists in visiting Brazil. Owing to its geopolitical location, Morocco is of particular importance not only for transportation between Africa and Brazil

1 Marcos Carrieri, "Brazilian companies join Egypt trade fair", ANBA (Brazil-Arab News Agency), 27.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/nkeIx, Access Date: 21.03.2026.



The Brazil Africa Forum 2025 was held in São Paulo, Brazil, on November 4–5, 2025. (Source: Brazil Africa Forum 2026)

but also for increasing tourism- and business-related travel. In addition to being a destination for Brazilian travelers, it also serves as a transit hub for onward travel to other African countries. In 2025, an increase was observed in reciprocal travel by tourists and business delegations between the two countries. Royal Air Maroc, which had suspended its flights to Brazil during the COVID-19 pandemic, resumed operations in December 2024, and the number of flights was increased in 2025 in response to growing demand.[2]

As part of the trade mission visits to Africa organized since 2023 under the coordination of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, and ApexBrasil, Morocco and Egypt were visited between April 7 and 10, 2025.[3] In addition to the technical assistance provided to Algeria through ongoing SSC projects, Algeria is currently Brazil's second-largest trading partner in North Africa. Trade volume between the two countries exceeded $3 billion in 2025, and meetings at the level of diplomats and trade delegations were held throughout the year to further develop diplomatic and commercial relations.[4]

3. Brazil and Portuguese-Speaking African Countries

Today, more than 55 percent of Brazil's population (112.9 million people) consists of individuals who identify themselves as being of African descent or as people of mixed ancestry with African heritage.[5] E As a former Portuguese colony, Brazil is a founding member of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), where it shares membership with the Portuguese-speaking African countries of Angola, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Among these countries, Angola is Brazil's strategic partner. Brazil was represented at the 15th Conference of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP, held in Guinea-Bissau on July 18, 2025, by the Secretary for Africa and the Middle East of Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Serving as a platform for the activities of the *Global Alliance Against Hunger and*

2 Marcos Carrieri, "Brasil busca investimentos no turismo", ANBA, 20.03.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/bPyyB Access Date: 20.03.2026.

3 Marc Daher, "Brasil Fortalece Laços Comerciais com Marrocos e Egito e Amplia Agenda Agropecuária no Norte da África", Centro Halal da America Latina,
https://www.kisa.link/UoePh

4 ANBA, "Brasil e Argélia têm reunião de consulta política", 26.11. 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/GUPPr Access Date: 21.03.2026.

5 "Maior presença de negros no país reflete reconhecimento racial", Agencia Brasil, 24.12.2023,
https://www.kisa.link/ZgGhZ, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

Poverty Initiative, launched by Brazil under the G20 framework and including all CPLP member states, the conference focused on the themes of food security and sustainable development.[6] This initiative also constituted the central theme of the *13th Brazil-Africa Forum*, held in São Paulo on November 4-5, 2025. At the forum, Brazilian diplomats reiterated the Lula administration's intention to once again make Africa a priority in the country's foreign policy. The forum was attended by the Vice President of Tanzania, the Deputy Prime Ministers of Ethiopia and Eswatini, and the ministers of agriculture from 40 African countries.[7]

However, following the military coup carried out in Guinea-Bissau, the rotating chair of the CPLP, on November 26, 2025, Brazil issued an official statement the same day calling for a return to democracy in the country.[8] To assess the developments in Guinea-Bissau, the *First Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the CPLP* was convened via videoconference on December 16, 2025. At the meeting, where President Lula represented Brazil, participants called for respect for the election results, and Guinea-Bissau's participation in CPLP activities was suspended.[9] Mozambique, the CPLP country receiving the greatest level of Brazilian support under SSC, was visited by President Lula on November 24, 2025, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral relations. As part of the visit, a business forum bringing together entrepreneurs from Brazil and Mozambique was also organized.[10]

4. Regional Actors in Africa and Brazil

Brazil attaches particular importance to its relations with South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria, which are among Africa's largest economies. Relations with Egypt are primarily evaluated within the broader context of Brazil's relations with the Arab world and North Africa. In relations with South Africa, Brazil's strategic partner, cooperation within BRICS, the G20, and the IBSA initiative stands out. In 2025, President Lula visited South Africa to attend the G20 Summit held in the country. Trade volume between the two countries reached $2.3 billion in 2025.[11]

In addition to its economic size, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and the largest military power in Sub-Saharan Africa. The ASA initiative, launched under the leadership of Brazil and Nigeria as a cooperation framework between the African Union and UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), did not prove to be long-lasting. Nevertheless, Brazil has continued to maintain its interest in the region through bilateral partnerships.

President Bola Tinubu of Nigeria, Brazil's Strategic Partner,[12] was received by President Lula during his official visit to Brazil on August 25, 2025. During the meeting, Lula reaffirmed Brazil's commitment to supporting Africa's devel-

6 BRASIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. "Nota à Imprensa Nº 326, XV Conferência de Chefes de Estado e de Governo da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa – CPLP", 17.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/UZQnE Access Date: 02.03.2026.

7 Brazil Africa Forum 2025, "Speech by Mr. Carlos Sérgio Sobral Duarte | Secretary for Africa and the Middle East of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil",
https://www.kisa.link/MRLUQ Access Date: 16.03.2026.

8 BRASIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. "Nota à Imprensa Nº 566, Golpe de Estado na Guiné-Bissau", 26.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/kYtUs Access Date: 07.03.2026.

9 Gisele Rech, "Guiné-Bissau é suspensa da CPLP após golpe de Estado", Público, 16.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/sJBYj Access Date: 26.03.2026.

10 Andreia Verdelio, "Lula arrives in South Africa for G20 Summit", Agencia Brasil, 21.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/yxAue Access Date: 26.03.2026.

11 BRASIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. "Visita de Estado do Presidente da República da África do Sul, Cyril Ramaphosa-Brasília", 09.03.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/tSvSA Access Date: 16.03.2026.

12 BRASIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. "República Federal da Nigéria", 11.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/TUKMt, Access Date: 17.03.2026.

opment and noted that bilateral trade, which had amounted to $10 billion in 2014, had declined to $2 billion in 2024 and needed to be increased. Another point emphasized by both leaders was the expansion of Brazil's technical cooperation assistance to Nigeria. During the talks, bilateral agreements were signed in various fields, including civil aviation, and it was decided that the Nigerian airline Air Peace would launch direct flights between São Paulo and Lagos. Within the framework of combating transnational crime, Brazil announced that it would appoint a police attaché to Nigeria. Memoranda of understanding were also signed to establish consultation mechanisms addressing regional and international developments, including economic relations, and to enhance cooperation in the fields of science and technology.[13] As part of the visit, the *Brazil-Nigeria Business Forum* was held, bringing together representatives of the business communities from both countries. Brazil's current exports to Nigeria consist primarily of sugar and sugar molasses. Brazil aims to expand its exports in the areas of agricultural and food production machinery and mineral fuels.[14] The Brazil–Nigeria Strategic Dialogue Mechanism, whose first meeting was held in 2013, convened its second meeting in Abuja in 2025, after an interval of more than a decade, with the participation of Brazilian Vice President Geraldo Alckmin.[15] The fact that President Tinubu's visit was also the first presidential-level visit from Nigeria to Brazil since 2012[16] demonstrates the desire of both countries to inject new momentum into their bilateral relations.

On May 23, 2025, a memorandum of understanding was signed in Brazil between the Brazilian Agency for Managing Guarantee Funds (ABGF) and the African Trade & Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI) to promote mutual trade between Brazil and Africa. The memorandum included measures to provide financial support to Brazilian companies in order to increase bilateral trade, which had exceeded $15 billion in 2024, representing a 20 percent increase over the previous year.[17]

5. Conclusion

The year 2025 represented a continuation of Brazil's approach toward Africa, building upon the policy of closer engagement with the continent initiated in the 1970s and, in particular, the policy of attaching special importance to relations with Africa that has been pursued since 2003. However, the momentum achieved between 2003 and 2015 slowed due both to Brazil's domestic economic and political challenges and to the deprioritization of Africa during the Bolsonaro administration. The Africa policy that Lula sought to revitalize after 2023 was pursued in 2025 largely with a focus on economic objectives. As of 2025, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, and Morocco – the five largest economies in Africa, respectively – were also the countries on which Brazil concentrated its efforts to strengthen bilateral relations.


13 Andreia,Verdélio, "Brasil e Nigéria firmam acordos bilaterais durante visita de Estado", Agencia Brasil, 25.08.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/zWwsg, Access Date: 11.03.2026.

14 SEBRAE (O Serviço Brasileiro de Apoio às Micro e Pequenas Empresas), 22.08.2025, "Brasil e Nigéria visam fortalecer laços comerciais durante Fórum Empresarial em Brasília",
https://www.kisa.link/fYzKg Access Date: 18.03.2026.

15 ApexBrasil, "Brasil e Nigéria reforçam parcerias em setores estratégicos", 25.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/sUGil Access Date: 22.03.2026.

16 BRASIL. Ministério das Relações Exteriores. "República Federal da Nigéria", 11.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/TUKMt, Access Date: 17.03.2026.

17 BRASIL. Comex. "Parceria amplia garantias de crédito para exportações entre Brasil e países africanos", 23.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/NnzHl Access Date: 12.03.2026.



10

France-Africa Relations in 2025

Halil Kaya*

1. Introduction

France, which left indelible marks on Africa's colonial past, extended its colonial expansionism, which began with the occupation of Algeria in 1830, to nearly half of the continent over the course of a century. For France, which maintained its status as the most privileged actor in the region through the *Françafrique*[1] mechanisms even in the post-decolonization period, 2025 marked the beginning of a strategic dismantling of this historical legacy. In the period following decolonization in Africa during the 1960s, the so-called independent but essentially dependent states first emerged as a result of policies developed by France during the De Gaulle era. These states not only provided France with strategic energy resources, raw materials, and labor but also served French interests for many years as defenders of French foreign policy at the United Nations (UN).[2] Today, however, France is no longer the sole decisive power in Africa, particularly in West Africa, where its former colonies are located. France is confronting the possibility of becoming merely an ordinary partner in Africa in the face of rising demands for regional sovereignty and intensifying multipolar competition. The military operation it launched in Mali in 2013 under the name Operation Serval and expanded across the entire Sahel in 2014 under the name Operation Barkhane

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1 The term *Françafrique* is used to describe the political, military, economic and cultural hegemony of France in the African continent.

2 Gilles Manceron, "La fin de la Françafrique?", *Droits&Libértés* n.209, Nisan 2025, s.25, https://www.kisa.link/wZZaI Access Date: 09.03.2026.



France handed over the "Camp Geille" military base and the air base at the airport in Dakar to Senegalese authorities. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

came to an end in 2022, while the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)[3] was likewise expelled from the country in 2023. In the case of Mali, the replacement of these two missions by the Russian private military group Wagner,[4] constituted the first indication of France's declining military influence in the region. Accordingly, this article examines the military, economic, and cultural developments recorded in France's relations with African countries in 2025.

2. Towards the End of the Military Presence

France's Operation Barkhane in the Sahel came to an end in 2022. The fact that the operation became associated with incidents amounting to massacres, particularly in Mali[5] nd failed to establish stability in the region after eight years, prompting France to redeploy its forces from Mali to Niger, marked a turning point in the loss of its military weight and legitimacy in

3 Multidimensional Integrated Stability Mission in Mali

4 Fatih Dağ, "Cezayir ile Sahel Devletleri İttifakı Karşı Karşıya: Bir Sınır Anlaşmazlığından Bölgesel Krize mi?", *Orsam*,

https://www.kisa.link/irquQ Access Date: 08.03.2026.

5 "Malide Düğün Bombalamakla Suçlanan Barkhane Operasyonunun Sivil Ölümleri Karnesi Kabarık", *Anadolu Agency*, 07.01.2021,

https://www.kisa.link/IEgqL , Access Date: 07.03.2026.

the region. However, France's military withdrawal from West Africa was not limited to Mali. Indeed, following the military coups that took place shortly thereafter in Niger[6] and Burkina Faso,[7] these countries also terminated their military cooperation agreements with France, thereby bringing the French military presence within their territories to an end. Within the framework of the Alliance of Sahel States, which emerged as a military alliance in September 2023 and was transformed into a confederation by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger on July 6, 2024, a clear stance was adopted against France's military presence in the region. After ending the French military presence, these three states also established a joint battalion to preserve and strengthen their sovereignty in the region.[8] 2025 was marked as the year in which the withdrawal process that had begun in Mali was completed with regard to the French military presence in West Africa. Indeed, France withdrew from Chad before the end of January 2025.[9] In February, it vacated its military base in Abidjan, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire, thereby ending its military presence in the country.[10] On July 17, during a military ceremony, France also announced its withdrawal from Senegal, where it had maintained a presence for more than sixty years.[11]

France's dominance in its former colonial territories, which had continued after independence, collapsed at least from a military perspective as of 2025. France, which already faced antipathy among the peoples of the region because of its status as the former colonial power, also failed to fulfill its role as the region's gendarme. This situation led the countries of the region, adapting to changing dynamics, to turn toward actors and methods that adopted a more aggressive approach to counterterrorism and conducted more successful operations than France. Consequently, the French military withdrawal that began with Mali in 2022 was completed in July 2025 with the abandonment of the military base in Senegal. Thus, France's permanent military infrastructure, established within the framework of a postcolonial security discourse in West Africa and the Sahel after decolonization, was completely dismantled. In fact, apart from a symbolic joint military camp in Gabon and a longstanding base remaining in Djibouti, France has almost no military presence left in Africa. In addition to developments in West Africa, the overthrow of President Andry Rajoelina, who is known to have acquired French citizenship in 2014, following the military coup that took place in Madagascar in October 2025 also demonstrates that France has been losing its influence in other parts of Africa as well. It would not be reasonable to

6 "Coup d'Etat au Niger : la junte « dénonce » des accords militaires avec la France", *Le Monde*, 04.08.2023

https://www.kisa.link/jIBVs, Access Date: 07.03.2026.

7 "French army officially ends operations in Burkina Faso", *France 24*, 20.02.2023

https://www.kisa.link/fcKjQ, Access Date: 07.03.2026.

8 "Burkina Faso leader vows AES alliance crackdown on armed groups in Sahel", *Aljazeera*, 24.12.2025

https://www.kisa.link/dhmQg Access Date: 08.03.2026.

9 "L'armée française rétrocède sa dernière base au Tchad", *Le Monde*, 30.01.2025

https://www.kisa.link/cnieb Access Date: 08.03.2026.

10 "En Côte d'Ivoire, la France rétrocède sa base militaire d'Abidjan au terme d'un long processus", *Le Monde*, February 20, 2025

https://www.kisa.link/oELmH Access Date: 08.03.2026.

11 "La France met fin à plus de six décennies de présence militaire permanente au Sénégal", *RFI*, 17.07.2025

https://www.kisa.link/jlXlT Access Date : 08.03.2026.

characterize this development merely as a process of military restructuring from France's perspective. On the contrary, this withdrawal is a manifestation of the serious erosion of France's influence and the confidence placed in it across Africa.[12]

3. Economic Influence Strategy: Africa Vision and the Future of the CFA Franc

The end of France's military presence on the continent has prompted a policy shift aimed at compensating for its loss of influence through economic, financial, and cultural instruments. As of 2025, France has been compelled to relinquish the gendarme role it had long assumed on the continent and has sought to maintain its presence through economic pragmatism via platforms such as *Africa Vision 2025*. Held in Paris on November 18-19, 2025, this forum emphasized the discourse of building together across various sectors, reflecting an effort to reframe the issue on the basis of partnership with African countries.[13] However, France's economic initiatives are also under competitive pressure from rising actors on the continent such as Türkiye, China, and Russia.[14] The CFA franc,[15] one of the economic remnants of France's colonial past on the continent, has also been the subject of growing debate in recent years. The year 2025 marked a period during which the intention of Senegal's new administration and the member states of the Alliance of Sahel States to withdraw their foreign exchange reserves from the French Treasury and transition to their own regional currencies began to be discussed in concrete terms.[16]

4. From Francophony to Francophobia: Towards the Collapse of Cultural Hegemony

The year 2025 witnessed serious debate over what is perhaps France's most significant source of influence on the continent: the French language. The fact that the status of French, which serves as the official language in many African states, has become the subject of debate signals the beginning of a linguistic decolonization process. Indeed, on March 17, Niger announced its withdrawal from the International Organization of La Francophonie (IOF). This was subsequently followed by Mali and Burkina Faso.[17] However, this move is primarily political in nature, as French continues to occupy a dominant position in many spheres throughout the region.

12 Fatih Dağ, "Fransa'nın Askerî Çekilmesi Post-Kolonyal Afrika'da Bir Dönemin Sonu mu, Stratejik Yeniden Yapılandırma mı?" *Orsam*, https://www.kisa.link/vIaYP Access Date: 09.03.2026.

13 https://www.kisa.link/ZGYWU Access Date: 15.03.2026.

14 Lisa Guilcher, "La diplomatie économique de Macron en Afrique: renouvellement ou repositionnement", *Portail de l'Intelligence économique*, February 10, 2026, Access Date: 14.03.2026.

15 CFA Franc is a currency used by 14 African countries that were former French colonies.

16 Göktuğ Çalışkan, "Adieu franc CFA: la naissance d'une monnaie de combat" *TRT Afrika*, December 16, 2025, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

17 https://www.kisa.link/QPKrr Access Date: 15.03.2026.

France's politics of memory toward Algeria also entered a period of profound deadlock in 2025. The recommendations put forward within the framework of the "memory initiative," coordinated by the historian Benjamin Stora, who is of Algerian Jewish origin, failed to gain acceptance from Algeria. The project included proposals such as opening the archives related to the Algerian War of Independence, establishing a joint memory museum, and commemorating Algerians who fought for France. However, Algeria expected more. Indeed, after Algeria revived the draft law – first introduced in 2010 – that would condemn France for its nuclear weapons tests conducted in Algeria, the memory initiative collapsed, and relations between the two states once again began to deteriorate.[18] Likewise, the crisis between France and Algeria deepened further after France declared its support for Morocco's position on the Western Sahara issue. In addition, Algeria's efforts to prioritize English over French in education demonstrate that France's cultural influence is in decline not only in West Africa but also across the Maghreb.[19]


5. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a period in which France's position as a privileged actor in Africa declined significantly. Although the vacuum created by its military withdrawal has been addressed through pragmatic economic initiatives such as *Africa Vision* 2025, the intense competition on the ground and the gradual weakening of commitment to the French language, one of the principal pillars of France's influence on the continent, indicate that France's influence in Africa has entered a period of structural decline. Indeed, President Macron's remarks on January 6, 2025, accusing African states of ingratitude,[20] demonstrate France's dissatisfaction with its current position in Africa. Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko responded to Macron by alluding to the destabilizing effects of the intervention in Libya during the Sarkozy administration. Nevertheless, despite all these developments, France remains one of the most important actors on the continent. However, 2025 symbolizes a new phase in which France has been compelled to compete on a more equal footing with actors such as Türkiye, China, and Russia. The year 2025 demonstrates that some African states that were once French colonies are now focusing less on constructing a *Francophone* identity and more on building an *empowered* identity that prioritizes the alternatives offered by a multipolar world.

18 Brahim Oumansour, "Tensions entre l'Algérie et la France: une crise à enjeux multiples", *Le Rubicon*, May 14, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/alyxW, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

19 Aksil Ouali, "Algérie: l'anglais devra remplacer le français à l'université dès la rentrée 2025-2026", *Anadolu Agency*,
https://www.kisa.link/TusOR Access Date: 15.03.2026.

20 Citing France's fight against radical terror organizations in West Africa since 2013 and the anti-France policies African countries pursue, Macron accused them of being ungrateful.
https://www.kisa.link/nfYrQ Access Date: 15.03.2026.



11

Germany-Africa Relations in 2025

Ahmet Bülbül*

1. Introduction

The year 2025 stands out as a period in which Germany sought to make its long-articulated claim of a "strategic partnership" in its Africa policy more visible in practice. The *Africa Policy Guidelines* document published by the German Federal Government in January 2025 defined Africa as a region directly linked to Germany's security, prosperity, and global competitiveness. Within this framework, the diplomatic visits, financial commitments, and institutional partnerships undertaken throughout the year constituted concrete manifestations of this strategic repositioning. This article examines how, as of 2025, Germany's Africa policy has been reshaped beyond normative values through the lens of geoeconomic dynamics such as global competition, the energy transition, migration management, and supply chain security.

2. Africa Policy Guidelines

The Africa Policy Guidelines document published by the German Federal Government in January 2025 represented one of the most significant policy initiatives of the year.[1] The document identifies Africa as "one of the new centers of gravity in the multipolar world" due to its young population, economic potential, critical raw materials, and growing influence in multilateral institutions, while recognizing that Germany's own security, prosperity, and political room for maneuver are directly connected to developments in Africa. Although the document emphasizes human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good

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1 The German Federal Government, "Shaping Partnerships Together in a Changing World: Africa Policy Guidelines", *Auswärtiges Amt*, January 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/FtEML, Access Date: 20.01.2025.

governance, this framework is now addressed alongside Germany's concrete interests, including the energy transition, the procurement of critical raw materials, the diversification of supply chains, and the control of irregular migration. In particular, in the context of green hydrogen, renewable energy, and strategic minerals, Africa is positioned as the "external pillar" of Europe's and Germany's energy transition. The document also adopts a comprehensive approach to security and migration management, simultaneously pursuing the objectives of limiting irregular migration through an indirect and institutional security approach within the frameworks of the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU), while also securing the skilled labor from Africa needed by the German labor market.[2]

3. President Steinmeier's Africa Tour

The Africa tour undertaken by German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier in the fall of 2025 constituted one of the most visible diplomatic initiatives of the year. Steinmeier's visits to Cairo on November 1, 2025, Ghana on November 3-4, and Angola on November 5-7 reflected Germany's intention to approach Africa no longer solely within the context of development assistance but also from the perspectives of trade, investment, infrastructure, and supply chains. In particular, the emphasis on "business, trade, and employment" during the Ghana and Angola stops demonstrates Berlin's efforts to place its Africa policy more explicitly on a geoeconomic foundation.[3] Nevertheless, compared with the sustained and multilayered presence of China and Türkiye on the continent, these visits produced only limited impact. In this respect, although these visits reflected growing strategic awareness, they failed to eliminate Germany's structural competitive disadvantages.[4]

4. Ministry of Development's Engagements: Visit to South Africa and the KfW Loan

A Germany's engagement with Africa was also expanded at the ministerial level. The visit by German Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Reem Alabali-Radovan to South Africa on July 23-25, 2025, included concrete engagements in the fields of the energy transition, vocational education, and development cooperation. In a statement issued by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), it was emphasized that the visit was centered on the objective of "strengthening economic cooperation and the strategic partnership" with South Africa, while also drawing attention to the presence of more than 600 German companies and over 100,000 employees in the country. Hydrogen fuel cells, workforce training for the renewable energy sector, and the development of vaccine and pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity were highlighted as concrete areas of cooperation.[5] An assessment by GIZ likewise stated that Germany's Africa policy is framed by the convergence of "global responsibility" with the demands and dynamics emerging from Africa.[6]

2 The German Federal Government, "Shaping Partnerships Together in a Changing World: Africa Policy Guidelines", *Auswärtiges Amt*, January 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/FtEML, Access Date: 20.01.2025.

3 Martina Schwikowski, "Bundespräsident Steinmeier setzt auf mehr Handel mit Afrika", *Deutsche Welle*, 31.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/oQOdR, Access Date: 05.11.2025; Felix Dappah,
"From Ghana to Angola: Germany Deepens African Engagements with Presidential Visits", *The African Courier*, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/ibQzF, Access Date: 08.11.2025.

4 Daniela Vates, "Wie die Bundesregierung die deutschen Interessen in Afrika sieht", *RND*, 08.01.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/BHfcz, Access Date: 15.01.2025;
Rama Yade and Defne Arslan, "To Counter Chinese and Russian Influence in Africa, Turkey Could Be a Decisive Ally for the US and Europe", *Atlantic Council*, 10.09.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/YVOyx , Access Date: 20.09.2025.

5 "Africa Visit: Development Minister Reem Alabali Radovan in South Africa: Strengthen Economic Cooperation and Strategic Partnership", *BMZ*, 23.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/zJegs, Access Date: 28.07.2025.

6 Josephilda Nhlapo-Hlope, "Global Responsibility, African Impetus", *GIZ*, 21.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OvqOB, Access Date: 28.07.2025.



As part of German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier's visit to Ghana, he held bilateral talks with Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama on 3 November 2025. (Source: Official Website of the Presidency of Ghana)

The economic dimension of the visit took on a concrete character with the announcement of a KfW loan worth approximately €500 million on July 25, 2025. This loan aims to support South Africa's energy sector reform process, strengthen grid infrastructure for solar and wind energy, and create a more favorable environment for private investment.[7] This financing is regarded as a strategic instrument not only in terms of climate policies but also for creating new investment and business opportunities for German companies. Nevertheless, such investments progress more slowly than Chinese energy and infrastructure financing because of their commitment to environmental and social standards. This situation clearly illustrates the dilemma of "high principles, limited speed" in Germany's Africa policy.[8]

5. The G20 Summit and High-Level Visits

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Federal Minister of Finance Lars Klingbeil jointly represented Germany at the G20 Summit held in Johannesburg on November 22-23, 2025.[9] The fact that the summit was held on the African continent for the first time symbolically demonstrated Africa's growing weight within the global economy and governance system. The summit focused on issues such as the energy transition, critical raw materials, economic growth, and debt sustainability. In his remarks following the summit, Merz stated that "Africa and Europe are neighbors and need one another," emphasizing that, from Germany's perspective, the continent is not merely a development arena but also an indispensable partner in addressing global challenges.[10] Klingbeil, for his part, stressed the need to strengthen international cooperation in the areas of investment, innovation, and climate finance.[11]

7 Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), "Growth Opportunities through Renewable Energy: KfW Loan Benefits German and South African Companies", 25.07.2025, https://www.kisa.link/tZEty, Access Date: 30.07.2025.

8 Philipp von Carlowitz ve Simon Züfle, "Das chinesische Afrika-Engagement – und die Folgen für die deutsche Wirtschaft und Politik", *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Vol. 105, Noç 6 (2025), pp. 439-443, https://www.kisa.link/sABuQ, Access Date: 15.07.2025.

9 Federal Government of Germany, "G20 Summit in South Africa", 21.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/VVwWK, Access Date: 25.11.2025.

10 Federal Government of Germany, "Press Conference by Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Federal Minister of Finance Lars Klingbeil after the G20 Summit", 23.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/qbXlC, Access Date: 27.11.2025.

11 Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany), "G20 Summit in Johannesburg", 24.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/mlKYC, Access Date: 27.11.2025.

6. Multilateral Partnerships: African Union and ECOWAS

Throughout 2025, Germany preferred to advance through multilateral and institutional partnerships rather than major bilateral initiatives. Following the meetings held in November 2025, Germany pledged additional financial contributions for projects aligned with the AU's *Agenda 2063* priorities and, within this framework, expressed its commitment to strengthening cooperation in the fields of trade, energy, infrastructure, and peace and security.[12] Similarly, the €49 million in assistance provided to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demonstrates Germany's intention to promote stability and economic development in West Africa through institutional channels.[13] Underlying this preference is Germany's strategy of generating legitimacy-based and collective influence in Africa rather than asserting unilateral leadership on the continent.

7.Pressure from the Private Sector: The Call for *"Africa Shift – Afrikawende"*

Another noteworthy development in Germany's Africa policy in 2025 was the growing pressure exerted by the German private sector on the government. In its assessment published on October 16, 2025, the Subsahara-Afrika Initiative der Deutschen Wirtschaft (SAFRI) emphasized that Africa is no longer merely "the market of the future" but has become a critical partner for Germany's economic resilience. It also argued that Germany should reshape its Africa policy in the context of raw material security, supply chain diversification, and new areas of economic growth.[14] Likewise, in its assessment published on September 29, 2025, the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) noted that actors such as China, Türkiye, Russia, and India have been acting more rapidly and with a greater willingness to assume risks on the continent, arguing that Germany's current approach remains inadequate in terms of speed and scale.[15] In light of these assessments, representatives of the private sector called on Berlin to adopt a clearer, bolder, and more coordinated Africa strategy, requesting concrete measures in areas such as financing, risk-sharing, and the reduction of bureaucratic obstacles.[16] These calls are consistent with criticisms of a "planning-implementation gap," which suggest that while Germany has demonstrated strong performance in producing strategic policy documents, it has remained more hesitant in providing the speed, scale, and risk-sharing required by the private sector.[17]

8. Raw Material Cooperation Under the European Union

A significant portion of Germany's Africa policy in 2025 was closely intertwined with the European Union's strategic orientation toward Africa. Partic-

12 African Union, "AU and Germany Deepen Strategic Partnership, Advance Agenda 2063 Priorities", 19.11.2025,
https://au.int/fr/node/45682, Access Date: 25.11.2025.

13 "L'Allemagne met 49 millions d'euros à la disposition de la CEDEAO pour cette fin", *Afriquinfos*, 06.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OuGGZ, Access Date: 12.11.2025.

14 Subsahara-Afrika Initiative der Deutschen Wirtschaft (SAFRI), "Afrikawende jetzt gestalten: SAFRI legt konkrete Forderungen für neue Afrikapolitik vor", 16.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/SIvku, Access Date: 20.10.2025.

15 Thando Sililo ve Heiko Schwiderowski, "Afrikawende jetzt: Deutsche Wirtschaft muss Afrikas Märkte stärker nutzen", *Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK)*, 29.09.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/HWwlq, Access Date: 05.10.2025.

16 Reuters, "German Policy Needs Decisive Africa Shift, Association Says", 15.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/voQxh, Access Date: 20.10.2025.

17 Luisa von Richthofen, "Deutschlands Afrika-Problem: Kein Plan, keine Chancen?", *Deutsche Welle*, 17.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/txzIk; Reuters, "German Policy Needs Decisive Africa Shift, Association Says".

ularly in the area of critical and strategic raw materials, Germany has largely exercised its national capacity through the EU's common framework. With the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), adopted in 2024, the EU made the diversification of supply chains a strategic priority. Africa was identified as one of the most important external partnership areas within this policy. At the AU-EU Summit held in Luanda in November 2025, political commitments were renewed. However, according to the analysis of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the EU's concrete raw material and industrial projects in Africa have lagged behind those of competing actors in terms of both speed and scale because of a limited project pipeline and the fragmented financing structure under the Global Gateway initiative.[18] A Germany has pursued this cooperation primarily through joint mechanisms such as Team Europe, the Global Gateway, and the European Investment Bank (EIB). As emphasized in the SWP report, the EU's raw material partnerships in Africa have thus far made greater progress in the areas of governance, standards, and capacity building, while struggling to meet African countries' expectations regarding local industrialization and integration into value chains.[19] This demonstrates that Germany's energy and raw material investments in Africa are taking shape not as an independent national initiative but rather as part of the EU's broader pursuit of strategic resilience, while also revealing that the current financing structures remain inadequate to respond to the rapidly evolving geoeconomic competition on the continent.[20]


9. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a period in which Germany sought to translate the strategic repositioning articulated at the level of discourse into concrete action in its Africa policy. The *Africa Policy Guidelines* published in January was followed throughout the year by efforts to operationalize this strategy through Steinmeier's Africa tour, Alabali-Radovan's visit to South Africa, the €500 million KfW loan, the G20 Summit in Johannesburg, and the deepening of institutional partnerships with the AU and ECOWAS. Although these initiatives demonstrate Berlin's growing interest in Africa, the German private sector's calls for an "Afrikawende" and the fragmented financing structures at the EU level indicate that this interest remains limited in terms of speed, scale, and implementation capacity. In comparison with China's rapid, large-scale investment model and Türkiye's flexible approach that combines diplomacy, trade, and development assistance, Germany's institutional and cautious model continued to generate competitive disadvantages in 2025. Therefore, although Germany's Africa policy in 2025 reflects growing awareness and expanding diplomatic and financial engagement, it remains at an early stage in transforming that engagement into a truly transformative strategy.

18 Meike Schulze, "Strategic Raw Material Cooperation between Africa and Europe", *SWP Comment*, 2026/C 07, 09.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/vanCM, Access Date: 15.02.2026.

19 Meike Schulze, "Strategic Raw Material Cooperation between Africa and Europe", *SWP Comment*, 2026/C 07, 09.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/vanCM, Access Date: 15.02.2026.

20 Anja Berretta, "Trade with Africa: New Old Dependencies?", *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, International Reports*, s. 2 (2025),
https://www.kisa.link/dhoQC, Access Date: 10.05.2025.



12

United Kingdom-Africa Relations in 2025

Mehmet Ali Mert* | Gökhan Sırmalı**

1. Introduction

The United Kingdom's (UK) relations with Africa have historically exhibited a multilayered structure shaped by the postcolonial legacy, Commonwealth ties, development assistance, and trade relations. However, the search for strategic repositioning observed in UK foreign policy in the post-Brexit period has increasingly transformed Africa into a distinct strategic priority.

The year 2025, in particular, represented a critical turning point during which priorities were reordered and the nature of the relationship was redefined. The year 2025 also marked a period in which Africa's visibility within global governance structures increased. The Republic of South Africa's assumption of the G20 presidency and the African Union's (AU) institutional representation on this platform for the first time demonstrated that the continent has become a more influential actor within the global system. This development has also created new opportunities for powers such as the UK that are seeking to redefine their relations with Africa.[1]

Following 2024, the UK appears to have developed a new approach to its Africa policy based on consultation and joint production. Indeed, the extensive consultation process conducted between November 2024 and May 2025, including engagements in 40 African countries and consultations with 47 governments and numerous international organizations, established the institutional foundation for this transformation.[2]

This article first briefly presents the historical background of UK–Africa relations up to the end of 2024 and then focuses on 2025, analyzing the security, economic, health, migration, and public diplomacy dimensions of these relations.

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1 Government of South Africa, "G20 Presidency", 2025, https://www.g20.org.za/g20-south-africa/g20-presidency/, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

2 Gov. UK, "The UK's New Approach to Africa: Summary of Consultation", 02.06.2025, https://www.kisa.link/FrFYL, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

2. The UK-Africa Relations until the End of 2024

Relations between the UK and Africa have long developed around development assistance, technical support, and limited commercial interactions. Particularly during the 2000s, when normative foreign policy instruments were predominant, the UK's Africa policy was largely framed through a development assistance-based approach.[3] However, by 2024, this model had changed with the adoption of a new approach that placed the demands of African actors at its center. In particular, the elevation of relations with Nigeria to the level of a strategic partnership and the articulation of growth-oriented cooperation objectives with South Africa foreshadowed the new approach that would emerge more clearly in 2025.[4]

3. A New Framework for UK-Africa Relations in 2025

2 The year 2025 marked the redefinition of UK-Africa relations. During this period, the UK began repositioning Africa within a multidimensional framework as a trading partner, security partner, health cooperation partner, and sphere of diplomatic influence. At the core of this transformation lies the transition from an aid-centered relationship to a partnership- and investment-oriented model, together with the approach of "thinking not for Africa, but together with Africa."[5] Nevertheless, the strategic substance and implementation instruments of this new approach have not yet become fully defined.[6]

Accordingly, 2025 represents both a process of strategic repositioning and a period that makes visible the tension between rhetoric and capacity.[7] The possibility of the United States adopting a more limited and interest-driven approach in its Africa policy is creating space on the continent for new actors. In this context, the new approach developed by the UK should be understood as a reflection of its efforts to secure a strategic position within changing global power dynamics.[8]

4. The Security Dimension

As of 2025, the security dimension of UK–Africa relations has expanded and deepened significantly. This expansion encompasses not only military cooperation but also multidimensional areas such as counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and maritime security. African actors regard the UK as a reliable partner, particularly because of its international diplomatic capacity and technical expertise in the field of security. Within this framework, these actors seek a more active UK role in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and representation in international platforms.[9] The security and defense partnership developed with Nigeria constitutes a concrete example of this transformation.[10] Threats such as terrorism, irregular migration, cybercrime, and information manipulation are increasing security interdependence between Africa and the UK.[11] This demonstrates that the UK views security challenges in Africa as an issue directly linked to its own national security.[12]

3 Manu Lekunze, "The Limits of Offensive Liberalism: UK Grand Strategy in Africa", *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 27.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/tyqII, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

4 Gov. UK, "The UK's New Approach to Africa".

5 Gov. UK, "The UK's New Approach to Africa".

6 Lekunze, "The Limits of Offensive Liberalism".

7 Gov. UK, "Statistics on International Development: Provisional UK Official Development Assistance Spend 2025", 09.04.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/hEYbf, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

8 Congressional Research Service, "U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview", 07.11.2023,
https://www.kisa.link/IQjnr, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

9 Gov. UK, "The UK's New Approach to Africa".

10 Gov. UK, "Third UK–Nigeria Security and Defence Partnership Dialogue 2025 Communique", 01.08.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/lDNST, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

11 Gov. UK, "UK–Nigeria Security and Defence Partnership Dialogue".

12 Lekunze, "The Limits of Offensive Liberalism".



South African Deputy President Paul Mashatile welcomed United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the opening of the G20 Leaders' Summit held in Johannesburg on November 22, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

Although the UK does not stand out as a decisive actor on the ground in security debates in West Africa, it is frequently cited as an alternative model, particularly in the context of criticism directed at French influence. In this regard, the "British approach" is characterized as a model based on more limited military engagement, prioritizing voluntary cooperation through the Commonwealth and establishing a relational framework with local actors.[13] This indicates that the UK is a security actor whose influence is grounded in normative power and institutional networks. At the same time, London's role as a global financial center generates an indirect security dimension through the integration of Africa's natural resources and financial flows into international markets.

5. The Economic Dimension

As of 2025, economic relations have become the central component of UK-Africa engagement. However, this economic approach is based on a framework centered on trade, investment, and the private sector.[14] By 2025, the trade volume between the UK and Africa had reached approximately £49 billion, with the share of trade in services increasing markedly. During the same period, financial instruments such as Mobilist and infrastructure partnerships were employed to mobilize private capital, while new investment initiatives were launched particularly in the fields of energy, infrastructure, and the digital economy. African actors, for their part, prioritize economic diversification, high value-added production, and increasing intra-African trade. This demonstrates that the economic relationship between the two sides is being shaped around the objectives of structural transformation and development.[15]

The first *UK-East Africa Trade and Investment Forum*, held in May 2025, brought Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania together directly with British companies. This was complemented by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade's visit to South Africa and Botswana in January 2025, the Growth Plan with South Africa, and the Growth and Investment Partnership launched in July 2025, all of which demonstrate that London is seeking to advance its economic relations with Africa through concrete platforms.[16] The regional initiative developed through the trade and investment forum covering Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in East Africa also demonstrates that the UK has adopted an approach that takes into account the dynamics of regional economic integration.[17] Accordingly, this multilayered structure reveals that the

13 University of Navarra, "The Presence of the French Military in the Sahel: A Lasting Commitment or a Distant Fantasy?", 19.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/UPgpI, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

14 Lekunze, "The Limits of Offensive Liberalism".; Gov. UK, "UK–Nigeria Security and Defence Partnership Dialogue".

15 Gov. UK, "The UK's New Approach to Africa".

16 Gov. UK, "Growth at the Heart of Foreign Secretary's Visit to Nigeria and South Africa", 03.11.2024,
https://www.kisa.link/MPfRP, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

17 HM Treasury, "Boost for British Business as New Partnership Breaks Down Barriers to Infrastructure Delivery in South Africa", 17.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/wwUvP, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

UK's economic presence in Africa is based on a flexible and selective strategy shaped across different scales and contexts.

6. The Health Dimension

Health emerged as one of the new priority areas in UK–Africa relations as of 2025. The first UK-Africa Health Dialogue, held in London in November 2025, demonstrated that the relationship was set to be institutionalized around health security. During the dialogue, strengthening capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to health threats; addressing human, animal, and environmental health in an integrated manner within the framework of the One Health approach; and developing joint preparedness mechanisms were identified as priority areas.[18] These developments indicate that health has been redefined as a policy area directly linked to both national and global security.

As of 2025, UK-Africa health relations have evolved into a health security partnership. Indeed, the *UK-Africa Health Summit* held in 2024 and the Africa Health Dialogue convened in 2025 stand out as two critical milestones that established the institutional foundation of this transformation.[19] Nevertheless, the UK's decision to reduce its contribution to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria by approximately 15 percent in 2025 also gave rise to criticism regarding the country's leadership in global health. This development demonstrates that the increasingly emphasized discourse of partnership and reciprocity in the health sector has not been supported to the same extent in terms of financial capacity and resource allocation.

7. The Migration Dimension

As of 2025, migration has emerged as a multidimensional policy area between the UK and African countries. African actors identify the root causes of migration as economic inadequacy, climate change, and security challenges, and they seek solutions to these underlying issues. By contrast, the UK's approach is primarily focused on controlling irregular migration, return mechanisms, and border management. Furthermore, the perception of visa policies as obstacles to business, education, and diplomatic relations has become a structural factor affecting the deepening of bilateral relations.[20]

Nigeria constitutes the principal case in the migration dimension. The joint communiqué issued following the 2025 Nigeria-United Kingdom Migration, Justice, and Home Affairs Dialogue demonstrates that the parties addressed migration within the framework of effective governance, judicial cooperation, and the fight against crime. Similarly, the security and defense dialogue highlighted issues such as border security, irregular migration, and combating organized crime networks. In this context, as of 2025, migration has evolved into an integrated governance area intertwined with security, border management, and home affairs policies.[21] Indeed, the readmission agreements signed with Angola and Namibia in

18 Gov. UK, "Communique on the Inaugural United Kingdom–Africa Centres for Disease Control High-Level Health Dialogue", 25.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/knlzb, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

19 Andrew Mitchell, "UK-Africa Health Summit 2024: Minister Andrew Mitchell's Speech", Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 18.03.2024,
https://www.kisa.link/zbZXV, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

20 Gov. UK, "The UK's New Approach to Africa".

21 Gov. UK, "Nigeria-United Kingdom Migration, Justice, and Home Affairs Dialogue 2025: Joint Communique", 09.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/Uanzz, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

2025, together with the introduction of visa restrictions against countries unwilling to cooperate, demonstrate that migration policy has become directly linked to foreign policy instruments. Accordingly, as of 2025, the UK's migration relationship with Africa can be regarded as a strategic policy domain situated at the intersection of foreign policy and domestic security policy, in which both coercive and incentive-based instruments are employed.[22]

Meanwhile, the UK's investment initiative of approximately $400 million in Ethiopia's energy infrastructure demonstrates that a direct link has been established between economic development and the reduction of migration. Such investments may be regarded as part of an approach that seeks to manage migration by improving structural conditions in countries of origin.[23]

8. The Public Diplomacy Dimension

One of the UK's strongest assets in Africa is its soft power capacity. Educational institutions, scholarship programs, the global prevalence of the English language, spheres of cultural influence (such as sports and media), and diaspora networks constitute the principal elements supporting the UK's long-term influence on the continent.[24] One of the most notable examples in the field of public diplomacy is the UK-Kenya Season 2025 program. Conducted by the British Council between May and November 2025, this program sought to promote public events, creative partnerships, and greater visibility in the fields of arts, culture, heritage, and education between the two countries. In this respect, the UK-Kenya Season demonstrates that public diplomacy has become positioned as a strategic instrument in the UK's relations with Africa for building networks, fostering elite-level interaction, and generating cultural capital.[25]

9. Conclusion

The year 2025 marks a period of transformation in which the priorities of UK-Africa relations were redefined. Capacity building and network-based cooperation in the field of security, financial instruments in the economic sphere, a security partnership based on mutual interdependence in health, and security-centered migration management integrated with foreign policy instruments constitute the different dimensions of this model. However, although this transformation reflects a strong discursive repositioning, it faces certain constraints at the implementation level due to factors such as limited economic capacity, declining development assistance budgets, and intensifying global competition. This demonstrates that the tension between rhetoric and capacity continues to characterize the UK's Africa policy.


Consequently, the year 2025 can be regarded as a transitional period during which a new strategic orientation in UK-Africa relations was articulated, while the limitations of that orientation also became increasingly visible. This makes it possible to characterize the UK as an actor with relatively low visibility but substantial effectiveness in Africa.

22 Gov. UK, "UK–Nigeria Migration Dialogue".

23 Reuters, "UK Investor Signs $400 Million Power Deals on Foreign Minister's Ethiopia Visit", 02.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/GIeWF, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

24 Gov. UK, "The UK's New Approach to Africa".

25 British Council, "Ghana, South Africa and Botswana Delegation visits Harrow, Richmond & Uxbridge Colleges",
https://www.kisa.link/EaWXF, Access Date: 10.04.2026.



13

Italy-Africa Relations in 2025

Raşit Yenigün*

1. Introduction

Relations between Italy and the African continent have historically been shaped by the legacy of colonialism, energy dependence, trade interactions, and migration dynamics. In particular, the close geographic and cultural ties established with North Africa have long made Africa a strategic priority in Italian foreign policy. By 2025, Italy-Africa relations had come to rest on a more comprehensive, multilayered, and strategic framework. During this period, the government in Rome moved beyond its traditional approach centered on security and irregular migration, positioning Africa as a strategic partner in terms of energy supply security, the diversification of supply chains, and new market opportunities.

The year 2025 stands out as a period in which Italy's Africa policy underwent not merely a quantitative expansion but also a qualitative transformation. In particular, diplomatic engagements developed through multilateral platforms and summits elevated Rome's Africa strategy to a central position at the European level. The principal driving force behind this transformation was the *Mattei Plan*, which entered its full-scale implementation phase in 2025. The plan offers a new paradigm of cooperation based on the principles of mutual benefit and "equal partnership," replacing traditional

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aid-based and paternalistic approaches. Within this framework, this article examines the developments recorded in Italy-Africa relations during 2025 under the *Mattei Plan*.

2. The Operationalization of the Mattei Plan

The year 2025 marked a critical turning point in which the Mattei Plan evolved from a theoretical framework into an operational state policy. Announced in 2024 under the leadership of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, the plan was initially limited to nine pilot countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Mozambique). However, during 2025, with the inclusion of Angola, Ghana, Mauritania, Senegal, and Tanzania, it expanded to encompass a total of 14 countries.[1] This expansion demonstrates Rome's determination to develop a more institutionalized and systematic engagement across the continent.

Moving beyond a narrowly defined energy-focused approach, the *Mattei Plan* has evolved into a multidimensional development model encompassing vital sectors such as infrastructure, agriculture, education, health, and water management. In this respect, the plan represents an example of "economic statecraft," in which public resources are mobilized to stimulate private sector investment and risk-sharing mechanisms are actively implemented.[2]

The plan's international legitimacy was reinforced by the "Italy-Africa: A Bridge for Common Growth Summit," held in Rome in June 2025. The participation of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and her remarks during the summit demonstrated that the plan is advancing within a framework that is conceptually and operationally aligned with the European Union's (EU) Global Gateway strategy. The most tangible financial indicator of this diplomatic coordination was the investment package of approximately €1.2 billion announced during the summit.[3]

3. The Mediterranean Vision for Energy Security

2 As of 2025, the energy sector had become one of the principal determinants of Italy's geopolitical influence in its Africa policy. The strategic proj-

1 Daniele Fattibene, "The Mattei Plan for Africa: From Aid to Partnership? Recommendations for the 2026 Italy-Africa Summit", *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, 28.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OVWJx Access Date: 17.03.2026.

2 Fattibene, ibid.

3 European Commission, "President von der Leyen in High-Level Event to Strengthen EU-Africa Cooperation under the Mattei Plan and Global Gateway", 19.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/eTwDQ, Access Date: 21.03.2026.



"The Mattei Plan and the Global Gateway: A Common Effort with the African Continent Summit" was held in Rome, the capital of Italy, on June 20, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

ects carried out through the national energy company ENI have elevated Italy to the position of a critical energy and security actor in the Mediterranean basin. The financial commitment underpinning this vision was made concrete through the massive investment plan announced in April 2025 by ENI Chief Executive Officer Claudio Descalzi. The company allocated a budget of approximately €24 billion over the next four years to increase energy production capacity in Algeria, Libya, and Egypt.[4] This investment initiative aims both to meet local energy demand in the region and to structurally strengthen Europe's energy supply security.

During this process, Rome has sought to reduce its dependence on Russian energy resources while positioning itself as a critical "energy supply and distribution hub" for the EU. The Coral South facility in Mozambique reaching full production capacity during 2025 and the final investment decisions taken for the Coral North project constitute concrete outcomes of this supply diversification strategy.[5] In addition, the expansion of the capacity of the Transmed pipeline connecting Tunisia to Europe further reinforced Italy's central role in Mediterranean energy geopolitics.[6]

In the field of renewable energy, 2025 marked a period of tangible progress in project implementation. The ELMED electricity interconnection linking Italy and Tunisia entered the implementation and construction

4 Reuters, "Italy's Eni to Invest $26 Billion in North Africa Over Next Four Years, CEO Says", 08.04.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/yNOizAccess Date: 24.03.2026.

5 Eni, "Eni Announces Final Investment Decision for Mozambique Coral North Project", 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/jOgzEAccess Date: 24.03.2026.

6 Francis Ghilès, *As North African Energy Links Are Redrawn, Italy Becomes Europe's Southern Gas Hub*, CIDOB, Barcelona, 2022,
https://www.kisa.link/ZHQQo, Access Date: 24.03.2026.

preparation phase with the support of international financial institutions, representing a critical step toward the integration of the European and North African electricity systems.[7] In parallel, the joint declaration of intent signed by Germany, Italy, Austria, Algeria, and Tunisia under the SoutH2 (Southern Hydrogen Corridor) project demonstrates that the political and institutional foundations for the development of hydrogen-based energy infrastructure have been established.[8] Furthermore, its prioritization by the European Commission among strategic energy projects indicates that this initiative has assumed a central role in advancing Europe's energy supply security and green transition objectives.

4. G7 Presidency and Investment Diplomacy

Italy used its 2025 G7 Presidency as an effective diplomatic instrument to redefine its Africa policy on a global scale. The government in Rome brought structural issues such as alleviating the debt burden of African countries and closing the financing gap onto the G7 agenda, thereby emphasizing an investment-oriented development model.

One of the most notable outcomes of this approach was the €250 million loan provided to the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) through the Italian development bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP).[9] This financing was directed particularly toward large-scale infrastructure projects supporting regional integration, such as the Lobito Corridor.[10] This initiative positions Italy not only as an energy consumer on the continent but also as a critical partner supporting regional development.

5. Social Development, Agriculture and Human Capital

According to data from the Italian government, the total value of projects implemented in Africa reached €1.4 billion in 2025. Rather than constituting a conventional "aid" package, this budget aims to generate tangible value on the ground through project-based investments, low-interest loans, and technology transfer mechanisms. This dimension of the *Mattei Plan* has become particularly evident in the areas of food security and education.[11]

Among the initiatives implemented within this framework, the Enrico Mattei Training Center in Algeria, which focuses on vocational education

7 ELMED Project (Terna & STEG), "The ELMED Project: Italy–Tunisia Electricity Interconnection",
https://elmedproject.com/, Access Date: 24.03.2026.

8 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, "Joint Political Declaration of Intent to Develop the Southern Hydrogen Corridor Signed by Five Countries in Rome", 21.01.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/mjTII, Access Date: 02.04.2026.

9 SACE, "Cassa Depositi e Prestiti and SACE Provide EUR250 Million to Africa Finance Corporation", 20.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/uymcG, Access Date: 04.04.2026.

10 African Finance Corporation, "AFC Secures Strategic Partnerships to Advance Lobito Corridor Project", 2025,
https://www.africafc.org/, Access Date: 18.04.2026.

11 Euronews, "Italy Reviews Progress on Mattei Plan at Africa Summit in Ethiopia", 13.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/xaZpg, Access Date: 18.04.2026.

and technology transfer, and infrastructure projects in Angola aimed at strengthening the agricultural value chain along the Lobito Corridor are of strategic importance. Similarly, rural development is being supported in West Africa through agro-industrial centers in Côte d'Ivoire and food security programs implemented in Senegal. Along the East African axis, investments to strengthen healthcare infrastructure in Ethiopia have come to the forefront, while biofuel and agriculture-energy cooperation developed with Kenya constitutes concrete examples of technology transfer in the field of renewable energy.[12]


These initiatives, which gained momentum in 2025, have strengthened Italy's "soft power" in the region while laying the foundations of a long-term strategy focused on addressing the structural causes of migration at their source.

6. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a period in which a structural, multilayered, and qualitative transformation in Italy's Africa policy was firmly established. The Mattei Plan introduced a new strategic paradigm by building Italy's relations with Africa on the principles of investment, partnership, and mutual benefit. The decisive steps taken in the fields of energy, infrastructure, and finance enhanced Italy's influence on the continent, while the strategic alignment established with the EU broadened the international legitimacy of this policy.

In this context, 2025 marked a period in which Italy emerged not merely as an "implementer" of the EU's Africa policies but also as a visionary, guiding, and pioneering actor. This new model developed by Rome serves as a reference point for Europe's future relations with the continent. Consequently, as of 2025, Italy is positioned in Africa not only as an economic player but also as an influential strategic actor playing a decisive role in shaping a new model of global partnership.

12 Agenzia Nova, "Mattei Plan: Here are the Main Projects Carried out in African Countries", 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/zlqkG, Access Date: 18.04.2026.



United States of America-Africa Relations in 2025

14

Meysune Yaşar*

1. Introduction

As a principal arena of global power competition, Africa continued to witness significant developments in 2025. Although the United States' approach to the region, a major driver of these developments, constitutes the primary point of departure for this study, the analysis is structured around three main themes: strategic competition shaped by geopolitics, economic cooperation and development policies, and, finally, security policies and military cooperation. As of 2025, significant policy changes by the United States in these areas have attracted considerable attention, and this study examines these developments through the dynamics of continuity and change in U.S. Africa policy.

One of the three principal axes of this discussion, the theme of geopolitical and strategic competition, seeks to answer the question of how China's expanding presence on the continent has affected Africa's place in U.S. foreign policy. The second section of the study, economic cooperation and development policies, focuses on the role of the economy in the United States' engagement with the continent and evaluates these interactions in light of the initiatives undertaken in 2025. The final section, security policies and military cooperation, addresses the question of how the United States has responded to the increasingly severe security crises across the continent. Taken as a whole, the study examines intensifying strategic competition, expanding economic engagement, and

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A peace agreement between Rwandan President Paul Kagame and President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Félix Tshisekedi was signed in Washington on December 4, 2025, mediated by U.S. President Donald Trump. (Source: President Donald Trump, President Paul Kagame of the Republic of Rwanda, and President Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, sign Washington Accords for Peace – The White House)

growing regional security threats on the continent from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy and provides an assessment specific to 2025.

2. Strategic Competition and the Geopolitical Dimension

In addition to the sphere of influence established by China across the continent through the Belt and Road Initiative, Russia's security-centered policy is viewed by the United States not merely as a series of military, economic, and development-oriented engagement initiatives but also as a form of strategic expansion. Accordingly, 2025 was a year in which strategic competition was strongly emphasized in the United States' approach to Africa. The principal areas of competition were the continent's role in global supply chains and its abundant natural resources. Minerals such as copper, cobalt, and lithium are of critical importance for energy transition processes. In 2025, access to these resources emerged as a major priority for the United States, increasing the strategic importance of African countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Zambia.[1] In line with infrastructure investment objectives, the *Lobito Corridor Project*, which links the DRC, Zambia, and Angola and extends to the Port of Lobito on the Atlantic coast, also attracted significant attention from the United States. The project aims to integrate Africa's critical minerals into

1 U.S. Department of State, "Strategic Partnership Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo", 04.12.2025, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

global markets through the United States while establishing alternative routes to China's infrastructure projects on the continent.[2]

Somaliland, another key focal point of strategic and geopolitical competition, has attracted considerable attention because it is located at the intersection of maritime trade routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, Somaliland's proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait further enhances its geopolitical significance. On June 12, 2025, U.S. Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill in the House of Representatives authorizing the President to recognize Somaliland.[3] Although the bill remained at the proposal stage, Somaliland's status became the subject of significant debate in the House of Representatives as one of the arenas of strategic competition.

While the United States has prioritized increasing infrastructure investments and deepening its focus on strategic locations in order to balance China's influence in the region, its approach to Russia's presence on the continent has been shaped primarily through a security-oriented framework. Russia, which has expanded its presence in Africa through private security companies and military cooperation, has gained significant opportunities to broaden its sphere of influence, particularly in light of the military coups that have recently occurred in the Sahel region and the strengthening of anti-Western political trends.[4] Accordingly, the growing tensions between the military governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and the West during 2025, together with the initiative undertaken by the Sahel countries to establish their own security architecture (the Alliance of Sahel States), were recorded as developments limiting U.S. influence in the region.[5] In response to these constraints, the U.S. administration placed particular emphasis on economic and development-oriented initiatives toward the continent.

3. Economic Cooperation and Development Policies

One of the most important aspects of the United States' economic and development engagement with the continent in 2025 was the *African Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA). The expiration of the program, which provides African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market, on September 30, 2025 became the subject of significant debate. Some U.S. policymakers argued that the legislation should be revised, and in early 2026 the U.S. administration reinstated the program retroactively. Under the new arrangement, the legislation, which will remain in effect until December 31, 2026, gave rise to substantial debates concerning uncertainties in U.S. trade policy toward Africa and the search for new trade models.[6]

2 United Nations Zambia, "Potential Impact of the Lobito Corridor and Support to the Regional Transformation Agenda",
https://www.kisa.link/ETFNf, Access Date: 12.03.2026.

3 Congress.gov, "H.R.3992 - Republic of Somaliland Independence Act", 06.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/wRlxx, Access Date: 11.03.2026.

4 Nicholas Idris Erameh & Seun Bamidele, "Moscow's African relations: Unveiling Russia's strategy in Africa and its impact on global politics", Security and Defence Quarterly, Vol.51, No.3, 2025, pp. 112–129.

5 Ebenezer Obadare, "A Dubious Turn in the Sahel", Council on Foreign Relations, 03.02.2026,
https://www.cfr.org/articles/a-dubious-turn-in-the-sahel, Access Date: 14.03.2026.

6 Council on Foreign Relations, "AGOA: The U.S.-Africa Trade Program", 01.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/plIBb, Access Date: 13.03.2026.

The *U.S.-Africa Business Summit* held in Luanda in June 2025 was one of the year's most significant economic diplomacy initiatives. While digital infrastructure projects, the agricultural sector, critical minerals, and energy investments emerged as prominent agenda items, the United States demonstrated its effort to address its economic and investment engagement with the continent on a more institutional basis.

This effort was also reflected in conflict resolution initiatives concerning the continent's crisis regions, and in April 2025 a peace commitment was signed between the DRC and Rwanda under U.S. mediation.[7] One of the primary motivations behind this initiative was the DRC's possession of a substantial share of the world's cobalt reserves, while agreements envisaging investments in Congo's lithium, copper, and cobalt reserves were emphasized as part of the peace process. In parallel, in 2025 the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation approved new investments in infrastructure, energy, and mining projects across the continent, prioritizing the objective of increasing critical mineral production. Financing was provided for projects such as rare earth element projects in Malawi, graphite mining in Mozambique, and a potash mine in Gabon.[8] For the Lobito Corridor, one of the key issues within the theme of strategic competition, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation provided a loan agreement for railway financing in Angola. The G20 Johannesburg Summit, held in South Africa on November 22-23, 2025, was highly significant as the first G20 meeting held on the continent. The U.S. boycott of the summit, which was highly important for the continent's presence in international politics, also sparked debate over the American administration's perspective on global economic governance mechanisms.[9]

4. Security Policies and Military Cooperation

Within the framework of security and military cooperation, the Sahel region came to the forefront during the first months of 2025. Military coups and anti-Western political rhetoric directly affected the United States' security partners while also weakening the U.S.-centered security architecture on the continent. Another important focal point was Niger. Due to political tensions and the suspension of security agreements, the American administration decided to withdraw its troops stationed in Niger. Within the emerging security architecture, the American administration focused on developing new partnerships, with Kenya, Ghana, and Senegal coming to the forefront during this process[10] Partnerships shaped through military training programs, security cooperation agreements, and joint exercises were interpreted as measures aimed at preserving the United States' strategic presence in Africa.

7 U.S. Department of State, "Peace Agreement Between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Rwanda", 27.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/oSXrJ, Access Date: 01.03.2026.

8 U.S. International Development Finance Cooperation, "DFC Board Approves New Investments, Bolstering Regional Stability, Economic Prosperity, and Critical Mineral Supply Chains", 20.02.2026,
https://www.kisa.link/PiJYF, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

9 Gustavo Romero & Stewart Patrick, "The G20 Agenda Is Shifting from the Global South to America First", Carnegie, 23.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/gMlhX, Access Date: 01.03.2026.

10 U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Morocco, "African Lion 2025 Concludes, Showcases US Ability to Project Power with Allies Across Africa", 27.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/jDyJt, Access Date: 02.03.2026.

Against the backdrop of these developments, toward the end of 2025 the United States initiated various discussions regarding the future direction of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). Within the scope of these discussions, AFRICOM's regional strategy was reassessed, with greater emphasis placed on capacity-building programs, military training activities, and regional security cooperation rather than a direct military presence.[11] The most notable development in the security diplomacy initiatives of 2025 was the Africa Chiefs of Defense Conference held in May. Organized jointly by U.S. Africa Command and Kenya, the conference brought together defense leaders from 37 African countries, with strengthening military coordination between Africa and the United States emerging as the principal objective. The conference's emphasis on the need to develop "African-led solutions" to Africa's security challenges was interpreted as reflecting the United States' long-term preference for supporting regional security capacity rather than direct military engagement.[12] Nevertheless, counterterrorism operations continued, and in this context airstrikes targeting ISIS-affiliated militants were carried out in Nigeria in December 2025.[13]


5. Conclusion

When the United States' Africa policy in 2025 is considered as a whole, it becomes evident that the three principal themes that stood out were closely interconnected. Through its actions in the region, the American administration sought to balance strategic competition on the continent, secure access to resources through economic ties, and address long-term security threats through military engagement and new strategic approaches in the security domain. However, it continues to face significant challenges across all of these areas. The American administration's long-term presence on the continent, shaped by its objectives of developing strategy, strengthening economic engagement, and establishing a new security architecture in response to these challenges, depends not only on developments originating within the continent but also directly on changes in its own foreign policy preferences. Consequently, the implications of the United States' new approach to the global system for Africa will bring about highly significant changes over the long term.

11 David Vergun, "Africom Strategy Focuses on Burden Sharing, Protecting U.S. Homeland", 05.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/Shgnb, 10.03.2026.

12 United States Africa Command, "U.S. and Kenya Conclude Successful 2025 African Chiefs of Defense Conference in Nairobi", 28-29.05.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OzLXO, Access Date: 09.03.2026.

13 United States Africa Command, "U.S. Africa Command Conducts Strike Againts ISIS in Nigeria", 25.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/JDlmY, Access Date: 13.03.2026.



Relations Between the Gulf Countries and Africa in 2025

15

Hamdullah Baycar*

1. Introduction

The year 2025 marked a period in which economic, conflict-related, diplomatic, and political relations between the Gulf countries and Africa intensified significantly. While investments in energy, logistics, and infrastructure continued, the defining dimension of these relations increasingly centered on involvement in conflict zones, the management of regional crises, and the expansion of influence through multilateral platforms.

The cases of Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in particular, demonstrate that, as of 2025, relations between the Gulf countries and African states have been shaped by two distinct yet complementary trends. On the one hand, proxy wars and the projection of intra-Gulf competition onto the ground have become increasingly prominent, while on the other, growing mediation efforts and enhanced diplomatic engagement have attracted attention. Within this framework, this article examines the developments through which the Gulf countries deepened their relations with the continent in 2025 along the dual axes of competition and diplomacy.

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2. Economic Dimensions of the Gulf-Af rica Relations

As of 2025, relations between the Gulf countries and Africa have evolved beyond the general pattern of economic outreach observed in previous years, deepening through more strategic, large-scale, and sector-focused investments. In particular, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait have expanded their influence across the continent in the fields of technology, energy, and infrastructure. In this context, at the G20 Summit held in Johannesburg in 2025, the UAE pledged $1 billion to support the development of artificial intelligence infrastructure and services across Africa. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia began implementing its approximately $41 billion infrastructure investment plan for Africa, announced in October 2024, and further consolidated its presence on the continent with investments in renewable energy reaching approximately $7 billion by early 2025. Qatar, for its part, drew attention in August 2025 through a private company's $103 billion investment plan covering six African countries and spanning a broad range of sectors from mining and agriculture to energy and infrastructure.[1]

The United States' initiatives to increase tariffs on African countries and reduce its diplomatic missions across the continent weakened its engagement in Africa and consequently created a geopolitical vacuum. During this period, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar positioned Africa as a priority economic and strategic arena and accelerated their initiatives in trade, investment, and infrastructure projects. Saudi Arabia's multilateral agreements signed in May 2025 with Africa50, Ghana EXIM Bank, and other national export banks, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) implemented by the UAE with Kenya and the Republic of the Congo, and Qatar's focus on logistics hubs and large-scale infrastructure investments in East Africa all demonstrate the institutionalization of the Gulf's economic diplomacy on the continent.[2] During the same year, multibillion-dollar investments in ports, railways, and energy infrastructure continued. For example, the UAE's expansion of its port network through DP World, Etihad Rail's multinational railway initiatives, the direction of Saudi-backed funds toward industrial and logistics projects, and the increase in Qatar-based investment commitments accelerated the emergence of new trade corridors linking Africa's inland regions to Gulf ports and from there to Asian markets.[3]

At the same time, 2025 was a year in which Gulf-Africa relations extended beyond infrastructure investments, deepening through financial institutions (such as the Islamic Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, and multilateral development funds), public-private partnerships, and private-sector actors. Emerging sectors such as the digital economy, fintech, and critical minerals also broadened the scope of these relations.[4]


1 Yaseen Tayob and Jordan Mc Lean, "Gulf Financing Is Changing Africa's Green Economic Growth Outlook But Who Benefits?", *SAIIA*, December 5, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/JUjUg, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

2 Michael William Wilson, *The GCC and Africa in 2026 Toward a New Model of Partnership*, No. 15 (Gulf Research Center, 2025), 91-97, https://www.kisa.link/JsnNb, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

3 Wilson, *The GCC and Africa in 2026 Toward a New Model of Partnership*; Michael W. Wilson, "Beyond Washington: Africa's Emerging Trade Axis with the Gulf, China, and Russia", Gulf Research Center, GRM, October 2025, https://www.kisa.link/CZwGt, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

4 Royal Ibeh, "Japan, Gulf Investors Invest $180bn in African Startups, Infrastructure", *Businessday*, January 27, 2026, https://www.kisa.link/GeGdF, Access Date: 01.05.2025.;

Wilson, "Beyond Washington: Africa's Emerging Trade Axis with the Gulf, China, and Russia"; Wilson, *The GCC and Africa in 2026 Toward a New Model of Partnership*.



Kenyan President William Ruto and President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the two countries on January 14, 2025. (Source: KENYA AND THE UAE SIGN HISTORIC COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT – The Official Website of the President of the Republic of Kenya)

Although Kuwait has been less visible than other Gulf actors at the political level, its economic- and investment-based relations with Africa have increasingly become an important item on the agenda. In this context, Kuwait's "Arab-African Cooperation Bridge" initiative demonstrates that these relations are being advanced within a more institutionalized, multilateral, and strategic framework. Announced by Foreign Minister Abdullah Al-Yahya, the initiative reveals that the Gulf countries' engagement with Africa is no longer limited to economic investments but is also expanding into areas such as diplomatic coordination, security cooperation, and joint policymaking. Among the initiative's key components is the establishment of a permanent diplomatic platform that will bring together Arab countries and member states of the AU, as well as plans to hold its inaugural meeting in Kuwait in November 2025. In addition, the initiative aims to support joint projects in strategic sectors such as food security and renewable energy through a $100 million fund. In this way, it seeks to establish Gulf-Africa relations on a more sustainable and institutionalized basis.[5]

3. Sudan: Proxy War and Intra-Gulf Rivalry

In 2025, relations between Sudan and the UAE deteriorated sharply, evolving from controversial cooperation within the context of the ongoing civil war to an open diplomatic rupture. The turning point came in March 2025, when

5 "Kuwait Launches Diplomatic Initiative to Enhance Arab-African Dialogue", News, *Divan Centre*, April 28, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/QCnPY, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

Sudan filed a case before the International Court of Justice accusing the UAE of complicity in genocide through its support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[6] Although the Court dismissed the case in May 2025 on jurisdictional grounds, the process represented a significant escalation in bilateral relations.

Subsequently, the Sudanese administration aligned with the military announced that it was severing diplomatic relations with the UAE, while Abu Dhabi rejected the allegations. Throughout 2025, claims that the UAE had provided military and logistical support to the RSF remained at the center of bilateral tensions. While the Sudanese government and various international reports argued that this support had prolonged the war, the UAE emphasized its humanitarian assistance and its calls for a diplomatic resolution. The escalation of violence in Darfur and the RSF's advances, in particular, intensified international criticism directed at external actors.

The case of Sudan should be viewed not only as a bilateral crisis but also as a geopolitical rupture reflecting the projection of intra-Gulf rivalry onto the ground. Saudi Arabia's position in support of Sudan's state institutions and the Sudanese Armed Forces signaled a clear divergence from the UAE.[7] Riyadh's diplomatic initiatives, particularly its efforts in Washington to encourage pressure on the UAE, demonstrate that Sudan has become an arena in which the leadership struggle among the Gulf powers is being tested. In this context, Sudan has emerged as a critical nexus where proxy wars and regional power competition intersect in Gulf-Africa relations.[8]

4. Geopolitical Breaking Point in the Horn of Africa: The Recognition of Somaliland and the Gulf Rivalry

Israel's recognition of Somaliland in December 2025, combined with Ethiopia's pursuit of access to the sea and the fragile state structures in the Horn of Africa, transformed relations between the Gulf and Africa into an unprecedentedly security-oriented and integrated geopolitical arena. Throughout this process, the UAE had long stood out as a major investor and security partner in Somalia, establishing deep influence in the country through its port operations, logistics networks, and relationships with local actors. In particular, the activities carried out through DP World constituted the institutional foundation of this economic and strategic influence.

However, as of 2025, these relations experienced a sharp rupture due to both sovereignty disputes and the perception that Abu Dhabi's growing strategic alignment with Israel had indirectly contributed to the process leading to Somaliland's recognition. The Mogadishu administration viewed these developments as a threat to national sovereignty, bringing its relations with the UAE to the brink of

6 Mehmet Rakipoğlu, "Sudan İç Savaşı'nda Güç Dengesi Nasıl Değişiyor?", *Kritik Bakış*, March 12, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/aERWl, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

7 "Saudi Arabia Raises Concerns with UAE over Sudan War and Yemen Policy: Report", *TRT World*, February 21, 2026,
https://www.trtworld.com/article/e24ea66b0dc2, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

8 Sean Mathews, "Saudi Crown Prince Sent Complaint Letter to UAE 'spy Sheikh' about Yemen, Sudan", *Middle East Eye,* February 20, 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/CmPjo, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

severance.[9] By contrast, Saudi Arabia regarded Somalia's territorial integrity as a fundamental component of security in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and moved to establish a counterbalance to the Israel-UAE axis by signing military cooperation agreements with Mogadishu alongside Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye.[10]

5. Mediation and Diplomatic Influence

In contrast to the conflict-driven dynamics in Sudan and Somalia, the case of the DRC in 2025 demonstrated the growing diplomatic capacity of the Gulf countries. During this period, Qatar assumed an important facilitating role, together with the AU and the United States, in reducing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. The peace agreement signed between the parties in June 2025 and the subsequent "Doha Framework Agreement" adopted in Doha in November 2025 constituted the tangible outcomes of this diplomatic process.[11] The framework focused on addressing the root causes of the conflict, the phased implementation of a ceasefire, the protection of civilians, and the return of displaced persons. It also envisioned that subsequent protocols would further elaborate mechanisms for ceasefire monitoring, force separation, and reintegration processes.

Another noteworthy dimension of Gulf-Africa relations in 2025 was the growing interaction in the field of global governance. The G20 Summit hosted by South Africa served as an important example in this regard. While Saudi Arabia already participated in the process as a G20 member, the Pretoria administration's invitation to Qatar and the UAE to attend the summit pointed to a new dimension in the Gulf countries' relations with Africa.[12] This development demonstrates that the role of the Gulf actors in Africa ais no longer confined to economic investments or security interventions but is also expanding through multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms.

6. Conclusion


In conclusion, 2025 marked a period of multilayered transformation in Gulf-Africa relations. While the case of Sudan clearly illustrates the African manifestations of proxy wars and intra-Gulf rivalry, the case of the DRC demonstrates the growing diplomatic capacity and mediation role of the Gulf actors. Taken together, these two cases indicate that Gulf-Africa relations can no longer be explained solely through economic investments or security cooperation; rather, they have evolved into a more complex structure in which geopolitical competition, diplomatic influence, and global governance processes are increasingly intertwined.

9 Bushra Mohamed, "Somalia-UAE Diplomatic Row: Israel's Recognition of Somaliland and Yemen Conflict Fuel Tensions", *BBC,* January 15, 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/HauwP, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

10 Giorgio Cafiero, "Saudi Arabia Confronts the Israel–UAE Alignment in Somalia", *Arab Center Washington DC*, May 1, 2026,
https://www.kisa.link/wmtZV, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

11 "No: 234, November 16, 2025, Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti ile AFC/M23 Arasında İmzalanan Kapsamlı Barış Anlaşması İçin Doha Çerçevesi Hk.", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, November 16, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/HGocn, Access Date: 01.05.2025.

12 "Qatar's Participation in G20 South Africa 2025 Summit, Reflects Doha's Role in Promoting Peace and Development Internationally", *Qatar News Agency*, November 22, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/mWLXx , Access Date: 01.05.2025.;
"Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to Lead UAE Delegation at G20 Summit in South Africa on Behalf of UAE President", *National Media Authority - United Arab Emirates,* 19 Kasım 2025,
https://www.nma.gov.ae/en, Access Date: 01.05.2025.



16 Israel-Africa Relations in 2025

Sevinç Ebru Temel*

1. Introduction

Israel's policy toward Africa has constituted one of the principal pillars of its foreign policy since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the continent in the 1950s. Having initially developed relations with newly independent African states on the basis of development assistance, agricultural technologies, and technical cooperation in the post-colonial period, Israel lost diplomatic relations with many African countries following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. With the end of the Cold War, however, it re-engaged with the continent and launched a comprehensive initiative aimed at revitalizing its relations with Africa.

The Operation Al-Aqsa Flood launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Gaza War significantly reshaped Israel's foreign policy priorities. In response to mounting international pressure, Israel focused on preserving and expanding its diplomatic support in multilateral platforms, particularly within the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. In this context, African countries, represented by 54 votes in the UN, became strategically important diplomatic actors for Israel. At the same time, the African continent has increasingly emerged as an important economic partner for Israel by offering opportunities for cooperation and investment in sectors such as the defense industry, cybersecurity, agricultural technologies, and water management. In particular, security partnerships developed in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, counterterrorism cooperation, and technology transfer initiatives constitute key components of Israel's strategy toward the continent.[1] However, Israel's Africa policy cannot be understood solely within the framework of bilateral relations. China's infrastructure investments

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1 Yaron Salman, "Security Cooperations and Human Rights Violations: The African Israeli Case", *African Security*, 2026, 19(1), 9–35.

under the Belt and Road Initiative, Türkiye's Opening to Africa over the past two decades, the investments of the Gulf states in the port and logistics sectors, and Russia's security-oriented partnerships have created an environment of intense geopolitical competition across the continent. This competition both shapes and constrains Israel's efforts to expand its sphere of influence in Africa.

This article examines Israel's Africa policy as of 2025 from its diplomatic, economic, military, defense, and agricultural dimensions, analyzing the instruments through which Israel seeks to expand its influence on the continent and the limitations of this policy.

2. Developments in 2025

2.1. Diplomatic Relations and Political Initiatives

As of 2025, Israel's Africa policy appears to have been shaped by the objective of balancing the international diplomatic pressure that emerged following the Gaza War while preserving its strategic partnerships across the continent. In this context, the Netanyahu government continued its efforts throughout 2025, as in previous years, to strengthen bilateral relations with African countries, expand its network of diplomatic representation, and secure support for its positions, particularly in United Nations (UN) voting.[2] Israel's recognition of Somaliland in October 2025 constituted one of the most noteworthy diplomatic steps taken in this direction.[3]

Among Israel's diplomatic objectives, the long-debated issue of revitalizing its relations with the AU also occupies a prominent place. However, Israel's AU observer status, which it obtained in 2021, was suspended following objections from several member states, most notably Algeria and South Africa. Furthermore, South Africa's genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the Gaza genocide, together with the support expressed by many African countries for calls for a ceasefire, constrained Israel's diplomatic room for maneuver across the continent. Nevertheless, Israel sought to offset its diplomatic setbacks in international platforms through strategic and political initiatives.

Within this framework, Israel concentrated its diplomatic engagement in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. Owing both to Addis Ababa's status as the headquarters of the AU and to Ethiopia's strategic position within the Red Sea–Indian Ocean security equation, Ethiopia remained one of Israel's most important partners on the continent. Kenya also continued to be one of Israel's closest partners in the fields of counterterrorism, border security, and cybersecurity. In addition, cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the areas of mining security, technology transfer, and security technologies came to the forefront.[4]

Israeli President Isaac Herzog's official visits to Zambia and the DRC in November 2025 also constituted one of the most significant indicators of Israel's re-

2 Michael B. Bishku, "Israel's Relations with Africa: The Return to Sub-Saharan Africa," *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 13*, No. 1, pp. 3-20.

3 Asher Lubotzky, "Somaliland and Israel-Considerations Regarding Recognition and Cooperation," *INSS Insight, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)*, November 24, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/kgytu, Access Date: 17.07.2026.

4 Zafrir Asaf and Yuval Derry, "A Bridge Over Troubled Water: Israel and Sub-Saharan Africa Economic and Trade Relations in the Information Era (2000–2024)", *Israel Africa Relations Institute*, September 15, 2024, 15,

https://www.kisa.link/MlDHh, Access Date: 17.07.2026.

newed engagement policy toward Africa. During the visits, the parties discussed expanding existing relations in the areas of agricultural modernization, water management, climate change mitigation, education, technology transfer, and economic cooperation.[5]

Overall, Israel's Africa policy in 2025 appears to have focused on deepening bilateral relations with strategically important countries rather than pursuing multilateral diplomatic initiatives. Despite the diplomatic constraints imposed by the Gaza War, Israel continued to employ security, technology, and development diplomacy simultaneously, pursuing a strategy aimed at preserving and expanding its influence across the continent through these instruments.

2.2. Economic and Technological Cooperation

As of 2025, another major pillar of Israel's Africa policy has been economic diplomacy and technology-driven commercial cooperation. Rather than relying on traditional commodity trade, Israel seeks to develop an economic model based on the export of high-value-added technology and services across the continent. In particular, agricultural technologies, water management, cybersecurity, health technologies, financial technologies, and digital transformation constitute the principal sources of Israel's competitive advantage in the African market.

From an economic perspective, Israel also views the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a strategic opportunity to gain access to a common market encompassing approximately 1.4 billion people. Although Israel is not officially a party to the AfCFTA, economic partnerships developed with regional hubs such as Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda, and Zambia are regarded as a driving force for expanding across the continent. In this context, Israeli companies are seeking to increase their investments and joint ventures in areas including financial technology solutions, digital payment systems, smart city technologies, and agricultural and water treatment infrastructure. Particularly in East African countries, where the impacts of drought and climate change are felt most acutely, drip irrigation systems, water recycling technologies, and smart agriculture applications continue to constitute core elements of economic cooperation.[6]

At the same time, Israel's economic presence in Africa is shaped within an environment of intense global competition. While China has emerged as the continent's most influential economic actor through infrastructure investments worth billions of dollars, financing mechanisms, and large-scale construction projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, the United Arab Emirates has expanded its influence through investments in port operations and logistics, and Türkiye has steadily increased its presence through investments in the construction, transportation, and manufacturing sectors.[7] Consequently, rather than competing with its rivals in terms of scale, Israel seeks to differentiate itself through an advanced technology strategy based on innovation and knowledge transfer.

5 African Security Analysis, "Israel–Africa Relations Renewed: President Isaac Herzog's Visit to Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo", November 13, 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/FTNyR, Access Date: 17.07.2026.

6 MASHAV, "Development Cooperation Programmes in Africa", 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/OdUZx, Access Date: 17.07.2026.

7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 2025: International Investment in the Digital Economy", 2025,
https://unctad.org/publication/world, Access Date: 17.07.2026.

2.3. Agricultural and Development Diplomacy

Agricultural and development diplomacy continued in 2025 to serve as one of the most important instruments of Israel's soft power policy, extending beyond the realm of economic cooperation within its Africa policy. In African countries confronted with water scarcity, climate change, and food security challenges, Israel employs its technological capabilities in areas such as drip irrigation systems, drought-resistant agricultural techniques, precision agriculture, and water recycling technologies as instruments of foreign policy while implementing projects aimed at supporting rural development.[8] One of the principal implementing actors of this policy, Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation (MASHAV), has been conducting technical training programs, expert exchange activities, and capacity-building projects in African countries since 1958. Through MASHAV, public officials and technical experts in many countries – particularly Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Ghana, Zambia, and Morocco – receive training in water management, modern irrigation techniques, agricultural production planning, and rural development, while joint projects are developed with local institutions. In particular, programs promoting the effective management of water resources in Ethiopia, initiatives to enhance the productive capacity of small-scale farmers in Rwanda, and projects aimed at improving agriculture in arid regions of Kenya are regarded as among the leading examples of Israel's development diplomacy.[9] Although this approach, commonly referred to in the literature as "agricultural diplomacy," remains active, it is also evident that it has been constrained to some extent following the Gaza War by growing pro-Palestinian public opinion and political reactions in certain African countries.[10]

2.4. Security and Defense Cooperation

Security and defense cooperation, which constitutes the most strategic dimension of Israel's Africa policy, continued to maintain its importance in 2025. In this context, Israel has continued to prioritize defense industry exports, the development of security capacity, and intelligence cooperation with African countries. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Israel is among the world's leading exporters of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), electro-optical surveillance systems, border security technologies, electronic warfare equipment, and cybersecurity solutions. These technologies have emerged as key components of security modernization, particularly in East African countries.[11] In this regard, defense cooperation developed with countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Rwanda encompasses not only the sale of military equipment but also technology transfer and institutional capacity-building initiatives.

The second pillar of Israel's security diplomacy consists of cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. Security threats posed by Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, Boko Haram based in Nigeria, and other transnational armed groups have created favorable conditions for Israel to develop close relations with countries in the region, particularly in the areas of intelligence sharing and border surveil-

8 MASHAV, "Projects,"
https://mashav.mfa.gov.il/node/24, Access Date: 17.07.2026.

9 ibid.

10 Salman, op. cit.

11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database",
https://armstransfers.sipri.org, Access Date: 17.07.2026.

lance systems.[12] Within this framework, services such as training programs for police forces, capacity-building programs for special forces, counterterrorism training, and security sector advisory services continue to constitute key components of Israel's security partnerships in Africa.

3. Conclusion


As of 2025, Israel's Africa policy stands out as a multidimensional foreign policy approach that integrates the pillars of security, economics, and development. As discussed in this study, Israel pursues a comprehensive strategy aimed at expanding its influence across the continent through not only diplomatic initiatives but also agricultural diplomacy, technology transfer, defense industry cooperation, water management projects, and high-value-added economic partnerships. In particular, security partnerships developed in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, support for strengthening counterterrorism capacities, and investments in digital technologies have emerged as important instruments enabling Israel to maintain its regional influence despite the diplomatic pressures resulting from the Gaza War.

At the same time, South Africa's case before the ICJ, growing criticism of Israel within the AU, and the diplomatic positions adopted by many African countries in support of Palestine have significantly narrowed Israel's room for maneuver in multilateral platforms. Nevertheless, Israel continues to seek to preserve and strengthen its influence across the continent through bilateral relations developed with strategically important African countries.

On the other hand, Israel's activities in Africa should be assessed within the context of intense economic and geopolitical competition from actors such as China, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia. While Israel appears unlikely to compete with China in terms of large-scale infrastructure investments and financing capacity, it has instead adopted an approach based on its expertise in advanced technology, cybersecurity, agricultural innovation, and the defense industry. This demonstrates that Israel's influence on the continent is shaped less by quantitative economic scale than by qualitative partnerships founded on technology, services, and knowledge sharing.

In conclusion, the future of Israel's Africa policy will depend not only on the country's diplomatic and economic capabilities but also on the regional and global repercussions of the Gaza War, the foreign policy priorities of African countries, and the trajectory of great-power competition across the continent. Within this framework, it appears more likely that Israel will continue to maintain its presence in Africa through bilateral partnerships based on security, technology, and development rather than through multilateral diplomatic initiatives.

12 Salman, op. cit.



Chapter Four

Culture, Art, Education and Sports

1 A Tangible Demonstration of Culture-Based Communication in Türkiye-Africa Relations: African Culture House — **407-416**
Zeliha Sağlam

2 Cultural Festivals and Events in Africa in 2025 — **417-422**
Rukiye Nur Akyazıcı | Habeeb Emiola

3 Museology in North Africa in 2025: The Grand Egyptian Museum and the National Museum of Libya — **423-428**
Duygu İlkhan Söylemez

4 Repatriation of Historic Artifacts to Africa in 2025 — **429-436**
Esin Güzel

5 Cultural Heritage Rivalry in North Africa in 2025 — **437-442**
Burak Yetimoğlu

6 Digital Transformation in Education and Information Technology Activities in Africa in 2025 — **443-448**
Mehmet Babacan

7 The Global Rise of African Pop Music in 2025: Afrobeats — **449-454**
Sena Birinci

8 The Multilayered Position of Swahili in Africa in 2025 — **455-460**
Sevgi Çalışır Zenci

9 2025 Developments in Military Turkish Language Education in Africa — **461-466**
Elif Ermağan


10 AFCON 2025 and Morocco's Regional and Global Strategy of Positioning Through Sports — **467-472**
Ahmet Göksel Uluer

11 The Sociological Dynamics of Digital Transformation in Education in Kenya: 2025 Developments — **473-478**
Ani Tarugishvili

12 2025 Continental Education Reforms in Africa: From Colonial Legacy to National Curricula — **479-484**
Yusuf Dinçel

13 Somalia in 2025: The Rising Star of the Art Ecosystem in Africa — **485-492**
Buse Erhalim Gümüş | Suad Jama Aidiid

14 Success Stories of Türkiye Alumni from Africa in 2025 — **493-500**
Tuğrul Oğuzhan Yılmaz



A Tangible Demonstration of Culture-Based Communication in Türkiye-Africa Relations: African Culture House

1

Zeliha Sağlam*

1. Introduction

The literature on Türkiye-Africa relations has largely been shaped by diplomatic engagement, economic cooperation, and development initiatives. However, questions concerning how these relations are narrated, experienced, and perceived remain incomplete without considering the inclusive language of communication.

This article analyzes the manifestation of cultural communication in Türkiye-Africa relations through the case of the African Culture House (ACH). By integrating elements of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, and humanitarian diplomacy, ACH demonstrates how Türkiye's approach toward Africa is institutionalized and translated into practice at both the institutional and societal levels. Focusing on 2025, the study examines the multilayered nature of cultural communication through the institution's discourse, spatial practices, and modes of relationship-building, demonstrating that this process is constructed not only through narrative but also through experience and interaction.

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2. Institutional Background

The African Culture House was established in 2016 under the leadership of First Lady Emine Erdoğan and emerged as a result of the humanitarian connections forged during visits to Africa. The stories of African women engaged in handicraft production, whose work often remained invisible despite their labor, served as the primary inspiration for the initiative.

The institution's principal objectives are to make women's labor visible and transform it into economic value, preserve and sustain cultural heritage, strengthen Türkiye–Africa relations on a humanitarian and everyday basis, and develop civil diplomacy mechanisms grounded in culture, art, and education.

In this respect, ACH offers a human-centered and engagement-oriented model of communication that extends beyond the conventional instruments of diplomacy.

3. Discourse: Equality and Reciprocity

ACH's approach moves beyond a hierarchical, aid-based understanding of relations by promoting a more egalitarian framework based on reciprocity and solidarity. African producers are positioned as bearers of knowledge and culture. This approach is consistent with the emphasis on "equal partnership" that characterizes Türkiye's Africa policy.

ACH represents a distinctive example of how cultural communication can be constructed through space. Located in a traditional Turkish house in Ankara's Hamamönü district, the institution offers visitors a multilayered cultural experience. Through exhibitions, handicraft workshops, music performances, and culinary events, Africa is transformed into a tangible and lived cultural reality.

One of the institution's greatest strengths is its ability to foster emotional connections. Handcrafted products and the stories behind them cultivate empathy and a sense of belonging among visitors. This demonstrates that cultural communication is not merely a process of transmitting information but also one of generating emotion and lived experience.

4. Initiatives and Areas of Impact

The African Culture house engages in cultural communication through tangible projects.



4.1. Education and Production Centers in Africa

In cooperation with TİKA, centers established in Senegal and Tanzania provide handicraft training, vocational skills development, and support programs for women's entrepreneurship. Within this framework, the Mama Jasiri Program equips young women with production and entrepreneurial skills, thereby strengthening their economic independence. In Tanzania, Dr. Khadijah Bwanakheri Mohammed serves as a mentor to women participating in the Mama Jasiri Program. Handicrafts produced through the program are exhibited at ACH, providing them with international visibility. This example clearly illustrates how cultural communication establishes connections among local production, global visibility, and cultural representation.

4.2. Visibility in International Platforms

ACH has assumed an active role in international platforms such as the 4th *Antalya Diplomacy Forum* and the 5th *Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum* (TABEF), positioning itself at the intersection of cultural and economic diplomacy. At these events, products created through women's craftsmanship are exhibited, cultural narratives are shared, and diplomatic engagement is further strengthened.

4.3. Academic and Intellectual Engagement: African Studies Specialization Program

An important dimension of the African Culture House's culture-based communication approach lies in its academic and intellectual initiatives. In this context, the African Studies Specialization Program represents a distinctive initiative that contributes to deepening Türkiye-Africa relations not only at the cultural and humanitarian levels but also within intellectual and academic spheres.

The program brings together graduate students, researchers, and young professionals from various African countries and Türkiye, providing a multilayered environment for learning and interaction. Participants attend seminars and workshops covering a broad range of topics, including Africa's historical legacy, political systems, position within the international system, forms of cultural production, and economic dynamics. In this respect, the program demonstrates that culture-based communication is constructed not only through cultural products and experiential spaces but also through processes of knowledge production and intellectual exchange.

Another significant contribution of the African Studies Specialization Program lies in the enduring relationships and networks established among its participants. The dialogue fostered throughout the program enables participants from different countries to engage directly with one another's perspectives, thereby contributing to a deeper sense of mutual understanding.

While deepening academic interest in African studies in Türkiye, the program also creates opportunities for emerging researchers to explore new intellectual and scholarly fields. In this respect, it contributes to the development of a strong intellectual foundation that supports the long-term sustainability of relations between Türkiye and African countries. Participants from 30 different African countries acquire multilayered knowledge through visits to Turkish institutions and organizations operating across Africa, allowing them to integrate theoretical perspectives with practical experience in the field.

Envisioned as an annual initiative functioning as an "Africa School," the program has attracted considerable attention for its interdisciplinary approach and experience-based structure and has been well received within academic circles and among relevant stakeholders.



First Lady Emine Erdoğan visited the Africa Cultural House and the Presidential Nation's Library of the Presidency with Jeannette Kagame, wife of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who was on an official visit to Türkiye. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

5. First Lady Diplomacy and a New Paradigm

ACH represents an example of "First Lady diplomacy" that extends beyond the conventional understanding of diplomacy. Developed under the leadership of First Lady Emine Erdoğan, this approach places women's labor at its center, regards cultural heritage as a powerful bond, and strengthens humanitarian ties. Rather than relying on an aid-based model, it advances a framework of co-operation founded on mutual empowerment.

The international engagements conducted within this framework have made ACH's impact in the field increasingly visible. A particularly significant occasion was the visit of First Lady Jeannette Kagame, the spouse of the President of



First Lady Emine Erdoğan visited the Africa Cultural House and the Presidential Nation's Library of the Presidency with Jeannette Kagame, wife of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who was on an official visit to Türkiye. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

Rwanda, as the guest of First Lady Emine Erdoğan. During the visit, ongoing efforts to ensure that handicrafts produced by African women are marketed under fair conditions were presented, and participants examined together how cultural heritage is preserved through every motif and detail of these handcrafted works.

Among ACH's diplomatic engagements, tangible evidence of strong partnerships included visits by ministers, ambassadors, distinguished representatives from various African countries, and their accompanying delegations. During these visits, satisfaction with the relationships that ACH has cultivated with African countries was particularly emphasized.

Strengthening women's role in economic and social life constitutes one of the institution's primary areas of focus. Accordingly, at the "Women's Leadership and Entrepreneurship Dialogue" panel, held as part of the 2025 Türkiye-Africa Business and Economic Forum and attended by First Lady Emine Erdoğan, business leaders and representatives of civil society organizations discussed how women's expanding role could be more effectively reflected in development policies. A shared perspective emerged that the longstanding cooperation between Türkiye and African countries is increasingly moving toward a more inclusive and sustainable future through women's leadership.

In November, First Lady Emine Erdoğan accompanied President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on his official visit to South Africa, where her engagements in the field of social responsibility underscored the importance of building a stronger future based on solidarity, sustainability, and social justice. Reflecting on the



First Lady Emine Erdoğan, wife of President Erdoğan, visited the Africa Culture House stand inside the Cemre Bazaar. (Source: Africa Culture House)

visit, she stated, "I sincerely believe that our visit to South Africa, which has left profound impressions on our hearts, will further strengthen the bonds of friendship between us and this strong and remarkable region," expressing her hope for even closer relations between the two countries.

This approach is also reflected in the relationships established with OAFLAD (Organization of African First Ladies for Development), an organization that plays a leading role in Africa's development. During meetings held in New York in 2025, particular emphasis was placed on supporting women's labor, strengthening economic empowerment through production centers, safeguarding intangible cultural heritage, and developing joint projects. The convergence of ACH and OAFLAD around shared values provides a strong foundation for future cooperation.

ACH has also assumed an active role in education and academic engagement by hosting numerous Africa-focused student organizations and academic groups, including those from İnönü University, Ankara Social Sciences University, and Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University's African Studies programs, thereby contributing to knowledge sharing. These initiatives have made a significant contribution to raising awareness of Africa among young people.

ACH has also distinguished itself through its visibility at international events, actively participating in organizations centered on the themes of family, culture, and solidarity. Its participation in the International Family Fair and the International Family Forum organized in Istanbul by the Ministry of Family



The African Studies Specialization Program, organized under the auspices of the Africa Culture House, was held in Ankara on January 20–26, 2025. (Source: Africa Culture House)

and Social Services of the Republic of Türkiye provided important platforms for emphasizing the strong relationship between women's empowerment and the strengthening of the family.

As part of its cultural activities, ACH introduced visitors to Africa's rich handicraft traditions and production stories at the Cemre Bazaar organized by TOGEMDER, presenting the cultural significance and craftsmanship embodied in each product through compelling narratives. Likewise, by participating in global platforms such as the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, ACH showcased Africa's cultural heritage to an international audience.

In addition, the 10th anniversary event organized by ASHOM, which brought together the spouses of African diplomats in Ankara, served as an important gathering celebrating the richness of African culture. The ACH exhibition space attracted considerable attention through the handcrafted products created by women from 40 countries.

ACH's activities also make an important contribution to the preservation and transmission of intangible cultural heritage. Handicrafts, traditional production techniques, gastronomy, and elements of oral tradition constitute essential components of the cultural heritage that defines the identities of African societies. This heritage represents a body of knowledge and skills transmitted from one generation to another, particularly through women. ACH also participated in the panel discussion titled "Understanding Women's Labor," organized in New York in 2025 by the Women and Democracy Foundation (KADEM) as

part of the sixty-ninth session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW69). In her presentation entitled "African Culture House: A Journey That Values Women's Labor," Chairwoman of the Board Zeliha Sağlam explored women's productivity and labor from multiple perspectives. By supporting these forms of production, ACH serves as a model for preventing the disappearance of traditional techniques while ensuring their sustainability by integrating them with contemporary design approaches.

As part of the Culture Route Festival organized by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Türkiye in 2025, ACH attracted considerable attention through its diverse activities promoting cultural diversity and intercultural engagement. Concerts, African dance performances, and handicraft workshops organized within the festival program highlighted Africa's rich cultural heritage through multiple artistic disciplines. In particular, African dance and music performances emphasized universal forms of communication expressed through rhythm and body language, while the handicraft workshops contributed to the preservation of intangible cultural heritage by facilitating the transmission of traditional production techniques.


Taken together, these initiatives demonstrate that ACH is not merely a cultural center but also a platform that enhances the visibility of women's labor, preserves cultural heritage, and consolidates international partnerships. Guided by shared values, mutual understanding, and solidarity, this ongoing endeavor continues to contribute to the construction of a more just, inclusive, and hopeful future.

6. Conclusion

The discourse constructed through ACH is shaped around three core principles: accessibility, sincerity, and cultural sensitivity. By complementing official diplomatic discourse, this framework brings bilateral relations into a more humanitarian and everyday context.

ACH stands out as a concrete model of strategic communication in relations between Türkiye and African countries. By integrating cultural diplomacy with public diplomacy, it generates influence through space, lived experience, and storytelling while contributing to the long-term construction of trust and mutual understanding.

In conclusion, ACH may be regarded as a distinctive and sustainable model that embodies the humanitarian, cultural, and societal dimensions of Türkiye's vision for Africa in practice.



Cultural Festivals and Events in Africa in 2025

2

Rukiye Nur Akyazıcı* | Habeeb Emiola**

1. Introduction

Africa's cultural landscape constitutes a rich tapestry in which millennia-old traditions, spiritual expression, and collective identity are intricately intertwined. Long misrepresented by colonial narratives that equated cultural difference with a lack of civilization, African societies have nevertheless always maintained deeply rooted cultural institutions that form the lifeblood of social life. Festivals occupy a central place in African societies. They are not merely occasions for celebration but structured events that reinforce community bonds, mark the passage of time, and transmit values across generations. As Ògúndèjí and Fasehun emphasize, festivals and carnivals provide vital insights into the social fabric of communities, simultaneously functioning as performances, rituals, and instruments of collective mobilization.[1]

In 2025, Africa's festival calendar exhibited remarkable vibrancy across three intersecting dimensions: Cultural Identity, Pan-Africanism and the Diaspora, and Syncretism. These categories are not mutually exclusive; rather, they represent complementary trajectories through which African peoples articulate, negotiate, and celebrate who they are, both among themselves and across the world. This article examines selected events from 2025 that exemplify each of these dimensions and analyzes their significance within the broader framework of Africa's cultural dynamics.

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1 P. Ògúndèjí and M. Fasehun, "Insights from Festivals and Carnivals", *Cultural Festivals and Their Role in Social Cohesion*, Springer, 2021, pp. 105-118,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55517-7_5, Access Date: 10.04.2026.



The Gnaoua and World Music Festival was held in Essaouira, Morocco, on June 19-21, 2025. (Source: Home - Festival D'essaouira Gnaoua 2027 | World Music)

2. Cultural Dynamics in Africa

As cultural phenomena, festivals are organized and recurring celebrations that constitute elements of popular culture, reflecting the activities, emotions, and interactions of communities around the world.[2] These events serve as markers of cultural identity, functioning as periodic occasions that anchor humanity's sociocultural space and embody collective social identity.[3]

Within the African context, this dynamic assumes particular significance in light of the historical legacy of colonialism and the continent's ongoing project of cultural reclamation and reaffirmation.

Broadly speaking, African festivals in 2025 can be classified into three categories: *traditional cultural events* rooted in indigenous heritage; *Pan-African events* that transcend ethnic boundaries in pursuit of continental solidarity; and *syncretic cultural celebrations* that blend African traditions with global influences. Each category reflects a distinct yet complementary dimension of African cultural expression, and together they comprise the 2025 African cultural calendar examined in this chapter. This study also explores the role of festival culture in articulating identity, transmitting cultural values, and promoting social continuity and stability.

3. Pan-Africanism and the Diaspora

3.1. The 9th Pan-African Congress-Lomé, Togo (December 8-12, 2025)

The 9th *Pan-African Congress* was unquestionably the most significant Pan-African event of 2025. Organized jointly by the African Union Commission and the Government of Togo, the Congress was held in Lomé from December 8

2 Greg Richards and Robert Palmer (ed.), *Festival Cities: Culture, Planning and Urban Life*, Routledge, Londra, 2020, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003130802, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

3 Cigdem Findiklar, "The Role of Festivals in Urban Identity: A Study on the Relationship Between Perception and Experience of Place; Case of Seb-i Arus", Middle East Technical University, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2017, https://www.kisa.link/QSXWr, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

to 12, 2025, marking the culmination of a year-long mobilization process that included six regional preparatory meetings held across Africa and the diaspora.[4] The event brought together approximately one thousand participants, including ministers, diplomats, academics, representatives of civil society organizations, and leaders of the global African diaspora.[5] The theme of the Congress, "Renewal of Pan-Africanism and Africa's Role in the Reform of Multilateral Institutions: Mobilizing Resources and Reinventing Itself to Act," symbolized a forward-looking rather than commemorative orientation.

Faure Gnassingbé, President of the Council of Ministers of Togo, described the gathering not as a commemorative ceremony but as an occasion for reaffirmation, reclamation, and transformation. He called upon delegates to view the Congress as a strategic instrument through which Africa could reclaim its voice on the global stage.[6] The Congress addressed fundamental questions concerning culture, knowledge, and identity, while the African Union Commission explicitly committed itself to embedding Pan-African consciousness, historical truth, and reparatory justice into both formal and informal education throughout the continent and the diaspora.[7]

3.2. Africa Day 2025-African Union (May 25, 2025)

Africa Day 2025 emerged as a major occasion for reaffirming Pan-African ideals at the continental level. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission emphasized that the day provided an opportunity to celebrate Pan-Africanism, the continent's shared heritage, and the strength of African unity, while renewing the collective commitment to justice, reparations, and a prosperous and inclusive Africa for all African peoples and the global African diaspora.[8] By encouraging Africans to embrace their diverse cultures, languages, and traditions in a spirit of collective pride and belonging, the event reinforced pride in African identity.

4. Cultural Identity

4.1. Africa Week at UNESCO-Paris (2025)

Although held in Paris, Africa Week at UNESCO serves as a direct platform for showcasing African cultural identity on the global stage. The 2025 edition was organized under the theme "Global Solidarity for the Restitution and Restoration of African Heritage through Culture, Education and Sciences." Conference panels highlighted Africa's contributions to global knowledge, covering subjects ranging from Nok metallurgy and Dogon astronomy to the intellectual legacy of Timbuktu.[9] An education panel chaired by Zimbabwe's First Lady, Dr. Auxillia Mnangagwa, strongly emphasized that schools should teach the issue of restitution not as an act of benevolence but as a matter of right.[10]

4 African Newspage, "As Africa Readies for 9th Pan-African Congress in Lome", 30.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/UZkof, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

5 Togo First, "African Union and Togo Launch Congress to Renew Pan-African Ties", 09.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/XuVPp, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

6 Togo First, ibid.

7 Modern Diplomacy, "Renewal of Pan-Africanism: A Vision for the 21st Century", 12.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/RJCMF, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

8 African Union, "Africa Day 2025: Powerful Reminder of the Continents Resilience, Diversity and Potential", 25.05.2025, https://www.kisa.link/aknjy, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

9 UNESCO, "Heritage Homecoming: Africa Week 2025 Unites the African Diaspora at UNESCO", 2025, https://www.kisa.link/Kqnqr, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

10 UNESCO, ibid.

4.2. Chale Wote Street Art Festival-Akra, Ghana (August 2025)

The *Chale Wote Street Art Festival* transformed the streets of Accra into a dynamic open-air gallery, bringing together contemporary urban expression and the aesthetics of traditional African creativity. Through murals, avant-garde fashion, live graffiti, and captivating musical performances, Chale Wote established itself as a powerful platform where contemporary African cultural identity, particularly an urban, youth-oriented identity in dialogue with indigenous heritage, is actively negotiated.[11]

4.3. Gerewol Festival-Chad/Niger (October 2025)

Held by the *Wodaabe* people of Chad and Niger, the *Gerewol Festival* continues to represent one of Africa's most distinctive expressions of cultural identity. The October 2025 edition centered on a male beauty and courtship ritual through which identity, aesthetics, and community belonging are expressed and celebrated through performance.[12] By demonstrating how concepts such as beauty, gender performance, and community are constructed in ways that both enrich and challenge global normative frameworks, the festival once again highlighted the diversity of African cultural identity.

4.4. Incwala Festival-Eswatini (December 2025 – January 2026)

Regarded as Eswatini's most sacred festival, the *Incwala Festival* offers a rare window into Africa's royal traditions. Warriors dressed in elaborate ceremonial attire perform ritual dances, while the king presides over ancestral rites, and the entire kingdom gathers in an expression of heritage and national renewal. As one of the few festivals where an ancient monarchy is effectively integrated with contemporary national pride, it provides a unique setting to examine living cultural identity.[13]

5. Syncretism

5.1. Gnaoua and World Music Festival-Essaouira, Morocco (June 19-21, 2025)

The 26th edition of the *Gnaoua and World Music Festival*, held in Essaouira from June 19 to 21, 2025, represented one of the most striking expressions of syncretism in Africa's 2025 cultural calendar. The festival distinguished itself by blending heritage with innovation through a three-day celebration of rhythm, dialogue, and cultural fusion. The most notable feature of the 2025 edition was the establishment of a university chair dedicated to globalization and intercultural studies, founded on the Gnaoua experience. This development clearly

11 African Leadership Magazine, "Africa's Festivals and Cultural Celebrations You Cannot Miss in 2025", 31.01.2025, https://www.kisa.link/XMIeW, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

12 African Leadership Magazine, ibid.

13 African Leadership Magazine, ibid.

demonstrates that the festival has evolved beyond a purely cultural platform into an intellectual institution as well.[14]

The festival was established to preserve Gnawa music and culture, which originated among the descendants of West African enslaved people brought to Morocco during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Gnawa music, rooted in Sub-Saharan African healing ceremonies, combines spiritual and ritual elements with traditional melodies and has gradually evolved into an internationally recognized cultural phenomenon.[15] The Gnawa constitute networks of spiritual brotherhoods whose identity intertwines Islamic Sufism with pre-Islamic Berber, Arab, and African spiritual traditions. As such, they represent a living embodiment of religious and cultural syncretism.

5.2. Africa Week at UNESCO: Pan-African Music Performances

The cultural performances presented during UNESCO's Africa Week 2025 offered a vibrant continental showcase of Pan-African syncretism. Featuring artists from eleven countries, the program brought together Tanzania's Afro-grooves, Mauritania's nomadic desert sounds, Côte d'Ivoire's *Sellou'Art* dancers, Rwanda's Intore ensemble, Zimbabwe's mbira jazz tradition, Morocco's mystical *Aïssawa* melodies, Cabo Verde's morna music, Congolese salsa, the Comoros' *toirab* tradition, Malian fusion music, and fashion inspired by Senegal's *Bogolan* textile art, creating a colorful panorama of living traditions engaged in dialogue with one another.[16]

6. Conclusion


The cultural festivals and events of 2025 once again affirmed Africa's enduring capacity to define, preserve, and transform its cultural heritage on its own terms. From the political significance of the 9th *Pan-African Congress* to the syncretic energy of the Gnaoua Festival and the communal sacredness of Incwala, each event portrayed a continent actively pursuing cultural self-determination. Far from being relics of the past, these celebrations function as living laboratories of identity formation, where the local and the global, as well as the ancestral and the contemporary, engage in a productive dialogue.

Taken together, the events examined in this article clearly demonstrate that African cultural identity in 2025 was neither static nor monolithic; rather, it constituted a dynamic synthesis of tradition, diasporic consciousness, and creative reinvention. In this respect, 2025 stands out as a significant milestone in the narrative of Africa's cultural renaissance. Festivals and cultural events have evolved beyond mere occasions for celebration to become strategic instruments of dignity, solidarity, and civilizational affirmation.

14 Morocco World News, "Three Days, One Music-Filled City: Gnaoua Festival 2025 Lineup Unveiled", 2025, https://www.kisa.link/KlVqi, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

15 Wikipedia, "Gnawa and World Music Festival", https://www.kisa.link/YpNGO, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

16 UNESCO, ibid.



Museology in North Africa in 2025: The Grand Egyptian Museum and the National Museum of Libya

3

Duygu İlkhan Söylemez*

1. Introduction

The year 2025 marked a period in which the history of museology in North Africa was fundamentally redefined. Two major openings in November and December, the Grand Egyptian Museum (GEM) near Giza and the National Museum of Libya (Red Castle-Assaraya al-Hamra) in Tripoli, brought together the region's archaeological heritage with modern conservation technologies and innovative architectural approaches. The simultaneous inauguration of both institutions in 2025 significantly consolidated North Africa's position in the global management of cultural heritage.[1]

This study examines the architectural design features, conservation infrastructures, and collection policies of these museums from a technical perspective. Constructed with an investment of approximately $1.2 billion by the Egyptian government, the GEM represents the culmination of more than three decades of planning and preparation. In Libya, the historic Red Castle, which had remained closed since the 2011 civil war, was restored with international support after nearly fourteen years and reopened as a museum.[2]

A technical comparative analysis of these two projects is of considerable importance in demonstrating how museological practices in North Africa are converging with global standards. Accordingly, this article provides a detailed examination of the architectural design, conservation capacity, and collection management strategies of both institutions.

* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Selcuk University, duyguilkhan@gmail.com

1 Zoe Carver, (2025), "A New Era in Egyptology: The Grand Egyptian Museum Opens its Doors",

https://www.kisa.link/nXflg, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

2 Heneghan Peng Architects, "Grand Egyptian Museum", ArchDaily,

https://www.kisa.link/kSqCo, Access Date: 03.04.2026.



The opening ceremony of the Grand Egyptian Museum, hosted by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, was held in Cairo on November 1, 2025. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

2. The Grand Egyptian Museum: Architectural Design and Conservation Infrastructure

Officially opened at full capacity with a grand ceremony on November 1, 2025, the Grand Egyptian Museum holds the distinction of being the world's largest museum dedicated to a single civilization. Located just two kilometers from the Giza Pyramids, the museum occupies an area of approximately 500,000 square meters, with 81,000 square meters devoted to exhibition space.

Designed by the Irish firm Heneghan Peng Architects, winner of the 2003 international architectural competition, the building establishes a profound dialogue with the geographical dynamics of the Giza Plateau. The 50-meter elevation difference separating the Nile Valley from the desert plateau became the principal determinant of the architectural concept, resulting in a monumental wedge-shaped structure embedded into the plateau. The exterior façade consists of triangular forms combining alabaster stone panels, Egyptian limestone cladding, and glass. These triangular elements both regulate the admission of natural light and contribute to the preservation of the artifacts. The predominantly concrete



The National Museum of Libya reopened in Tripoli on December 12, 2025, after 14 years. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

structural system is based on the principle of thermal mass, minimizing the building's climate-control requirements despite its vast scale.[3]

Connected to the main building by a tunnel approximately 200 meters in length, the Conservation Center occupies an area of 18,000 square meters and is

3 *Dezeen*, "Grand Egyptian Museum reaches completion in Giza", https://www.kisa.link/GllKU, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

regarded as one of the world's most comprehensive archaeological conservation facilities. Its 17 specialized laboratories include dedicated units for a wide range of materials, from papyrus and textiles to mummies, stone sculptures, and metal artifacts. The most tangible achievement of this infrastructure has been the first-ever exhibition of King Tutankhamun's entire collection of 5,398 objects in a single location.[4] Housing more than 100,000 artifacts, the museum comprises 12 main exhibition galleries, a children's museum, a conference center, and a dedicated pavilion displaying Khufu's solar boats.[5]

3. The National Museum of Libya: Modernizing a Historic Structure

Reopened to the public on December 12, 2025, the National Museum of Libya is located within the historic Assaraya al-Hamra (Red Castle) complex in Tripoli. Originally converted into a museum in 1919 during the Italian colonial period, the building was forced to close following the instability that emerged after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and remained inaccessible to visitors for nearly fourteen years. Initiated by the Government of National Unity in March 2023, the comprehensive restoration project was carried out with the technical guidance of UNESCO and the contributions of Turkish and Italian experts.[6]

With an exhibition area of 10,000 square meters, the museum is the largest in Libya and has been designed to provide modern exhibition facilities without compromising the integrity of its historic interiors. Its collection presents a continuous historical narrative spanning the Phoenician, Roman, Byzantine, and Islamic periods. Among the most prominent objects are mosaics, monumental sculptures, and frescoes from the UNESCO World Heritage archaeological sites of Leptis Magna and Sabratha, as well as the mummies discovered at Uan Muhuggiag and Jaghbub.[7] Parallel cultural events were simultaneously organized in Rome, London, and Paris to coincide with the museum's reopening, underscoring the institution's growing international diplomatic significance.[8]

Prior to the reopening, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh stated in his opening address that the museum's restoration and reopening constituted tangible evidence of Libya's reconstruction of its national institutions. This statement clearly demonstrates that the institution functions not merely as a cultural venue but also as a powerful symbol in the reconstruction of national identity in the post-conflict period.[9]

4 *Al Jazeera*, "A look inside Egypt's newly unveiled Grand Egyptian Museum", https://www.kisa.link/SusdJ, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

5 *ABC News*, "Egypt's Grand Museum fully opens in gala ceremony after 2-decade build", https://www.kisa.link/aaWyh, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

6 *The Art Newspaper*, "Reopening of Libya's national museum celebrated as 'new beginning'", https://www.kisa.link/aMkKP, Access Date: 03.04.2026.
Wikipedia, "Red Castle Museum", https://www.kisa.link/gnbNm, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

7 *Agenzia Nova*, "The National Museum of Tripoli reopens, with simultaneous ceremonies also held in Rome, London, and Paris", https://www.kisa.link/rfyrP, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

8 *ARTnews*, "Libya's National Museum Reopens After 14 Years", https://www.kisa.link/PBfVo, Access Date: 03.04.2026.
https://www.kisa.link/KCBrW, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

9 *Daily Sabah*, "Libya reopens national museum, showcases ancient treasures", https://www.kisa.link/KCBrW, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

4. Collection Management and Repatriated Artifacts

The year 2025 marked a period in which both museums enriched their collections through new acquisitions and international repatriations. In addition to presenting the complete Tutankhamun collection to the public for the first time, the GEM also placed more than 20,000 previously unexhibited artifacts on display.[10]

On the Libyan side, museum officials announced prior to the reopening that 21 archaeological objects illicitly removed from the country had been repatriated from collections in France, Switzerland, and the United States. They also indicated that repatriation negotiations were ongoing with Spain and Austria. These returns play a critical role in restoring collections damaged by post-conflict looting and in strengthening mechanisms for provenance tracking and accountability.

Digital transformation has likewise become a defining priority in collection management at both museums. At the GEM, a visible conservation laboratory allows visitors to observe, through glass viewing panels, the restoration process of Khufu's solar boat in real time. During 2025, UNESCO also recognized both the GEM and the National Museum of Libya as key partner institutions in regional cultural heritage conservation initiatives. [11]

5. Conclusion

2025 marked a new phase of momentum for museology in North Africa in terms of both scale and quality. With its vast campus, 17-laboratory Conservation Center, and formal architectural dialogue with the pyramids, the Grand Egyptian Museum has become one of the foremost international reference points in contemporary museum architecture. The National Museum of Libya, in turn, stands as a symbolic success story of post-conflict cultural restoration, demonstrating how a historic fortress can be successfully adapted to meet modern museum exhibition standards.

Both projects have clearly demonstrated that archaeological artifacts can be preserved and exhibited to the highest international standards in the lands to which they belong. Egypt's technology-driven mega-museum model and Libya's approach, centered on the rehabilitation of its historic fabric, represent two complementary strategies. These developments also serve as a technical reference for other museum projects across the African continent, placing the responsibility of safeguarding cultural heritage for the present and the future on global collaboration.[14]

10 *ABC News*, "Egypt's Grand Museum fully opens in gala ceremony after 2-decade build", https://www.kisa.link/aaWyh, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

Daily Sabah, "Libya reopens national museum, showcases ancient treasures", https://www.kisa.link/KCBrW, Access Date: 03.04.2026;


Maghrebi.org, "Libya reopens national museum", https://www.kisa.link/kpRhg, Access Date: 03.04.2026.

11 UNESCO, "Grand Egyptian Museum", https://www.kisa.link/ABBUj, Access Date: 03.04.2026.;

Maghrebi.org, "Libya reopens national museum", https://www.kisa.link/kpRhg, Access Date: 03.04.2026

Maghrebi.org, "Libya reopens national museum", https://www.kisa.link/kpRhg, Access Date: 03.04.2026;

UNESCO, "Grand Egyptian Museum", https://www.kisa.link/ABBUj, Access Date: 03.04.2026.



4

Repatriation of Historic Artifacts to Africa in 2025

Esin Güzel*

1. Introduction

The year 2025 witnessed developments that signaled structural transformations in the recovery of Africa's cultural heritage. The issue of repatriating African cultural property that had been systematically removed to Europe and North America during the colonial period remained confined to a limited sphere of diplomatic debate for many years. However, over the past decade, increasing political pressure, scholarly research, and ethical discussions have brought the issue to the forefront of the global agenda. In 2025, this process gained further momentum and was redefined through new mechanisms and actors.[1]

The repatriation processes that took place during the year extended beyond the physical return of artifacts and reshaped debates over ownership, representation, and cultural sovereignty. The revision of collection policies by major European museums, the willingness of national governments to reconsider existing legal frameworks, and the increasingly coordinated diplomatic initiatives undertaken by African countries all indicate that the issue of restitution has become institutionalized.

This study adopts an event-centered approach to examine the repatriation of cultural property to Africa during 2025, with the aim of evaluating the significance, scope, and implications of these developments.

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1 Oritsejolomi Otomewo, "Communiqué 53: When the artifacts come home to roost", Communiqué, 14.01.2025, https://www.kisa.link/NzEOi, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

2. The Repatriation of Benin Bronzes to Nigeria

The artifacts known as the Benin Bronzes were produced in the royal workshops of the Kingdom of Benin, located in present-day Nigeria, over a period extending largely from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century. They include bronze relief plaques, sculptures, ceremonial objects, and ivory carvings created using sophisticated bronze-casting techniques. Beyond their artistic value, these works serve as visual records representing the political structure, religious rituals, and dynastic history of the Kingdom of Benin.[2]

The vast majority of these artifacts were looted during the British Empire's military expedition against the Kingdom of Benin in 1897. Although this operation, known as the *Punitive Expedition*, was officially justified as retaliation for the killing of a British delegation, its consequences amounted to large-scale cultural plunder. Benin City was occupied, the royal palace was burned, and thousands of works of art were systematically collected and transported to Britain. The looted objects were subsequently dispersed among museums, galleries, and private collections across Europe. Some entered the collections of the British Museum directly, while others were sold or donated to museums in Germany, the Netherlands, and elsewhere in Europe. As a result, the Benin Bronzes entered the international art market and came to be preserved in fragmented form across numerous institutions.[3]

The most significant development in the repatriation of the Benin Bronzes during 2025 was the large-scale return of artifacts by the Netherlands to Nigeria. The Dutch government approved the repatriation of a total of 119 objects held in the collections of several museums, and the artifacts were formally transferred during an official ceremony. The returned objects include bronze relief plaques, sculptures depicting human and animal figures, ceremonial bells, royal scepters, and ivory carvings. In terms of both the number of objects involved and the level of institutional coordination, the centralized decision to repatriate artifacts from multiple museum collections demonstrates that the restitution process was coordinated at the national level.[4] This represents a departure from the more fragmented and institution-specific repatriation efforts of previous years. Furthermore, the Netherlands' decision emerged in response to growing political pressure and public demand for restitution across Europe. Consequently, it prompted a reassessment of collection policies among European museums. Throughout 2025, the legitimacy of artifacts acquired during the colonial period became the subject of intensive debate, leading to the repositioning of museums as institutions bearing historical responsibility.[5]

2 Danai Nesta Kupemba, "Netherlands to return stolen Benin Bronzes to Nigeria", BBC, 19.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/vRPTd, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

3 The British Museum, "Benin Bronzes",
https://www.kisa.link/tGcpE, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

4 Nelson C.J., "The Return of Benin Bronzes Could Change How Young Nigerians Engage With History", Okay Africa, 08.04.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/STgHC, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

5 Kazeem Kasali, "Nigeria Receives 119 Benin Bronzes From Netherlands In Historic Repatriation", TVCNEWS, 23.06.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/qperz, Access Date: 23.02.2026.



The Netherlands returned 119 Benin Bronzes to Nigeria in 2025, which had been captured from Nigeria by British soldiers in the 19th century. (Source: Netherlands to return Benin Bronzes to Nigeria | Wereldmuseum Rotterdam)

From Nigeria's perspective, the repatriation process has become an integral component of national cultural policy. New museum projects have been proposed to preserve, exhibit, and make the returned artifacts accessible to the public. Olugbile Holloway, Director General of the National Commission for Museums and Monuments of Nigeria, described the artifacts as "the embodiment of the spirit and identity of the people from whom they were taken."[6]

3. Ethiopia and Cameroon's Global Restitution Efforts

The origins of the campaign to repatriate Ethiopia's cultural property can be traced to the Maqdala Expedition of the second half of the nineteenth century.

6 Al Jazeera, "The Netherlands returns 119 stolen sculptures to Nigeria", 21.06.2025, https://www.kisa.link/xOtnS, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

The military campaign launched by the British Empire in 1868, officially justified by Emperor Tewodros II's refusal to release British captives, resulted in widespread cultural plunder. The imperial palace and churches at Maqdala were systematically looted, and hundreds of religious and royal objects were removed to Europe.[7]

Among the artifacts taken during this campaign were gold and silver crosses, sacred manuscripts, royal crowns, ceremonial shields, and iconographic paintings. The manuscripts and religious objects belonging to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church possess exceptional theological and ritual significance. These objects were subsequently dispersed among museums, universities, and private collections across Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom. Although the Ethiopian government and various academic circles have long sought their return, these efforts produced only limited results for many years.[8] In contrast, 2025 marked a period in which the process gained renewed momentum. The restitution efforts concerning Ethiopia displayed a multilayered and fragmented structure involving a variety of actors. One of the most notable examples was the return of 12 artifacts from a private collection in Germany to Addis Ababa University. Most of these objects are believed to have been removed from Ethiopia during the 1868 Maqdala Expedition, making them closely associated with the country's historical trauma.[9]

Although the number of artifacts repatriated from private collections remains limited, these returns are highly significant in terms of restoring public access to Ethiopia's cultural heritage. Likewise, the meeting organized in Addis Ababa under the auspices of UNESCO represented an important step toward accelerating restitution efforts and strengthening international cooperation.[10]

Unlike the centralized and large-scale repatriation initiatives undertaken in Nigeria, the restitution process involving Ethiopia is characterized by a dispersed structure involving states, private collectors, universities, and religious institutions. While this illustrates the multilayered nature of restitution, it also highlights significant limitations. Indeed, the fact that most of the Maqdala artifacts held in major museums in the United Kingdom have yet to be returned demonstrates that the process remains incomplete and continues to face substantial obstacles.[11]

Cameroon has also emerged as a prominent case in contemporary restitution debates. One of the most significant examples concerns the repatriation of wooden sculptures, masks, and ritual objects belonging to the Bangwa people

7 Levent Öztürk, "Etiyopya", Islamic Encyclopedia of the Türkiye Diyanet Foundation, 1995,
https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/etiyopya#2-tarih, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

8 Craig Simpson, "Ethiopia demands that King Charles return 'immoral' treasures", The Telegraph, 24.01.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/VzaGZ, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

9 Wycliffe Muia, "Ethiopia receives historic artefacts held in Germany for 100 years", BBC, 20.11.2025,
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07m7pl3njmo, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

10 UNESCO, "New types of cooperation and agreements in the field of the return and restitution of cultural property to Africa - a continental approach", 27.01.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/synDW, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

11 Sinai Fleary, "British Army told to return 'looted' Ethiopian treasures", The Voice, 12.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/dxVlh, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

that were taken to Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The returns initiated in 2024 laid the groundwork for continuing discussions in 2025, while the active involvement of local communities in the preservation and exhibition of the returned artifacts has demonstrated that restitution is not merely an intergovernmental process but one that also requires meaningful societal participation.[12]

At the same time, the ongoing discussions surrounding the repatriation of the Ngonnso statue in Cameroon illustrate the complexities of the restitution process. Although the statue, which represents the founding figure of the Nso people, holds profound cultural and religious significance, its return from a museum in Germany had not been realized as of 2025.[13] This case demonstrates that restitution does not invariably produce positive outcomes and often requires prolonged negotiations. The Ngonnso case clearly illustrates that repatriation processes encompass not only legal considerations but also ethical, political, and cultural diplomatic dimensions.

4. Smuggled Cultural Heritage Items of Egypt and South Africa

Unlike in many other African countries, the removal of Egypt's cultural property abroad occurred primarily through archaeological excavations, collecting practices, and illicit trafficking. The increase in illegal activities during the twentieth century resulted in significant losses to Egypt's cultural heritage. The year 2025 marked an important turning point in the recovery of some of these artifacts through cooperation with the United States. Within this framework, a collection of 36 artifacts repatriated from the United States reflects the historical diversity of Egypt's cultural heritage. The collection includes significant objects such as a ritual vessel depicting the deity Bes, a Roman-period mummy mask, Coptic and Syriac manuscripts, and an approximately 3,000-year-old painted wooden panel. These artifacts provide valuable insights into religious beliefs, funerary practices, and the early Christian period. The fact that all of these objects had previously been removed from Egypt through illicit means further underscores the importance of their repatriation for the protection of cultural heritage.[14]

A substantial proportion of the repatriations to Egypt took place within the framework of international efforts to combat illicit trafficking, demonstrating that restitution is not limited to addressing historical episodes of colonial plunder but is also directly connected to contemporary trafficking in cultural proper-

12 Kanika Saigal, "10 items of colonial loot Africa wants back", The Africa Report, 25.04.2025, https://www.kisa.link/lSpCu, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

13 Shulmo Trust Dohyee, "Bring back Ngonnso", Africa Is a Country, 20.01.2025, https://www.kisa.link/fBHiw, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

14 Vittoria Benzine, "U.S. Returns 36 Stolen Artifacts to Egypt After Major Recovery Effort", Artnet, 10.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/oBjBd, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

ty. This process highlights that the protection of cultural heritage has become an integral component of current legal and security policies.

Meanwhile, the repatriation of human remains to South Africa in 2025 expanded the ethical dimensions of restitution debates. Human remains belonging to six individuals, together with two face masks and a soapstone pipe, were repatriated from a university collection in Scotland to South Africa. These remains had been acquired during anthropological research conducted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and had long been used as scientific research material. Such practices are now subject to significant ethical criticism, as the remains were collected without the consent of the communities concerned and preserved under conditions that violated human dignity.[15]

The repatriated human remains originated from Indigenous communities in South Africa. For these communities, the remains are regarded not merely as biological material but as sacred ancestral entities. Consequently, the repatriation process has come to be understood as one directly linked to human rights, ethical responsibility, and historical justice.

As restitution became a more visible and institutionalized process at the global level in 2025, UNESCO assumed an important role by reinforcing intergovernmental dialogue, international cooperation, and the coordination of repatriation efforts based on mutual trust, particularly through initiatives such as the meeting held in Addis Ababa. Across Europe, museum collection policies also became the subject of intense public debate. The legitimacy of artifacts acquired during the colonial period was increasingly questioned. While countries such as the Netherlands took concrete steps toward repatriation, some museums in the United Kingdom adopted a more cautious approach based on legal considerations and advocated long-term loan arrangements instead. From a legal perspective, the inadequacy of existing international regulations in addressing colonial-era looting emerged as a major obstacle. As a result, restitution claims have increasingly been grounded in principles of ethics and historical justice.[16]

African countries have sought to strengthen their institutional capacity for preserving and exhibiting repatriated artifacts. In Nigeria, for example, the development of museum infrastructure and the implementation of new museum projects have become important components of this process. Nevertheless, domestic debates have emerged concerning the ownership and management of the returned objects. In Western public discourse, concerns have been raised regarding Africa's capacity to preserve these artifacts, while many African

15 BBC, "Glasgow university returns human remains to South Africa", 15.10.2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3vnkely463o, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

16 Emiline Smith, "British Museum Launches Farcical "Decolonizing" Loan Program", Hyperallergic, 22.12.2025, https://www.kisa.link/pSoOP, Access Date: 23.02.2026.

scholars and practitioners have regarded such arguments as a continuation of colonial attitudes. In contrast, a number of Western academics have supported restitution, arguing that it has the potential to spark off a radical transformation in museological practices.[17]


5. Conclusion

2025 marked a turning point in the repatriation of Africa's cultural heritage, both in terms of scale and substance. Restitution processes have evolved beyond isolated initiatives into more systematic, institutionalized, and multi-actor frameworks. The cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, South Africa, and Cameroon demonstrate that, although these processes have unfolded in different ways, they reflect a common trajectory.

The repatriation of 119 Benin Bronzes to Nigeria illustrates that restitution has become a large-scale policy area coordinated at the state level, whereas the Ethiopian case reflects the fragmented and multi-actor character of the process. The repatriations to Egypt demonstrate that restitution is increasingly associated with combating contemporary illicit trafficking rather than solely addressing historical looting, while the return of human remains to South Africa has expanded the ethical dimensions of the debate. The Cameroonian case, in turn, highlights the role of local communities and underscores the social dimension of restitution.

During this period, the more active involvement of international organizations, particularly UNESCO, contributed to placing restitution within a more institutionalized framework. Nevertheless, legal constraints and the preference of some European museums for long-term loan arrangements continue to constitute major obstacles to the further advancement of the restitution process.

17 Alex Marshall, "Even Without Benin Bronzes, This New Museum Aims to Be a Powerhouse", The New York Times, 07.11.2025, https://www.kisa.link/gVahx, Access Date: 23.02.2026.



Cultural Heritage Rivalry in North Africa in 2025

5

Burak Yetimoğlu*

1. Introduction

Today, political and economic rivalries between states are no longer confined to military or commercial arenas; they have increasingly evolved into diplomatic disputes centered on the ownership of cultural heritage and the construction of national identity in the international arena. In this regard, Africa has emerged as one of the regions where global struggles over sovereignty and heritage are most visible.[1] Although similar tensions exist across many parts of the continent, recent years and particularly 2025 have witnessed the emergence of an increasingly pronounced cultural rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, with Tunisia at times becoming strategically involved as well.[2]

This article aims to analyze the competition over cultural heritage in North Africa, particularly between Morocco and Algeria. To this end, it first examines the politicization of cultural heritage in international relations, then explores the historical background of tensions between the two countries, and finally evaluates the contemporary dynamics of this rivalry through the caftan controversy, which reached its peak in 2025. In doing so, the study seeks to analyze how cultural heritage has become a field of power and contestation within the contemporary international system.

2. Politicization of Cultural Heritage: Diplomacy, Identity and Rivalry

Cultural heritage diplomacy is defined as the use of a state's cultural assets and heritage to enhance its prestige on the global stage, legitimize its national

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1 Idriss Jebari, "Couscous, Kaftans, and Culture Wars: Algeria and Morocco at UNESCO", *GIGA Focus Middle East 4,* 2024.

2 The caftan nomination, first submitted to UNESCO by Morocco in 2023, was brought back onto the agenda in March 2025 and was ultimately approved on December 10, 2025, during the twentieth session of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage held in New Delhi. However, the inscription was viewed by Algeria as a unilateral appropriation of a shared cultural element and reignited longstanding debates over the common heritage of the Maghreb. As a result, the caftan issue evolved beyond a technical process of cultural inscription into a symbolic and diplomatic source of tension between Morocco and Algeria.

Marouane Kabbaj, "Guerre diplomatique culturelle : Pour Alger, un nouveau revers dans la bataille du patrimoine", *Maroc-Hebdo,* December 12, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/iSoII



The Moroccan caftan was inscribed on the UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2025. (Source: Moroccan Caftan: art, traditions and skills - UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage)

identity, and establish normative superiority over other countries.[3] Cultural heritage is not a static reality frozen in the past; rather, it is a political instrument through which states reinterpret the past, construct narratives in accordance with present-day needs, and envision the future.[4] [5] This capacity makes cultural heritage a productive foundation for political projects while allowing states to attribute meanings ranging from material significance to ideological symbolism in the context of diplomatic engagement.[6]

Intangible cultural heritage, in particular, strengthens national belonging during nation-building processes, [7] while simultaneously sharpening distinctions between the nation and its perceived rivals.[8] In this context, states employ defensive or corrective heritage diplomacy to protect national narratives against perceived external threats or to respond to competing claims over cultural ownership.[9] In the case of Morocco and Algeria, the cultural dispute has evolved beyond a competition over tourism promotion or folklore into a direct struggle over sovereignty and national honor, what the scholarly literature has termed a "heritage war".[10]

Across North Africa, states increasingly view international cultural organizations such as UNESCO as diplomatic platforms through which they legitimize national identities and seek avenues for international recognition and negotia-

3 Izabella Parowicz, "The Heritage Diplomacy Spectrum: A Multidimensional Typology of Strategic, Ethical, and Symbolic Engagements", 2025, *Heritage 8*, p. 10.

4 Viktorija L. A. Čeginskas and Tuuli Lähdesmäki, "Introduction: Reflecting on Heritage Diplomacy", *International Journal of Cultural Policy,* 2023, p. 1.

5 Parowicz, "The Heritage Diplomacy Spectrum", 2.

6 Čeginskas and Lähdesmäki, "Introduction".

7 Bahar Aykan, "The Politics of Intangible Heritage and Food Fights in Western Asia", *International Journal of Heritage Studies 22*, 2016, pp. 10: 799-800.

tion.

3. From Geopolitical Competition to Cultural Clash: The Historical Background of Morocco-Algeria Relations

The roots of the current cultural conflict between Morocco and Algeria lie in the region's colonial past, postcolonial border disputes, and sharply divergent nation-building trajectories. Although the two countries have shared intertwined Amazigh, Arab, and Islamic cultural traditions for centuries, France's asymmetric colonial policies in North Africa pushed them onto markedly different historical paths.[11] France occupied Algeria in 1830 and administered it as an integral part of French territory, formally annexing the region, whereas Morocco became a French protectorate in 1912 while largely preserving its monarchical system and a degree of institutional autonomy. As the French historian Benjamin Stora has argued, Morocco's contemporary national identity rests on the continuity of a long-standing dynastic tradition that survived the colonial period, whereas Algeria's national identity emerged from a far more abrupt and traumatic rupture caused by colonial rule.[12]

These divergent historical trajectories became apparent immediately after Algeria gained independence following a violent war in 1962. Owing to the undefined desert boundaries left by the French colonial administration, the Sand War broke out between the two countries in 1963. The conflict began when Moroccan forces crossed the border, asserting claims over the Tindouf and Béchar regions, and laid the foundations for a profound strategic mistrust that has persisted ever since. The principal geopolitical rupture between the two states, however, arose from the Western Sahara dispute following Spain's withdrawal from the territory in 1975 and Morocco's subsequent annexation through the Green March.[13] Consistent with its anti-colonial foreign policy vision and in an effort to counterbalance Morocco's regional expansion, Algeria financed and supported the Polisario Front, which advocates the independence of Western Sahara.[14]

This military and geopolitical cold war gradually intensified with the closure of the Morocco-Algeria border in 1994 and ultimately culminated in Algeria's complete severance of diplomatic relations with Morocco in August 2021.[15] As diplomatic communication froze and the regional arms race escalated,[16] both states sought alternative arenas through which to pursue their rivalry. Consequently, today's dispute over cultural heritage is, in essence, a political contest between two cultures whose boundaries remain difficult to delineate in a hybrid region characterized by extensive demographic interaction and borders originally drawn by colonial powers under the Treaty of Lalla Maghnia of 1845.[17] The shared cultural practices produced by communities living on both sides of the border have thus become instruments of interstate competition.

8 Julia Csergo ve Jessica Roda, "Le patrimoine culturel immatériel en tension(s)", *Sociétés & représentations*, 2025, p. 60: 8.

9 Parowicz, "The Heritage Diplomacy Spectrum", 15.

10 "Entre l'Algérie, le Maroc et la Tunisie, la bataille du zellige a commencé", *Jeune Afrique*,
https://www.kisa.link/vOkWy Access Date: 24.04.2026,

11 "Cold War in Africa: Morocco and Algeria", *AUSA*, March 27, 2024,
https://www.kisa.link/zSerN, Access Date: 24.04.2026.

12 Benjamin Stora, Algérie, Maroc: histoires parallèles, destins croisés, Zellige (Emina Soleil Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002).

13 Morocco and Algeria: A Strategic Rivalry Shaping the Maghreb - EST, 30 Temmuz 2025,
https://www.kisa.link/PAdRb, Access Date: 24.04.2026.

14 AUSA, "Cold War in Africa".

15 Jebari, "Couscous, Kaftans, and Culture Wars".

16 Morocco and Algeria.

17 Sarah Zaaimi, "A War Is Raging between Algeria and Morocco. It Is Being Fought in the Heritage Arena.", *Atlantic Council*, May 30, 2024,
https://www.kisa.link/dTkmE, Access Date: 24.04.2026.

4. UNESCO Inscription of the Moroccan Caftan in 2025

The year 2025 marked a period in which the competition over cultural heritage in North Africa became increasingly visible and crystallized at the symbolic level. One of Morocco's most significant achievements in cultural diplomacy during the year was the official inscription of the Moroccan caftan on UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity at the nineteenth session of the UNESCO Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, held in New Delhi on December 10, 2025. Presented by the Moroccan government as a major diplomatic success, this decision was interpreted not only as an act of cultural recognition but also as a reinforcement of Morocco's national representation in response to approaches advocating the treatment of the region's heritage under a broader "shared Maghreb identity.[18]

Morocco's success in 2025 should be viewed as an extension of the intensifying institutional competition that has emerged within UNESCO in recent years. A significant stage of this tension arose in connection with Algeria's submissions concerning traditional garments in 2023 and 2024, which prompted Morocco to lodge an official objection with UNESCO in 2024, arguing that the nominations incorporated elements of Moroccan cultural heritage.[19] The inscription approved in 2025 was therefore shaped by these reciprocal diplomatic initiatives and further strengthened Morocco's claim to international recognition of its cultural heritage.

Throughout 2025, this rivalry extended beyond international organizations and increasingly influenced domestic policymaking. In this regard, statements made by Algeria's Minister of Culture in June 2025 [20] indicated that the country intended to strengthen its legal framework for the protection of cultural heritage.[21] This initiative has been interpreted as a defensive measure against what Algeria perceives as Morocco's efforts to appropriate various cultural elements, illustrating that cultural heritage is increasingly being treated as an issue of sovereignty and national security. At the same time, the increasingly confrontational political rhetoric demonstrated that the cultural sphere had become an extension of the broader geopolitical rivalry between the two countries.

The controversy surrounding the caftan represents a continuation of the multilayered heritage competition that had emerged in previous years. In particular, the debates surrounding the use of *zellige* [22] motifs on the Algerian national football team's Adidas jerseys in 2022 demonstrated that cultural elements have also become objects of competition within international commercial and symbolic arenas.[23] Given this context, the caftan controversy should be understood as part of a broader strategy of heritage diplomacy.

18 "Le caftan marocain inscrit au Patrimoine culturel immatériel de l'Unesco, au grand dam de l'Algérie", Culture,Maroc, *Le Monde*, December 10, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/gUENN, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

19 Sarah Zaaimi, "Le Maroc dépose une plainte auprès de l'UNESCO contre l'Algérie pour appropriation du caftan fassi", Maroc-Hebdo, May 20, 2024,

https://www.kisa.link/mkqYs, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

20 Lynda Hanna, "Face aux convoitises marocaines, l'Algérie veut blinder son patrimoine", TSA, June 28, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/dSFjT, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

21 "Entre l'Algérie et le Maroc, la guerre du patrimoine est déclarée",

https://www.kisa.link/vcLAz, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

22 A traditional mosaic art form widely used in North African and Andalusian architecture, created from colored, glazed terracotta tiles cut into intricate geometric patterns. Widely regarded as one of the defining symbols of Moroccan architecture, *zellige* became the subject of an intellectual property and "cultural appropriation" dispute between Morocco and Algeria in 2022 after Adidas incorporated these motifs into the Algerian national football team's jerseys.

23 Jeune Afrique, "Entre l'Algérie, le Maroc et la Tunisie, la bataille du zellige a commencé".

Similarly, gastronomy has not remained immune to this rivalry. Couscous[24] was inscribed on UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2020 following a joint nomination by Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania and was initially presented as a symbol of regional cooperation.[25] By 2025, however, this collective framework had weakened considerably. In particular, statements by Algerian officials accusing Morocco of appropriating couscous and other cultural elements indicate that this shared heritage has once again become the subject of national competition.[26] As academic studies have emphasized, cultural practices whose origins long predate the emergence of modern nation-states have increasingly become instruments of contemporary struggles over identity and representation.[27] In this respect, 2025 stands out as a period during which cultural heritage became increasingly politicized across a broad spectrum ranging from gastronomy to architecture, serving as a symbolic arena for interstate competition.

5. Conclusion

The cultural heritage dispute between Morocco and Algeria in North Africa, particularly exemplified by the controversies surrounding the caftan and *zellige* in 2025, extends far beyond an authentic folkloric rivalry. Rather, it represents the outward expression of a deeper geopolitical, diplomatic, and socio-psychological struggle. Persistent political obstacles including the unresolved Western Sahara conflict, the continued closure of the Morocco-Algeria border, and both states' competing aspirations for regional leadership[28] have driven the rivalry into the cultural sphere, where competition appears more flexible yet requires equally assertive strategies.

Today, UNESCO inscriptions and WIPO trademark registrations function for both states as instruments of sovereign recognition, nation branding, and the exclusion of competing claims. The transformation of the rich cultural heritage shared by the peoples of North Africa – whose common history spans millennia and whose societies share deeply intertwined historical roots and religious traditions – into competing claims of exclusive national ownership, rather than a unifying Maghreb identity, constitutes one of the principal obstacles to regional peace and integration. It is therefore essential for the international community, and UNESCO in particular, to develop new mechanisms that promote shared ownership and cross-border cultural exchange in place of policies that allow cultural heritage to be instrumentalized as a political weapon. Otherwise, these heritage disputes, reinforced by diplomatic rhetoric, will continue to erode the region's fragile political fault lines and deepen existing polarization.

24 Couscous is a traditional dish prepared by moistening and rolling semolina or durum wheat into small granules and is widely consumed throughout the Maghreb region of North Africa. In 2020, it was inscribed on UNESCO's Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity as a multinational element following a joint nomination by Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia. Despite this shared inscription, however, couscous has in recent years become a symbolic arena of interstate competition, marked by disputes over cultural ownership and increasingly nationalist narratives.

25 "Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie : projet commun pour inscrire le couscous au patrimoine mondial de l'Unesco - France 24",

https://www.kisa.link/VdJoo , Access Date: 25.04.2026.


26 "Alger convoque de nouveau le casus belli du couscous", *Jeune Afrique*,

https://www.kisa.link/Xbkib Access Date: 25.04.2026.

27 "«Le couscous est plus ancien que les Etats» : entre l'Algérie et le Maroc, une paternité disputée de longue date" *Libération,*

https://www.kisa.link/ADxCF, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

28 Morocco and Algeria.



Digital Transformation in Education and Information Technology Activities in Africa in 2025

6

Mehmet Babacan*

1. Introduction

Africa should not be regarded merely as the name of one of the world's largest continents; rather, it should be understood in light of the civilizations, power struggles, and accumulated legacies that have unfolded across these lands, often described as the "footprint of humanity." In the minds of people living in different parts of the world, Africa has long been associated with suffering, tragedy, and images of catastrophe, while in international politics it has frequently been portrayed as a region in which dominant powers and global actors compete to extract and control its resources.[1]

At a time when technological advances are progressing at an extraordinary pace and artificial intelligence-based software platforms are permeating every aspect of state and social life, Africa is likewise positioning itself as a growing force in technology, science, and education through the support of local and global entrepreneurs.[2] Alongside its abundant natural resources, Africa possesses a substantial human capital. Achieving technological, educational, and cognitive transformation on a continental scale depends on equipping this human capital with stronger knowledge and skills. From a regional perspective, technological investments across the continent, the restructuring of educational systems, and advances in information and communication technologies are of critical importance for realizing this transformation. Within this framework, this article ex-

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1 Muhsin Korkut, "Afrika Düşüncesi ve Dekolonizasyon Çelişkisi", *TASAM,* 28.01.2019

https://www.kisa.link/rFPdr, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

2 Tania Begazo, Moussa P. Blimpo, Mark A. Dutz, "Overview", *Digital Africa: Technological Transformation for Jobs*, World Bank Group, Washington, 2023, p. 27.



From ETEX-2025 Expo

amines the technological and digital developments that shaped educational and information technology activities across Africa in 2025.

2. Regional Technology Investments, Trade Fairs and Digitalization Initiatives

In 2025, Africa witnessed significant investments that are expected to facilitate digital transformation on a continental scale. In addition, international exhibitions, promotional events, and various initiatives were organized to support the dissemination of complementary and next-generation technologies. One of the first of these developments was the *Africa Tech Summit*, held in London on June 6. Thirteen emerging technology companies from various African countries came together to attract global investors to the continent and showcase innovations they had developed in sectors such as healthcare, finance, law, logistics, and environmental sustainability. The summit provided an important platform for Africa to enhance its global visibility in the technology sector. Participating companies included Nigerian startups Blue Room Care, Build Africa, Myituran, and Wallx Africa, as well as South African technology ventures such as Ctrlfleet, Lawyerly, Njiapay, and Smartrefill, all of which gained valuable opportunities to expand internationally.[3]

The *Ethiopian Tech Expo* (ETEX 2025), widely recognized as East Africa's largest technology event, was held in Addis Ababa from May 16 to 18, 2025,

3 *The Wall Africa Journal Turk,* "2025 Afrika Teknoloji Zirvesi Londra'da yapılacak", 28.05.2025

https://www.kisa.link/nTxbO, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

with broad international participation. Focusing particularly on artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, smart cities, financial technology (FinTech), and technology education, the event highlighted Ethiopia's leading initiatives in these fields while setting a target of expanding the country's information technology (IT) market to $2.44 billion by the end of 2025. Positioning Ethiopia as a leader in Africa's digital future, the expo featured initiatives such as the "5M Coder Initiative," which presented a vision of equipping millions of Africans with the digital skills necessary to drive the continent's expanding technology ecosystem. This vision stands out as a transformative step toward accelerating innovation and digital transformation both in Ethiopia and across the African continent.[4]

Another major event held in 2025 was Bigtech Africa 2025, an international conference organized with the goal of shaping the continent's digital future by bringing together companies, entrepreneurs, investors, and public-sector representatives working in artificial intelligence, digital technologies, and information technology. Held in Tunisia from September 9 to 11, 2025, the event not only provided African technology companies with an opportunity to showcase their products and services to global audiences but also served as a platform for establishing new partnerships and closely monitoring technological developments across African markets. Turkish technology companies also established significant collaborations during the event, which brought together representatives of some of the world's leading technology firms and emerged as one of the continent's most comprehensive technology gatherings.[5]

3. Promoting "Innovation" and "Information Technologies" across the Continent

The digital transformation that Africa seeks to achieve has the potential not only to generate significant benefits across various sectors of society and public administration but also to contribute to the green transition, economic development, and sustainable growth. However, this interconnected and systematic process requires sustained support for innovation and research and development (R&D), as well as the widespread expansion of information and communication technologies throughout the continent through a comprehensive approach that includes rural communities. Drawing on the World Bank's *Digital Africa* report, this process is illustrated in Figure 1.[6]

4 *Etex: Ethiopian Tech Expo 2025,* "Shaping Ethiopia's Digital Future: Innovation, Security, Transformation", 16.05.2025

https://etexethiopia.com/, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

5 *TÜBİTAK,* "BIGTECH AFRICA 2025 – Tunus'ta Teknoloji, Yapay Zekâ ve Girişimcilik Buluşması", 30.07.2025

https://www.kisa.link/ABIfZ, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

6 Tania Begazo, Moussa P. Blimpo, Mark A. Dutz, "Overview", *Digital Africa: Technological Transformation for Jobs,* p. 27.

The Africa AI Council, regarded as a milestone for enabling continental-scale digital transformation and advancing AI governance and innovation across Africa, was officially established by the Smart Africa Board in November 2025. This decision by the Smart Africa initiative, launched in 2013 by African heads of state and government to accelerate sustainable socioeconomic development across the continent, is considered one of the most significant developments of 2025. Indeed, the initiative stated that the Council was established "to reinforce Africa's commitment to digital sovereignty, inclusive innovation, and sustainable economic growth in the age of artificial intelligence."[7]


7 *Smart Africa,* "The Smart Africa's Board Unveils the inaugural Africa AI Council to Lead the Continent's AI Transformation", 09.11.2025

https://www.kisa.link/bqIcY, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

4. Transformation in Education and Practices that Make a Difference

In addition to its abundant natural resources, Africa's strong human capital must be equipped with the knowledge and skills required for the era of Industry 4.0, making the adoption and expansion of digital technologies a critical policy priority. As of 2025, Nigeria remained the continent's most populous country,

Figure 1: Conceptual framework for the policy analysis of digital technologies (DTs) on employment and revenue growth



with a population exceeding 230 million, followed by Ethiopia, Egypt, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Tanzania.

Beyond the size of the population, enhancing its quality is equally important. Ensuring that demographic trends across African countries meet established standards in education and skills development underscores the need for transformative initiatives at the continental level. Within this context, UNESCO organized workshops and vocational education projects under the Better Education for Africa's Rise initiative (BEAR)[8] in 2025. Digitalization also remained a prominent theme in education curricula across the continent, while the 2025 *Africa Evidence Summit*[9] with its particular emphasis on higher education, emerged as a key forum highlighting evidence-informed decision-making in education and the role of African scholars.


5. Conclusion

In the era of digitalization and the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence–driven technologies, Africa pursued the goal of achieving a continental transformation in education and information technologies throughout 2025. Countries such as Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Kenya, which have established themselves as leaders in fields including artificial intelligence, digital technologies, the Internet of Things, smart cities, and cybersecurity, hosted numerous international events during the year. At the same time, implementing projects designed to familiarize Africans with the technologies required for digital transformation and to develop the necessary competencies demanded the parallel advancement of educational and information technology initiatives. In this regard, the digitalization of education has emerged as a central component of the continent-wide transformation envisioned for Africa's educational systems.

As Africa's transformation in education and information technologies has progressed in an interconnected and systematic manner, the need to support these processes through innovation and transformative practices has become increasingly evident. Accordingly, technology platforms and trade fairs brought together a broad range of stakeholders including business leaders, academics, heads of state and government, entrepreneurs, and global investors and have emerged as important venues for attracting international attention to the continent and fostering opportunities for multinational technological cooperation.

8 *UNESCO,* "The Better Education for Africa's Rise Project",
https://www.kisa.link/wrRMn, Access Date: 25.04.2026.

9 *CEGA (Center for Effective Global Action),* "2025 Africa Evidence Summit",
https://www.kisa.link/nbraa, Access Date: 25.04.2026.



The Global Rise of African Pop Music in 2025: Afrobeats

7

Sena Birinci*

1. Introduction

African pop music has, in recent years, become one of the most dynamic and transformative forces in the global music industry. At the center of this transformation is Afrobeats, which has evolved beyond being merely a musical genre associated with a particular region to emerge as a movement influencing the aesthetics, production, and consumption of global popular music. The year 2025 stands out as a critical period in which this rise became more visible, measurable, and institutionalized.

This study aims to examine the global rise of Afrobeats during 2025. To this end, it is structured around the major trends that emerged throughout the year, developments on digital platforms, international collaborations, and the institutional transformation of Africa's music industry. As of 2025, Afrobeats' position within the global circulation of music should be assessed not only in terms of increasing streaming figures but also through the multidimensional dynamics of cultural representation, identity formation, and international visibility. In this regard, Afrobeats also functions as a vehicle for redefining Africa's place within the global cultural system. Accordingly, this article provides a comprehensive analysis of how Afrobeats expanded globally throughout 2025, the structural dynamics that supported this process, and its implications for both the music industry and the broader cultural sphere.

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2. Afrobeats: A Conceptual Framework

Afrobeats is a contemporary popular music movement that originated in West Africa and became institutionalized primarily in Nigeria and Ghana beginning in the 2000s.[1] The genre emerged through the interaction of indigenous African rhythmic traditions with elements of hip-hop, R&B, dancehall, and electronic music. With the widespread adoption of digital production technologies, it has undergone a significant transformation in both its production and circulation. Its defining characteristics include high-tempo rhythmic structures, syncopated beats, dance-oriented compositions, and multilingual lyrics. These features are widely regarded as the principal factors enhancing the genre's accessibility for both local audiences and the global music market.

From a conceptual perspective, it is important to distinguish Afrobeats from the similarly named Afrobeat, with which it is frequently confused. Afrobeat refers to the genre pioneered in the 1970s by Nigerian musician Fela Kuti, characterized by its fusion of jazz, funk, and traditional African music, as well as its extended compositions and politically charged lyrics.[2] Afrobeats, by contrast, functions as an umbrella term encompassing a broader musical landscape, maintaining a more direct relationship with commercial popular music while incorporating a variety of subgenres. Consequently, Afrobeats should be unders-

1 Ibrahim Yusif, "The sound of change: Afrobeats and the deconstruction of African stereotypes", *The Journal of Critical Race and Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2024, pp. 46-69.

2 Sola Olorunyomi, "Afrobeat!: Fela and the Imagined Continent", *Africa World Press*, 2003.

tood not as a single, fixed genre but as a pluralistic musical formation in which diverse artistic practices and aesthetic approaches converge. Among its leading representatives are Nigerian artists such as Wizkid, Burna Boy, and Davido. In addition, members of a younger generation of performers, including Rema and Tems, have played a significant role in expanding the genre's global reach.[3] Artists such as Sarkodie and Stonebwoy from Ghana likewise reflect the regional diversity of the Afrobeats ecosystem.

The development of Afrobeats should be understood not only through its musical characteristics but also within the broader context of structural dynamics such as technological advancement, the proliferation of digital platforms, and the restructuring of the global music industry. Afrobeats represents more than a specific musical genre; it constitutes a dynamic cultural sphere shaped by the intersection of production, distribution, and consumption practices. Rather than possessing fixed boundaries, the genre remains fluid, continuously redefined through musical interactions across different regions, industry strategies, and evolving audience practices. In this respect, Afrobeats provides an analytical framework for understanding the transformation of the contemporary global popular music system.

3. The Rise of Afrobeats on Digital Platforms in 2025

2025 stands out as a period in which Afrobeats experienced a more visible and measurable rise in the global circulation of music through digital platforms. Notable increases were recorded in the streaming figures of African artists on major global platforms such as Spotify, Apple Music, and YouTube. This growth extended beyond regional and diaspora-based audiences, reflecting the genre's appeal to an increasingly broad international listenership. During this period, Afrobeats became one of the fastest-growing genres within the global streaming economy, securing a significant share of platform-based music consumption.

Algorithmic recommendation systems played a decisive role in this expansion. By 2025, the curation strategies adopted by digital platforms increasingly emphasized diversity and local content, facilitating the discovery of music produced across Africa. Editorial playlists and personalized recommendation mechanisms, in particular, significantly enhanced the visibility of Afrobeats tracks across diverse geographic regions. This development demonstrates the continuing erosion of geographic boundaries in music consumption and the accelerating circulation of musical genres across global markets.

At the same time, the influence of short-form video platforms became particularly pronounced in 2025. Social media-based content creation platforms,

3 Yusif, op. cit., p. 49.

most notably TikTok, emerged as the primary channels accelerating the viral circulation of Afrobeats songs. Dance-oriented content, viral challenges, and user-generated videos enabled certain tracks to spread rapidly on a global scale, with their popularity often surpassing the reach of traditional music promotion strategies. As a result, the interaction between digital culture and the music industry played a central role in the rise of Afrobeats.[4]

Another notable development in 2025 was the increasingly consistent presence of Africa-based artists on international charts. An examination of global Top 100 rankings and regional popularity charts indicates that Afrobeats productions were not limited to short-lived viral successes; rather, they demonstrated sustained streaming performance over time. This suggests that the genre has moved beyond being a temporary trend to establish a lasting position within the global music industry.

At the same time, the visibility afforded by digital platforms has also transformed music production processes within Africa. Independent artists' access to low-cost production tools and their ability to reach audiences directly have partially diminished the role of traditional intermediaries in the music industry. In this context, 2025 can be regarded not only as a year in which Afrobeats expanded globally but also as a period in which music production and distribution practices evolved toward a more decentralized structure.

4. Cultural Identity, Representation and Soft Power

The global visibility achieved by Afrobeats in 2025 points to a multidimensional phenomenon that should be examined not only within the context of the music industry but also through the lenses of cultural identity, representation, and soft power. The international circulation of the genre has created a space in which cultural narratives about Africa are reproduced and transformed, with music becoming not merely a form of aesthetic expression but also a vehicle carrying symbolic and political meanings.

The global rise of Afrobeats marks a significant turning point in the representation of African identities. After being portrayed for decades in global popular culture in limited ways and often through stereotypical lenses, Africa has, by 2025, gained a more diverse, dynamic, and agentive form of visibility through Afrobeats. The use of local languages in song lyrics and the incorporation of everyday life and urban culture as aesthetic narrative elements are among the defining features of these new forms of representation.[5] This demonstrates that cultural production is no longer shaped exclusively by Western-centered norms;

4 Kisha Dasent, *"TikTok: Globalization and the Social Identification of Afrobeats"*. Akpan, U.S. (ed) African Media Space and Globalization, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp. 287-302, 2023.

5 Fatima Zahra Ahmed, "The Globalization of African Music Through Streaming Platforms", *Journal of Research in Social Science and Humanities*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2025, pp. 10-15.

rather, different regions are increasingly able to project their own narratives onto the global stage.

Afrobeats can also be understood as an instrument of soft power for nation-states. The international circulation of cultural products has emerged as a key factor in shaping countries' global image. As of 2025, several African countries, particularly Nigeria, have positioned the music industry as part of their cultural diplomacy strategies, using the global success of Afrobeats to enhance their international visibility and prestige.[6] In this context, rather than producing explicit political messages, music generates influence indirectly through its capacity to create cultural appeal and attraction.


At the same time, the global circulation of Afrobeats has also generated certain tensions regarding cultural representation. As the genre has become increasingly integrated into international markets, the prioritization of particular aesthetic conventions and the growing influence of commercial considerations have created the risk that the diversity of African cultural production may be represented in limited ways. This raises important questions about which voices and narratives achieve global visibility and has fueled broader debates concerning the unequal distribution of cultural representation.

5. Conclusion

The year 2025 stands out as a period in which Afrobeats moved beyond being merely an Africa-centered popular music genre and established itself as a permanent and influential force within the global music industry. Increased visibility through digital platforms, international collaborations, and institutional developments within Africa strengthened the genre in both economic and cultural terms. These developments enabled Afrobeats to move beyond the status of a marginal phenomenon in the global popular music system and become a central actor in terms of aesthetics, production, and circulation.

Moreover, the rise of Afrobeats in 2025 generated significant implications for cultural representation, identity, and soft power. The genre has contributed to making African identities more visible on the international stage while facilitating the global circulation of cultural diversity and local narratives. In the years ahead, the sustainable growth of Afrobeats will depend on the effectiveness of digital distribution, the protection of production and copyright, and the preservation of diversity in cultural representation. In this regard, 2025 can be regarded as a watershed year in which Afrobeats emerged as a transformative cultural force on a global scale.

6 Yusif, op. cit. pp. 62-63.



8

The Multilayered Position of Swahili in Africa in 2025

Sevgi Çalışır Zenci*

1. Introduction

Africa is characterized by extraordinary linguistic diversity, with more than 2,000 languages spoken across the continent.[1] Within this multilingual landscape, certain languages have evolved beyond serving as local means of communication to function as regional or continental lingua francas.[2] In this context, Swahili has become not only one of the principal lingua francas of East Africa but increasingly one of the most important lingua francas across the African continent.[3] Today, Swahili is estimated to be spoken by more than 200 million people and is widely used throughout East, Central, and Southern Africa, making it one of the region's principal languages.[4]

The significance of Swahili in Africa extends far beyond its demographic reach. The language also holds institutional status within regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community, and has become an important instrument of political integration.[5]

The year 2025, in particular, marks a period during which Swahili's global visibility and strategic importance within Africa increased significantly. During this period, notable developments included broader recognition of the language by international organizations, its expanded integration into educational systems, and its growing use in digital technologies.[6] Accordingly, this article examines the position of Swahili in Africa through political, institutional, eco-

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1 Ethnologue, "Languages of the World", 2023, https://www.ethnologue.com, Access Date: 25.12.2025.

2 Ali Mazrui, *The Cultural Politics of Language In Africa*, Routledge, 2016.

3 Derek Nurse and Thomas Spear, "The Swahili: Reconstructing The History And Language of An African Society", *University of Pennsylvania Press*, 1985.

4 Ethnologue, op. cit.

5 African Union Commission, "Report On The Promotion And Use Of Kiswahili As A Working Language In The African Union", 2022.

6 UNESCO, "Global Report On Language Policies And Multilingualism", *UNESCO Publishing*, 2022.

nomic, and digital dimensions and provides an analytical assessment of the new dynamics that had emerged by 2025.

2. Historical Background

Although Swahili belongs to the Bantu language family, it has developed a complex vocabulary through prolonged contact with Arabic, Persian, and Indian languages. Swahili emerged along the East African coast through interactions between Arab traders and local Bantu communities. Beginning in the tenth century, it played a significant role within the Indian Ocean trading network and, during the nineteenth century, was adopted by colonial administrations as a regional lingua franca.[7]

Today, Swahili holds official or national language status in several African countries, most notably Tanzania and Kenya. In addition, it serves as a working language within the AU and several regional organizations. The historical overview presented in Table 1 demonstrates that Swahili is not merely a language but also a carrier of civilization.

Period	Characteristics	Impact
10th-15th centuries	Arab-Bantu interaction	Language of commerce
19th century	Colonial period	Missionary schools
20th century	Post-independence	National identity
21st century	Digitalization	Global visibility

Table 1. Swahili's Development through History

3. The Role of Swahili in Africa

The literature generally examines the role of Swahili in Africa within the contexts of its function as a lingua franca, nation-building, Pan-African identity, and digitalization. Numerous linguistic studies have emphasized the use of Swahili as a common language of communication in East Africa.[8] Research on language policy has drawn particular attention to the role of Swahili in fostering national unity in Tanzania.[9] These studies demonstrate that Swahili is not merely a means of communication but also a political project.

Studies adopting a Pan-African perspective argue that Swahili plays a strategic role within the AU and continental integration processes.[10] This approach views Swahili as a potential instrument for Africa-centered knowledge production. Recent research has also shown that the use of Swahili in digital environments is expanding rapidly.[11] In particular, natural language processing research seeks to enhance the technological visibility of African languages.[12]

7 Derek Nurse, "*Inheritance, Contact, And Change İn Two East African Languages", Cambridge University Press*, 2000, pp. 134-150.

8 Abdulla Mohammed, "Modern Swahili Grammar And Usage", *African Languages and Cultures,* 14(2), 2001, pp. 87-102.

9 Casmir Rubagumya, "Language Promotion For Educational Purposes: The Example Of Tanzania", *International Review of Education,* 37(1), 1991, pp. 67-85.

10 Salikoko Mufwene, *Globalization, Global English, And World English(Es): Myths And Facts.* 2010, pp. 31-55.

11 Guy De Pauw, Peter Waiganjo Wagacha ve Gilles-Maurice de Schryver, "The SAWA Corpus: A Parallel Corpus English–Swahili", *Language Resources and Evaluation*, 43(3), 2009, pp. 223-238.

12 Joshi Pratik, Sebastin Santy, Amar Budhiraja, Kalika Bali ve Monojit Choudhury, "The State And Fate of Linguistic Diversity And Inclusion In The NLP World", *Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 2020, pp. 6282–6293.

4. Swahili in 2025

4.1. The Political Status of the Language

One of the most significant developments for Swahili in 2025 was its growing visibility within international organizations. The most notable milestone in this regard was the adoption of Swahili as one of UNESCO's official working languages at the UNESCO General Conference in November 2025. This decision is regarded as a historic milestone, as it made Swahili the first African language to receive official recognition at the international level.

This development has had significant implications for the international status of African languages and for the continent's representation within global governance mechanisms. First, the increased visibility of Swahili within international organizations has strengthened the global representation of African languages. Second, it has created favorable conditions for Africa-centered knowledge production to gain greater visibility within international institutions and platforms. Finally, the growing international prestige of Swahili has encouraged African countries to give the language a more prominent place in their multilingual diplomatic strategies, thereby making Swahili an important instrument for strengthening the continent's cultural and diplomatic representation.

The symbolic significance of UNESCO's decision is considerable, as the language policies of international organizations are generally closely linked to global power dynamics. Consequently, Swahili's attainment of this status may be regarded as an important turning point in enhancing the cultural and linguistic visibility of Africa. Furthermore, *World Kiswahili Language Day*, celebrated annually on July 7, was marked in 2025 by large-scale events in numerous countries, underscoring the language's role as a force for cultural cohesion.

4.2. Economic and Commercial Dimension

Swahili plays a critical role in facilitating trade within the East African Community. In 2025, the increased use of Swahili in regional trade agreements enhanced the language's economic value. In particular, its function as a common language for cross-border trade has accelerated regional economic integration.

4.3. Cultural Visibility

Swahili serves as a carrier of cultural identity through music, literature, and cinema.[13] In 2025, the growing availability of Swahili-language content on Netflix and other digital platforms further strengthened the language's global cultural visibility.[14] For example, Bongo Flava music and Swahili literature play a significant role in identity formation among younger generations.[15]

13 Alain Ricard, *The Languages and Literatures of Africa*, David Philip Publishers, Cape Town, 2004.

14 FengYi Yin, "Navigating The Global-Local Nexus İn Indigenous African Language Television", *Critical Studies in Media Communication*, 2025, pp. 1-17.

15 Alex Perullo, *Live From Dar Es Salaam: Popular Music And Tanzania's Music Economy*, Indiana University Press, 2011.



The two-day event held in Rwanda on July 6-7, 2025, drew more than 300 participants from East Africa and beyond, including senior government officials, academics, young people, and Kiswahili experts. (Source: UNESCO)

International events dedicated to the Swahili language and culture in 2025 also became an important component of Africa's cultural diplomacy.[16] In particular, the increasing use of Swahili in music, film, and digital media has contributed to the language's growing popularity among younger generations.[17] Moreover, diaspora communities and Swahili programs established at universities have further supported the language's global diffusion.[18]

4.4. Education and the Academic Sphere

As of 2025, Swahili's role in education has expanded considerably. In particular, the language is used across a broad educational spectrum, from primary education to higher education, in East African countries. In 2025, UNESCO-supported projects facilitated the development of digital educational materials in Swahili, thereby enhancing the language's academic status.[19]

Language policies implemented across African countries are generally analyzed in the language planning literature through three widely recognized dimensions: status planning, corpus planning, and acquisition planning.[20] Swahili has made significant progress in all three areas. Within the framework of status planning, the language has been recognized as one of the working languages of the AU.[21] In the field of education, the expansion of Swahili instruction represents a major development in terms of acquisition planning.[22] Consequently, the integration of local languages into education systems has become an increasingly important priority across African countries.[23]

4.5. Digitilization and Technology

As of 2025, Swahili has gained greater representation in artificial intelligence and digital platforms. Companies such as Google and Microsoft have expanded translation and voice assistant services in Swahili.[24] These developments ensure the language's sustainability in the digital age.

16 UNESCO, op. cit.

17 Laura Fair, *Reel Pleasures: Cinema Audiences And Entrepreneurs İn Twentieth-Century Urban Tanzania,* Ohio University Press, 2018.

18 Ali Mazrui, "The Swahili Diaspora And Language Expansion", *Journal of African Cultural Studies,* 19(2), 2007, pp. 115-130.

19 UNESCO, *Global Report On Multilingual Education And African Languages,* UNESCO Publishing, 2025.

20 Robert Kaplan and Richard Baldauf, *Language Planning: From Practice To Theory,* Multilingual Matters, 1997.

21 African Union, op. cit.

22 UNESCO, *World Kiswahili Language Day Background Document,* UNESCO Publishing, 2021.

23 UNESCO, ibid.

24 Prisca Boniphace Makulilo, "Morphological Productivity and Lexical Innovation in Swahili: Digital Communication and Language Transformation in Social Media Spaces", *Language, Technology, and Social Media* 3(2), 2025, pp. 231-249.

In particular, the number of datasets and language models developed for Swahili in the fields of natural language processing and artificial intelligence has continued to grow. These efforts have enabled the language to be used more effectively across digital platforms while also enhancing the technological visibility of African languages.


Several factors account for Swahili's prominence in the field of artificial intelligence. Foremost among these is its status as one of Africa's most widely spoken languages, with more than 200 million speakers. In addition, its use as the principal language of communication in regional trade across East and Central Africa has increased its economic and commercial significance. Furthermore, its inclusion as either a medium of instruction or a subject of instruction in the education systems of many African countries has strengthened its institutional use and capacity for digital content production. These demographic, economic, and institutional advantages have contributed to making Swahili one of the priority African languages for artificial intelligence applications, including natural language processing, machine translation, and large language models.

5. Conclusion

2025 marked a period during which Swahili further strengthened its position both in Africa and globally. UNESCO's recognition of Swahili as one of its official working languages significantly enhanced the language's international visibility. Moreover, the expansion of the East African Community and the integration of Swahili into the education systems of several countries further reinforced its regional importance.

Developments in digital technologies are also promising for the future of Swahili. The growing use of the language in artificial intelligence, natural language processing, and digital learning platforms has strengthened its technological ecosystem.

Taken together, these developments demonstrate that Swahili has become not only a language of communication in Africa but also one of the principal instruments of political, cultural, and economic integration. Consequently, the future of Swahili holds strategic significance for Africa's language policies and regional integration processes.



2025 Developments in Military Turkish Language Education in Africa

9

Elif Ermağan*

1. Introduction

The political and cultural ties established with Africa since the Ottoman period, together with the diplomatic initiatives undertaken during the Republican era, illustrate that this multidimensional relationship possesses historical continuity.[1] In particular, the support provided to African countries during their independence processes, the opening of embassies, and contributions to these independence movements may be regarded as milestones in the long-term and positive trajectory of Türkiye's Africa policy. Over the past two decades, Türkiye's Opening to Africa has led to a significant expansion of political and economic relations, an increase in trade volume, and considerable progress in diplomatic representation.

This historical background has also been reflected in the fields of military cooperation and language education, bringing greater visibility to both areas. Since the 2000s, Türkiye has assumed an active role in Africa in the areas of military education, technical cooperation, and institutional capacity building.[2] During this period, Turkish has evolved beyond being merely a language of general communication and has become the professional language of military training. It has begun to serve as an important tool for ensuring the proper understanding of commands, enhancing the efficiency of training, and developing joint operational capacity.[3] Turkish language instruction provided in Türkiye as well as at military bases and training centers in Africa has facilitated the institu-

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1 İsmail Ermağan and Elem Eyrice Tepeciklioğlu, "Türkiye-Afrika ilişkileri: Nasıl ve Nereye?", İçinde İ. Ermağan ve E. E. Tepeciklioğlu (Ed.), *Dünya Siyasetinde Afrika 7: Türkiye'nin Afrika Ülkeleri ile İlişkileri Süreç-Kısıtlar-Olası Çözümler,* 2021, pp. 1–24, Nobel Yayınları.

2 A. F. Kenfack Kitio, "The Rising Security Cooperation of Turkey in Africa: An Assessment From The Military Perspective", *Journal of Rising Powers and Global Governance*, 2020, 1(2), pp. 43–59.

3 U. Işık, "Yabancı Dil Olarak Türkçe Öğretiminde Askerî Komutlar", *Bezgek Yabancılara Türkçe Öğretimi Dergisi*, 2024, 3(4), pp. 298–308.



Twenty-two Gambian soldiers to receive training at military schools in Türkiye successfully completed their Turkish language course. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

tionalization of this cooperation. In particular, initiatives such as TURKSOM in Somalia and Turkish language classrooms established in various African countries constitute concrete examples of this policy in practice.[4]

This study examines the development, scope, and strategic significance of military Turkish language education in Africa as of 2025. Existing studies indicate that Turkish language instruction has the potential to become a significant component of military cooperation in Africa. Turkish language programs launched in various African countries in recent years have strengthened the position of Turkish as a language of military education. It can be argued that military Turkish language education has emerged as an important component of defense diplomacy and soft power strategy, extending beyond the scope of general language instruction.

2. Cultural and Language Studies in Türkiye's Relations with Africa: Military Turkish Language Education

The military relations developed by Türkiye within the framework of its Opening to Africa[5] have increased the demand for Turkish, giving rise to tangible examples of its practical application. Türkiye has established multidimensional partnerships with numerous African countries in the fields of defense and security, the defense industry, military education, and the fight against terrorism and organized crime. Following the announcement of the Africa Action Plan in 1998, Türkiye steadily expanded its institutional cooperation with African countries in the fields of security and defense. During this process, security and defense agreements were signed with numerous African countries, the network of military attachés across the continent was strengthened, and military educa-

4 M. T. Bani Salameh, "Turkey's Strategic Expansion in Africa: Multifaceted Engagement in Ethiopia, Libya and Somalia", *Insight on Africa*, 2025, 17(2).

5 A. Sıradağ, "Understanding Türkiye's New Defense and Security Policy Towards Africa: New Dynamics and New Approaches", *Turkish Journal of African Studies*, 2025, 2(1), pp. 19–32.

tion activities acquired an institutional character. In addition to educational activities, Türkiye contributes to the provision of defense equipment that supports the capacity of security institutions while also supporting Africa's peace and security architecture through participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.[6]

Turkish language instruction for African students, military personnel, businesspeople, bureaucrats, and individuals from various professional groups has become increasingly widespread both in Türkiye and across African countries. Nevertheless, a more comprehensive and integrated strategic framework is needed to ensure that these activities become sustainable and effective. In particular, it is important to develop new studies in three key areas that have not yet been adequately addressed in the Turkish-language literature: (i) the place and function of language and cultural studies within Türkiye's Africa policies, (ii) the interaction of Turkish with local and widely spoken languages in Africa and its position within the context of multilingualism, and (iii) the institutional structure, methodologies, and implementation models of general and occupational Turkish language instruction for African countries.

At the same time, despite increasing educational exchanges and human mobility between Türkiye and Africa, the African continent remains underrepresented in both the literature and practice of teaching Turkish as a foreign language. This situation also limits the full realization of the contribution that Turkish language instruction can make to the cultural diplomacy and soft power objectives of Türkiye's Africa policy. In this context, it is important to develop more systematic policies in cultural and language studies to enhance the long-term sustainability of Türkiye-Africa relations.[7]

In practice, language education is positioned as a strategic instrument in interstate military cooperation.[8] Language proficiency is essential for the accurate understanding of commands, ensuring coordination among units, and, consequently, improving the overall effectiveness of military training. For this reason, language education in the military context directly affects not only communication but also operational success. In this regard, military Turkish language education is evaluated within the framework of the language for specific purposes approach. This approach may be characterized as task-oriented, terminology-based, and practice-oriented. Accordingly, throughout the training process, language assumes a role shaped directly by military needs, with practical application taking precedence.[9]

6 H. A . Aksoy, S. Çevik and N. T. Yaşar, "Visualising Turkey's activism in Africa. Centre for Applied Turkey Studies", 2022, https://www.kisa.link/VSeZy, Access Date: 22.2.2026; Kaan Devecioğlu, "Türkiye modeli": Savunma Sanayii Alanında Afrika'yla Derinleşen İş Birliği, *ORSAM*, 2024, https://www.kisa.link/YyrZj, Access Date: 14.3.2026.

7 Elif Ermağan and İsmail Ermağan, "Yabancı dil olarak Türkçe öğretimi kitaplarında Afrika", İ. Ermağan, A. Boztaş & Y. Turhan (Ed.), *Dünya siyasetinde Afrika 8,* 2022, Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık, pp. 515–550.

8 Elif Ermağan, "II. Dünya Savaşı Esnasında Amerikan Askerlerine Türkçe Öğretmek için Yazılan "Turkish: A Guide to The Spoken Language" Adlı Kitabın Dil Öğretimi Açısından Değerlendirilmesi." *RumeliDE Dil ve Edebiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi,* 2021, (Ö9), 43–55.

9 G. Tekin and G. Özyürek, "Temel Düzeyde Askerî Bağlamda Türkçe Öğretimi: Yöntem ve İçerik Açısından Bir Değerlendirme", *Disiplinlerarası Dil ve Kültür Çalışmaları*, 2025, 3(1), 34–51.

3. 2025 Developments in Military Language Instruction in Africa

Türkiye conducts military Turkish language education in Africa under the coordination of the Ministry of National Defense, through institutions such as the Turkish Maarif Foundation and the Yunus Emre Institute. In this context, the institutionalization of Turkish language instruction indicates that Türkiye's institutional capacity in the field of military education will continue to expand across Africa and gain greater visibility.[10]

Türkiye's largest overseas military training center in Africa is Camp TURKSOM in Somalia. Thousands of Somali soldiers have received Turkish language instruction there. From this perspective, military Turkish, as a subfield of occupational Turkish, possesses a multilayered structure consisting of the language of military instruction, the language of commands, the language of hierarchy and forms of address, and the language of operations. This has made the Somali case one of the most comprehensive and institutionalized examples of military Turkish language education.

One of the notable developments as of 2025 is the Africa-based training model, which is founded on providing military Turkish language education directly within African countries. This model expands the scope of language instruction, enabling a larger number of military personnel to receive training while reducing costs and ensuring continuity in education. At the same time, technology-based instruction has become increasingly important in training processes. Through various institutional partnerships, such as language centers in Türkiye that provide Turkish language instruction, distance learning applications and simulation-based language teaching methods have the potential to make military Turkish language education in Africa more practice-oriented, flexible, and accessible.

Among the developments of 2025, the case of Cameroon deserves particular attention. TİKA established a Turkish language classroom at the EMIA military academy in Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon, to support Cameroonian military students who will receive training in Türkiye. Under the project, which will begin during the 2025-2026 academic year, 35 students are expected to receive instruction each year. The inauguration ceremony was attended by the ministers of defense and officials from both countries. The project aims to strengthen defense cooperation and intercultural collaboration within the framework of the multidimensional partnership between Türkiye and Cameroon.[11]

In the case of The Gambia, Turkish is taught to the personnel of the Gambian Armed Forces through the "Atatürk Classroom" and the "Atatürk Library" located at the training school in Fajara. Between 2020 and 2025, a total of 555 soldiers received Turkish language instruction in these locations. Under the

10 WaJ Türk, "Türkiye-Afrika Arasındaki Savunma İlişkileri Güçleniyor", 2025, https://www.kisa.link/PJqas, Access Date: 01.03.2026.

11 TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), "TİKA'dan Kamerun'daki Askeri Okula Türkçe Dil Sınıfı", May 12, 2025, https://www.kisa.link/aXQsw, Access Date: 12.3.2026.

program implemented in cooperation with the Turkish Maarif Foundation and the Ministry of National Defense, students are expected to attain the B2 level through approximately 40 weeks of instruction in order to qualify for military education in Türkiye. The objective of these language teaching programs is to strengthen military and cultural relations by enhancing multidimensional communication between the two countries. In addition, the library renovated by TİKA provides Turkish- and English-language resources to support the soldiers' language education.[12]

Overall, military Turkish language education can be said to play a strategic role in Africa. This clearly underscores the role of language in facilitating secure defense cooperation by enhancing military capacity while, as an extension of this function, strengthening diplomatic relations. On the other hand, limitations such as the shortage of qualified instructors, intensive training programs, and the challenges posed by specialized military terminology also emerge as significant findings.


4. Conclusion

Military Turkish language education in Africa not only deepens Türkiye's engagement with the continent but also establishes a multidimensional foundation for cooperation at the military, diplomatic, and academic levels. In the future, further institutionalization of this field, supported by academic research, will contribute to making these relationships more systematic and sustainable.

As of 2025, military Turkish language education in Africa can be considered to be progressing in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Through educational programs implemented in different African countries, field-based training models, and digitalization initiatives, Turkish language instruction has become more sustainable through the support of institutional structures. At the same time, Turkish has evolved into an active component of military training processes in Africa, an environment that facilitates process management among countries engaged in military cooperation, and a factor that deepens relations between Türkiye and African countries. This, in turn, enhances cultural exchange, fosters mutual understanding, and provides the societal foundation for sustainable cooperation.

Despite persisting structural challenges, including the shortage of instructors, limited program diversity, and the availability of teaching materials, current trends indicate that these limitations and systemic issues can be overcome through greater investment, institutionalization, and innovative teaching methods. Overall, military Turkish language education is playing an increasingly central role in Africa and is emerging as a significant and enduring component of Türkiye's international cooperation strategy.

12 Anadolu Agency, "Gambiyalı Askerler, Türkiye'de Eğitim Alabilmek İçin Türkçe Öğreniyor", February 26, 2026, https://www.kisa.link/oLcFE, Access Date: 11.3.2026.



AFCON 2025 and Morocco's Regional and Global Strategy of Positioning Through Sports

10

Ahmet Göksel Uluer*

1. Introduction

The Kingdom of Morocco has significantly increased its visibility in global sports diplomacy in recent years by hosting major international sporting events. In this context, the country hosted the FIFA Club World Cup in 2013, 2014, and 2022; the African Nations Championship (CHAN) in 2018; and the athletics competitions of the African Games in 2019. Furthermore, since 2016, it has strengthened its position within the international sporting calendar by hosting Diamond League athletics meetings, the Marrakech Grand Prix, and Formula E World Championship races at various times.

In addition, the tournament that Morocco had long aspired to host was the FIFA World Cup. Having submitted five bids to host the tournament since the 1990s,[1] the country ultimately secured its place as one of the hosts of the highly prestigious centennial 2030 FIFA World Cup by joining the Spain-Portugal consortium in 2023.[2] In 2023, the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON 2025), which had initially been scheduled to be hosted by Guinea, entered a process of selecting a new host after assessments concluded that Guinea would not be able to complete the necessary infrastructure

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1 The New Times, "Morocco hopes to bid for 2030 World Cup despite 5th time defeat", 15.06.2022,

https://www.kisa.link/XpUki, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

2 VOA Africa, "Morocco Joins Spain-Portugal 2030 World Cup Bid", 15.03.2023,

https://www.kisa.link/uHWvy, Access Date: 10.04.2026.



Opening ceremony of the 35th Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON 2025), Rabat, Morocco. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

and stadium investments on time. During this process, Morocco's candidacy was approved. Morocco had previously hosted the tournament in 1988 and had been forced to relinquish its hosting rights in 2015 because of the Ebola outbreak. Consequently, Morocco was selected as the host of AFCON 2025, and the tournament was successfully held between December 21, 2025, and January 18, 2026, across nine stadiums in six different cities throughout the country. Before and during the tournament, demonstrations criticizing the government's high level of public spending took place, attracting international attention under the label of the "Gen Z Protests.[3]

3 The Guardian, "Violence breaks out in Morocco as anti-government protests rage for fourth day", 01.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/NuSpJ, Access Date: 10.04.2026;
CNN, "Gen Z Moroccans denounce government priorities in some of the largest protests in years", 29.09.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/XAPUO, Access Date: 10.04.2026.

This article examines Morocco's growing tendency to host major international sporting events through the lens of the country's pursuit of international image, power, and identity construction. In this context, AFCON 2025 represents an important showcase for Morocco because of both the prestige associated with the continent's and the world's most popular sport and its role as a preview of the 2030 FIFA World Cup. Drawing on the literature on international relations and mega sporting events, the article explores how sport is employed by states as an instrument of soft and smart power. It then discusses the objectives Morocco seeks to achieve through hosting mega sporting events in terms of image, power, and identity.

2. Sports as an Instrument of Soft/Smart Power

In the discipline of International Relations, the concept of soft power refers to the ability to influence and persuade other actors without resorting to coercive means.[4] A wide range of elements, including culture, norms, and political values, are considered components of soft power. Within the literature, sport – and particularly the hosting of mega sporting events – is likewise regarded as a culturally grounded instrument of soft power capable of enhancing a country's image, prestige, and international influence. In this respect, highly visible events with broad international participation and massive global audiences, such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, constitute some of the most significant platforms through which states project this form of power.

Particularly over the past two decades, major sporting events hosted or planned by countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China have been extensively debated in the international literature within the framework of the concept of *sportswashing*. A substantial body of scholarship argues that these events have been employed as instruments of foreign policy and public diplomacy aimed at diverting attention from criticism regarding human rights and democratic governance, enhancing international image, and strengthening global legitimacy.[5]

In addition, mega sporting events are increasingly viewed as manifestations of smart power, in which hard and soft power resources are deployed simultaneously and across multiple domains. In this sense, sport serves a variety of objectives, including drawing attention to global issues, facilitating

4 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2004.

5 Aaron Ettinger, "Saudi Arabia, sports diplomacy and authoritarian capitalism in world politics", *International Journal of Sport Policy and Sports*, No. 15, 2023, pp. 531 – 547.; Paul Michael Brannagan, Jonathan Grix and Alessio Norrito, "Demystifying sportswashing: An assemblage theory perspective on authoritarian states' investment in global sport", *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2026, pp. 144 – 164.; Jonathan Grix and Paul Michael Brannagan, "Authoritarian States and Global Sport: The Contested Cases of Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia", *Social Sciences*, Vol. 13, No. 701, 2024, pp. 1 – 12.



Opening ceremony of the 35th Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON 2025), Rabat, Morocco. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

access to new markets, establishing regional hegemony, and promoting new national visions.[6] Moreover, it is regarded as an important instrument of nation branding, contributing to nation-building, identity construction, and the enhancement of global status and international standing.[7] For example, by hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup, Qatar successfully branded itself as a stable country within its region and as a respected actor on the global stage.[8]

3. Conclusion

The hosting of mega sporting events, as exemplified by AFCON 2025, should be viewed as a natural extension of Morocco's broader multidimensional strategy. First, Morocco's selection as host following the uncertainty surrounding Guinea's ability to stage the tournament reinforced the country's reputation as a reliable actor within Africa. Second, these tournaments carry symbolic significance for strengthening the influence of a country sit-

6 Paul Michael Brannagan, Richard Giulianotti and Jonathan Grix, "Sport and Power: hard power, soft power and smart power", *Leisure Studies*, pp. 9 – 10,

https://www.kisa.link/hVGCe


7 Victor Cha, "Role of Sport in International Relations: National Rebirth and Renewal", *Asian Economic Policy Review*, No. 11, 2016, p. 139.

8 Noof Al-Dosari, "Sport and International Relations: Qatari Soft Power and Foreign Policy Making", *Tajseer*, No. 3, Vol. 2, 2021, p. 168.

uated at the crossroads of Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa, while enabling it to establish networks of cooperation centered on its strategic geographic position.[9] Third, Morocco represents a distinct case by diverging in several respects from other countries that have pursued similar strategies through sporting events. Economically and militarily powerful authoritarian states such as Russia and China have tended to regard such tournaments as symbols of national power and as instruments for diverting attention from domestic challenges through sport.

For Morocco, mega sporting events provide multidimensional opportunities for foreign policy and international cooperation that extend well beyond the country's economic capacity. On the one hand, these events serve as important promotional tools that enhance Morocco's tourism potential and strengthen its international brand value. On the other hand, they contribute to deepening relations with international partners, particularly the European Union, while reinforcing Morocco's image as a stable and cooperative actor. In this context, AFCON 2025 transcended its role as a continental football tournament. It became a strategic stepping stone that enabled Morocco to demonstrate its organizational capacity ahead of the jointly hosted 2030 FIFA World Cup with Spain and Portugal, strengthen its international image and prestige, and more effectively implement its smart power strategy through sports diplomacy. From this perspective, the tournament may be regarded as a significant milestone that reinforced both Morocco's claim to regional leadership in Africa and its global visibility.

9 IRIS, "African Cup of Nations 2025: Geopolitical Stakes, Sport Power and Morocco's Ambitions", 08.01.2026, https://www.kisa.link/QtnNy, Access Date: 14.04.2026.



The Sociological Dynamics of Digital Transformation in Education in Kenya: 2025 Developments

11

Ani Tarugishvili*

1. Introduction

Although the widespread adoption of digital education is often associated with advances in information and communication technologies, its origins can be traced to much earlier historical developments. In 1728, an advertisement published by Caleb Phillips in a newspaper in Boston, United States, offered shorthand instruction by correspondence to those wishing to learn the skill. This initiative is regarded as one of the earliest known examples of distance education.[1] Beginning in the twentieth century, these developments accelerated. In the 1950s, the BBC began broadcasting educational radio programs for schoolchildren living in remote areas, [2] and with the widespread adoption of television, distance education entered a new phase through the incorporation of visual content.[3] In the twenty-first century, the COVID-19 pandemic marked a turning point in the transformation of distance education. However, despite the significant expansion of online learning opportunities during this period, these opportunities have not been distributed equitably across society. Particularly in developing countries, substantial inequalities persist in access to digital technologies, infrastructure, and digital skills.

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1 Denise M. Casey, "A journey to legitimacy: The historical development of distance education through technology", *Tech Trends,* Vol. 52, No. 2, 2008, pp. 45-51.

2 David Crook, "School Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: An Exploratory History", *Journal of Educational Administration and History*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2007, pp. 217-226.

3 Mary Burns, "Distance Education for Teacher Training: Modes, Models, and Methods", *Distance Education for Teacher Training*, Ed. Mary Burns, Education Development Center, 2011.

In Kenya, where the population is predominantly young, digital education continues to reflect broader socioeconomic inequalities despite the increasing diffusion of information and communication technologies. This phenomenon is explained in the literature through the concept of the *digital divide*, which refers to inequalities in access to information and communication technologies among individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds.[4] Within the framework of international law, education is recognized as a universal fundamental human right and serves as a key instrument for expanding employment opportunities, promoting economic growth, strengthening social cohesion, and reducing poverty.[5] Given the limited body of existing research on the subject, examining inequalities in digital education, particularly in Kenya, is of critical importance.

2. Digital Divide in Kenya: Sociological Dimensions

Developments in information and communication technologies have occurred at varying levels across countries worldwide. Inequalities in access to technology, digital infrastructure, and digital services contribute to the deepening of the *digital divide*.[6] In the educational context, the digital divide refers to the disparity between students who have access to computers, the internet, and digital learning resources and those who do not. Students who lack access to digital resources encounter difficulties in developing digital skills, and their ability to compete in an increasingly digitalized labor market is adversely affected.[7] In Kenya, the *digital divide* varies according to the urban-rural divide, income level, and gender.[8] For example, while schools in urban areas generally possess more advanced digital infrastructure and internet connectivity, inadequate infrastructure and low levels of digital literacy constitute major barriers in rural areas. Furthermore, female students from both rural communities and low-income households participate in digital education to a more limited extent because of cultural and socioeconomic barriers.[9] To reduce these structural inequalities, various initiatives have been implemented, including the *Girls in ICT for Inclusive Digital Transformation* project, launched on April 24, 2025.[10] Despite these developments, available data indicate that significant disparities in access to information and communication technologies persist in Kenya.[11] Women account for only 30 percent of those employed in Kenya's information and technology sector.[12] In addition, while smartphone

4 OECD, "Understanding the Digital Divide", *OECD Digital Economy Papers*, Vol. 49, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2001, p. 5.

5 United Nations, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights", *United Nations General Assembly*, Paris, 1948; Sharon E. Lee, "Education as a Human Right in the 21st Century", *Democracy and Education*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2013, p. 1.

6 Sanjiv Dasgupta et. al., "Policy Reform, Economic Growth, and the Digital Divide: An Economic Analysis", *World Bank Policy Research Paper*, Vol. 2567, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2001.

7 OECD, op. cit., 2001 pp. 5–6; John Paul, "Narrowing the Digital Divide: Initiatives Undertaken by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)", *Program: Electronic Library and Information Systems*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2002, pp. 13–22.

8 Frederick Okello, "Bridging Kenya's Digital Divide: Context, Barriers and Strategies", CIGI Policy Paper, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Ottawa, 2024

9 Francis E. and ve Susan Parvyn-Wamahiu (Ed.), "Information and Communication Technologies for Development in Africa", Vol. 2, The Experience with Community Telecentres, International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, 2003.

10 UNESCO, "Champions Girls in ICT for a Digital Future", 05.05.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/hWWrt Access Date: 20.03.2026.

11 Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) & Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), "Analytical Report on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Based on the 2023/24 Kenya Housing Survey", Nairobi, 2025.

12 GSMA, "Mobile Gender Gap Report 2024", 2024,

https://www.kisa.link/IdzKu Access Date: 09.04.2026.



Kenyan youth are learning about the technologies of the future in a robotics and coding workshop. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

ownership stands at 53.7 percent nationwide, computer access is 10.7 percent and internet usage is 23.8 percent. Thus, the *digital divide* in Kenya constitutes a multidimensional challenge that is particularly visible in the field of education. Consequently, the integration of information and communication technologies into Kenya's education system plays a critical role in reducing the digital divide.

3. Current Developments in Digital Education in Kenya

In response to the structural challenges discussed above, the innovative reforms introduced by the Government of Kenya to strengthen digital education practices and infrastructure investments in schools have continued throughout 2025. One such initiative is the *DigiSchool* (digital literacy) project, designed to promote digital education in primary schools.

Implemented through a partnership among Kenya's Ministry of Education, UNESCO, and Huawei, the *DigiSchool* project provides students and teachers with devices equipped with interactive digital content and broadband internet access, develops digital learning materials, delivers training programs to enhance teachers' digital competencies, expands online access for students living in rural areas, and implements multidimensional policies and practices aimed at reducing gender inequality in digital education. The project has produced highly effective results. For example, as of 2024, more than 6,000 students had benefited from the program following the integration of 34 schools into the system, making it possible to deliver online classes and live video-based instruction, particularly in rural areas.[13] At an event held in Nairobi on March 17, 2025, it was announced that the second phase of the *DigiSchool* project, which aims to equip all public primary school students with digital skills, had been successfully completed and that the project had been integrated into the education system on a broad scale. Nevertheless, implementation challenges continue to persist.[14] For example, the COVID-19 pandemic slowed both the distribution of devices to schools and the training of teachers.[15] Similarly, during the 2024-2025 academic year, the education system received technical support through the deployment of 1,000 information and communication technology personnel to public schools. However, the planned establishment of 1,000 smart computer classrooms for the same period could not be achieved because of budgetary constraints over the previous two years.[16]

As of 2025, the Kenya National Examinations Council has taken significant steps to enhance both accessibility and operational efficiency by integrating digital tools into assessment and evaluation processes. In June 2025, a pilot online proficiency examination was administered to ninth-grade students, enabling candidates to receive their examination results instantly through the platform. This initiative marked a significant milestone in the integration of digital tools into technology-assisted assessment and evaluation processes within Kenya's education system. Furthermore, the 2023-2027 *Kenya National Education Sector Strategic Plan* (NESSP) identifies the integration of digital literacy into the education system and the broader use of information and communication technologies in educational processes among its principal priorities.[17] In addition, the baseline budget covering the 2026/27–2028/29 fiscal years emphasizes the expansion of digital education programs and the strengthening of

13 African Union Commission, "Digital Education Strategy and Implementation Plan (2023–2028)", African Union, Addis Ababa,

https://www.kisa.link/aQdNQ Access Date: 30.03.2026. pp. 14-28;

UNESCO, Government, UNESCO and Huawei launch new report on Kenya's DigiSchool Project. 09.08.2023

https://www.kisa.link/uQRxW Access Date: 29.03.2026.

14 OECD, "Kenya's Digital Literacy Programme (DigiSchool)", OECD AI Policy Observatory, 09.07.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/RKPKL Access Date: 02.04.2026.

15 Alberto V. Delgado Martín and José M. Larrú Ramos, "Digital Education Index for Developing Countries Framework: Evaluation of the Deployment of Digital Education in Kenya", *Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2025.

16 Government of Kenya, National Treasury, "Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2026/27–2028/29: Education Sector Report, 13.10.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/IqMCF Access Date: 17.03.2026.

17 UNESCO, "Spotlight on Basic Education Completion and Foundational Learning in Kenya 2025", *Global Education Monitoring (GEM) Report – Spotlight Series*, UNESCO, Paris, 2025,

https://doi.org/10.54676/OXPS7092.


information and communication technology infrastructure. Other digital education initiatives in Kenya include platforms such as *EduPoa*, which digitalize processes including student registration, student assessment, and parent communication[18] Finally, the Kenya Institute of Special Education provides specialized services to special education schools through remote video support. As a result, during the first phase of this project, 13 schools gained internet access, and approximately 6,000 students and teachers benefited from these services.[19]

4. Conclusion

The developments recorded in the field of digital education in Kenya in 2025 clearly demonstrate that the country's education system has advanced in terms of digital infrastructure, governance, and pedagogy. However, these advances remain constrained by structural inequalities and have not occurred uniformly because of the urban-rural divide, socioeconomic disparities, and gender-based differences. Initiatives such as digital literacy programs and the digitalization of assessment and evaluation systems have not been sufficient to eliminate the structural dimensions of the digital divide entirely. In this context, the Kenyan case demonstrates that digital education is not merely the outcome of a process of technological modernization but also a social process that both exposes and transforms deeply rooted sociological inequalities.

18 Josphat Kiptanui, "Digital Learning in Kenya: How Technology is Transforming Education", *EduPoa™ Blog*, 31.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/lwewb Access Date: 10.04.2026.

19 PR Newswire, "*Kenya DigiSchool Connectivity Project enables online learning for deaf children*", 17.03.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/kSRgb Access Date: 15.04.2026.



2025 Continental Education Reforms in Africa: From Colonial Legacy to National Curricula

12

Yusuf Dinçel*

1. Introduction

Africa's experience of colonialism not only produced adverse political and economic consequences but also caused profound damage to education, a sector that is fundamental to societal development. One of the most burdensome legacies inherited by African countries from the colonial era is the inability to use their indigenous languages effectively in education. Today, the languages of the former colonial powers continue to predominate in many African countries.

The strategic documents developed within the framework of the "national curriculum" initiatives recently launched by the AU are significant in demonstrating that education in Africa is undergoing a process of decolonization. This study examines the steps taken across Africa during 2025 to abandon education systems inherited from the colonial era.

2. The Historical Legacy of Colonialist Educational Models

The history of colonialism has had a profound impact on the education systems of many African countries.[1] During the colonial period, policies

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1 Yasmine Bekkouche and Yannick Dupraz, "Colonial Origins and Quality of Education: Evidence from Cameroon", *African Economic History Network,* 22.01.2024, https://www.kisa.link/Upkxc, Access Date: 23.03.2026.



The Pan-African Conference on Teacher Education (PACTED 2025) was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on October 1-3, 2025. (Source: African Union)

aimed at controlling and assimilating indigenous populations fundamentally transformed the structure and functioning of local education systems in Africa. Foremost among these policies was the imposition of a Western-style education model that privileged European languages and cultures over indigenous languages and cultures. This resulted in the alienation of indigenous education from the societies it was intended to serve. Another major initiative undertaken by Western colonial powers was the establishment of missionary schools that targeted indigenous belief systems while promoting Christianity and Western ways of life. Furthermore, widespread land dispossession forced local communities to migrate, disrupting the cultural and educational structures of displaced populations.[2]

Following independence, education in African countries was approached not from the perspective of a national vision but within a narrow framework, where it was instrumentalized as a prerequisite for development.[3] The system established by Western colonialism in Africa remains in a profound state

2 Mirriam Wangui, "Impact of Colonial Policies on Indigenous Education Systems in Africa", *European Journal of Historical Research,* Vol. 3, No. 2, 2024, pp. 35-36.

3 Deborah Spindelman ve Luis Crouch, "Purpose of education in former British African colonies: From contestation to bureaucratization", International Journal of Educational Development, Vol. 113, 2025, p. 13.

of crisis even today. Most African countries continue to struggle to address challenges such as poverty, disease, corruption, and environmental degradation, while also failing to prepare young people for a competitive future. Consequently, comprehensive reform of education systems across Africa is imperative, and such reforms must be implemented with due consideration for the continent's cultural distinctiveness.[4]

3. The AU's Continental Strategy for Education (CESA)

Following decades of stagnation, Africa is increasingly regarded by experts as a continent with immense potential, particularly in light of its demographic advantages and its underutilized human and material resources.[5] For the 2016-2025 period, the AU adopted the CESA to promote Africa's cultural values, advance sustainable development at both regional and continental levels, and address the need for comprehensive reform of the continent's education systems.[6] Through this strategy, the AU sought to transform education systems across the continent.[7] Teachers are recognized as the driving force behind this educational transformation, which aims to build a prosperous and peaceful Africa.[8]

As part of this strategy, the AU established a ten-year action plan for its member states and sought to develop a framework that would guide them in the field of education. Within this framework, member states have endeavored to implement the strategy in ways that reflect their respective national contexts and conditions.[9] The AU convened in Ethiopia on October 1-3, 2025, where it adopted the second ten-year CESA strategic framework covering the 2025-2034 period.[10]

In this respect, the CESA challenges the colonial model of education because, in previous periods, educational systems across Africa were based exclusively on curricula introduced by the colonial powers, and graduates of these systems were expected to spearhead development initiatives. CESA, however, enables each region to develop an educational model tailored to its own specific conditions. Through this approach, education in Africa is intended to be shaped around indigenous and nationally grounded principles.

4 Mohamed Lamine Kaba, "Moving from a neocolonial education system to an education system that serves African development", *New Eastern Outlook,* 26.02.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/UYmtF, Access Date: 24.03.2026.

5 "Continental Education Strategy for Africa", *Association of African Universities,*
https://www.kisa.link/HsPFq, Access Date: 24.03.2026

6 "Launch of the process for the review of the African Union's Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) 2016-25", *Teacher Task Force,*
https://www.kisa.link/jbbMc, Access Date: 24.03.2026.

7 "Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2026-2035: A Framework for Action", *International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa,*
https://www.kisa.link/pzidu, Access Date: 24.03.2026.


8 "AU Continental Teacher Prize", *African Union,*
https://education-au.org/programs, Access Date: 25.03.2026.

9 "Continental Education Strategy for Africa 2026-2035: A Framework for Action", *African Union,*
https://www.kisa.link/EbMpB , Access Date: 28.03.2026.

10 "Historic: Education union leaders bring their voice to the African Union", *Education International,*
https://www.kisa.link/CbWGu, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

4. Decolonizing Knowledge in Africa in 2025

Guided by *Sustainable Development Goal* 4 of the 2030 Agenda, African countries concentrated in 2025 on improving education without reducing it to a mere instrument of development. Despite this objective, however, major obstacles continue to prevent educational activities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, from reaching the desired level. In 2025 alone, Sub-Saharan Africa faced a shortage of 15 million teachers.[11]



The AU designated 2025 as the "Year of Justice for Africans and People of African Descent Through Reparations." It called for reparations for historical injustices committed against people of African descent, including the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism, and apartheid. Not only have these historical crimes gone unpunished, but their legacies have become embedded in the political and economic systems of African countries. These historical injustices also directly targeted Africa's education systems, and their effects continue to be felt today. Consequently, the remnants of colonial-era education must be eliminated.[12] In 2025, through UNESCO initiatives, the "Transforming Knowledge for Africa's Future" project was launched to shift Africa from being a consumer of knowledge to becoming a producer of knowledge. This initiative enables researchers of African descent to contribute to the modern scientific community by drawing upon indigenous knowledge systems.[13]

5. Digital Decolonization Efforts in Africa in 2025

As artificial intelligence becomes increasingly widespread around the world, the relationship of students and teachers with education is also being reshaped across Africa. Through initiatives established by entrepreneurs, including *Digital Skills for Africa*, *Lumo Hubs*, and *Luma Learn*, an inclusive model of locally grounded learning has emerged. The founder of the *Luma Learn* program summarizes the rationale as follows: "Sometimes the best way to understand a concept is to learn it in your mother tongue." For example, Simphiwe, a seventeen-year-old student from South Africa, stated that he studies physics in IsiZulu, his native language.[14]

11 Benister Nephitaly ve Modupe (Mo) Olateju, "Why Africa urgently requires transformation of its education systems", *Brookings,*
https://www.kisa.link/qBNiB, Access Date: 01.04.2026.

12 Cristina Duarte, "Beyond compensation: Reparatory justice as a structural economic imperative for Africa", *United Nations/Africa Renewal,*
https://www.kisa.link/riCkO, Access Date: 04.04.2026.

13 "The African Union Commission Successfully Launches Decade of Education and Six Strategic Frameworks at PACTED 2025", *African Union,*
https://www.kisa.link/Glgcr, Access Date: 04.04.2026.

14 Franck Kuwonu, "AI and the future of learning", *United Nations/Africa Renewal,*
https://www.kisa.link/EksFf, Access Date: 04.04.2026.

During the colonial period, African youth had no opportunity to receive an education in their indigenous languages, and because the language of the colonial power was recognized as the official language, the use of other languages in public life was severely restricted.

Ongoing security crises across Africa continue to disrupt the education of millions of students, further exacerbating existing educational inequalities. In response, the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced that significant progress had been made in 2025 toward the digitalization of education. Through the expansion of the Virtual Teacher Project, approximately 10,000 students achieved measurable improvements in mathematics. In the event of emergencies, students will be able to continue their education through tablets, television, and radio without requiring internet access. The initiative thus seeks to transform periods of crisis into opportunities.[15]


Finally, the *Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa* (STISA) 2034, published in July 2025, aims to promote knowledge-based and innovation-driven investment in critical sectors, particularly agriculture, as well as health, energy, and the environment. Through this ten-year strategy, frameworks have been established to strengthen food and nutrition security and improve preparedness for emergency situations.[16]

6. Conclusion

The year 2025 marked a period in which educational reforms across Africa sought to transform educational paradigms inherited from the colonial era. African countries have pursued the nationalization of their educational curricula, and in this context, major strategic documents such as *CESA (2025-2034)* and *STISA 2034* have been adopted. The strategic documents consistently emphasize that education is the primary means of addressing the adverse living conditions experienced across African countries and that such education must be developed on the basis of indigenous and nationally grounded curricula.

15 "Digital Learning in Africa: Bridging the Gap in Low-Resource Contexts", *UNESCO,* https://www.kisa.link/ICFuF, Access Date: 04.04.2026.

16 "Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa STISA 2034", *African Union,* https://www.kisa.link/fEfSg, Access Date: 15.04.2026.



Somalia in 2025: The Rising Star of the Art Ecosystem in Africa

13

Buse Erhalim Gümüş* | Suad Jama Aidiid**

1. Introduction

The biennials, triennials, photography exhibitions, and contemporary art fairs held across different regions of Africa in 2025 emerged as significant cultural platforms that highlighted not only local artistic production but also global issues. These events extensively explored themes such as identity, collective memory, environmental crises, and digital transformation. In particular, events organized in South Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Kenya, and Senegal showcased the continent's cultural dynamism and its engagement with the global art ecosystem. By contrast, Somalia, long associated with internal conflict, political instability, and security challenges, has drawn increasing attention through its evolving artistic environment and cultural production despite these enduring vulnerabilities. This article examines the most prominent artistic events across various disciplines that took place in Somalia during 2025.

2. The Art Ecosystem in Somalia

Throughout the collapse of the state, periods of conflict, and mass displacement, Somali culture was never entirely extinguished. On the contrary,

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Approximately 1,000 art enthusiasts attended the event "An Evening of Coffee and Painting " organized with the support of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu. (Source: X account of the Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye in Mogadishu)

its literature, poetry, music, visual arts, and intellectual traditions continued to develop both within the country and abroad. For much of the post-conflict period, the most influential Somali cultural initiatives emerged within the diaspora and, to a lesser extent, in cities located in the northern regions of the country. At the same time, many of the most significant debates within Somali cultural life took place in diaspora cities such as London, Minneapolis, Toronto, and Nairobi. These cities hosted literary gatherings, exhibitions, artistic collaborations, and public discussions that sustained Somali cultural life during difficult periods.

What makes 2025 particularly noteworthy is that, compared to previous years, cultural activities have increasingly become concentrated in the capital, Mogadishu, and the southern regions of the country. New initiatives have emerged, particularly in literature and the visual arts, as well as in public art and community festivals. This development points to a growing sense

of cultural confidence within the country. Thus, although significant challenges remain, Somalia's cultural ecosystem became more visible during the year. This ecosystem encompasses a broad spectrum of artistic fields, including literature, visual arts, music, theater, cinema, and performance arts.

3. Written and Oral Literature

An examination of literary activities reveals the prominent role played by book fairs. The *Hargeisa International Book Fair* (HIBF) has become one of the leading literary events in the Somali-speaking world. The event brought together writers, artists, and academics from both the region and around the world.[1] Similarly, the *Puntland Book Fair* emerged as an important platform for intellectual exchange and public debate.[2] In addition to events held in these major cities, interest in the arts has also increased in relatively smaller urban centers. The *Southwest State Book Fair*, organized in Baidoa, where internal conflict persists and drought continues to shape daily life, has evolved into a platform through which young people take their first steps in creative writing.[3] By promoting the works of local authors, encouraging a culture of reading, emphasizing the themes of education and peace, featuring cultural exhibitions, and bringing together international guests with Somali citizens, the event attracted considerable public interest.

In addition to the literary activities discussed above, initiatives in poetry and oral literature also continued throughout the year. Indeed, in Somalia, long known as the "land of poets," activities related to poetry and oral culture did not diminish even during the civil war. Through oral literary traditions, values central to Somali society including culture, identity, religion, and peace-building continued to be transmitted to younger generations. Parallel developments also took place in the field of visual arts.

4. Visual Arts

Alongside literary initiatives, 2025 was also marked by the growing visibility of the visual arts. The exhibition *A Window to Her World*, held at the Somali National Museum and featuring works by Fardosa Hussein, Zahra Abihagi, Sana Ashaf, Fatima Aweys, Nura Iman, and Bushra Mohamed, created space for contemporary artistic expression while promoting social dialogue through art. The exhibition explored themes including Somali cul-

1 "Hargeisa International Book Fair: A Literary Renaissance in the Horn of Africa", *Saxafi Media*, 20.07.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/DcWqS Access Date: 15.06.2026.

2 Puntland Book Fair, Offical Facebook Page,
https://www.facebook.com/Bandhiggabuugtanugaal/ Access Date: 15.06.2026.

3 "Baidoa Hosts Southwest State Book Faie to Promote Literacy and Peace", *FTL Somalia,* 15.09.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/hJytZ Access Date: 15.06.2025.

tural heritage, peace, identity, and resilience through various artistic media, while also conveying gender-based narratives through artistic expression.[4]

One of the events that particularly brought together young people interested in painting during 2025 was *Paint & Coffee Night*. Organized in Mogadishu by Abdinasir Abdikadir Mohamed, founder of the 4C Art Studio, with the support of the Embassy of Türkiye in Mogadishu, the event brought together hundreds of young Somalis interested in painting, providing them with opportunities to receive introductory training in painting and the visual arts.[5]

New cultural institutions have also played a significant role in shaping the city's artistic landscape. The Somali Arts Foundation has contributed to the development of artistic networks, exhibitions, and cultural programs, while Fankeenna has emerged as an important platform documenting and promoting Somali creativity.[6] Collectively, these initiatives represent a new generation committed to creating sustainable spaces for artistic production and cultural participation in Somalia.

Viewed more broadly, culture has become increasingly visible not only within galleries and exhibition spaces but also throughout the urban environment. The revival of street art and mural projects has transformed public spaces into sites of creativity and expression. Murals have introduced new visual narratives into the urban fabric, demonstrating how art can contribute to public dialogue, civic engagement, and the reimagining of urban spaces. This creative dynamism has likewise been reflected in the fields of music, theater, cinema, and performance arts.

5. Music, Theater, Cinema and Performance Arts


2025 witnessed increased international visibility for music, theater, cinema, and performance arts in Somalia, particularly through the contributions of the Somali diaspora. The collaboration between traditional Somali artists and young Somali musicians engaged in contemporary music fostered a new synthesis in Somali music and enhanced its international visibility.

Cinema in Somalia also began to attract renewed attention after a long period of decline, with particular emphasis placed on independent productions, short films, and documentaries. These productions explored themes such as cultural values, history, contemporary issues, and gender. The grow-

4 "Brushstrokes and Beyond*" UNDP Somalia*, 15.03.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/odCSN Access Date: 15.06.2026.

5 "Paint and Coffee Night: Somali Youth Celebrate Art, Culture and Unity in Style" *Horseed Media, 14.07.2025,*
https://www.kisa.link/GVCgT Access Date: 15.06.2026.

6 Fankeenna. *Official Platform.*
https://www.fankeenna.com/ Access Date: 15.06.2026.



Approximately 1,000 art enthusiasts attended the event "An Evening of Coffee and Painting " organized with the support of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu. (Source: X account of the Embassy of the Republic of Türkiye in Mogadishu)

ing use of digital platforms enabled these works to reach international audiences.

Theater also gained greater prominence in Somalia through projects initiated by young Somalis. In the international context, Between Two Worlds, written by Mohamed Mohamud and staged at London's Maanta Theater, fo-

cused on the themes of migration, identity, and belonging between Mogadishu and London.[7]

The Somalia Week Festival also emerged as a comprehensive event highlighting developments in music, film, and theater through a series of cultural panels.[8]

6. Cultural Growth across Somalia and Beyond

Although Mogadishu has become the most visible symbol of the cultural revival discussed above, developments in Somalia's southern regions point to a broader pattern of cultural renewal. For example, the Southwest State of Somalia's Peace and Culture Week demonstrated how cultural initiatives can serve as instruments for community engagement, social cohesion, and the preservation of local heritage. Bringing together artists, community leaders, and citizens, the event underscored the important role of culture in strengthening social ties and fostering a shared sense of identity.[9]

At the same time, Somali culture has become increasingly visible on the international stage. Somalia's preparations to participate for the first time with a national pavilion at the world-renowned *Venice Biennale* represented a major milestone for the country's contemporary art scene. This initiative was more than participation in an international exhibition; it reflected the growing confidence of Somali artists and cultural institutions, as well as their determination to integrate Somali artistic production into global cultural debates. In addition, events such as the *My Somalia* exhibition held in London[10] and the *Nairobi Somali Culture and Arts Festival*[11] further enhanced Somalia's international visibility.

Taken together, these developments indicate that cultural activities in Somalia have become both more local and more global: while continuing to be rooted in community-based initiatives, they are simultaneously establishing increasingly strong connections with international artistic networks. This dual process has emerged as one of the defining characteristics of Somalia's contemporary cultural landscape.

7. Conclusion

The most significant cultural story of 2025 is not a single artistic discipline, festival, exhibition, or institution. Rather, it is the emergence of a

7 "Made in the East End presents… Kayd x OH Somali Creative Mixer Event: "Between Two Worlds' by Maanta Theatre", *Oxford House,* 11.07.2025

https://www.kisa.link/NGDGa Access Date: 15.06.2026

8 Somali Week Festival 2025*, Kayd,* 2025,

https://www.kayd.org/somali-week-festival-2025-1 Access Date: 15.06.2026.

9 "Southwest State of Somalia's Peace and Culture Week Setting an Inspiring Model for Other States" *Hiiraan Online*,22.09.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/QUtjV Access Date: 15.06.2026.

10 "My Somalia Group Art Exhibition*" Yee London*, 2025,

https://www.kisa.link/GnAQF Access Date: 15.06.2026.


11 "Somali Ambassador to Kenya Launches 3-Day Cultural Arts Festival"*, FTL Somalia,* 29.09.2025,

https://www.kisa.link/bykzA Access Date: 15.06.2026.

more visible and interconnected cultural ecosystem within Somalia. The year 2025 marked a period in which Mogadishu and the southern regions of Somalia gained increasing importance as centers of artistic production, cultural dialogue, and creative experimentation. This transformation is evidenced by both the growing number and the increasing quality of activities in the fields of literature, visual arts, music, film, theater, and performance arts. Furthermore, the expansion of international participation in public art projects and community festivals in Somalia points to a broader process of cultural renewal. Although some artistic fields are still in the process of development, the growing number of initiatives targeting Somali youth demonstrates the country's considerable potential for further growth. Moreover, Somalia-centered events organized in other countries have also contributed to enhancing the country's international visibility.

One of the most significant developments of 2025 has been that, after decades, Mogadishu has increasingly come to be viewed not only as a political capital but also as a cultural center. Furthermore, the organization of artistic events not only in major cities such as Mogadishu but also in smaller localities reflects the broader cultural revival taking place throughout the country. This revival has not been driven by a single institution or event but by a wide range of initiatives that have expanded spaces for artistic expression, public dialogue, and cultural participation. Its significance lies not only in the events themselves but also in the networks, institutions, and communities that have been created.

In this sense, 2025 may be remembered as the year in which Somalia's cultural reconstruction became increasingly visible alongside the country's long-standing image shaped by internal conflict, political instability, and security challenges. These developments, in fact, extend beyond the sphere of culture. They reflect a society that is becoming increasingly confident in telling its own stories, harnessing its own creativity, and contributing to both regional and global cultural debates. Somalia is a civilization with a profound history and a deeply rooted cultural heritage. From this perspective, 2025 does not represent the beginning of a new story so much as a brief chapter in the journey of a society reconnecting with its own essence and rediscovering what has always belonged to it. In this regard, it is reasonable to anticipate that Somalia will continue to build momentum in this journey in the years ahead.



Success Stories of Türkiye Alumni from Africa in 2025

14

Tuğrul Oğuzhan Yılmaz*

1. Introduction

Africans studying at universities in Türkiye through various scholarship programs, most notably the Türkiye Scholarships Program administered by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), as well as through their own individual means, contribute not only to the development of their home countries by transferring the knowledge and experience they acquire, but also to strengthening the human ties between Türkiye and Africa. A new generation of African alumni of Turkish universities has emerged, ranging from ambassadors and physicians to bureaucrats and engineers. These graduates have reinforced the longstanding bonds of friendship and brotherhood between Türkiye and Africa while also making significant contributions to their own countries.[1]

One of the strongest examples demonstrating the impact of African graduates educated in Türkiye is Hussein Ali Mwinyi, a graduate of a Turkish university who has served as President of Zanzibar, the semi-autonomous region of the United Republic of Tanzania, since 2020. Describing himself as "half Turkish" and emphasizing that "investing in people is the greatest investment," Mwinyi completed his medical education at Marmara University Faculty of Medicine between 1985 and 1991 and later served as Tanzania's Minister of Defense from 2014 to 2020.[2]

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1 Tunç Demirtaş, "Yüzyılın Muhasebesi: Türkiye'nin Afrika'daki Varlığı", *Kriter*, https://www.kisa.link/LMMVA (Access Date: 05.03.2026).

2 Tufan Aktaş, "Tanzanya'nın Türkçe konuşan bakanı", *Anadolu Agency*, 21.01.2017, https://www.kisa.link/XQkzO, Access Date: 05.03.2026.



Sheikh Abdul Nasiru-Deen, Ghana's Ambassador to Ankara and Türkiye Alumnus, visited YTB President Abdulhadi Turus.

Another notable example illustrating the influence of Turkish university graduates in public administration is Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, who graduated from Ankara University's Faculty of Political Sciences in 2015. Following his graduation, Nur successively served as Somalia's Minister of Justice (2020-2021), Minister of Defense (2021-2023), and Minister of Ports and Maritime Transport, thereby demonstrating the growing visibility of graduates educated in Türkiye in senior public administration across Africa.[3]

3 Murat Özgür Güvendik, "Somali'nin Türkiye mezunu Adalet Bakanı Nur, Savunma bakanı olarak atandı", *Anadolu Agency*, 26.12.2021, https://www.kisa.link/Armcc, Access Date: 05.03.2026.

This study examines the success stories of four Turkish university graduates from Ghana, Somalia, The Gambia, and Cameroon during 2025.

2. Sheikh Abdul Nasiru-Deen, Ghanian Ambassador to Ankara: We Loved Türkiye Very Much

The achievements of Ghanaian graduates of Turkish universities across various sectors stand out as tangible outcomes of Türkiye's international education diplomacy. One particularly noteworthy example is Sheikh Abdul Nasiru-Deen, who may be regarded as one of Türkiye's goodwill ambassadors. Having first arrived in Ankara on a YTB scholarship,[4] Nasiru-Deen completed his undergraduate education in Türkiye before returning to Ghana. Approximately twenty-two years later, he was appointed Ghana's Ambassador to Türkiye. Following the commencement of his diplomatic mission on November 4, 2025, Ambassador Nasiru-Deen visited YTB and, in an interview with TRT Haber and TRT Afrika, expressed his strong sense of belonging to Türkiye and his favorable impressions of Turkish society, stating: "We loved Türkiye very much, alhamdulillah. It was that way then, and it still is today. Turks are a hospitable people. Every greeting you offer is sure to be answered with tea or coffee."

In the same interview, Ambassador Nasiru-Deen also highlighted the contributions of graduates of Turkish universities to Ghana's public and private sectors. He noted that Turkish university alumni had achieved remarkable success, particularly in the healthcare, construction, and electricity sectors, and stated that graduates of Yıldız Technical University occupied influential senior positions within Ghana's Ministry of Energy.[5] This observation demonstrates that international students educated in Türkiye strengthen the human and institutional ties between the two countries through the roles they assume in decision-making mechanisms and strategic sectors upon returning to their home countries.

The career of Ambassador Sheikh Abdul Nasiru-Deen represents one of the most striking examples of the growing visibility of Turkish university graduates in the diplomatic sphere. Indeed, YTB President Abdulhadi Turus also emphasized the continuity between Nasiru-Deen's educational background and diplomatic career in a post on social media. Turus recalled that Ghana's new Ambassador to Ankara, Sheikh Abdul Nasiru-Deen, who presented his letter of credence to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, had first studied Turkish at Gazi

4 Zafer Fatih Beyaz, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, 5 ülkenin büyükelçisini kabul etti", *Anadolu Agency*, 04.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/kIsty, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

5 "Türkiye'ye büyükelçi olarak döndü", *TRT Haber*, 14.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/nlbzO (Access Date: 10.03.2026);
"From student to ambassador: The Story of Ghana's Nasiru-deen in Türkiye", *TRT Afrika*, 15.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/lZfDr, Access Date: 05.03.2026;
"Daga samun tallafin karatu na gwamnatin Turkiyya zuwa jakadan Ghana a Ankara", *TRT Afrika (Hausa)*, 16.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/XLBFs, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

University before graduating from Ankara University's Faculty of Pharmacy. He noted that the linguistic and cultural knowledge Nasiru-Deen acquired in Türkiye had provided an important foundation for his current diplomatic responsibilities. Turus further described Nasiru-Deen's return to Türkiye as ambassador as one of the clearest examples of the human and diplomatic ties established between the two countries through the responsibilities assumed by international graduates educated in Türkiye.[6]

3. Somali Physician Hassan Salad Ibrahim Fidow: I'm deeply grateful to the people of Türkiye

Somalia, one of the African countries with the largest number of graduates from Turkish universities, represents one of the clearest examples of the impact of Türkiye's international higher education and scholarship policies. Somali graduates who complete their education in Türkiye and return home contribute to their country's reconstruction and development by serving in a wide range of fields, including public administration, healthcare, education, and infrastructure. In this context, graduates working in the healthcare sector deserve particular attention. Somali healthcare professionals, especially physicians, educated in Türkiye play critical roles in expanding access to quality healthcare services and strengthening the institutional capacity of Somalia's healthcare system.[7]

Somali healthcare professionals who graduated from Turkish universities continue to play significant roles in strengthening their country's healthcare system. One notable example is Dr. Hassan Salad Ibrahim Fidow, who completed his medical education in Türkiye and currently serves as a specialist in orthopedic surgery and traumatology at the Mogadishu Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital in Somalia. Having begun his residency training in 2017, Fidow also serves as Secretary General of the Somali Orthopedic Association. Describing his decision to work at the hospital – built by Türkiye and recognized as one of Somalia's most advanced healthcare institutions – as a deliberate choice, Fidow explained his professional motivation by stating: "I believed I could be more helpful here to those in need and to the Somali people. That is why I chose this hospital."

Fidow also emphasized the hospital's strategic importance to Somalia's healthcare system, noting: "This hospital is extremely important for the Somali people because the facilities available here do not exist elsewhere in Somalia."

6 "Gana Büyükelçisi yabancı değil! Üniversite eğitimini Türkiye'de almış", *Milliyet*, 06.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/tCSzU Access Date: 10.03.2026.

7 Ahmed Satti-Gökhan Kavak, "Türkiye mezunu Somalili gençler, akademi ve diplomaside ülkelerine katkı sağlıyor", *Anadolu Ajansı*, 17.09.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/jGdAv, Access Date: 10.03.2025;
Nuri Aden, "The Türkiye-trained generation: Somalia's new architects of recovery", *TRT Afrika*, 28.11.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/pwPJt, Access Date: 10.03.2026.

Highlighting the contribution of the education he received in Türkiye to his professional career, Fidow stated, "I would like to thank the Turkish people and the Republic of Türkiye very much for providing me with this opportunity." His remarks illustrate the impact of Türkiye's support in healthcare and education at both the individual and institutional levels. This example demonstrates that Somali graduates educated in Türkiye not only return home as highly qualified professionals but also become key actors contributing to the sustainability of Türkiye's health diplomacy and broader human cooperation initiatives."[8]

4. Gambian Bureaucrat Isatou B. Jobe: I'm from Gambia but I consider myself Turkish

Graduates of Turkish universities also hold important positions within The Gambia's public bureaucracy and diplomatic service. One notable example is Isatou B. Jobe, who serves as Deputy Permanent Secretary at The Gambia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jobe participated in the Turkish Language Program for Public Officials and Academics (KATİP), administered by YTB, in 2014, during which she received Turkish language training in Türkiye. As part of the program, she visited various cities, gaining first-hand knowledge of Turkish culture and public institutions. Jobe has stated that she was sent to Türkiye for professional development while serving at The Gambia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and emphasized that the KATİP Program provided not only language instruction but also contributed to the establishment of enduring human ties between Türkiye and The Gambia.

While highlighting the significant contributions that the knowledge and experience she acquired in Türkiye have made to her professional career, Jobe describes herself as "a goodwill ambassador" for Türkiye. This assessment demonstrates that public officials educated in Türkiye not only enhance their technical knowledge and professional skills within their respective institutions but also become natural actors of public diplomacy, contributing to more positive perceptions of Türkiye and strengthening institutional cooperation networks. In this respect, Gambian graduates of Turkish universities play an important role in deepening the diplomatic, institutional, and human relations between the two countries.[9] Following her participation in the KATİP Program, Jobe also continued her academic studies in Türkiye, completing a master's degree in the Department of International Relations at Kocaeli University.

8 "Türkiye'den öğrendiğim en önemli şey vatanseverlik': Somali'yi inşa eden Türkiye mezunları", *Anadolu Agency*, 30.10.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/azFsP (Access Date: 15.03.2026);
"How Türkiye-Trained Somalis Drive Somalia's Development", *TRT Afrika*, 23.12.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/iaTgS, Access Date: 15.03.2026.

9 Ahmed Satti-Gökhan Kavak, "Afrika'daki gönül elçileri: Gambiyalı Türkiye mezunları", *Anadolu Agency*, 09.04.2025,
https://www.kisa.link/IXbHj Access Date: 20.03.2026.

5. Cameroonian Engineer Mansur Bey: Türkiye is more than just Istanbul

The impact of Turkish university graduates extends beyond public administration and diplomacy to technical fields such as engineering and the private sector. Mansur Bey, a Cameroonian graduate of a Turkish university, completed his undergraduate education in the Department of Civil Engineering at Istanbul Technical University and subsequently completed an internship in Türkiye, gaining valuable professional experience. Emphasizing the significant contribution that the academic and technical education he received in Türkiye has made to his career, Mansur Bey notes that African students educated at Turkish universities continue to maintain the human and institutional ties they established with Türkiye after returning to their home countries.

After returning to Cameroon and beginning his career in the private sector, Mansur Bey observed that graduates of Turkish universities play an important role in strengthening bilateral relations through their language skills, professional qualifications, and cultural knowledge. In particular, he noted that graduates who speak Turkish contribute to enhancing the social, economic, and commercial cooperation between Türkiye and Cameroon. His observations demonstrate that the educational experience gained in Türkiye contributes not only to individual career development but also to the deepening of long-term human and economic relations between the two countries.[10]

Having brought the education and professional experience he acquired in Türkiye back to Cameroon, Mansur Bey turned to entrepreneurship after graduation. Through the company he founded, he manufactures diapers, cosmetic products, and tobacco products while also operating in the agricultural and livestock sectors. Seeking to maintain commercial ties with Türkiye, Mansur Bey draws attention to the regional specialization of Turkish industry and recommends that African entrepreneurs wishing to do business with Türkiye establish direct contact with the cities specializing in their respective industries. He remarked: “Everyone who comes to Türkiye from Africa wants to go to Istanbul, but whatever business you are engaged in, you should go to the city where that industry is actually based.”[11]

Emphasizing that Türkiye’s economic and manufacturing capacity extends far beyond Istanbul, Mansur Bey also shared observations from the different cities he visited during his time in the country. He noted that Samsun stands out in

10 Ahmet Emin Dönmez, “Türkiye mezunu Kamerunlu Mansur, ülkesinde Türk şirketleriyle çok sektörlü iş yapıyor”, *Anadolu Agency*, 06.02.2026, https://www.kisa.link/Mhenz Access Date: 20.03.2026.

11 ibid.


medical equipment manufacturing, Kayseri in the furniture industry, and Bursa in industrial production and machinery manufacturing. Describing the knowledge-sharing culture that characterizes manufacturing in Anatolia, he stated: "In Anatolia, manufacturers do not simply sell you a product; they also teach you how it is made and how you can improve it. This is a tremendous advantage for businesspeople and students coming from Africa." This assessment illustrates that international students studying in Türkiye gain not only academic knowledge but also the opportunity to observe the country's industrial ecosystem and manufacturing culture firsthand.[12]

6. Conclusion

African graduates who complete their higher education in Türkiye and return to their home countries make significant contributions both to their countries' development processes and to strengthening relations between Türkiye and African countries through the positions they hold and the activities they undertake. The examples examined in this study demonstrate that graduates of Turkish universities play active roles across a wide range of fields including diplomacy, public administration, healthcare, engineering, entrepreneurship, and academia, placing the knowledge, skills, and professional experience they have acquired at the service of their countries.

The graduate profiles examined in this study reveal that Türkiye's international education and scholarship policies represent not only an effort to cultivate highly qualified human capital but also a strategic instrument of public diplomacy that fosters long-term human and institutional relationships. Graduates educated in Türkiye serve as natural bridges that promote cultural, economic, academic, and diplomatic cooperation between Türkiye and their home countries. Whether through the positions they hold in public institutions or through their work in the private sector and civil society, these graduates demonstrate that the knowledge and experience they acquired in Türkiye make tangible contributions to the development of their countries.

12 ibid.



Publications Regarding Africa: 2025

Civil Society in Africa: Possibilities and Constraints 502
Ed. Filiz Cicioğlu & Hatice Rumeysa Dursun, Kadim Publishing

U.S.-China Competition in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait 504
Dr. Kaan Devecioğlu, Küre Publishing

Politics and Diplomacy in West Africa 507
Editor: Assoc. Prof. Mürsel Bayram


Politics and Diplomacy in Central Africa: An Analysis of Causality, Method and Source in Regional Conflicts 509
Editor: Assoc. Prof. Mürsel Bayram

Yearbook of Non-State Actors in Africa 2025: Analysis of Security and Political Dynamics 511
Editor: Kemal İnat and Talha İsmail Duman, Pınar Publications

China's Africa Strategy: Investment, Dependency, and Competition 514
Dr. Deniz İstikbal, Paradigma Publications, 2025

Türkiye-Africa Relations: From Politics to Practice 517
Editor: Tunç Demirtaş, SETA Publications

Civil Society in Africa: Possibilities and Constraints
Ed. Filiz Cicioğlu & Hatice Rumeysa Dursun, Kadim Publishing



Reviewed by: **İpek Merve Hazal Aydın**

This book has been written with the aim of examining the historical development, current structure, and role of civil society in social life from an interdisciplinary perspective, with a particular focus on the African continent. In this respect, it represents an effort both to understand how civil society in Africa was shaped during the post-colonial period and to analyze the opportunities and challenges currently faced by national and international civil society actors. Another major concern of the book has been to examine how the vulnerabilities of African countries, such as the nature of political regimes, economic fragilities, external dependency, legal restrictions, and security challenges, have historically and contextually affected the multilayered activities of civil society across the continent.

This edited volume has been compiled by two editors with the contributions of various scholars. Each chapter focuses on different African countries and themes, thereby rendering visibility to the continent's social and political diversity. Accordingly, the phenomenon of civil society in Africa is examined not only through country-level individual cases but also within the framework of structural trends, historical transformations, and comparative analyses.

In the introduction of the book, titled "A General Overview of Africa," one of the editors, Associate Professor Filiz Cicioğlu, comprehensively examines the historical origins of civil society on the continent. This chapter comparatively evaluates pre-colonial forms of traditional organization and the modern civil society structures that emerged during the post-colonial period. It also provides a detailed discussion of the structural characteristics and areas of activity of national and international civil society organizations across the continent, their cooperative and conflictual relationships with states, and the institutional and political obstacles they face throughout Africa, supporting these discussions with concrete case studies.

In the subsequent main sections of the book, Africa is categorized into five regional groupings: North, Southern, East, Central, and West Africa. The North Africa section examines Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia; the Southern Africa section focuses on South Africa; the East Africa section covers Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Sudan; the Central Africa section examines the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the West Africa section analyzes Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. Each selected country constitutes a unique case illustrating the domestic and external dynamics that shape civil society organizations, the structural, institutional, political, and so-

cial obstacles they are compelled to confront, and what they have succeeded – or have not yet succeeded – in achieving.

Taken as a whole, the book strongly emphasizes the strategic importance of civil society organizations both in maintaining the relevance social justice issues on the local level and in terms of their interactions with international development interventions. Nevertheless, these organizations have not been able to establish systematic and enduring roots within society. While proto-civil society traditional structures functioned as an effective balancing mechanism for maintaining social order, the interventions imposed by Western colonial actors and top-down systems of governance that were alien to the continent's unique dynamics rendered these structures dysfunctional and gradually eroded them over the course of history. In the post-colonial period, the fundamental agenda of civil society was repeatedly ignored under the shadow of the legitimacy crisis into which authoritarian one-party regimes and military governments had descended. Civil society activities were able to gain genuine momentum only after the end of the Cold War, when international organizations began placing greater emphasis on policies promoting democratization, governance, and development.

Furthermore, the book also compellingly highlights one of the principal dilemmas confronting contemporary civil society in Africa. Although the continent is home to numerous social problems that require civil society engagement, lasting solutions to these issues have consistently failed to materialize. This is because many organizations remain highly dependent on national and, especially, international sources of funding. As a result, civil society organizations are prevented from operating in accordance with local needs and are instead compelled to act in line with the agendas prescribed by donor institutions. Consequently, these constraints on their areas of action and institutional autonomy hinder their ability to produce effective solutions.

Finally, this work makes significant contributions to the study of civil society in Africa at both the theoretical and empirical levels. First, it fills an important gap in the Turkish-language literature as one of the few comparative studies conducted on a continental scale. Moreover, by adopting a broad historical perspective from the pre-colonial period to the present, it offers a comprehensive assessment of the transformation of civil society. In addition, its interdisciplinary approach bridging political science, history, international relations, and development studies, enables the various dimensions of the subject to be understood in conjunction with one another. When considered alongside the previous volume focusing on the Middle East, the work stands out as one of the key installments in a distinctive and ongoing academic publication series that examines civil society experiences across the Global South within a comparative regional framework.

U.S.-China Competition in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
Dr. Kaan Devecioğlu, Küre Publishing

Reviewed by: **Muhammet Albayrak**



U.S.-China Competition in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a comprehensive academic study that examines, through the lens of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the U.S. China competition which is one of the most defining geopolitical developments in the international system in recent years. The book demonstrates that the global power struggle is concentrated not only in conventional arenas of competition such as the Pacific or the South China Sea, but also in strategic maritime chokepoints and regional conflict zones that are of critical importance to global trade. In this respect, the book evaluates geopolitical competition, energy security, maritime trade routes, and regional security from a comprehensive perspective.

Consisting of four main chapters, the book first presents the theoretical foundations of U.S.-China competition, then examines the principal dynamics of the rivalry between the two countries, and analyzes its regional manifestations through the cases of the Yemen Crisis and the Horn of Africa. By combining a theoretical framework with field analyses, the study enables readers not only to understand the events themselves but also to grasp the dynamics of the international system underlying these developments.

The first chapter examines the relationship between China, as a rising power, and the United States, as the incumbent hegemonic power, through the framework of Power Transition Theory. While explaining the fundamental assumptions of Power Transition Theory, the author demonstrates how shifts in the distribution of power generate competition and the potential for conflict among major powers. Within this framework, the United States' satisfaction with the existing international order is compared with China's expectations regarding the system, emphasizing that the differences in the two countries' perspectives on the international system constitute one of the principal causes of their rivalry. The theoretical discussions conducted through concepts such as the balance of power, hegemony, systemic transformation, and international order establish a strong conceptual framework for the regional analyses presented in the subsequent chapters.

The second chapter provides a detailed examination of the principal dynamics of the rivalry between the United States and China. The author demonstrates that the competition between the two countries extends far beyond military ri-

valry, constituting a multilayered process encompassing economic, technological, ideological, and diplomatic dimensions. In this context, various aspects of the competition are assessed through the struggle for dominance, ideological divergence, the security dilemma, economic interdependence, technological competition, and critical technologies. Furthermore, by examining the influence of socio-cultural factors as well as regional and global developments on the rivalry, the chapter demonstrates that U.S.-China relations are shaped not only by state policies but also through international institutions, public diplomacy, and economic networks.


The third chapter of the book focuses on the Yemen Crisis, which is of critical importance to the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. It first examines Yemen's domestic political developments, the weakening of state authority, and the struggle among various actors within a historical context. In addition, by evaluating the impact of the regional power rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran on Yemen, the author demonstrates that the crisis stems not only from domestic dynamics but also represents a significant manifestation of global power competition. The chapter also addresses the approaches of the United States, European countries, and international organizations toward the crisis, while providing a comparative analysis of the Yemen policies pursued by the United States and China.

Within this framework, the United States' security-, maritime dominance-, and counterterrorism-oriented approach of is compared with China's policies, which prioritize energy supply security, the protection of trade routes, and economic stability. The author also emphasizes that, despite their differing priorities, the two countries have at times been able to develop pragmatic cooperation in areas of shared interest, such as the security of maritime trade routes, counter-piracy efforts, and regional stability. This assessment is particularly noteworthy in demonstrating that opportunities for cooperation do not disappear entirely even amid an environment of intense global competition.

The fourth chapter examines the geopolitical implications of U.S.-China competition with a particular focus on Djibouti and the Horn of Africa. It provides a detailed explanation of the region's significance for global maritime trade and energy security, owing to its strategic location connecting the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. In evaluating Djibouti's historical development, political structure, and foreign policy orientation, the author compares the United States' military basing strategy in the region with China's infrastructure investments and economic strategies pursued under the *Belt and Road Initiative*. In particular, the author argues that China's establishment of its first overseas military base

in Djibouti represents not only a military undertaking but also an extension of its economic and logistical objectives. One of the chapter's major strengths is its emphasis on areas of cooperation alongside competition. By highlighting issues such as counter-piracy operations, maritime security, and the fight against international terrorism as areas of shared interest for both the United States and China, the chapter demonstrates that competition and cooperation can coexist simultaneously within the same geographical space.

In conclusion, *U.S.-China Competition in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait* is a successful and comprehensive academic study that examines one of the most significant power struggles in today's international system through the lens of a strategically important geographical region. By supporting its theoretical approaches with field analyses, the work provides a detailed account of the positions of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Yemen, Djibouti, and the Horn of Africa within the global balance of power. Serving as an important reference for academics and researchers working in the fields of international relations, security studies, geopolitics, and regional studies, the book also offers a comprehensive perspective for readers seeking to understand the transformation of global power dynamics and the regional manifestations of U.S.-China competition. Its integration of theoretical depth with an analysis of contemporary geopolitical developments distinguishes it as a significant contribution to contemporary literature on international relations.



Politics and Diplomacy in West Africa
Editor: Assoc. Prof. Mürsel Bayram

Reviewed by: **Hasan Sekman**

In recent years, Africa has become a prominent area of study in international relations literature with regard to global power competition, economic transformation, and security dynamics. It is against this back drop that *Politics and Diplomacy in West Africa*, published by Çizgi Kitabevi Publications in 2025 and edited by Associate Professor Mürsel Bayram, examines the historical, political, diplomatic, and social structures of fifteen West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo). The book is significant both for bringing together the diverse perspectives of regional experts and for systematically examining the political development of West Africa on a country-by-country basis.

The work aims to inform readers by building a bridge between the history, current situation, and future of the countries discussed in the text. The 454-page book is composed of foreword, introduction, chapters devoted to the fifteen countries of West Africa, conclusion, and appendices. Each chapter addresses the relevant country's historical background, colonial experience, post-independence political transformation, foreign policy orientation, and contemporary challenges, thereby providing readers with both a comparative and comprehensive perspective on West Africa.

Rather than being a book intended solely for academia, the study adopts a straightforward language and a clear, accessible, and objective style aimed at all readers interested in the politics and history of West Africa. The use of photographs, maps, statistics, graphs, and memoirs, together with the authors' rich narrative style, creates a coherent whole.

The book offers a broad perspective in terms of the sources on which it draws. Its extensive bibliography, spanning thirty-four pages, constitutes an important reference resource for researchers studying the African continent. The fact that the chapter authors have conducted Africa-centered research reflects the academic quality of the work. As an edited volume, its multi-authored structure has enabled different fields related to the African continent, such as politics, diplomacy, and security, to be examined by their respective specialists, thereby strengthening the interdisciplinary character of the study. From an editorial perspective, a strong sense of coherence is evident across the chapters.

The work evaluates the positions of West African countries within the international system and their foreign policy orientations in a historical context. In each chapter, the academic terminology and descriptive analyses employed facilitate the reader's understanding of the subject. The authors reflect the princi-


pal objectives of the text by examining in detail the primary motivations shaping the domestic and foreign policies of the countries under study.

The study examines the civil wars, constitutional coups, separatist movements, and the activities of terrorist organizations that emerged in West African countries following their independence processes from a historical perspective. This approach is significant because it evaluates contemporary security challenges not only through the lens of current political developments but also in conjunction with the structural problems created by the colonial legacy. The work also examines the growing influence of China, Russia, and Türkiye in Africa alongside the redistribution of power within the international system following the Cold War. It notes that relations between Türkiye and Africa have gained considerable momentum over the past two decades. The book emphasizes that Türkiye has sought to establish comprehensive relations with the region, ranging from security to culture, within the framework of a multidimensional foreign policy.

One of the noteworthy aspects of the work is its observation that, rather than maintaining relations with the Western countries that had previously dominated them through colonial ties, African states have increasingly deepened their relations with countries such as Türkiye that pursue a win-win strategy. In recent years, many African states have adopted more flexible foreign policy strategies through multidimensional diplomacy with middle powers. Accordingly, a more detailed discussion of this issue could further strengthen the analytical value of the study.

From an editorial perspective, an evaluation of the selected themes suggests that, in addition to the hard power dimensions of politics and security, greater emphasis on the soft power dimensions of diplomacy such as culture, the arts, sports, and education could further enrich the content of the work. Including these aspects in future studies on Africa would further enhance the scholarly contribution of research on the region.

In conclusion, *Politics and Diplomacy in West Africa* offers a comprehensive perspective on the African literature in Turkish. Translating the work into English in the future would also be valuable in promoting the international dissemination of Africa-related scholarship produced in Türkiye. The book enables all readers interested in Africa to systematically follow current developments concerning the continent. At a time when the importance of the African continent within the international system is increasing, this work constitutes an important resource on the region. Particularly given the limited availability of comprehensive Turkish-language sources on West Africa in Türkiye, the book fills a significant gap.



Politics and Diplomacy in Central Africa: An Analysis of Causality, Method and Source in Regional Conflicts

Editor: Assoc. Prof. Mürsel Bayram

Reviewed by: **Aras Fırat Tekeş**

The edited volume titled Politics and Diplomacy in Central Africa, prepared in 2025 under the editorship of Associate Professor Mürsel Bayram, serves as a continuation of the author's African Political History series, which began with North, East, and West Africa, and aims to fill the geographical and thematic gap in the literature concerning the Central African basin. Published by Çizgi Kitabevi Publications, the work examines eight countries in the region across a total of 10 chapters while seeking to create a shared body of knowledge through the contributions of active academics, research assistants, graduate researchers, journalists, and public officials. The central premise of the volume is to examine the political processes of the Central African basin, from the pre-colonial period to the present, through the lens of internal dynamics and global power competition while taking subregional transition corridors into account.

The participation of researchers from diverse academic ranks and disciplinary backgrounds has endowed the volume with a pluralistic and dynamic perspective rather than a uniform narrative. The editor's inclusive approach, which creates space for graduate researchers, journalists, and practitioners working in the field, offers a functional framework that brings together theoretical knowledge and field observations. In particular, the use of primary observations provided by local actors and field experts living in the region has enhanced the empirical richness and factual reliability of the study. By choosing to interpret regional dynamics through concrete political and diplomatic processes rather than overwhelming them with abstract theoretical debates, the volume strips the subject of unnecessary conceptual complexity and provides an accessible yet analytical framework for researchers newly entering the field.

Although differences in approach can be observed among the chapters depending on the authors' command of the subject matter and levels of methodological maturity, the historical and political analyses presented throughout most of the work are supported by quantitative data, economic indicators, and concrete empirical evidence. This approach reinforces the descriptive narrative with tangible data, providing readers with an analytically reliable and factually grounded framework.

An examination of the book's language and narrative style reveals that it generally adopts a competent, coherent, and analytical approach appropriate for its intended academic audience. The authors' distinctive narrative styles and field experiences contribute to a dynamic flow throughout the text, facilitating the reading process.

Throughout the text, the contributors frequently draw upon key concepts and terminology that constitute the cornerstones of international relations and postcolonial

theory, including causality, artificial borders, colonial legacy, and the state of exception. The use of these theoretical concepts provides a functional framework for understanding the historical and political processes under discussion, thereby grounding the descriptive narratives within a conceptual foundation.


The chronological historical approach adopted throughout the volume constitutes a functional methodology that facilitates tracing the political transformation of a complex region such as Central Africa within a coherent framework. Addressing historical processes in chronological sequence makes causal relationships more visible while reinforcing both the analytical structure and the readability of the text.

Furthermore, the volume's treatment of Jean-Bédel Bokassa's abrupt political maneuvers undertaken in pursuit of foreign assistance, as well as incidents of institutional violence such as the Gaud-Toqué Scandal, as concrete case studies is particularly valuable. The inclusion of such specific examples elevates the work beyond a general regional narrative by providing readers with robust empirical evidence regarding the political and institutional structures of Central Africa.

Given that African studies in Türkiye have generally concentrated on specific macro-regions, the volume's direct focus on the Central African basin and its completion of a missing segment within the series suggest that it has the potential to become a pioneering and authoritative reference in the literature. The chronological continuity of the analysis, extending from the basin's pre-colonial indigenous structures through the struggles of independence to contemporary political crises, offers researchers new to the region a comprehensive historical guide.

While portraying internal political dynamics, the volume does not overlook the struggles among global powers for influence in the region. By incorporating global developments such as France's declining network of relations, China's pragmatic and extensive economic investments, and Russia's contemporary asymmetric presence on the ground, it successfully analyzes rational balancing strategies. The up-to-date data and sources employed in the political economy analyses provide a functional basis for understanding the region's dynamic structure and effectively conveying the current situation to readers.

Ultimately, the volume is instructive in demonstrating the dynamic level and expanding research capacity of regional studies in Türkiye, which have developed in parallel with the country's multidimensional foreign policy initiatives. The body of African scholarship in Turkish academia continues to broaden its empirical foundation through comprehensive, field-oriented edited volumes, thereby providing a solid basis for future theoretical analyses. By placing a challenging and understudied region such as Central Africa at the center of a comprehensive analytical framework, the study constitutes a valuable reference source and a source of inspiration for researchers who will pursue more in-depth studies of the region in the future.



Yearbook of Non-State Actors in Africa 2025: Analysis of Security and Political Dynamics
Editor: Kemal İnat and Talha İsmail Duman, Pınar Publications

Reviewed by: **Dr. Musa DEMİRDAĞ**

Following Türkiye's declaration of 2005 as the "Year of Africa," interest in the continent increased across numerous fields, including diplomacy, trade, and academia. Particularly after 2005, a substantial body of literature on Africa emerged through master's theses, doctoral dissertations, and both individual and collaborative academic studies. One such contribution is the *Yearbook of Non-State Actors in Africa 2025*, edited by Kemal İnat and Talha İsmail Duman, compiling contributions from academics and experts in various disciplines, and published by Pınar Publications.

The study examines the emergence of non-state actors in Africa within the framework of historical and structural dynamics. The legacy inherited from the colonial period, artificial borders, governance crises, economic inequalities, and external interventions have all contributed to the weakening of state authority across the African continent. Within this context, non-state actors are viewed not merely as entities confined to the security sphere but as actors that fill the voids left by the retreat or neglect of the state, establish alternative forms of governance, and generate legitimacy at the local level.

One of the study's most noteworthy features is that it does not examine non-state actors solely through the lens of terrorist organizations. Instead, the book analyzes non-state actors within the broader framework of social movements, ethnically and religiously motivated organizations, and paramilitary structures shaped by struggles for power and authority. This approach facilitates a more systematic understanding of the multilayered nature of political violence in Africa. For example, organizations such as the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia and the Justice and Spirituality Movement in Morocco are examined as nonviolent actors, whereas groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and AQIM are identified as armed organizations with radical ideological orientations.

The book consists of two sections. The first section examines non-state actors in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region. It focuses on organizations that are commonly analyzed within the literature from a security perspective. For example, the section devoted to Al-Shabaab comprehensively examines the organiza-


tion's evolution in the context of the collapse of the Somali state, Ethiopia's intervention, and its relationship with al-Qaeda. It emphasizes that the organization initially emerged as a movement responding to local security needs but gradually evolved into a component of the global jihadist network. Similarly, the chapters on Boko Haram, ISWAP, and JNIM examine the security challenges in the Sahel and West Africa within different contexts. These chapters provide detailed analyses of divisions among the organizations, their competitive and cooperative relationships, and their connections with transnational networks. The study emphasizes that the emergence of these organizations should be understood within the framework of political and economic conditions. Accordingly, this approach makes it possible to move beyond security-centered explanations and instead treat structural dynamics as the more decisive analytical framework.

The second section of the book examines non-state actors in North Africa. This section analyzes various political and social movements within the framework of political Islam, social opposition, and debates over regional sovereignty. For example, the relationships between ideologically driven movements and the state, the processes of repression they have experienced, and their political transformations are discussed through the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, and the Justice and Spirituality Movement in Morocco. These examples demonstrate that non-state actors are not composed solely of organizations based on violence and that some movements have sought to become integrated into the political system. This approach provides a framework that challenges reductionist interpretations of organizations in Africa. In addition, the relationships between ethnic and paramilitary actors and state authority are examined through the cases of the Polisario Front in Western Sahara, the Libyan National Army, and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. The argument that, in the cases of Sudan and Libya, the state and paramilitary structures have become deeply intertwined and that the boundaries of sovereign authority have become increasingly blurred offers a different perspective on security. This demonstrates that these actors cannot be explained solely through the categories of insurgents or terrorist organizations. In some cases, it shows that the state's security capacity is reproduced through these very structures.

One of the book's major strengths is its integration of a theoretical framework with field-based analyses. The study develops a comprehensive conceptual framework by drawing upon scholarly literature in international relations, security studies, political science, economics, and sociology. Its detailed treatment of debates concerning non-state actors enhances the academic value of the work. In each chapter, the historical background, organizational structures,

and ideological transformations are examined alongside contemporary developments, thereby providing a consistent analytical framework. Nevertheless, the study also has certain limitations and is therefore open to criticism. First, its security-centered approach occasionally causes issues of economic exploitation and everyday social experiences to remain in the background. Second, the absence of visual materials and quantitative supporting elements diminishes the text's ability to substantiate its arguments. Third, in the chapters covering the 2024-2025 period, the emphasis on reporting events rather than providing analysis causes the work at times to shift toward a descriptive level, making it resemble a news report. Finally, the lack of a more in-depth historical framework concerning the colonial and postcolonial periods narrows the context in which contemporary developments take place.

China's Africa Strategy: Investment, Dependency, and Competition
Dr. Deniz İstikbal, Paradigma Publications, 2025



Reviewed by: **Erkan Şahin**

China's Africa Strategy: Investment, Dependency, and Competition is a comprehensive study that examines the global power transition, hegemonic rivalry, and the search for a multipolar world order in the field of International Relations through the lens of Africa. The work demonstrates with academic rigor that China's economic rise is not confined to the Asia-Pacific region but has also transformed Africa into a strategic arena for investment, diplomatic influence, and asymmetric interdependence as part of its "Grand Strategy." By selecting Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya as case studies, the author supports the diplomatic consequences of economic dependency with empirical evidence in order to interpret whether China's intentions within the global system are revisionist or status quo-oriented.

The introductory chapter discusses Africa's historical background, the history of colonialism, and the concept of the "White Man's Burden." It emphasizes that although the continent, which had been dominated by British, French, German, Italian, and Portuguese colonial powers since the sixteenth century and regarded as a source of raw materials and cheap labor for the sake of industrialization, gained its independence after the Second World War, it has nevertheless remained trapped in a cycle of poverty, corruption, and internal conflict. In contrast to this historical legacy imposed by the Western powers, the turbulent transformations that have occurred in the global order during the twenty-first century have once again made Africa a strategic center of attraction, thereby shaping the growing interest of China, the rising power of East Asia, in the continent.

The first chapter, which provides the theoretical foundation of the book, analyzes China's position within the international system by placing the concept of "Grand Strategy" at its center. The work defines grand strategy as the direction of all political, economic, military, and diplomatic resources at the highest level of state decision-making toward preserving or transforming the international order in accordance with national interests. In this regard, the author discusses both realist and liberal perspectives that explain the rise and decline of great powers. While the realist approach focuses on the hegemon's determination to preserve its power, the liberal approach offers a broader interpretation encom-

passing ideology, domestic dynamics, and the international order. The foreign policy preferences of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), its emphasis on multipolarity, and its vision for the United Nations (UN) are examined within this grand strategic framework.

The second chapter describes China's extraordinary process of economic development from its socialist period (1912-1978) to the present. It notes that, as a result of the success achieved through the reform and opening-up policies initiated in 1978 over a period of forty-six years, China had become, by 2016, the world's largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and the world's largest trading nation. The work further details how China, which invested $2.37 trillion abroad between 2005 and 2023, has utilized this economic capacity to offer alternatives to Western-centered institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. Organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank (the BRICS Bank), and the New Silk Road Project (the *Belt and Road Initiative*) are presented as multipolar financial and political alternatives that China has developed in response to the U.S.-led international order.

The third chapter of the study examines China's investments in Africa, framed through the rhetoric of peace, stability, and shared development, by focusing specifically on the cases of Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya. In contrast to the "democracy" and "free market" conditions attached to loans and investments by Western actors, China's emphasis on non-interference in domestic affairs and the pursuit of common development has elevated Beijing to the position of an attractive partner in the eyes of African states. However, the author argues that the relationship established through foreign trade, infrastructure projects, and loans represents not an innocent win-win policy but rather one of "asymmetric interdependence." While China imports energy, agricultural products, and raw materials from these countries, it exports manufactured goods, thereby dominating African markets. The chapter also presents an objective analytical discussion of criticisms concerning the "debt trap," a term referring to the transfer of national and strategic assets to China in exchange for unpaid external debts, as observed in cases such as Sri Lanka and Tajikistan.


The fourth chapter reveals the primary academic contribution of the book by focusing on the concrete diplomatic and political outcomes of this asymmetrical economic interdependence. The author demonstrates through quantitative evidence that China's infrastructure investments, loans, and grants to these countries are reciprocated in the form of diplomatic support for China within international institutions, particularly in the United Nations General Assembly.

In a study examining 1,583 resolutions voted on in the UN General Assembly between 2005 and 2023, it was found that Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya voted in complete alignment with China on 1,255 resolutions. Excluding exceptional votes related to nuclear proliferation, this diplomatic convergence averaged 79 percent and reached an especially striking 91 percent in 2022, when foreign trade and investment had reached record levels. The author interprets the willingness of African states to shield China from criticism at the UN and to support its calls for global reform as a seamless diplomatic extension of Beijing's Grand Strategy.

The fifth and final chapter integrates all of these empirical findings within the broader context of the hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China. It argues that the global hegemon, the United States, has become increasingly concerned about the sphere of influence that China has established through asymmetrical relationships, viewing such developments as reflected in the redeployment of its naval forces to the Asia-Pacific, the initiation of trade wars, and the formation of containment blocs with actors such as India, Japan, and South Korea. By engaging with the theoretical debate in the international relations literature over whether China's peaceful rise will ultimately lead to conflict, the author emphasizes that the political and economic competition between the two actors at the global level carries significant conflict potential.

The methodological framework of the book likewise demonstrates its academic rigor. Rather than relying on official sources that obscure the regional and country-specific details of investments, the author employs an integrated methodological approach by using the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) for investment data, the China-Africa Research Initiative for information on loans, grants, and projects, and the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which compiles data from the World Bank and the United Nations, for foreign trade statistics. This approach provides the study with a solid statistical foundation.

In conclusion, *China's Africa Strategy: Investment, Dependency, and Competition* interprets China's global vision not merely as a strategy of economic development but as a state-centered model of development and dependency that serves as an alternative to the Western system, constructed through a chain of investment, lending, political influence, and diplomatic legitimacy. By empirically demonstrating the direct correlation between voting behavior in international organizations and economic investment, the book constitutes an essential academic reference for researchers in the fields of International Relations, International Political Economy (IPE), and African Studies.



Türkiye-Africa Relations: From Politics to Practice
Editor: Tunç Demirtaş, SETA Publications

Reviewed by: **Abdullatif Hüseyin Mazı**

Türkiye's foreign policy toward the African continent has, over the past twenty-five years, evolved far beyond a diplomatic orientation or a short-term initiative into an institutionalized, multidimensional, and structural partnership architecture. Initially conceived as an opening toward Africa, this process has now become a comprehensive set of concrete practices extending from security and energy to trade and cultural diplomacy. *Türkiye-Africa Relations: From Policy to Practice*, edited by Tunç Demirtaş, is a timely and comprehensive edited volume that seeks to make sense of this multilayered structure.

The central argument of the book is that Türkiye-Africa relations are not confined to a temporary policy of engagement. Rather, the book seeks to demonstrate that these relations have gradually evolved into a partnership model that has become institutionalized, found practical expression on the ground, and taken different forms across various countries. In this respect, the study evaluates Türkiye's Africa policy not only in terms of intentions or rhetoric but also through practical outcomes. The emphasis reflected in the book's title, *From Policy to Practice*, clearly conveys this approach.

The book consists of two main sections. The first section, titled *Türkiye-Africa Relations: From Security to Culture*, addresses the subject through thematic analyses, while the second section focuses on country case studies under the title *Türkiye's Partnership Map in Africa*. The first section examines topics such as defense cooperation, energy security, the Boko Haram threat in the Lake Chad Basin, cultural diplomacy, and African migration. The second section analyzes Türkiye's partnership map in Africa through individual country cases. The chapters on Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Libya, Senegal, Cameroon, Ghana, Chad, Angola, and Tanzania demonstrate that Türkiye's relations with the continent have not followed a uniform trajectory. Each country is evaluated in light of its own historical background, domestic political dynamics, and the distinctive nature of its relationship with Türkiye.

An examination of the sections devoted to security reveals that the analysis of the defense industry and military cooperation occupies a central place in the book. The work does not reduce Türkiye's defense role on the continent to that of a supplier of arms or military technology. Instead, it defines this process as

a long-term partnership encompassing military training, technical assistance, and the development of states' security capacities. The cases of Somalia and Libya, in particular, clearly demonstrate that Türkiye has established deeper and more institutionalized partnerships in the field of security. Furthermore, by examining the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, which remains one of the region's most devastating security challenges, the book analyzes the complex threat landscape of the Sahel and West Africa.

The following section examines Türkiye's efforts to diversify its energy resources alongside the energy infrastructure and development needs of African countries. This perspective moves energy relations beyond the realm of one-sided economic interests. Instead, energy is presented as an area in which the mutual needs of Africa and Türkiye converge. The relationship established between Africa's energy potential and Türkiye's foreign policy and economic objectives constitutes one of the key themes supporting the book's emphasis on practical engagement.

Another noteworthy aspect of the book is its ability to move beyond the conventional themes of security and economics. The discussion of cultural diplomacy through the concept of the *First Lady Effect* addresses a distinctive subject that is rarely encountered in the literature. This examination of First Lady diplomacy provides an example demonstrating the extent to which Türkiye's soft power instruments have diversified.

The book also addresses the issue of migration, and its perspective, which moves migration in Africa beyond the conventional discourse of securitization, significantly broadens the analytical scope of the study.

The second section of the book, titled *Türkiye's Partnership Map in Africa*, is devoted to case studies that take into account the continent's heterogeneous, complex, and distinctive dynamics. Türkiye's relatively institutionalized partnerships with countries such as Somalia and Libya occupy a central place. The case of Somalia is examined within the context of state-building and security sector reform, while the Libya case addresses not only the opportunities created by security cooperation but also the structural risks associated with it. The chapters on Sudan, Kenya, and Senegal demonstrate how Türkiye has developed relations in different regions through diplomatic, economic, and sociocultural instruments. The inclusion of comparatively less frequently discussed cases such as Cameroon, Ghana, Chad, Angola, and Tanzania demonstrates the broad regional diversity that characterizes Türkiye's engagement across the continent.

The book's most significant contribution to scholarly literature lies in its au-

thorship. A substantial number of the chapters have been written by African scholars, experienced practitioners familiar with the region, and independent researchers. This has helped overcome the problem of a one-sided narrative centered in Ankara. As a result, the volume creates a multidimensional platform for discussion that incorporates the voices of the region itself and its local dynamics into the analytical process.

Although the work offers rich content and a robust methodological framework, certain limitations arising from its structure should not be overlooked. It is, of course, difficult to evaluate an entire continent comprising fifty-four independent states within the confines of a single volume. Moreover, while the considerable attention is devoted to security and defense industry relations, one of the book's strengths, greater emphasis could have been made on sociological questions such as how local communities perceive these activities or how civil society views this process, ultimately widening the scope of the book.

In conclusion, *Türkiye-Africa Relations: From Policy to Practice* is an important and timely reference for those seeking to understand Türkiye's Africa policy. The work moves Türkiye-Africa relations beyond the realm of abstract foreign policy discourse by examining them through concrete institutions, sectors, and country cases. At the same time, it provides a solid analytical foundation for understanding the current stage of Türkiye's engagement with Africa. In these respects, it establishes a strong intellectual foundation for researchers closely following the field and for students of international relations, while also serving as a valuable resource for public policy specialists and practitioners working in the field.



AFRICA YEARBOOK 2025

Published by the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, this work focuses on key developments in Africa in 2025 and aims to enhance awareness and knowledge about the continent in Türkiye. Another goal of this work is to maintain academic interest in Africa. In this regard, the yearbook, the first of its kind, has been prepared with contributions from esteemed Turkish and African researchers working on Africa, and it aspires to make a modest contribution to the relevant literature.

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